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Prospettive e problematiche

a cura di Myrtha de Meo-Ehlert

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Editoriale

L'anima e l'animale
Prospettive e problematiche

Myrtha de Meo-Ehlert

"Why look at Animals?"
John Berger, *About Looking*

"L'animal nous regarde, et nous sommes nus devant lui.
Et penser commence peut-être là."
J. Derrida, *L'animal que donc je suis*

Lo sguardo dell'uomo sull'animale, che lo osserva e si specchia in esso, e lo sguardo dell'animale sull'uomo, che provoca in esso un sentimento di vergogna[1], o lo spinge ad essere 'attento e sospettoso'[2], cattura solo una una delle molteplici relazioni tra uomo e animale, aprendo la possibilità di pensarne infinite.

La questione dell'anima degli animali, affrontata in questo numero de *Lo Sguardo*, si innesta nel problema storico tra ricerca empirica e ontologia, toccando con quest'ultima sempre anche questioni teologiche e teleologiche. Il

[1] Jacques Derrida, *L'animale che dunque sono*, Milano 2006, tr. di M. Zannini, p. 38: «Contro l'imbarazzo che ci può essere nel trovarsi nudo, col sesso scoperto, davanti a un gatto che mi guarda senza muoversi, solo per vedere. (...) È come se, nudo di fronte al gatto, ne provassi vergogna, ma avessi nello stesso tempo vergogna di vergognarmi. Riflettersi della vergogna, specchio di una vergogna che si vergogna, di una vergogna speculare, ingiustificabile, inammissibile».

[2] John Berger, *About Looking, Wha look at animals*, 4-6: «The eyes of an animal when they consider a man are attentive and wary. The same animal may well look at other species in the same way. He does not reserve a special look for man. But by no other species except man will the animal's look be recognized as familiar. Other animals are held by the look. Man becomes aware of himself returning the look. (...) What were the secrets of the animal's likeness with, and unlikeness from man? The secrets whose existence man recognized as soon as he intercepted an animal's look».

discorso contemporaneo sull'anima degli animali si può distinguere in tre filoni, uno pragmatico, uno metafisico ontologico e uno psicologico[3].

Quando Peter Singer, teorico dell'utilitarismo, provocava scandalo con i suoi contributi sulla dignità dell'uomo[4], usava la relazione con l'animale per completare la definizione di 'persona' come essere qualificato di autocoscienza, razionalità (minima) e capacità di sentire dolore, includendo in questa categoria animali 'superiori' (scimmie) ed escludendo esseri umani 'inferiori' (embrioni, bambini appena nati). Aldilà delle conseguenze etiche di questa operazione, la sua mossa è innanzitutto un'operazione di ridefinizione di una specie da salvaguardare, benché il suo punto di vista cerchi di affrontare proprio il cosiddetto specismo. Singer infatti fa uso di due elementi qualificanti di una 'persona', per poterle accordare i diritti 'umani': un minimo di razionalità e autocoscienza da un lato (con una serie di implicazioni epistemologiche) e la capacità di sentire dolore (che necessita percezione ed emozione) dall'altro lato. Benché questa definizione sembri introdurre nuovi elementi sostanziali nella categorizzazione, essa si basa sulla classica distinzione tra uomo - definito come essere razionale e unico essere che ride o che sente dolore - e animale nella qualificazione della nuova categoria 'persona'. Accanto a questa operazione pragmatica, nell'ontologia contemporanea la domanda sull'anima animale viene inserita in una ricerca neurofilosofica affronta per esempio da Markus Wild, Colin Allen e Marc Bekoff, Alasdiar MacIntyre, Robert Lurz[5].

Questa indagine sull'epistemologia animale è criticata da un approccio psicologico, che sottolinea la distinzione tra uomo pensante e animale non pensante sulla basa di una teoria darwinista e una teleologia scientifica. Il giudizio è fondato sull'osservazione del comportamento degli animali, che benché sembri analogo al comportamento umano non permette però la deduzione in favore di capacità intellettive degli animali[6].

Mentre è stato tentato di assottigliare la distinzione metafisico-ontologica tra l'uomo e animale in alcuni contributi contemporanei, tra correnti antispeciste e altre vicine al pragmatismo, nella storia della filosofia la relazione tra animale e uomo è stata determinata dall'interpretazione del 'qualificante', del diverso stato ontologico o del comune essere. L'accentuazione dell'uomo creato *ad imaginem Dei* in opposizione alla creazione dell'animale *ad naturam*, permette di seguire un duplice filone d'indagine. Da un lato, la problematizzazione del rapporto tra

[3] Anche M. Wild sottolinea tre branche nella filosofia dell'animale che individua nell'interesse per la differenza antropologica, quello per l'anima degli animali, quello per l'etica animale.
[4] P. Singer, *How Are We to Live? Ethics in an Age of Self-interest*, Melbourne 1993. *Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants*, Oxford 1985. *Unsanctifying Human Life: Essays on Ethics*, ed. by. H. Kuhse, London 2002.
[5] Cfr. M. Wild, *Tierphilosophie zur Einführung*, Hamburg 2008, D. Perler u. M. Wild, *Der Geist der Tiere*, Frankfurt 2005, K. Petrus und M. Wild, *Animal Minds & Animal Ethics. Connecting Two Separate Fields*, Bielefeld 2013 C. Allen und M. Bekoff, Species of mind. The philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology, Cambridge, MA 1997. A. MacIntyre, *Dependent rational animals*, Chigaco 1999. R. Lurz, *The Philosophy of Animal Minds*, Cambridge 2009.
[6] Cfr. R. Brandt, *Können Tiere denken? Ein Beitrag zur Tierphilosophie*, Frankfurt 2009. P. Janich, *Der Mensch und andere Tiere. Das zweideutige Erbe Darwins*, Berlin 2010.

uomo e animale si concentra sull'anima razionale dell'uomo, con le sue singole virtù intellettive, dall'altro, il focus è concentrato sull'anima sensibile che uomo e animale hanno in comune. Per quanto riguarda il primo aspetto, l'indagine si concentra sulla definizione e distinzione della conoscenza umana, cercando di individuare il 'qualificante' umano nell'epistemologia, focalizzandosi sui sensi interni: senso comune, estimazione, immaginazione, memoria, reminiscenza, capacità di astrazione e di negazione. Il secondo versante presenta si concentra sul rapporto proprio tra le virtù intellettive e l'anima sensibile .

Questo numero de *Lo Sguardo* cerca di inquadrare i contributi storico filosofici dedicati proprio all'anima degli animali nell'ampia trattazione del rapporto tra uomo e animale delineando quattro campi semantici di esso e permette così di ampliare e fondare il dibattito contemporaneo sull'anima degli animali. Si distinguono perciò due sezioni che presentano ricerche diacronicamente unite da un approccio particolare. determinato dalla diversità o dall'unità delle nature umane e animale, dal rapporto e dalla relazionabilità tra uomo e animale, concludendo con una serie di contributi estrinsechi all'analisi noetica.

Infine, vorrei esprimere un particolare ringraziamento a Marzia Caciolini che ha collaborato a tutte le fasi della ideazione, preparazione e curatela di questo numero; senza di lei questo volume non avrebbe potuto essere publicato.

¶ Sezione Prima

Paradigmi

Prospettive e individuazione dei problemi sull'anima animale

Articoli/1

Between Machinery and Rationality

Two Opposing Views on Animals in the Renaissance – and Their Common Origin

Cecilia Muratori

Articolo sottoposto a *peer-review.* ricevuto il 04/05/2015. Accettato il 11/06/2015

While a fascination with the mechanics of the body is evident in many Renaissance authors, the question about the extent of the animals' rationality also gained currency. I aim to show that already before Descartes these two opposing conceptions of the nature of animals – considered as machines, or as intelligent beings partaking in rationality – intertwined, manifesting a surprising common origin. Drawing especially on the works of Pereira and Tommaso Campanella, I argue that both hypotheses derive from a difficulty in dealing with the view of nature as a continuum, alongside the crisis of the Aristotelian structure of the soul. If no clear line can be drawn to separate sensation and rationality, aren't we forced to conclude that animals must either be rational *or* lack sensation altogether? While Pereira proposes to follow this second path, Campanella warns that the proper goal is to avoid both these extremes. But the success of Descartes' theory ultimately obfuscated the fact that the distance between animal automatism and animal rationality was shorter than it might seem: they could indeed be viewed as two possible ways to solve (or rather to escape) the problem of dealing with the continuity between man and animal.

***

Introduction

As Pierre Bayle pointed out in his *Dictionnaire*, thinking about the soul of animals seems to lead either to extreme positions, or to a medium position that one can't possibly fully explain and justify[1]. Bayle has in mind two specific extreme positions: some consider animals to be rational, just like humans, while others compare them to machines, devoid not only of rationality but of sensation altogether. Both these views are represented in two famous articles

[1] P. Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Amsterdam/Leyde/La Haye/Utrecht 1740, 4 vols., here vol. 3, p. 653 (article: *Pereira*): «Les opinions extrême sur ce sujet [i.e. the soul of animals] sont, ou absurdes, ou très-dangereuses; le milieu qu'on y veut garder est insoutenable».

in the *Dictionnaire*, devoted respectively to Girolamo Rorario, author of *Quod animalia bruta ratione utantur melius homine*[2], and to Gómez Pereira, who discussed in *Antoniana Margarita* (1554) a theory of animal automatism which has often been considered to bear some similarities with that of Descartes[3]. Attempts to argue for – so to speak – a third way in between these two polarised positions appear to Bayle to be doomed to failure, and indeed the debate on the soul of animals after the publication of Descartes' *Discourse on Method* is dominated by precisely these extreme interpretations.

In this essay I draw attention to a possible background from which the split between animal rationality and animal 'machinery' could have originated, showing that both extremes share a common way of arguing about the animal soul. In other words, they may be regarded, from a logical point of view, as similar solutions to the problem they deal with: the differentiation between the soul of man and the soul of animals. Instead of considering them as opposed, I propose to investigate these two positions in their interrelation. Such an approach will show that the polarisation between considering the soul of animals to be either very close or rather very far from the human one (claiming that animals are rational, or that they don't feel at all) reveals a structural problem, rooted in the Renaissance reception of Aristotle's account of the soul[4]. The controversy on animal machinery and animal rationality thus leads us beyond the historiographical construction based on considering Descartes as the turning point with regard to the debates on animal automatism.

I will proceed in three steps: first I will outline the problem of the continuity of sensation and rationality, which is at the basis of the split between animal rationality and animal automatism; then I'll sketch the rise of the two extreme solutions presented by Bayle, considering in particular the case of Pereira; finally I will reconstruct how Tommaso Campanella dealt with precisely these two options – and ended up advocating a third way.

[2] Rorario probably wrote this text in 1539, but it was published for the first time by Gabriel Naudé in 1648. Cf. M. Marcialis, *Filosofia e psicologia animale. Da Rorario a Leroy*, Cagliari 1982, in particular pp. 51ff.

[3] Descartes himself famously denied even having read *Antoniana Margarita* (see a letter to Mersenne dated 23 June 1641, in R. Descartes, *Œuvres de Descartes*, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Paris 1964-1974, vol. 3, p. 386 (cf. on this D. Des Chene, *Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes*, Ithaca, New York 2001, p. 13). On Pereira's theory of automatism see J. Bandrés and R. Llavona, *Minds and Machines in Renaissance Spain: Gómez Pereira's Theory of Animal Behavior*, in «Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences», XXVIII, 1992, pp. 158-168, here pp. 164-167. See for instance: M. Spallanzani, *Descartes e il 'paradosso' degli animali-macchina*, in «Bruniana&Campanelliana», XVII/1, 2011, pp. 185-198; L. Bianchi, *Rorario tra Naudé e Bayle*, in «Bruniana&Campanelliana», XVII/1, 2011, pp. 175-184; M. Wild, *Die anthropologische Differenz*, Berlin 2006, pp. 17-18. On Descartes' conception of animal automatism see especially Th. Gontier, *Descartes et les animaux-machine: une réhabilitation?*, in *De l'animal-machine à l'âme des machine. Querelles biomécaniques de l'âme (XVIIe-XXIe siècle)*, ed. J.-L. Guichet, Paris 2010, pp. 25-44.

[4] On the reception of Aristotelian psychology before Descartes see D. Des Chene, *Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul*, Ithaca NY 2000.

1. The Root of the Controversy: the Continuity of Sensation and Rationality

Aristotle's *De anima*, and in particular his discussion of the role of imagination, functioning as a kind of bridge between sensation and rationality, is a principal source of debate concerning the soul of animals in the Renaissance. The key passage is in book I, where Aristotle famously claims that if thought is a sort of imagination, or is impossible without imagination, it follows that even thought cannot take place without the body, which indicates the possibility of grounding the activity of rational thinking firmly in the realm of sensation[5]. It is only through the distinction between two different kinds of imagination – the first shared by animals and humans, and the second present only in human beings[6] – that a clear line can be drawn to separate the activities of the animal soul from those of the intellective soul.

