CONTRIBUTI / 4 / Fiorenza Manzo
Memory and Substantiality in Leibniz’s Philosophy
The paper aims to show that it is possible to define the ontological hierarchy of Leibniz’s universe by considering memory as a pure function. The argument begins with an introduction to Descartes’ view on memory in order to show how the Cartesian view differs from the Leibnizian one, thereby revealing the originality of the latter. The paper then clarifies the reasons for some of the fundamental divergences between the two, concerning their approaches, their respective investigative assumptions and demonstrative purposes. The second part of the paper examines the genesis of the mind-memory relation and the reasons for Leibniz’s interest in defining this relation – especially in his opposition to Hobbes on the crucial question of the nature of the conatus. Special attention is paid to the Fundamenta praedemonstrabilia of the Theoria Motus Abstracti. In formulating his theory of motion, at a young age, Leibniz arrives at a position that will prove to be essential also for his mature system: «Nullus conatus sine motu durat ultra momentum praeterquam in mentibus. […] Omne enim corpus est mens momentanea, seu carens recordatione» (A VI, 2, 266). On the basis of memory, Leibniz sets out an essential distinction between mind and body, which he claims has never been identified before, and certainly never in these terms: it is the difference between two kinds of minds, one ‘lasting’ and the other ‘momentary’. Leibniz’s interest is mainly in the function of memory itself. He recognizes in it one of the key conditions for the development of a central theme of his philosophy: the substantiality of the mind. The recognition of a substantial nature is linked to the recognition of a state of self-sufficiency: it will then be necessary to clarify in what sense and on what terms the memory can serve this purpose. In this regard, it will be essential to analyze the Leibnizian theory of petites perceptions and to show how memory plays a decisive role in these. According to Leibniz, perception and memory are held together through so-called ‘traces’: every event and every existing thing, even those perceived in the most confused and unconscious ways, leave traces of themselves in substances (forming the ‘complete concept’ that makes them identifiable to God). There are substances incapable of any form of active recollection, but, among those capable of it, a further distinction must be made between those endowed with a simple apperceptive ability, which allows them a kind of ‘induced’ recollection depending on the present recurrence of something connected to a past event, and those capable of réminiscence and souvenir, that is, of autonomous recollection and re-enactment, which is linked to the recognition of the self as a center of perception and memory. In this last part, the main references are to Leibniz’s mature works: the Nouveaux Essais, the Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce and the Monadologie.