Despite Aristotle's claim that it is possible to define clearly which faculties pertain to animals and which do not, the reception of his theory of imagination shows that the gap between the faculties of the animal soul, and those that are the prerogative of humans, insisted on opening up. For instance the fact that 'new powers' (such as the Avicennian *vis aestimativa*) are added in the aftermath of the Aristotelian reception may be a sign of discomfort, an attempt to bridge two poles that keep moving apart[7]. On the one hand, it seems necessary to acknowledge the possession of the imagination by (at least) certain animals, if one wants to explain how animals form images and create associations between them, for instance when their behaviour shows that they remember or even that they dream. On the other, it appears difficult to decide what exactly pertains to imagination and what should instead be ascribed to the realm of rationality, which operates on the basis of the products of imagination itself. In other words, the cooperative work of imagination and rationality could lead to a very dangerous conclusion: that there is no gap at all between these two faculties, but only a gradual transition, in the form of a rising complexity of associations. Consequently, the entire difference between humans and animals would also be

[5] Aristotle, *De anima*, 403a. English translation: Aristotle, *On the Soul*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. by J. Barnes, Oxford/Princeton 1991 (first ed. 1984) (= *On the Soul*), vol. I, p. 642: «If we consider the majority of them [i.e. the affections of the soul], there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence».

[6] Aristotle, *De anima*, 434a. (*On the Soul*, p. 690: «Sensitive imagination, as we have said, is found in all animals, deliberative imagination only in those that are calculative: for whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring calculation; and there must be a single standard to measure by, for that is pursued which is greater. It follows that what acts in this way must be able to make a unity out of several images»).

[7] On Avicenna's *wahm* (*vis aestimativa*) see R. E. Hall, *Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sīnā: Systematic Synthesis and Development of the Aristotelian, Neoplatonic and Galenic Theories*, in *Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group*, ed. J. McGinnis, Leiden 2004, especially pp. 65-68.

interpreted as a gradual rather than a definite one. A principal question shaping the Renaissance debate on the basis of Aristotle is thus the following: is it possible to coherently argue that animals partake in sensation and imagination, but not in rational thinking[8]? Isn't one led into an insoluble puzzle, if one is to follow Aristotle's claim in *De anima*, according to which all animals feel, most animals use imagination, but no animal thinks rationally? Indeed in *De rerum natura* Bernardino Telesio points out that following this structure inevitably leads to the insertion of new faculties between sensation and rationality, thus 'multiplying the soul': but adding 'steps' in between won't make the distance any shorter, and in the end it remains unintelligible how perception should work together with rationality, while at the same time animals are supposed to be deprived of the latter[9].

Using Telesio's *De rerum natura* as a basis for his critique of Aristotle's psychology, Tommaso Campanella also refers to this very same pattern when, in the first book of his *Metaphysica*, he writes that Aristotle dealt clumsily with the problem of distinguishing the faculties that belong to the animals from those which are peculiar to humans[10]. Indeed Aristotle's decision that animals must have *prudentia*, but without the support of reason, was in Campanella's view arbitrary. The animals' behaviour, continues Campanella, demonstrates that they not only feel, but they also remember, recollect, «argue with cleverness», and are even able to draw conclusions via «a thousand syllogisms»[11]. All in all, it doesn't appear possible to keep the gap between sensation and rationality: they rather seem to deeply intertwine, so that instead of a clear distinction one is forced to think in terms of a gradual differentiation, leading from the most basic activity of perception, to more complex ways of developing sense-date into arguments. In fact this is true also of sensation itself, which according to Campanella must be continuously present in the entire world, since it is not coherent to attribute sensation to animals (a very heterogeneous group anyway) and, for instance, leave out the plants, which are also capable of adapting to the environment, and in general respond to external stimulations such as the shining of the sun. Therefore – as Campanella claims – it is surprising that Aristotle should have maintained an absolute separation between sensitive beings (animals) and non-

[8] This question is discussed throughout the volume *The Animal Soul and the Human Mind: Renaissance Debates*, ed. C. Muratori, Pisa-Rome 2013. On Renaissance Aristotelianism see the overview given by L. Bianchi, *Continuity and Change in the Aristotelian tradition*, in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. by J. Hankins, Cambridge 2007, pp. 49-71.
[9] See B. Telesio, *De rerum natura, libri VII, VIII, IX*, ed. L. De Franco, Florence 1976, p. 190 (lib. VIII, cap. VIII): «utique rationes, quae eos [i.e. the Peripatetics] impulere, ut hujusmodi substantiam humanae animae adicerent, et ut substantiae uni plures facultates pluresque attribuerent operationes, et multas omnino illam facerent, explicandas examinandasque esse duximus».
[10] T. Campanella, *Universalis philosophiae seu metaphysicarum rerum, iuxta propria dogmata, parte tres, libri 18*, Paris 1638 (= *Metaphysica*), pp. 54-55 (lib. I, cap. VI, art. VI): «Ergo imperite Aristoteles animalibus dat prudentiam, quibus negat rationem».
[11] T. Campanella, *Del senso delle cose e della magia*, ed. by G. Ernst, Rome-Bari 2007 (= *Del senso delle cose*), pp. 85-86 (lib. II, cap. XXIII).

sensitive ones (plants); similarly, the line he draws to distinguish sensation from rationality, animals from humans, is also too blurred.

Before turning to examining Campanella's solution to this problem in further detail, I consider the way he diagnoses the traps into which a follower of Aristotle might fall, in case he should insist on keeping the radical distinction between sensation and rationality: he would have to chose between two possibilities – both of which are wrong, for Campanella, because they are based on a fundamental misunderstanding.

2. One Problem, Two Solutions: Animal Rationality, or Animal Automatism?

If the gap separating sensation from rationality cannot be closed, and all attempts to bridge the distance by multiplying the faculties 'in between' cannot lead to stable conclusions, then what remains is to choose one of the two extremes, stating either that animals are rational, or that they must lack both sensation *and* rationality. This is the twofold perspective described by Pierre Bayle, and which Campanella had already sketched clearly in *De sensu rerum*[12]. Here he writes: «These learned men went so far as to seemingly deprive of sensation not only all things, but also the beasts themselves. Indeed they fear that, if one attributes to them sensitive discourse, then one gives to them also a mind free in choosing, like the human one»[13]. The structure of Campanella's argument is noteworthy: he writes that the reason for depriving animals of sensation is the belief, or the fear, that once they are granted sensation, nothing could prevent the conclusion that rationality is rooted in sensation, and that therefore we could lose all distinction between humans and animals. This is precisely the argument presented by the Spanish doctor Pereira in the first pages of *Antoniana Margarita*.

In the first chapters of the book, Pereira seems to be trying to prove that animals do partake in rationality: indeed he argues that if they feel like we do, then they must be able to interpret the content of their sensations, distinguishing for instance between friends and enemies. Therefore they must be performing mental operations, and it does not matter what we call this mental capability (for instance whether estimative or cogitative faculty): if animals are able to process their sensations in this way, then they are in fact using an intellect. Pereira refers

[12] The Latin version of this book was published for the first time in 1620. The first Italian version probably dates back to 1604, and was preceded by an early Latin manuscript (cf. G. Ernst's introduction to her edition of the text: *Del senso delle cose*, p. XXVIIff.)

[13] T. Campanella, *De sensu rerum et magia*, Paris 1637 (= *De sensu rerum*), p. 16 (lib. I, cap. VII): «At eo pervenerunt praefati sapientes, quod videntur tollere sensum non modo rebus cunctis, sed et ipsis bestiis. Quoniam timent, ne si concedant illis sensitivuum discursum, mentem quoque arbitrio libera tribuant, qualis est humana: nec vident quanta differentia est inter humanam mentem et hanc sensum communem». Cf. also *Del senso delle cose*, p. 19: «Dunque non si deve dire che l'istinto divino le guidi, ma il proprio senso; e a tanto son trascorsi questi savii che par che tolgano il senso, non solo a gli enti tutti, ma anco alle bestie, perché si credono, donando a loro discorso senstivo, donargli anco mente d'arbitrio libera come ha l'uomo, e non veggono quanta differenza ci è tra la mente umana e questo senso commune».

directly to Aristotle and to the debate surrounding the continuity of sensation and rationality, and he concludes as follows: «if the animals were equal to us in feeling, then it would be necessary to infer that there is nothing peculiar to us humans which would not be shared with them»[14]. This is revealed as the real target of Pereira's argument: to say it in Campanella's words, it is the fear that by granting animals sensation the assumption automatically follows that they think rationally as well. Pereira therefore leads the reader into rejecting an absurd conclusion: since sensations necessarily need to be processed mentally, then we are *de facto* attributing rationality to animals when we assume that they feel. But this is for Pereira not possible – and therefore this argument is offered as a proof that «animals lack sensation», as the title of the first chapter of the book announces[15].

Pereira follows step by step the whole list of (absurd) conclusions that would follow if one were to acknowledge the presence of sensation in animals: it is almost a cascade of necessary conclusions that must follow from what might at first sight appear to be an uncontroversial starting point. Pereira is particularly interested by the connection of feeling, thinking and speaking: if animals feel and if they could say what they perceive, shouldn't they be able to say, for instance, «album», or «blanco», when they see something white[16]? He then proceeds to give an account of animal behaviour based on the assumption that brutes do have feeling: animals must be considered capable of abstracting universals[17], of distinguishing friends from enemies, and especially they must be deemed capable of putting such knowledge into practice by running away from the latter, while being friendly with the former. In so doing, they must therefore form mental judgments: whether we ascribe such behaviour to a *vis aestimativa* or *cogitativa* – Pereira writes – what matters is that some sort of 'internal power' must be attributed by necessity to the animals by simply following from the basic acknowledgement of sensation[18]. All in all, if animals are said to have

[14] G. Pereira, *Antoniana Margarita*, Medina del Campo 1554, col. 5: «si bruta in sentiendo nobis paria essent, exinde necessario inferendum, nihil proprium nobis hominibus esse, quod illis commune non esse. Namque ex brutorum operationibus si alterum elicitur, et reliquum elici necessarium est».

[15] It is interesting to note, as G. Sanhueza has done (*La pensée biologique de Descartes dans ses rapports avec la philosophie scolastique. Le cas Gomez-Péreira*, Paris 1997, p. 81), that Gómez Pereira does not use the term automatism.

[16] Pereira, *Antoniana Margarita*, col. 3: «Ut si brutis loqui permissum esset, album colorem quem vident, album appellassent si Latine loquerentur, vel blanco, si Hispane».

[17] *Ibid.*, col. 7: «Cum statim colligam, certum esse, si bruta nobiscum paria in sentiendo essent, etiam in ratiocinando, et universalia intelligendo, futura nobis simillima».

[18] *Ibid.,* col. 7-8: «Si bruta actus exteriorum sensuum ut homines exercerent, id canis, aut equus mentaliter [...] conciperent, visis dominis, quod homo viso hero [...]. Vel si aliquis hoc fateri nolit, neque brutis tantum tribuere inficiari non poterit, bruta, visis amicis, aut inimicis, mentales propositiones formare, quibus eorundem anima sensitiva cognoscit hos amicos esse, illos inimicos, amicos enim amice prosequitur, inimicosque fugit: sed hoc fieri nequit, nisi vi aliqua interiore, seu aestimativa, aut cogitativa appelletur (de nominibus enim cura habenda non est, dum res intelligatur) id praecipiat, praeceptumque illud sine cognitione non fieri in nobis experimur, cum posterius sit sensatione. Bruta ergo si in sentiendo paria nobiscum sunt, eodem modo fugere aut aemulari amicos aut inimicos debent, prout et nos: ergo affirmare mentaliter

perceptions, abstract universals, and to adapt their behaviour accordingly, the implication is that they perform nothing short of a mental operation.

This chain of conclusions implies that just like human souls, the souls of animals would be ultimately an indivisible unity. From a theological point of view, this poses the question of their status after death, and where their souls would go[19]. What this problem reveals is the fact that granting sensation means, for Pereira, that it would be impossible to distinguish between the soul of animals and human souls in any meaningful way including the prospect with regard to the afterlife. If animals can feel, then they can think, and establishing this connection would bridge the gap on which human uniqueness depends: the barrier separating their souls and the human souls must fall as a consequence. But the drawbacks of this equality will affect not only the level of religion, establishing that the animal souls must be immortal like the human ones: the pernicious consequences of this position stretch well into the practical terrain of human exploitation of animals. As Bandrés and Llavona have noted, this is one of the most interesting, and deeply unsettling conclusions to be drawn from Pereira's 'paradoxical' reasoning[20]. If animals feel, the question inevitably arises whether the way humans treat them should not be labelled as extremely cruel. Pereira lingers on the description of various painful examples of animal exploitation – examples which are so powerful that *if* animals really felt, just like humans, we would have to drop entirely the idea of a *benignitas* in nature[21]. He mentions the case of the beasts of burden, which are systematically exploited by humans, but also instances of animal torture that humans perform for sport, simply for fun. Therefore allowing animal sensation leads to a question about the deeper meaning and justification of animal pain, by which human life would literally be surrounded all the time – and this, once again, cannot be a tenable option for Pereira.

This practical implication bears comparison with Descartes' statement that his theory about the nature of animals finally liberated man from doubt as to whether we should feel guilt about inflicting pain on them, especially through slaughter[22]. It is thus interesting to note another possible contact point between Descartes and Pereira in the fact that the latter, too, introduced a noteworthy

alteros amicos, aliosque inimicos coguntur dicere, qui praefatam similitudinem brutorum et hominum ponunt».

[19] *Ibid.*, col. 22.

[20] Bandrés and Llavona, *Minds and Machines in Renaissance Spain: Gómez Pereira's Theory of Animal Behavior*, p. 160.

[21] Pereira, *Antoniana Margarita*, col. 21-22: «si bestiis datum esset sensationibus exterioribus et organicis interioribus nobiscum convenire, inhumanum, saevum, ac crudele, fieri ab hominibus passim concedendum esset. Quid enim atrocius, quam veterina animalia sub gravibus oneribus, et prolixis itineribus fessa, vapulis caedere, et ferro adeo crudeliter pungere, donec sanguis e vulneribus manet, ipsis non raro gemitibus, ac vocibus quibusdam [...] miserationem petentibus? Ac ultra hanc immanitatem, quae tanto atrocior, quanto frequentior habetur, crudelitatis apicem obtineret, taurorum agitatorum tormentum, sudibus, ensibus, lapidibusque caesis ipsis: nec in alium humanum ususm, quam ut iis flagitiis humanus visus delectetur, quibus bestia vindictam mugitu supplex poscere videtur».

[22] R. Descartes, *Tutte le lettere*, ed. G. Belgioioso, Milan 2009, p. 2624.

distinction within the realm of sensation. In the commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, which is printed together with *Antoniana Margarita*, Pereira underlines that humans are conscious that they feel, and that animals in any case lack that kind of sensation, thus prompting the question whether animals could feel, but, so to speak, unconsciously[23].

This problem appears not to be relevant for Campanella: indeed, the distinction would be an unnecessary sophism in his view. In *De sensu rerum* he repeats that actually «no one doubts that animals feel»[24]: we observe the behaviour of the animals, and we simply know that they feel, just like we do. It follows that Pereira's conclusion is not at all a plausible solution. But if animals feel, aren't we forced to admit that they have reason as well? In another words, aren't we swapping one extreme solution (the lack of sensation) with another (the lack of differentiation between animals and human)[25], exchanging Pereira an author like Rorarius, who provocatively wrote that animals are even more rational than humans? Campanella has in mind a third way.

3. The Third Way

If Aristotle's psychology can only lead to the two extreme solutions already sketched (both improbable for different reasons), then the only way to escape the *impasse* would be to change perspective on the limit between sensation and rationality. In particular, Campanella claims that all attempts to maintain the Aristotelian distinction between the two faculties are impossible to justify philosophically: they only express the prejudicial fear of placing animals and humans on the same level. He therefore states that: «Rationality doesn't really differ in its fundament from sensation and imagination, but the difference is in the operation of the same soul»[26]. The reason is that «[t]he sensitive soul is the same as the rational soul, *contra* the Peripatetics' view»[27]. Campanella thereby asserts a certain continuity of the two faculties, which are not essentially distinct. Indeed, as he writes in *De sensu rerum*, animals ratiocinate only to a lesser degree than humans, just as plants feel less than animals but should not be supposed to lack sensation[28]. From this point of view, the argument of Pereira and the

[23] Pereira, *Antoniana Margarita*, col. 537: «No enim homines conscii sumus, nos ipsos sentire». As Bandrés and Llavona (*Minds and Machines in Renaissance Spain: Gómez Pereira's Theory of Animal Behavior*, p. 160) put it: «For Pereira the term 'sensation' is a metaphor where animals are concerned. Animals only have mechanical reactions towards the stimuli of their environment, with no implication of mental experience».
[24] *De sensu rerum*, p. 83 (lib. II, cap. XXIII). *Del senso delle cose*, p. 85 (and see also p. 3: «gli animali, per consenso universale, hanno sentimento»).
[25] Cf. also Bayle's article on Rorarius: «Il y a long-tems qu'on a soutenu que l'ame des bêtes est raisonnable»; and his comment (note D): «Nous pouvons compter Straton & Enesideme parmi ceux qui ont soutenu que l'ame des bêtes est raisonnable; car ils ensegnoient que le sentiment ne peut subsister sans l'entendement» (P. Bayle, *Dictionnaire*, vol. 4, p. 77).
[26] *Metaphysica*, p. 54 (lib. I, cap. VI, art. VI): «Rationem vero a sensu et phantasia non differre realiter in fundamento, sed operationem eiusdem animae».
[27] *Ibid.*: «Animam sentientem eandem esse ratiocinativam contra Peripateticos».
[28] Cf. *Del senso delle cose*, p. 88.

ironically-termed «learned men» is firmly rejected as an absurdity: in fact the whole world is an animal, so that there is no place in Campanella's universe for beings resembling automata. But Campanella still needs to explain how he avoids the second extreme solution: is it true that conceding sensation to animals ultimately leads to cancelling the border between sensation and rationality, and therefore between man and the animals?

First of all, Campanella explains that all those functions that the Peripatetics attributed to the intellective soul, including the capability to conceive universals, can indeed be performed by animals as well, according to their different physical dispositions: for instance, everyone knows how well monkeys are able to argue[29], and just by observing the behaviour of a dog in response to a man approaching makes it clear that animals must be able to conceive universals (the dog at first growls on recognizing the figure of a – potentially dangerous – human being, but responds joyfully when it recognises that it is a man it knows and doesn't need to fear)[30]. If ratiocination is defined as the faculty of drawing syllogisms, of calculating, conceiving universals, imagining, remembering, etc., then it must be considered to be present in the animal world as well. As Campanella states in *Metaphysica*, «all these functions belong to the same soul, and should not be denied to animals, even if they are more perfect in us». When the dog sees the stick, he is afraid, because «he draws a syllogism regarding the fact that he could be hit today just like the other day».

Thus Campanella introduces three reasons that justify this continuity of ratiocination between animals and humans, explaining at the same time why the latter can think better than the former: this is «both because of a more perfect spirit and of better cells, and because of the informing assistance of the mind infused by God» [31]. The first two reasons have to do with the constitution of the body: the (corporeal) spirit and the brain of human beings allow them to perform better calculations. The third reason is in fact Campanella's solution to the dilemma of the continuity of sensation and rationality. The immortal mind that God infuses in humans allows them to be free beings striving for contact with the Creator, thus developing religious feelings. It also assists the activity of ratiocination, but it should not be identified with rationality itself. Therefore there is still a very definite boundary-line between humans and animals, but this limit does not correspond to the capability to think, contrary to the Aristotelian tradition. Campanella has thus introduced a continuity of sensation and rationality, while at the same time arguing that rationality is not the defining characteristic of mankind. This is why all animals have a sensitive soul and also partake in rationality, but they are nevertheless not like humans,

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 82.
[31] T. Campanella, *Metaphysica*, p. 55 (lib. I, cap. VI, art. VI): «Ergo omnes hae functiones, sunt eiusdem animae, nec negandae sunt animalibus, licet in nobis sunt perfectiores, tum ob spiritum perfectiorem, melioresque cellas, tum ob mentis a Deo immissae adstitentiam informantem: canis cum videt baculum, timet verbera, quia syllogizat, se posse verberari hodie, sicut nudius tertius».

because they lack a mind, which is a spark of the divine. In other words, the difference in the capability to ratiocinate is a quantitative one, while the mind is the only qualitative difference between animals and humans.

What exactly the mind does, if it is no longer to be identified with rationality (as it traditionally was), is an interesting problem that has been analysed in detail by Germana Ernst[32]. Campanella's mind is a divine spark: while it might allow man to think better and more sharply than any animal, it also marks the point of radical difference from the world of animals by making man the only creature capable of free, creative thinking. But there are practical consequences deriving from the possession of a mind, too: Campanella argues that man is the only animal who is conscious of his position in the world and in the universe, and thus also the only one whose behaviour can reflect this insight into the structure of the world, which appears to him as a great animal inhabited by all creatures, human and animal[33].

This conception of the mind is rooted in an approach which seeks a sort of third way between the two extreme positions of animal machinery and animal rationality. Campanella claims that instead of insisting on distinguishing between a sensitive and a rational soul, the real peculiarity of humans as compared to animals should be located elsewhere. Leaving the two extremes behind, the philosopher should articulate elements of continuity (the shared common ground of sensation and ratiocination) and hierarchy (the presence of the mind), in order to understand what humans share with animals, and what is peculiar to them only. In this process the Aristotelian approach to the man-animal distinction must be left behind as well, because it is the structure of the Aristotelian soul which inevitably pushes the argumentation towards one of the two untenable extremes. Moreover, Aristotelian psychology tends to associate the immortality of the human soul with the rational part of the soul, and this, for Campanella, exposes yet another weakness of Aristotelian psychology. In his *Quaestiones physiologicae* (contained in the 1637 edition of the *Philosophia realis*), Campanella recollects that he felt deep disappointment and concern at discovering the fragility of the arguments of Aristotelian origin about the immortality of the soul. The weak point is once again the relationship between sensation and rationality: the proof of the soul's immortality relies on demonstrating satisfactorily that the rational soul is completely differentiated and separable from the sensitive one, which is mixed with the body and thus cannot be said to be immortal[34].

[32] See G. Ernst, *L'analogia e la differenza. Uomo e animali in Campanella*, in *The Animal Soul and the Human Mind: Renaissance Debates*, pp. 209-225.

[33] I have considered the ethical aspects of the man-animal distinction elsewhere: C. Muratori, *Eating (Rational) Animals: Campanella on the Rationality of Animals and the Impossibility of Vegetarianism*, in *Ethical Perspectives on Animals in the Renaissance and Early Modern Period*, ed. C. Muratori and B. Dohm, Florence 2013, pp. 139-166 (=«Micrologus' Library», LV); and, *Come i vermi nel formaggio: la distinzione tra uomo e animali in una metafora campanelliana*, in «Bruniana&Campanelliana», 2015/2 (forthcoming).

[34] T. Campanella, *Quaestiones phsyiologicae*, in *Philosophia realis*, Paris 1637, p. 509: «Quaestio LIV *De anima humana a deo immissa et de immortalitate Animorum*. Utrum vero, ac sufficienter Aristoteles demonstraverit intelligentis Animae humane immortalitatem, alterumque

But this approach, as we saw, does not lead far, and thus Campanella exclaims:

> Poor us, if the immortality of the soul should depend only on these reasonings: one night in my youth, considering how fragile they are, I started to weep aloud and I turned ardently to Plato and Telesio, and to the teachings of the saints, which gave me great comfort: from that time on I have abandoned Aristotle[35].

Plato and Telesio are able to give the philosopher some comfort from the disappointment of discovering the weaknesses in the Aristotelian system. In *Syntagma*, published posthumously by Gabriel Naudé, Campanella states again that he turned to Plato, Pliny, Galen and Telesio, when he understood that he wasn't gaining much knowledge from studying Aristotle and his commentators[36]. Campanella expresses his disappointment with the fallacies of Aristotelian psychology also by developing what I called a 'third way' with regard to the man-animal continuity.

Yet despite Campanella's appeal to avoid both extreme simplifications, a significant part of the debate on the soul of animals in the seventeenth century seems to get stuck precisely on choosing between these two options, confronting them, and opposing them because of the failure to notice that they are two aspects of the very same argument. Whether or not Campanella's third way is ultimately a satisfying philosophical argument, it remains an indication of the necessity of going beyond the assumption that rationality must be a prerogative of humans, while at the same time rejecting any version of the theory of animal automatism, including in the form of contrasting animal instinct with human reason. Campanella, indeed, even notes that experience shows the fallacy of the theory of animal instinct as a blind yet infallible guide: we see that animals make mistakes, too, and frequently even. In Campanella's view, such absurd theories can be countered by simply observing the behaviour of animals[37]. This is why in *Del senso delle cose* he lists instances of animal behaviour which prove not only the fact that animals feel, but also that they experience complex emotions, such as shame or generosity, and that, most importantly, their actions are clearly

genus a sensitivo, separabile re, et ratione a magnitudine, et an recte agentem superaddiderit Intellectum».

[35] *Ibid.*, 513. This passage is quoted and commented upon in G. Ernst, *Autobiografia di Tommaso Campanella*, in *Laboratorio Campanella: biografia, contesti, iniziative in corso: atti del Convegno della Fondazione Camillo Caetani, Roma, 19-20 ottobre 2006*, ed. G. Ernst and C. Fiorani, Rome 2007 p. 23.

[36] Cf. T. Campanella, *Sintagma dei miei libri e sul corretto metodo di apprendere*, ed. G. Ernst, Pisa-Rome 2007, pp. 31-32: «Deinde, cum essem anxius quod veritas non sincera, sed potius falsitas pro veritate in Peripato versari mihi videbatur, Aristotelis commentatores, Graecos atque Latinos Arabesque examinavi omnes, et haesitare magis coepi in dogmatis eorum».

[37] Cf. *Del senso delle cose*, p. 19: «Si vanta un di questi autori ch'egli abbia trovato che nullo animale erra dal suo fine e nullo altro ente, se non l'uomo, perché è composto di ragione e di senso ripugnati fra loro; e quelli sono da Dio guidati ai lor fini. Gran schiocchezza, poiché si veggono spesso errare». As Germana Ernst points out in this edition, the reference is to Domingo De Soto's *De iustitia et iure*.

informed by such emotions[38]. These examples are meant to dismiss as an untenable solution the theory of animal automatism, which became equally popular and controversial in the aftermath of Descartes. In fact, it is striking to note that contemporary debates on the question whether animals can be moral still take as a starting point similar observations: the issue of whether animals feel, is still debated in similar terms, despite the different terminology now developed in the field of animal ethics[39].

For Campanella there can be no doubt that animals feel, and this approach leads to considering any discussion of 'automatism' as a philosophically unproductive way to understand the real difference between humans and all other feeling creatures. After having thus ruled out both the theory that animals are automata, and that they are rational in the same way as human beings, Campanella comes to the conclusion that if a third way is conceivable, then it must integrate continuity with elements of distinction – and this is the challenge that in my opinion Campanella's theory laid down: how to understand the continuity of sensation and rationality without the fear that only the animals' automatism can rescue human beings from being categorised as animals themselves.

[38] For instance *ibid.*, pp. 86-87: «Li leoni perdonano agli imbelli, abbattono i superbi, si ricordano de' benefici, tanto che in Roma non volsero divorare un condennato che dentro un antro aveva la spina dal piede ad uno di quei leoni cavata fuori. Gli elefanti hanno tutte queste generosità e più sentono; combattono con arte, imparano la lingua, fanno patti con noi, conoscono la colpa e si lavano dopo il coito, d'inginocchiano alla luna come gli antichi Greci, la riveriscono per il beneficio che ricevono la notte da lei».

[39] See for instance M. Rowlands, *Can Animals be Moral?*, Oxford 2012, pp. 7-8. After having described the behaviour of certain animals experiencing grief, or concern for the suffering of other animals, the author refers to contemporary interpretations of such experiments as follows: «These are all examples of the sort of cases sometimes cited as evidence for the claim that some nonhuman animals can experience, and be motivated to act by, emotions of a certain sort. The emotions in question include compassion, sympathy, grief, and courage».

Articoli/2

The Animal Soul in the Seventeenth Century

The Opposing Views of Descartes and Gassendi

Brian Donovan Johnson

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The most salient feature of the relationship between René Descartes and Pierre de Gassendi is the long controversy that marred their friendship. The question of the animal soul is a prominent part of that controversy. Descartes denies animals possession of a soul, while Gassendi admits the existence of an animal soul, although he denies animal reasoning ability. A comparison of each thinker's philosophy of animal nature reveals that Descartes's animal and Gassendi's animal are strikingly similar, highlighting the fact that their dispute over the question of the animal soul is less about conflicting theories of animal nature than it is about Gassendi's discontent with Descartes's arguments for an immaterial soul.

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The Seventeenth Century saw much debate over the nature of animals, especially in France. Michel de Montaigne[1] and Pierre Charron[2] had espoused classical views that conceded abilities to animals that rivalled or even excelled those of humans, and this direct challenge to human supremacy incited opposition. Marin Mersenne highlights mental abilities exclusive to humans in *La vérité des sciences : contre les sceptiques ou pyrrhoniens* (1624), while Pierre Chanet refutes the reasoning ability of animals in *Considérations sur la Sagesse de Pierre Charron* (1643) and *De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux : avec l'examen de ce que M. de la Chambre a escrit sur cette matière* (1646). Marin Cureau de la Chambre responded to the latter by publishing *Traité de la connoissance des animaux* (1648), in which he expands on his position that instinctive animal behavior constitutes reasoning.

[1] See the *Essais* (1580), particularly *L'Apologie de Raimond Sebond*.
[2] Most pointedly in the three volumes of *De la sagesse* (1601).

The debate between Chanet and Cureau de la Chambre is a minor controversy beside the dispute that erupted between René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi. As was the case with Chanet and Cureau de la Chambre, the nature of animals played a great part in their disagreement; however, when they clash heads in Gassendi's *Disquisitio Metaphysica*[3] (1644), the question of animal nature arises primarily to elucidate the nature of the human soul. Descartes argues for an immaterial soul to account for all thought and Gassendi the possibility that matter produces thought-this accounts for the majority of their disagreement. As for animal nature and, in particular, the existence of an animal soul, Descartes and Gassendi also disagree. Descartes famously denies the existence of an animal soul in *Discours de la méthode* (1637), while Gassendi argues to the contrary. Despite this seemingly profound distinction, their conceptions of animal nature share many features. Descartes draws a sharp line between animals and humanity, denying animals any reasoning ability. While Gassendi attributes certain mental abilities to animals that Descartes rejects, they are still incapable of higher functions that would properly constitute reasoning. The theories of both Descartes and Gassendi support the human supremacy that Montaigne and Charron undermine.

1. Descartes's Soulless Animal

The primary purpose of Descartes's theory of animal nature in the *Discours de la méthode* is to distinguish humans from animals. The separation of the two is necessary to avoid dire theological consequences. If human and animal nature are the same, then there is no reason to believe that human and animal souls differ. According to Descartes, if this is the case, then there is no reason to believe that humans have an immortal soul: «après l'erreur de ceux qui nient Dieu […] il n'y en a point qui éloigne plutôt les esprits faibles du droit chemin de la vertu, que d'imaginer que l'âme des bêtes soit de même nature que la nôtre, et que, par conséquent, nous n'avons rien à craindre, ni à espérer, après cette vie, non plus que les mouches et les fourmis»[4]. Thierry Gontier inscribes Descartes's fear in a tradition including both classical and Renaissance authors whose influence determines the context in which Descartes reacts to Montaigne: «Le contexte dominant dans lequel Descartes lit Montaigne le porte ainsi à voir dans le discours sur les animaux de l'*Apologie* de Raimond Sebond non une simple critique de l'orgueil anthropocentrique, mais le germe d'une psychologie matérialiste destructrice du dogme de l'immortalité de l'âme humaine»[5]. Thus Descartes refuses to examine the possibility that both humans and animals may

[3] Full title: *Disquisitio Metaphysica seu dubitationes et instantiae adversus Renati Cartesii metaphysicam et responsa*.
[4] R. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode,* Paris 1970, ch. V, pp. 124-25.
[5] T. Gontier, *De l'homme à l'animal: Montaigne et Descartes ou les paradoxes de la philosophie moderne sur la nature des animaux,* Paris: 1998, pp. 193-194.

have immaterial souls, but rather hinges the distinction between the two on its possession.

For Descartes to accomplish his goal, he must define the soul so that no animal behavior depends upon it, while some human behavior is inexplicable without it. To this end, Descartes marks a clear division between body and mind. The body is purely physical and hence mechanical, while the soul is an immaterial, reasoning substance. The human body is like «*une machine qui, ayant été faite des mains de Dieu, est incomparablement mieux ordonnée, et a en soi des mouvements plus admirables, qu'aucune de celles qui peuvent être inventées par les hommes*»[6]. Animal bodies, too, are like machines, but there is a significant difference between humans and animals in this respect. If there was an actual machine that mimicked perfectly the construction of an animal body — Descartes uses the example of a monkey — there would be no way to distinguish the machine from the real animal. As Descartes puts it, one could not tell that the machine was not «tout de même nature» as the animal[7]. In essence, he is saying that the body of the animal and its workings are identical to the nature of the animal. The choice of a monkey underscores that this is true for all animals, even those that may appear to be intelligent. All animal behavior is explicable as the response of a material body to external stimuli.

This is not the case with humans. A real human is distinguishable from a machine that replicates the body by its inability to speak coherently. A mechanical replica is unable to «arrange[r] diversement» words «pour répondre au sens de tout ce qui se dira en sa présence»[8]. A machine cannot partake in a rational conversation, even though it may be able to «profère des paroles»[9]. A machine's utterances would simply be physical responses to environmental stimuli, and therefore independent of rational thought.

The machine's abilities and limitations correspond to the abilities and limitations of animals. Descartes notes that parakeets and magpies can pronounce words, for instance, but that they are incapable of engaging in conversation[10]. For Descartes, animals are unable to do what nearly any human can do, namely, «arranger ensemble diverses paroles, et d'en composer un discours par lequel ils fassent entendre leurs pensées»[11]. Magpies and parakeets cannot use language even though they have vocal organs capable of articulating human language, which Descartes offers as proof of their lack of rationality[12]. In the case of other animals, were they rational, they would at least be able to communicate their thoughts via signs as the case of human deaf-mutes illustrates[13]. Since no animal do so, this is proof that they have no thoughts to communicate, evidence «pas

[6] R. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, cit., chap. V, p. 120.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.* p. 121.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*
[13] *Ibid.*

seulement que les bêtes ont moins de raison que les hommes, mais qu'elles n'en ont point du tout»[14]. Like a machine, animals are unthinking, and since they have no thoughts to communicate, they cannot use language.

In the *Discours*, Descartes responds to two misconceptions concerning the possibility of animal language that date back to the ancient world. The first is that the cries and calls of animals constitute language. What seems to distinguish animal cries from language is the fact that a machine could duplicate them: «on ne doit pas confondre les paroles avec les mouvements naturels, qui témoignent les passions, et peuvent être imités par des machines aussi bien que par les animaux»[15]. These cries are not a communication of thought, but rather reactions resulting from the passions, which do not qualify as thought.

The second misconception is that animals have their own languages, but that humans are unable to understand them. Descartes specifically criticizes following the lead of «quelques anciens»[16] in this regard. R.W. Serjeantson believes that this warning against believing that animals speak although we do not understand their language is directed against Montaigne and Charron[17]. The fact that animals such as magpies and parakeets have vocal organs capable of articulating human speech nullifies this belief, «car s'il était vrai, puisqu'elles ont plusieurs organes qui se rapportent aux nôtres, elles pourraient aussi bien se faire entendre à nous qu'à leurs semblables»[18]. If a magpie language did exist, it would mean that magpies are capable of thought. Since magpies can articulate human speech, they would be able to use human words to communicate their thoughts. That they do not, as Descartes shows previously, is proof that they do not think[19].

Descartes's responses to each of the misconceptions he addresses highlight animals' lack of rationality. It is true that animals emit cries and calls of various sorts, but these are not properly words, and they do not communicate thoughts. They, therefore, do not require the influence of a rational soul. The inability of animals like magpies and parakeets to use human speech precludes the existence of their own animal languages, since it demonstrates their lack of thought. Since they do not think, they have no rational soul. This is the difference between humans and animals that a lack of language brings to light. Even a child can use language, while even the most perfect of monkeys and parakeets cannot, a fact which argues for a soul «du tout différente» in nature from the human soul[20].

[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 122-123.
[15] *Ibid*.
[16] *Ibid*.
[17] R. W. Serjeantson, *The Passions and Animal Language, 1540-1700*, «Journal of the History of Ideas» 62(2001), 425-444, p. 437.
[18] R. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, cit., p. 123.
[19] In his paper on the subject, *Descartes, La Mettrie, Language, and Machines,* Keith Gunderson backs Descartes's view that one cannot conclude from isolated instances, such as the speech of a parrot, that animals reason or use language as humans do. In effect, Gunderson claims that arguing that from like effect we must conclude like cause is unsound in cases involving human intelligence, and uses the case of computer calculations to make his point.
[20] R. Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, cit., p. 123.

Animals do not have a rational, immortal soul, but the purpose of Descartes's arguments goes beyond this conclusion. What is most important for Descartes is its implication. Humans possess something that animals do not; therefore they are fundamentally different from animals.

Attributing language to animals is only one of the classical arguments for animal reasoning ability and combatting human supremacy. A popular method which both Montaigne and Charron employ is to remark on the many ways in which animal abilities surpass those of humans. Descartes uses the *Discours* to refute this line of argument by providing a mechanical explanation for even the most complex of animal behaviors. Using again the idea of a mechanical replica of a human being, Descartes states that one may distinguish the replica from a real human by cataloguing the diversity of its abilities. Whereas humans are able to adapt to a widely diverse set of circumstances and engage in suitable behaviors to meet their needs, a machine is capable of only a finite number of activities in response to a limited number of stimuli «bien qu'elles fissent plusieurs choses aussi bien ou peut-être mieux qu'aucun de nous»[21]. Excellence in one or even several abilities does not mean that a machine is of the same nature as a human being. The limitation of machines shows, in fact, that they act «pas par connaissance, mais seulement par la disposition de leurs organes»[22]. The reason this is so is because a machine cannot possibly be of a complexity that can account for the diversity of human behavior that results from rationality:

> Car au lieu que la raison est un instrument universel, qui peut servir en toutes sortes de rencontres, ces organes ont besoin de quelque particulière disposition pour chaque action particulière ; d'où vient qu'il est moralement impossible qu'il y en ait assez de divers en une machine pour la faire agir en toutes les occurences de la vie, de même façon que notre raison nous fait agir[23].

Descartes cannot imagine the possibility of a machine in human form that could contain all the necessary mechanisms to account for the nearly infinite diversity of human action.

As in the case of the inability of machines to use language, their behavioral limits apply directly to the case of animals. Just as the excellence of a machine in particular abilities does not indicate that it is of the same nature as a human being, the excellence of animals in certain domains does not mean they are of the same nature as humans. The reason is the same lack of diversity in their behaviors. The same animal that exhibits a skill surpassing human ability in one domain «n'en témoignent point du tout en beaucoup d'autres»[24]. The absence of skill in a large number of areas demonstrates that animals do not have intelligence equal to or greater than humans, as their skill in particular cases might imply, but «plutôt qu'ils n'en ont point»[25].

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 121.
[22] *Ibid.,* p. 123.
[23] *Ibid.,* pp. 121-122.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 123.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 124.

Descartes likens the special abilities of animals to a clock: «c'est la nature qui agit en eux, selon la disposition de leurs organes : ainsi qu'on voit qu'un horloge, qui n'est composé que de roues et de ressorts, peut compter les heures, et mesurer le temps, plus justement que nous avec toute notre prudence»[26]. The nature of animals is to act according to the disposition of their bodily organs, just as the nature of a clock is to measure out time according to its mechanical construction. Obviously, the movements of a clock do not necessitate its having a rational soul. Thierry Gontier characterizes the difference between the apparent reason in animal behavior and human behavior as a difference between external and internal intelligence. A human's behavior results from his own reasoning ability, while the animal's behavior is directed by God: «Pour Descartes…la sagesse n'est pas absente des œuvres des animaux, mais elle est à rapporter à l'intelligence divine»[27]. Accordingly, the behavior of animals, even those that surpass human abilities, are not contingent upon a rational soul. The entirety of Descartes's arguments against a reasoning animal has the sole purpose of drawing a clear line between humans and animals.

For Michael Miller the motive behind Descartes's criteria for reasoning ability is the exclusion of the possibility of rational animals[28]. Furthermore, Descartes states «that there are no varying degrees or varying uses of rationality»[29], which automatically biases his reasoning ability criteria against animals. They must reason as humans do in human circumstances to be considered rational. Animals' material bodies account for the entirety of their behavior, whereas humans have a rational soul, a thinking substance, that manifests in thought and accounts for such things as language and complex behaviors beyond the capabilities of even the most intricate machines.

2. Gassendi's Soulful Animal

Although animal nature is a key component of the debate between Descartes and Gassendi, the *Disquisitio Metaphysica* is not an objection to Descartes's *Discours*, where Descartes's exposition of animal nature appears. Instead, the *Disquisitio* is a systematic refutation of the *Méditations métaphysiques*, in particular, Descartes's espousal of an immaterial soul. Gassendi believes that the animal soul, like everything else, consists of matter, though of an extremely subtle variety. His writings indicate a strong measure of doubt — despite the contrary opinion of the church — concerning the immateriality of the human soul. Indeed, the primacy of matter is so great a part of Gassendi's thought that Olivier Bloch views the essence of Gassendi's objections to Descartes's

[26] *Ibid.*
[27] T. Gontier, *De l'homme à l'animal: Montaigne et Descartes ou les paradoxes de la philosophie moderne sur la nature des animaux*, p. 227.
[28] M. Miller, *Descartes' Distinction Between Animals and Humans: Challenging the Language and Action Tests*, «American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly» 72.3 (1998), pp. 339-370, pp. 355-357.
[29] *Ibid.,* p. 358.

Méditations to reside in his «refus global du principe de méthode sur lequel repose le système cartésien, à savoir l'exigence d'un 'ordre des raisons' différent de l'ordre des matières, et qui serait le véritable ordre philosophique»[30]. Gassendi's philosophical investigations start from the material world, whereas Descartes sets off from the purely rational. Recourse to animal nature is merely one of several means in the *Disquisitio* by which Gassendi contests Descartes's theory of an immaterial soul.

To see precisely how Gassendi's theory of animal nature differs from Descartes's, it is necessary to look outside the *Disquisitio*. In François Bernier's *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi*, which is a translation and reorganization of Gassendi's corpus, a reader has the chance to see Gassendi's own opinions concerning the nature of the human soul and the nature of animals, although his adhesion to the authority of the church clouds much of what he writes about the former[31].

Among all the passages pertaining to animals in the *Abrégé*, one can also find a direct response to the idea of an animal-machine, although Descartes's name does not appear in the text. Bernier labels the pertinent passage «Si les Brutes sont de pures Machines» and tellingly includes it in a chapter on the immortality of the soul. Gassendi attributes the idea of the animal-machine not to Descartes but to «un Espagnol nommé Perera»[32], evidently the sixteenth-century theologian Benedict Pereira, diminishing any claims Descartes may have to an original theory. Contemporaries, «quelques-uns de nos Modernes» as Gassendi puts it, take up the opinion «à l'egard des Brutes, afin, disent-ils, de les mieux distinguer des Hommes»[33]. The reason the idea of the animal-machine appears in a chapter on the immortality of the soul becomes clear when Gassendi divulges the impetus behind the argument for a non-sentient animal.

> Ils pretendent donc […] que si on admet que les Brutes pensent, ou mesme qu'elles ayent du sentiment, quelque grossier et imparfait qu'il puisse estre l'on ne satisfera jamais aux objections de ceux qui veulent que l'Ame de[s] Brutes, et celles des Hommes ne different que selon le plus, et le moins, c'est pourquoy pour se tirer tout d'un coup d'embarras, et sans considerer si le remede qu'ils apportent n'est point pire que le mal, ils soûtiennent avec cet Autheur [Pereira] que les Brutes ne sont que de pures Machines, comme pourroient estre des Horloges, et qu'elles ne voyent, ni n'entendent, ni ne connoissent, ou pour me servir de leurs termes, qu'elles sont destituées de tout sentiment soit exterieur, comme la Veüe, l'Oüye, etc. soit interieur comme la Phantaisie[34].

[30] O. Bloch, *La Philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, Matérialisme et Métaphysique,* The Hague 1971, p. 49.
[31] Isabelle Moreau points out that Bernier's *Abrégé* does not present Gassendi's philosophy in its entirety, as the title suggests; rather, Bernier «transmet à ses contemporains ce qu'il faut savoir de la philosophie de Gassendi» (I. Moreau, *Guérir du sot: les stratégies d'écriture des libertins à l'âge classique*, Paris 2007, p. 402). According to Moreau what is missing are the fruits of Gassendi's «dialectique humaniste» and his «intentions pédagogiques et concordantistes de l'ecclésiastique» (*Ibid.,* p. 403), neither of which have direct bearing on his theories of animal nature.
[32] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*. Évreux 1992, t. VI, p. 214.
[33] *Ibid*.
[34] *Ibid.,* pp. 214-215.

Gassendi recognizes that the idea of an animal-machine is merely an attempt to protect religious dogma and not an attempt to present a true account of animal existence that accords with experience. He agrees that the existence of an animal-machine would be useful if there were clear proof of its veracity, but the proposition, he contends, is patently false:

> Certainement il seroit à souhaiter qu'on pût bien clairement demontrer ce qu'avance Perera, et ses Sectateurs, parceque cela etabliroit une difference tres considerable entre l'Ame des Brutes, et celles des Hommes; mais quel moyen de demontrer une chose qui paroit si manifestement fausse? Et qui est ce qui en pourra jamais estre persuadé? Ou qui est ce qui pourra jamais croire qu'un Animal qu'on ecorche tout vif, qui crie qui se debat, et qui grince des dents, ne sente pas davantage qu'un morceau de parchemin qu'on dechireroit[35]?

Gassendi preserves his piousness by admiring Pereira's intent, but dissents on the grounds that his argument lacks persuasive power. To illustrate this fact, Gassendi resorts not only to the example of sensation he deems undeniable in the citation above, but also employs a string of examples that indicate reasoning ability among animals.

Gassendi's initial examples are the web use of spiders, the construction of dams by beavers, and the maternal behavior of hens[36]. As complex as some of these behaviors are — Gassendi gives a detailed description of the architecture of a beaver's lodge — they still represent what one might term instinctive behaviors. He adds various examples which show that animals can deny instinctive responses, such as a donkey that refuses to advance over the edge of a cliff no matter how hard its master beats it. This, he claims, demonstrates its ability to reason despite its reputation for being the stupidest animal:

> Mais pour vous faire souvenir de l'exemple de l'Animal qu'on pretend estre le plus sot de tous les Animaux; quand on a conduit un Asne jusques sur le bord d'un precipice, on a beau le battre, on a beau pousser la Machine à coup de pieds, elle n'avancera jamais, il ne precipitera jamais, mais ou il suspendra son mouvement, encore qu'il soit porté, ebranlé, et determiné vers le precipice, ou il se detournera mesme enfin si on le presse trop, et retournera sur ses pas, tant il est vray qu'il connoit le danger, qu'il a quelque pressentiment du mal qui luy arriveroit s'il se precipitoit, et qu'il semble preferer les coups, et la douleur presente à une future[37]!

In addition to the extensive list of examples that Gassendi provides, he maintains the possibility of a great number more: «Je pourroy icy rapporter cent autres particularitez des Animaux qui toutes seroient des marques authentiques de leur connoissance»[38]. All of these examples of animal reasoning suggest the falsehood of the animal-machine theory.

[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 215-216.
[37] *Ibid.,* p. 217.
[38] *Ibid.,* p. 218.

Gassendi makes it clear that he does not mean to say that animals reason exactly as humans, but Leonora Cohen Rosenfield correctly notes that for Gassendi «the difference between animal and human reasoning is one of degree and not of kind»[39]. He does, however, uphold the superiority of human reasoning ability, which operates at a higher degree of perfection than that of animals:

> Mais quoy, disent-ils, en voulez vous donc faire des Animaux qui soient proprement et absolument Raisonnables comme les Hommes? Non assurement; car quelque perfection que nous remarquions dans leurs actions, elles paroissent toujours si basses, et si imparfaites au regard de celles des Hommes, qu'on est contraint d'avoüer qu'elles partent d'un principe tout à fait different…[40].

A «principe tout à fait different» implies more than a difference of degrees, and when Gassendi details the gap between human and animal reasoning abilities, the differences are considerable enough to support that conclusion:

> …elles sont incapables de parvenir par le Raisonnement à la connoissance des choses incorporelles, de se reflechir sur leurs propres actions, qui est une des principales marques du vray Raisonnement; de faire des abstractions, et de raisonner sur les choses universelles; de connoitre le Bien honneste, et de le suivre abandonnant le Bien sensible; et qu'enfin elles sont sans liberté, et toujours determinées à une certaine chose selon les mouvemens divers et necessaires de la matiere dont elles sont et composées, et agitées[41].

There is little difference between Gassendi's animal and a machine. The description above sheds some light on the role of the will Gassendi purports in animal impulsive actions. If the animal has understanding, it cannot reflect upon that understanding. If it knows the relationship of cause to effect, as in the example Gassendi gives concerning a dog that reaches a desired food item by mounting items nearby to reach it[42], it is nonetheless drawn to the food item mechanically. If one applies Gassendi's limitations to the case of the donkey that refuses to plunge over a precipice, the donkey's will is apparent in its denial of the impulse to advance that its master's blows represent, and it chooses the pain of the blows over that of the fall from a height, this latter because it has an understanding of the peril that faces it. Nonetheless the whole process is deterministic in nature because of the completely material nature of the beast. Gassendi's animal is a machine, but apparently not purement machine because he allows for animal sensation, imagination, and understanding, even though the last he limits to non-abstract and non-reflexive functions. Olivier Bloch even notes similarities between Gassendi's proofs of the gap between human and animal intellectual abilities in the *Syntagma Philosophicum* and those found in

[39] L. Cohen Rosenfield, *From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine: Animal Soul in French Letters from Descartes to La Mettrie*. New York 1941, p. 10.
[40] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*, cit., t. VI, p. 218.
[41] *Ibid.,* pp. 218-219.
[42] *Ibid.,* p. 217.

Descartes's *Discours de la méthode*[43]. Despite human perfections and Gassendi's description implying a difference of kind rather than degrees, he reaffirms that the difference between human and animal mental abilities is not enough to warrant a distinction of kind to humans: «Il est vray, disent les plus Zelez, qu'il y a une grande difference entre les operations des Brutes, et celles des Hommes, mais cela ne semble pas suffire pour etablir une difference specifique entre elles et nous»[44]. Gassendi thus concurs with Montaigne that humans are animals, and as Rosenfield points out, «Man is simply the highest type of animal»[45]. His description of animal abilities, however, does contradict his conclusion to some extent.

Aside from the differences that do exist between Gassendi's animal and the «purement» machine animal, and the evidence for falsehood of the animal-machine, Gassendi does have another reason for refuting the idea. Since he believes that the opinion exists only to support Christian dogma, he worries that perceived need of such a support undermines the church. He finds the animal-machine just as dangerous for religion as Descartes finds the rational animal:

> Certainement je ne porte point envie à leur zele, j'ay deja dit qu'il seroit à souhaiter que cela se peust bien demontrer, mais cependant je les prie de prendre garde, comme j'ay aussi deja insinué, que le remede qu'ils veulent apporter ne soit pire que le mal, et que ce ne soit, comme je pense, une des plus dangereuse[s] Doctrine[s] qui puisse[nt] estre introduite[s] dans le Christianisme: Car de prendre à tasche comme ils font de detruire toutes les raisons sur lesquelles les Philosophes, et les Theologiens ont jusques icy etabli la difference specifique de l'Ame Humaine, et de celle des Brutes, et de soûtenir que si l'on n'admet pas que les Brutes soient insensibles, l'on soit obligé d'admettre qu'elles sont de mesme Categorie que nous, ou que nous sommes donc de mesme Categorie qu'elles; c'est vouloir fonder cette difference, c'est à dire la spiritualité de l'Ame humaine, sur l'Insensibilité des Brutes, ou ce qui est le mesme, c'est vouloir fonder un article de Foy sur un principe qu'ils ne prouvent par aucune raison, qui paroit evidemment faux, qu'ils ne persuaderont jamais à personne, et dont ils ne sont apparemment point persuadez eux mesmes, ce qui est asseurement sinon un tres malicieux, du moins tres dangereux Dessein: Comme si la Religion ne pouvait plus subsister sans ce beau et nouveau principe, *Les Brutes ne sentent point, les Brutes ne sont que de pures Machines*! Admirable fondement de la plus importante verité du Christianisme[46]!

In essence, Gassendi states that it is below the church to use animal nature to found religious truths. His argument illustrates how reason can cut both ways, as Descartes is among those who declare the rational animal dangerous for Christianity, and Gassendi holds the same to be true of the animal-machine. Gassendi does not object to the distinction made between human and animal spirituality, and so his philosophy offers evidence that a rational animal can coexist with an immortal soul exclusive to humans.

[43] O. Bloch, *La Philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, Matérialisme et Métaphysique,* cit., pp. 403-404.
[44] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*, cit., t. VI, p. 219.
[45] L. Cohen Rosenfield, *From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine*, cit., p. 10.
[46] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*, cit., t. VI, pp. 219-220.

To understand how this is possible in Gassendi's case, one needs to examine his theories of the soul. Bernier's presentation of Gassendi's philosophy of the soul consists of three chapters. The first deals with the question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul, the second is on the nature of the animal soul, and the third is on the nature of the human soul. These divisions show the importance of the materiality/immateriality of the soul and the distinction between humans and animals that differences in the soul represent to Gassendi's philosophy. Gassendi's task is difficult, because despite the similarity between humans and animals he admits, his philosophy must allow for some difference to justify the immortality of the human soul. Even more difficult is any suggestion that implies the materiality of the human soul, for the official position of the church is that the soul is incorporeal. Gassendi must avow his adherence to church dogma even as he questions it. Accordingly, just such an avowal appears in Bernier's chapter on the question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul.

The chapter opens, however, with a denial that exact knowledge of the soul is Gassendi's goal: «Si nous entreprenons icy de traiter de l'Ame, comme la marque interieure par laquelle les Animaux sont distinguez du reste des corps, ce n'est point tant que nous esperions de connoitre sa nature, que parce qu'on ne doit pas ignorer jusques où les Philosophes ont en cela poussé leurs connoissances»[47]. Gassendi's strategy, therefore is to display the opinions of antiquity regarding the nature of the soul, among which are both those for and against its immateriality. The declarations of several classical minds on the inpenetrability of the soul precedes Gassendi's own assertion of the same which he rests on the limitations of human reason to which the disagreement among philosophers attests: «cette grande discorde des Philosophes fait assez voir qu'il n'est rien de plus foible, de plus obscur, de plus inconstant [than human reason]; ce n'est pas que la veritable raison soit contraire à ce que l'Esprit de Dieu definit, mais l'Esprit humain fragile, et chancelant raisonne ordinairement mal lorsqu'il est abandonné à luy-mesme»[48]. This comment serves to buttress Gassendi's disclaimer at the opening of the chapter.

Gassendi does make a pronouncement on the nature of the soul before his list of philosophical opinions on the matter, not based on human reasoning but rather on faith:

> La Foy nous enseigne une chose dont nous ne devons point douter, asçavoir *Que l'Ame humaine est une substance incorporelle, et immortelle, qui n'est point tirée de l'essence Divine, ni de quelque domicile Celeste où elle existast auparavant; mais qu'elle est cré[é]e de rien, multipliée selon le nombre des corps, existante par soy, et essentiellement forme*. C'est ainsi que les derniers Conciles l'ont défini[49].

[47] *Ibid.,* t. V, p. 291.
[48] *Ibid.,* p. 293.
[49] *Ibid.,* p. 292.

Here is a very precise account of the soul that accords with Descartes's immaterial and immortal version fairly well, and that no one should doubt according to Gassendi. Yet he follows this definition with a remark that undermines the authority of the church's pronouncement by ingenuously bringing to light its conflict with earlier church opinion: «De sorte que les SS. Peres, S. Hierôme, S. Augustin, S. Gregoire, ne peuvent plus dire à l'égard de l'Origine de l'Ame, *Qu'ils n'en ont rien de certain, rien qui soit defini, que cette question e*[*s*]*t indissoluble dans cette vie, et autres choses semblables*»[50]. He even connects these opinions indirectly with heresy: «La chose nous est maintenant marquée, et définie, l'Eglise ne souffrant pas que nous balancions entre tant de differentes Opinions de Philosophes, et d'Heretiques»[51]. These remarks in tandem with his superficial affirmation of the official stance of the church are representative of his technique throughout the chapter on the question of the materiality or immateriality of the soul. He never departs from a position of complete propriety, in line with church dogma, but supplies evidence that gives reason to doubt the dogma to which he defers.

The extent to which Gassendi deviates from church dogma and the sincerity of his religious convictions are a matter of debate, but Olivier Bloch demonstrates that his faith is real, as are his efforts to reconcile a materialist philosophy with his religion[52]. Some matters lie purely in the realm of faith, and Gassendi places them «au-dessus de toute discussion»[53]. Gassendi's treatment of the soul, however, appears to question a religious doctrine that contradicts observation and experience, although he ostensibly accepts the immortality of the soul.

He dutifully reports a quantity of philosophical opinions in favor of the incorporeal soul such as Pythagorus, Plato, and Aristotle. In addition, he also includes the heretical Manicheans and he closes his presentation of Aristotle's immaterial soul with a couple of off-hand objections[54]. His list of those who support the corporeal soul is much more extensive, thus already throwing some doubt on the immaterial soul by the sheer weight of the opinions to the contrary. The group consists of Diogenes, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Hippocrates, and Zenon and the Stoics[55]. Speaking of Epicurus, Gassendi takes the opportunity to show that common opinion both agrees and disagrees with his corporeal soul, depending on whether it is the human or animal soul that is in question: «quoy qu'on accorde à Epicure que l'Ame est Corporelle à l'egard des Brutes, on ne [le] luy accordera point à l'egard de l'Ame humaine, principalement entant quelle est

[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Ibid.,* pp. 292-293.
[52] O. Bloch, *La Philosophie de Gassendi: Nominalisme, Matérialisme et Métaphysique,* cit., p. 299 *et passim*.
[53] *Ibid.,* p. 320.
[54] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*, cit., t. V, p. 298.
[55] *Ibid.,* pp. 298-299.

Raisonnable, Esprit, Entendement, comme nous dirons ensuite plus au long»[56]. To counterbalance this approval of Epicurus, Gassendi reminds his readers that he elsewhere demonstrates the weakness of Epicurus' argument for the necessity of a material soul[57]. Gassendi's views regarding Epicurus are important for his own speculation concerning the soul that occurs in the following chapters.

The reader leaves the first chapter with a foreshadowing of Gassendi's two-part human soul. He writes, «il ne faut que distinguer deux choses en nous avec Philon, asçavoir l'Animal, et l'Homme, l'Animal acause de l'Ame par laquelle nous vivons, et qui nous est commune avec les Brutes, et l'Homme acause de l'Entendement par lequel nous raisonnons et qui est spirituel, et l'image de Dieu»[58]. This dual understanding of humanity includes a material component, but Gassendi is careful not to openly contradict the church's definition of the soul that appears earlier in the chapter. He simply supplies some reason to doubt current religious dogma in the form of earlier church opinion that supports the materiality of the soul:

> Je ne diray rien icy des SS.Peres qui ont cru que l'Ame humaine mesme estoit Corporelle; on sçait bien qu'avant que l'Eglise eust défini la chose dans les dernier Siecles, c'estoit une Opinion assez commune; il n'y a qu'à voir les paroles que se lisent dans les anciens Conciles: *Des Anges et des Archanges, et de leurs puissances ausquelles j'ajoute nos Ames, cecy est le sentiment de l'Eglise Catholique; que veritablement ils sont intelligibles, mais qu'ils ne sont pourtant pas invisibles, et destituez de tous corps, comme vous autres Gentils le croyez, car ils ont un corps fort delié soit d'air, soit de feu*. Tertullien devoit estre de ce sentiment lors qu'il soutenoit, *que l'Ame ne seroit rien si elle n'estoit corps, et que tout ce qui est, ou existe est corps à sa maniere*. D'où vient que S.Augustin dit de Tertullien qu'il a cru que l'Ame estoit corps, *par ce qu'il n'a pû la concevoir incorporelle, et qu'ainsi il craignoit que si elle n'estoit corps, elle ne fust rien*[59].

Gassendi says more than «rien» by concluding his treatment of the human soul with examples of earlier church opinion in support of its materiality. While reading between the lines, Gassendi's own doubt concerning the church's contemporary position seeps through, and the reader is undoubtedly more willing to accept Gassendi's rendering of the human soul and its similarities and contrasts with the soul of animals.

Gassendi defines the animal soul, speaking only of living creatures other than humans, as that force «qui estant dans le corps fait que l'Animal est dit vivre, et exister, comme il est dit mourir lorsqu'elle cesse d'y estre»[60]. He rejects the opinions he treats in his discussion of the immateriality or materiality of the soul that support an immaterial animal soul[61]. He speculates that the animal soul is «quelque substance tres tenue, et comme la fleur de la matiere»[62]. Gassendi

[56] *Ibid.,* p. 299-300.
[57] *Ibid.,* p. 299.
[58] *Ibid.,* p. 300.
[59] *Ibid.,* pp. 300-301.
[60] *Ibid.,* p. 303.
[61] *Ibid.,* p. 304.
[62] *Ibid.*

provides reasons that essentially amount to the warmth of the living body and its connection to the movement of small units of matter to support his conclusion that the animal soul is

> …une especе de feu tres tenu, ou une especе de petite flamme, qui tant qu'elle est en vigueur, ou qu'elle demeure allumée, fait la vie de l'Animal, lequel meurt lors qu'elle s'eteint, que pour cela il faut que dans le reste du corps il y ait de petites cavitez, et de petis passages libres et ouverts dans lesquelles ce petit feu, ou cette petite flamme puisse se mouvoir librement…[63]

The animal soul is a material substance that spreads itself throughout the body and is responsible for all basic life functions. What the animal soul lacks is the immortal reasoning soul of humans, what Gassendi refers to in his discussion of the animal soul as «l'Entendement immortel»[64].

This is the great difference between the human soul and the animal soul. The corporeal soul is of «only one kind» but exists in more and less perfect versions» according to Lolordo[65]. The differences in degrees between animal souls imply the possibility of a corporeal human soul that differs from those of animals only by degree of perfection. Lolordo claims that this is the case of plants and animals in Gassendi's philosophy, the soul of each not differing in kind but rather degree of functionality, animals' souls being capable of both vegetative and sensitive functions[66]. Gassendi may then be a philosopher who does not categorically consider all animals the same, allowing for greater and lesser degrees of perfection between animal species, and therefore greater and lesser reasoning and language abilities. As such he breaks from traditional Western philosophy as Derrida portrays it in *L'Animal que donc je suis*, which characteristically lumps all animals together and deprives them of their difference.

Gassendi's examination of the human soul begins with a strong statement in favor of an immaterial immortal soul, but as in his treatment of the immateriality of the soul elsewhere, he tempers his stance by noting the difficulty that accompanies the position:

> Il nous faut maintenant parler de l'Ame Humaine, à l'egard de laquelle la Foy, et la Raison nous obligent de raisonner autrement qu'à l'egard des autres. Car si les libertins qui ne craignent point de passer pour Impies, et pour temeraires, disent en un mot que l'Ame humaine ne differe de celle des Brutes que selon le plus ou le moins, et qu'elle est corporelle, ceux qui reconnoissent que non seulement elle est capable des dons surnaturels et immortels, mais aussi qu'elle est douée d'une faculté d'entendre, et de raisonner qui n'appartient nullement aux autres Animaux, la tiennent Incorporelle, et croyent qu'elle tire son origine immediatement de Dieu. Cependant une chose peut faire quelque diffculté; c'est que l'Ame de l'homme est non seulement raisonnante, et intelligente, par où l'on peut dire qu'elle est distinguée de celle des Brutes, et qu'elle est Incorporelle, et l'ouvrage de la main de Dieu, mais de plus qu'elle est sensitive, et

[63] *Ibid.,* p. 305.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 303.
[65] A. Lolordo, *Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy,* New York 2007, p. 203.
[66] *Ibid.*

vegetative, ce qui luy est commun avec l'Ame des Brutes, et qui pourroit donner lieu de croire qu'elle seroit corporelle…[67]

The difficulty is the same that Gassendi points out to Descartes, that similarities between humans and animals argue for a soul of the same nature. A theory of the human soul must take these similarities into account. Gassendi resolves the problem by attributing two souls to humans, the sensitive soul, which it has in common with animals, and the rational soul, which belongs to humanity alone. The sensitive soul is material, and the rational soul immaterial and immortal[68].

Gassendi sees two principal advantages to the theory of two souls. The first is that it accords well with Christian doctrine:

Or que l'Ame humaine soit composée de deux parties, l'une Raisonnable, et l'autre Irraisonnable, c'est ce qui s'accorde merveilleusement avec les Theologiens, lorsqu'ils distinguent dans nostre Ame deux parties, l'une superieure, l'autre inferieure, appuyant specialement leur distinction sur ces paroles de l'Apostre, *Je vois dans mes membres une autre Loy qui repugne à la Loy de mon Esprit*. Car comme une mesme et simple chose ne peut pas se contrarier à elle mesme, il semble que de ce combat qui est entre le Sens, et l'Esprit, ou l'Entendement, l'on doit inferer que l'Esprit, et le Sens, c'est à dire l'Ame Raisonnable, et la Sensitive sont choses differentes[69].

The second advantage is that it accounts for both the resemblances and differences between humans and animals without contradiction by attributing a sensitive soul to both and a reasoning soul only to humans. It also has religious benefits:

…on peut commodement expliquer par là [the two-soul system] comment il se peut faire que l'homme à l'egard d'une partie ait esté fait un peu moindre que les Anges, et subsiste par cette partie apres le trepas, et a l'egard de l'autre, qu'il ne differe en rien des Brutes, et ayt la mesme destinée que les Chevaux, et autres semblables Animaux, ensorte qu'il soit dit selon la premiere vivre une vie intellectuelle, et Angelique, et selon la derniere une vie Animale, et pareille à celle des Bestes, selon la premiere estre fait à l'image, et à la ressemblance de Dieu, et selon la derniere estre comparable, et semblable aux Chevaux, aux Chiens, et aux autres Animaux qui n'ont point de raison[70].

Gassendi's human being is, like Descartes's, somewhere between angels and animals, and like Descartes's possesses an immortal, incorporeal soul. Unlike Descartes's human being, Gassendi's also possesses a material soul that accounts for life functions, sensation, and imagination.

The division between human and animal mental functions is not as abrupt in terms of the soul, since animals also possess a sensitive soul and are capable of sensation and imagination, even understanding of a certain kind, as Gassendi's example of the mule that will not jump over a precipice attempts to

[67] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*, cit., t. V, p. 313.
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 315.
[69] *Ibid.* p. 317.
[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 317-318.

illustrate. In the end, however, Gassendi's animal is not that far removed from Descartes animal-machine. Despite their ability to communicate, to imagine, etc., animals' operative powers do not exceed the domain of the sensitive soul and they therefore do not quite qualify as reasoning beings: «Concluons donc à l'egard des Brutes, qu'on n'en peut veritablement pas faire des Animaux qui puissent proprement, et absolument estre dits Raisonnables […] mais qu'apres tant de marques de sentiment et de connoissance, nous ne pouvons pas aussi en faire de pures Machines insensibles»[71]. Gassendi's debate with Descartes is more about the differences in the faculties and properties that each attributes to the rational soul and the possession of a material sensitive soul by humans than about the abilities of animals.

3. Conclusion

Although animal nature figured prominently in the extensive argument between Descartes and Gassendi, the real focus of their disagreement is Descartes's argument for the immateriality of the human soul and its implications. Upon close examination, Gassendi's animals differ little from Descartes's, despite some fundamental differences in theory. For each, the animal is a completely material being, hence matter accounts for every aspect of animal behavior. Descartes's and Gassendi's theoretical differences fall into two general categories: the details of animal mechanics and the existence of animal intelligence. Descartes explains animal mechanics by positing the existence of animal spirits whereas Gassendi attributes the same animal functions to a material sensitive soul. Descartes denies the existence of animal thought of any kind, much less animal reasoning ability, but Gassendi's sensitive soul allows the animal limited intelligence in the form of sensation, imagination, and understanding.

The difference between the two seems to lie in the internal life of animals. The notion of consciousness is not available to either philosopher, but Descartes's *cogito* is a close approximation. The *cogito* is concomitant with the possession of that immaterial thinking substance Descartes equates to the soul. By denying animals a soul, Descartes divests them of any thinking ability at all. Put in another way, matter can never produce thought. This is where Gassendi disagrees; matter, in the form of the sensitive soul, can produce thought of a limited sort. Where the two agree is that animals are incapable of abstract reasoning, this ability is exclusive to humans.

Turning to humans, the similarities between Descartes and Gassendi are even more salient, though this owes something to Gassendi's deference to the church. Descartes cleanly divides human nature into two inextricable substances: the material body and the immaterial mind. The human body functions exactly as an animal's, while the mind accounts for every aspect of human intelligence. Gassendi's human body also operates exactly as that of an animal, with each possessing a material sensitive soul. The sensitive soul does, however, account

[71] F. Bernier, *Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi en VII tomes*, cit., t. V,I p. 223.

for those mental functions falling short of true reasoning ability. Gassendi agrees with Descartes that true reasoning ability is the domain of an immaterial soul, and each distinguishes humans from animals by virtue of its possession.

Contributi/1

Ten theses on Animality

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Ten theses on animality are presented in order to delineate what the philosophical concept of "animality" really is. The ten theses are: Animality, Animality is different from anti-speciesism: Animality does not directly concern ethics; Homo sapiens has never been an animal; Animality and language; Animality and immanence; Animality beyond animals; Animality and the "mystical"; Becoming-animal.

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1. Animality[1]

Let us take the following famous case, a flock of starlings above the sky of Rome. This is a mobile living form, which lasts no more than a few seconds, because just after a new form will appear, and so on. What is more astonishing, in such a form, is that it is not planned. There is not such an entity like the master starling. The very form coincides with its own developing, the essence with the appearance, and the space with the time. From a human point of view, the moving flocks are marvelous. Nevertheless, do the starlings of the flock perceive such a wonder? Each starling of the flock takes into account just six or seven starlings that fly nearby[2]. This means that every starling does perceive the movements of the starlings that are close to it only. That is, it does not perceive the whole of the flock. The beauty of such a phenomenon goes unnoticed by the starlings that give life to such a wonder. For this reason, it is a beauty full of grace, just because the biological reason, which explains its own existence – a flock defends better against avian predators – it is not relevant at all, in our perceiving its intrinsic beauty. A flock of starlings is an example of *animality*, that is, a living movement that is not explained by evolutionary reasons. Better, the evolutionary reasons do not explain the whole of the phenomenon. For human beings, a flock

[1] I thank Daniela Angelucci and Leonardo Caffo for their comments to an earlier version of this text.

[2] M. Ballerini, N. Cabibbo, R. Candelier, A. Cavagna, E. Cisbani, I. Giardina, V. Lecomte, A. Orlandi, G. Parisi, A. Procaccini, M. Viale, V. Zdravkovic, *Interaction ruling animal collective behavior depends on topological rather than metric distance: Evidence from a field study*, *PNAS*, 2008, vol. 105(4), pp. 1232–1237.

of starling is marvelous. A flock of starlings is gratuitous. Animality appears every time something appears which exceeds its own material or biological conditions. Animality is intrinsically free: «All the natural movements of the soul are controlled by laws analogous to those of physical gravity. Grace is the only exception»[3].

Such a definition implies that the scope of animality is wider than the animal world. Animality means a life, which extends itself beyond the taxonomic boundaries Biology or Geology have fixed. Therefore, an animality event can be something which is not living. There is animality each time a life in this wider sense appears which is not forced into the limits of our classifications; a life, which runs away from all sides; a life, which is not worried by *our* ontological concerns. Take the case of the flock. We perceive the flock; we do not perceive the single starlings. Animality pertains to the flock. The flock somewhat lives by its own, even if 'its' life is very short and without goal or project. It simply lives. A life that aims to anything but to its own living, this is animality. Deleuze defines such a state «pure immanence», which «eludes all transcendence of the subject and of the object. Absolute immanence is in itself; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject»[4]. Animality is the free and erratic movement of the flock. Animality *always* surprises us. We think that life is 'naturally' divided in genera and species, and we are not aware that such a classification help us more to defend ourselves from the mobile oddness of animality than to understand it. Animality is such a life that our language does not dispose of a label that can

[3] S. Weil, *La Pesanteur et la grâce,* Paris 1947 (Eng. tr. *Gravity and Grace*, London 2003, p. 1).
[4] G. Deleuze, *Immanence: une vie…*, in *Philosophie*, 1995, vol. 47, p. 4-7 (Eng. tr. *Pure Immanence. Essays on Life*, A. Boyman ed., New York 2001, p. 26).

contain it with no remains. Let us take the case of the limestone stones in the image.

The stone has an important philosophical history. According to a celebrated Heidegger proposition, «[l.] the stone (material object) is worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming»[5]. The stone is such an entity that is without world; it is a piece of the world, but as to itself it brings nothing into the world. The stone is nothing but a thing; it is apparent «the *living character of a living being*, as distinct from the non-living being which does not even have the possibility of dying. A stone cannot be dead because it is never alive»[6]. A limestone, for example, can be composed of skeletal fragments of marine organisms such as coral or foraminifera. That is, once limestone was somewhat alive, and maybe it will be alive again in the future, when 'its' material will be incorporated into another living organism. It is quite strange, limestone cannot die, however it can be alive. Heidegger seems to assume that quite a rigid demarcation exists between the stone, the animal and the human being, like if passages and transformations between them were impossible. However, the stone is without world:

> Let us provisionally define world as those beings which are in each case accessible and may be dealt with, accessible in such a way that dealing with such beings is possible or necessary for the kind of being pertaining to a particular being. The stone is without world. The stone is lying on the path, for example. We can say that the stone is exerting a certain pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is 'touching' the earth. But what we call 'touching' here is not a form of touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like *that* relationship which the lizard has to the stone on which it lies basking in the sun. And the touching implied in both these cases is above all not the same as that touch which we experience when we rest our hand upon the head of another human being[7].

Heidegger assumes that the stone does not have any 'living' relation with the «surface of the earth». It simply stays where it happened to stay. On the contrary, Darwin showed that what lies on the surface of the earth is continually transformed into «vegetable mould» by the action of worms (instead, according to Heidegger, «it lies upon the earth but does not touch it»[8]), which literally eat and digest the ground creating new fertile soil:

[5] M. Heidegger, 1927, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude*, Translated by W. McNeill and N. Walker, Indiana University Press 1995, p. 177.
[6] *Ibid.,* p. 179.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 196.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

so that the whole superficial bed of vegetable mould passes through their bodies in the course of every few years. From the collapsing of the old burrows the mould is in constant though slow movement, and the particles composing it are thus rubbed together. By these means fresh surfaces are continually exposed to the action of the carbonic acid in the soil, and of the humus-acids which appear to be still more efficient in the decomposition of rocks. The generation of the humus-acids is probably hastened during the digestion of the many half-decayed leaves which worms consume. Thus the particles of earth, forming the superficial mould, are subjected to conditions eminently favourable for their decomposition and disintegration. Moreover, the particles of the softer rocks suffer some amount of mechanical trituration in the muscular gizzards of worms, in which small stones serve as mill-stones[9].

There is a continuous passage of material and energy between the soil and the living beings, and vice versa. Stones slowly take part of such a movement. Stones do not merely stay where it happened to befall. They interact with the world, they transform it at the same time the world transforms them. The very same living mechanism apply to the lizard, which transforms its own world when necessary[10]. For example, lizards (*Acanthodactylus beershebensis*) actively and quickly change their own diet when confronted with a mutated habitat with an increasing danger of predation[11]. The lizard, like the stone, 'have' a world, even if the way and the scope the changes they can 'do' are much more slow and gradual then the changes human beings introduces into the world. When the stone 'does' something, there animality shows itself. The 'life' of things implies animality:

Patrols of vegetation once halted on stupefied rocks. Then thousands of tiny velvet rods sat themselves down cross-legged.

After that, ever since the apparent stiffening of the moss and its marshals against the rock, everything in the world — caught in inextricable confusion and fastened underneath — panics, stampedes, suffocates.

What's more, hairs have sprouted; with time, everything has grown more shadowed. Oh, hairy preoccupations growing ever hairier! Thick rugs, in prayer when one is sitting on them, rise up today with muddled aspirations. In this way not only suffocations, but drownings occur.

Now it is becoming possible to scalp the austere and solid old rock of these terrains of saturated terrycloth, these dripping bath mats[12].

Animality implies the inhumane attempt to look the world from the point of view of the world itself. Derrida places himself in the position of the object of the cat look[13]. This is the first move toward animality; in fact, what animality requires to us is assuming the position of being watched by a thing, a stone for

[9] C. Darwin, 1881, *The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms with Observations on their Habits*, London 1881, pp. 305-306.
[10] Cf. J. Odling-Smee, K. Laland, M. Feldman, *Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution*, Princeton 2003.
[11] D. Hawlena, V. Pérez-Mellado, *Change your diet or die: predator-induced shifts in insectivorous lizard feeding ecology*, in «Oecologia» 1999, vol. 161, pp. 411–419.
[12] F. Ponge, *The Voices of Things*, New York 1971, pp. 46-47.
[13] J. Derrida, *L'Animal que donc je suis*, Paris 2006.

example. Heidegger describes the stone like something that is completely at our own disposal: «the earth is not given for the stone as an underlying support which bears it, let alone given as earth. Nor of course can the stone ever sense this earth as such, even as it lies upon it. The stone lies on the path. If we throw it into the meadow then it will lie wherever it falls. We can cast it into a ditch filled with water. It sinks and ends up lying on the bottom»[14]. The stone is the object, the man – Heidegger himself – the subject. What animality requires is to take into account what the stone 'does' even when it seems to be nothing but a mere thing. In a sense the patient stone 'allows' the man to throw itself into the ditch. It needs a lot of patience to be a stone. It needs to 'realize' that there is life at the bottom of the ditch too. Animality is such a slow patience: «love of God is pure when joy and suffering inspire an *equal* degree of gratitude»[15].

2. Animality is different from anti-speciesism

Anti-speciesism argues against our – as *human* animals – more or less explicit «speciesism»[16], the frequently unnoticed consideration that our point of view about life and world as the *unique* relevant, morally and philosophically, point of view. Taking into account the non-human animal point of view is the first goal of anti-speciesism: the basic point is the «equal consideration of the interests of all animals»[17]. Therefore, anti-speciesism is mainly concerned with non-human animals, while animality has a wider scope. Take the following situation, a chimpanzee behind the bars of a cage:

An anti-speciesism activist will rightly try to free the chimpanzee, because it is very probable that the animal has the interest and the desire not to be encaged. Anti-speciesism takes into consideration the point of view of the non-human animal. Anti-speciesism is against anthropocentrism as a peculiar human form of speciesism: «a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one's own species and against those of members of other species»[18]. The difference between anti-speciesism and animality show itself when one

[14] M. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude*, cit., p. 197.
[15] S. Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, cit., p. 63.
[16] P. Singer, *Animal Liberation*, New York 2002[3], p. 9.
[17] *Ibid.,* p. 231.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

analyzes how the first movement defends its own thesis. According to Tom Regan animal have the right to have some rights because they are «subjects-of-a-life», therefore they are not mere things (like Heidegger's stone). If a living being is a «subject-of-a-life», it will have some form of subjectivity, therefore interests and feelings. That is, its life matters. In this sense, a «subject-of-a-life» is part of the «moral circle»[19] which contains those sentient animals whose life is morally relevant:

> Subjects-of-a-life not only are in the world, they are aware of it and aware, too, of what transpires "on the inside," in the lives that goes on behind their eyes. As such, subjects-of-a-life are something more than animate matter, something different from plants that live and die; subjects-of-a-life are the experiencing center of *their* lives, individuals who have lives that fare experientially better or worse for themselves, logically independently of whether they are valued by others. At least in the case of mammals and birds, then, the conclusion we reach is simple: as a matter of fact, these animals, as is true in our case, are subjects-of-a-life[20].

The «subject-of-a-life» definition is not far from the way Heidegger defined man as «world-forming». The difference is that Heidegger narrowed down such a condition to *Homo sapiens* only, while Regan extends it to many other animals. However, the core definition is very similar: «subjects-of-a-life» are the «experiencing center of *their* lives». Here the model of animal life is *human* life. A «subject-of-a-life» is morally relevant because it actively does something of its own life. A «subject-of-a-life» has to have interests and feelings in order to survive because it has been thrown into life without any guarantees. The same occurs to the Heidegger «Dasein», the human being: «this Dasein, however, occurs in freedom. Possibility, change, and predicament are obscure. Dasein stands before possibilities it does not foresee. It is subject to a change it does not know. It constantly moves in a predicament it does not have power over»[21]. This definition similarly applies to a «subject-of-a-life». On the contrary, a plant, and a fortiori a stone, are not a «subject-of-a-life» or a «Dasein». Where Heidegger favors human species only, Regan favors (many) non-human species also; apart of this (in any case important) difference, both share the same somewhat 'humanistic' idea of nature and non-living world as something submissive to animal life. Animal life is modelled on human life: «sheep and hogs, mink and beavers, owls and ravens, for example, are psychologically present in and to the world, with mental lives that, while not as complex as ours, are not simple by any means. In particular, like us, they have both preference interests and welfare interests»[22]. The key point is such «like us»; they deserve moral consideration just because they are «like us», just because «they [are] like us in being subjects-of-

[19] Id., *The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology*, New York 1982.
[20] T. Regan, *Animal rights, human wrongs: an introduction to moral philosophy*, Ranham 2003, p. 93.
[21] M. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude*, cit., p. 19.
[22] T. Regan, *Animal rights, human wrongs: an introduction to moral philosophy*, cit., p. 38.

a-life»[23]. Even though its moral value, anti-speciesism essentially tries to extend the boundaries of the *human* «moral circle» to accommodate inside it *some* other animals. From this point of view, it really does not dismantle the anthropocentric 'humanistic' prejudice. If the chimpanzee in the cage has to be freed because it is somewhat «like us», we are not yet over anthropocentrism.

3. Animality does not directly concern ethics

Since «cows and pigs, coyotes and mink, robins and crows» are «subjects-of-a-life», therefore they «are our psychological kin. Like us, they bring to their lives the mystery of a unified psychological presence. Like us, they are *somebodies,* not *somethings.* In these fundamental ways, they resemble us, and we, them»[24]. The ontological ground of anti-speciesism is such a fundamental distinction between «somebody» and «something». Ethics – the doctrine of values and rights – applies to «somebody» only. The question of animal rights is exactly an ethical question. What it is worth keep in mind is that ethics always implies some reference to humanity. For example, the life of the chimpanzees deserve to be safeguarded because they are «like us». Everywhere ethics apply, where a *human* concern is implicitly or explicitly present. Take the case of the developing field of environmental ethics. In such a case also the reference point of view is the human one:

> Adapting Life to space will require major biological changes, helped by designed evolution. Our designs will then become self-fulfilling, and we shall need to propagate life deliberately in order to secure our survival. Life centered ethics can motivate this quest, secure the future, and shape it with far-reaching, even cosmic, consequences. Therefore life-centered ethics themselves need always to be propagated[25].

The problem of environmental ethics is, as anthropomorphically usual, «our survival». Let us take another example, the concept of "sustainable development"; according to United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is a «development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs». The human «future generations» are at stake here, not the Heidegger stone. Therefore, if ethics implies a more or less hidden reference to humanity, animality does not matter ethics. Animality is the *inhuman* attempt to look at the world from the point of view of stones: «all existence is drawn through the sieve of humanity, the rich world of things discarded like chaff so thoroughly, so immediately, so efficiently that we don't even notice. How did it come to this, an era in which "things" means ideas so often, and stuff so seldom?»[26].

[23] *Ibid.,* p. 94.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] M. Mautner, *Life-centered ethics, and the human future in space*, «Bioethics», 2009, vol. 23(8), pp. 433–440, p. 439.
[26] I. Bogost, *Alien Phenomenology, or What It's Like to Be a Thing*, Minneapolis 2008, p. 3.

The issue of animality does not directly concern ethics because it radically endorses a post-humanistic world, that is, a world that is not centered on humanism: «posthumanism [...] is […] posthuman*ist*»[27]. In such a world, there are no ethics in the humanistic sense, because there are no more beings, which claim to represent the reference standard (ethics for animality has to be invented from scratch). In such a world to be «like us» is no more a privileged status. There are no ethics in the way a thing interacts with another thing. Following a suggestion of Deleuze, animality implies ethology (a kind of topology of bodies), not ethics: «In a morality, you always have the following operation: you do something, you say something, you judge it yourself. It is the system of judgement. Morality is the system of judgement. Of double judgement, you judge yourself and you are judged. […] Judging always implies an authority superior to Being, it always implies something superior to an ontology. It always implies one more than Being, the Good which makes Being and which makes action, it is the Good superior to Being, it is the One»[28]. The world of animality is morally flat. There are neither the Good nor the Value, human and animal, animate and inanimate. There are bodies (animals, plants, stones and so on) that interact each other. The key question is not what a body is, rather what such a body can do:

> Knowing what you are capable of. This is not at all a moral question, but above all a physical question, as a question to the body and to the soul. A body has something fundamentally hidden: we could speak of the human species, the human genera, but this won't tell us what is capable of affecting our body, what is capable of destroying it. The only question is the power of being affected. What distinguishes a frog from an ape? It's not the specific or generic characteristics, Spinoza says, rather it's the fact that they are not capable of the same affections[29].

However, there is a prospective where ethics still takes place in animality. It has to do with the power of each body to make connections with other bodies. For example, such a power implies that the body does not hide itself behind the distinctions Heidegger set up: the stone, the animal, the man. A body is nothing but its own capacity to make connections with other bodies:

> My eye, for example, my eye and the relative constancy of my eye are defined by a certain relation of movement and rest through all the modifications of the diverse parts of my eye; but my eye itself, which already has an infinity of parts, is one part among the parts of my body, the eye in its turn is a part of the face and the face, in its turn, is a part of my body, etc. ... thus you have all sorts of relations which will be combined with one another to form an individuality of such and such degree[30].

[27] C. Wolfe, *What is posthumanism?*, Minneapolis 2010, p. XV: «posthumanims in my sens isn't posthuman [...] but is only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy, inherited from humanism itself [...]».
[28] Cf. G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, *Mille plateaux. Capitalisme et schizophrénie*, Paris 1980 (Eng. tr. *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, translation of B. Massumi, Minneapolis 1987).
[29] Cfr. G. Deleuze, *Cours Vincennes: 1978-1981*, http://www.webdeleuze.com.
[30] *Ibid.*

The ethics of animality has nothing to do with values and norms. It is the power to move towards always new bodily connections, while at the same time to preserve the absolute singularity of such a body: «two tendencies with opposite extremes: to destroy the self for the sake of the universe, or to destroy the universe for the sake of the self. He who has not been able to become nothing runs the risk of reaching a moment when everything other than himself ceases to exist»[31]. What is at stake is an ethics capable to pay attention to stones and trees, like this pine tree here below: maybe it is not sentient in the same sense as a frog is[32], so what?

4. Homo sapiens has never been an "animal"

According to a standard zoological definition, an animal is a «multicellular, heterotrophic organism that develops from an embryo derived from gametes produced in specialized organs or surrounded by somatic cells. Typically, animals are motile – that is, capable of independent locomotion – at least during some stage of the life cycle, and have sensory apparatus with which to detect changes in their immediate environment»[33]. Let us take the case of the zebra in the image:

According to this definition, a zebra is an animal, because it cannot directly fix carbon for its own growth, therefore it uses organic carbon; its body develops from an embryo derived by two gametes: it is capable of independent locomotion; has a sensory apparatus with which it detects changes in its immediate environment. From a zoological point of view, an animal life develops itself around the body and its immediate surroundings. Animal life precisely takes place in the "where" and "when" of the body.

[31] S. Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, cit., p. 142.
[32] But see F. Baluška, S. Mancuso, D. Volkmann, (Eds.), *Communication in Plants. Neuronal Aspects of Plant Life*, Berlin 2006.
[33] M. Allaby ed., *A Dictionary of Zoology*, Oxford UK 1999², p. 28.

If one accepts such a standard zoological definition – it seems quite uncontroversial – a typical member of the species *Homo sapiens* is not an "animal". The key difference lies in the fact that a typical human life does not have to do with its «immediate environment». The zebra can be worried because it smells the odor of a hidden lion, or because it does not smell the flavor of its preferred flower. On the contrary, a woman can be worried by the rumors of a possible future reorganization of the factory where she is working; or she can remember her mother who died many years before. A typical human life extends itself well beyond its own body *hic et nunc*. While a typical animal life all develops itself where the body actually is, a typical human life develops itself forward and back in time and space. In human life, there is quite a deep separation between the body and what such a body can think to, hope for, remember and so on. The human body is right here, but 'its' thoughts can be very far – in space and time – from it. It is true that animals too are somewhat capable to detach themselves from their own «immediate environment»[34], but it seems quite indisputable that in the typical human life there is an enormous degree of detachment from it. Notwithstanding the dramatic anatomical and genetic similarities between *Homo sapiens* and all other living beings, human life is made of activities and thoughts that are not present in the rest of the zoological world. Such a statement obviously does not mean that human life is better or worse than zebra life, for example. The point is that human life is dramatically different from animal life.

If one takes into account such a typical characteristic of *human* life, therefore *Homo sapiens* is not an animal, at least not in the same sense, as a zebra is an animal. The main theoretical consequence of such statement is that so far human animality is completely unknown[35]. "Animality" means a life that completely and radically coincides with itself. Animality means a life without detachment from the *hic et nunc* of the body. On the contrary, since actual human life is completely detached from the immediacy of the body, there is no animality in human life. Human life is a zoological life without animality. *Homo sapiens* is human just because s/he does not know her/his own animality.

5. Animality and language

It seems that no life is possible without some capacity of communication[36]. Human language serves to communicate, but essentially, it is *not* a means of communication. Let us take the case of the zebra. Zebras react to alarm signals of antelopes that live nearby[37]. This means that zebras understand a "signal" – even if conspecifics did not emit it – as a material entity, that stands for a particular entity in the world, in this case probably a predator. This a perfect

[34] Cf. D. Griffin, *Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness*, Chicago 2001[2].
[35] See F. Cimatti, *Filosofia dell'animalità*, Roma-Bari 2013.
[36] Cf. D. Favareau ed., *Essential Readings in Biosemiotics. Anthology and Commentary*, Berlin 2010.
[37] Cf. B. Penzhorn, *A Long-term Study of Social Organisation and Behaviour of Cape Mountain Zebras* Equus zebra zebra, «Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie,», 1984, vol. 64(2), pp. 97-146.

example of animal communication: a sender, a mutual (interspecific) code, a signal that 'means' something, a recipient, which understands the 'meaning' of such a signal. This is communication. The key structural point is that in animal communication each signal correspond to a determinate entity or action/situation in the world; there is no such a thing as a signal to whom nothing refers to, like the English word "nothing" or "empty". In animal communication, for example, there are no signals for negation[38]. This means that an antelope cannot communicate the message "there are *no* lions". It can communicate, "There are lions" only. The absence of sign, in animal communication codes, which express the logical operation of negation, prevents nonhuman animals to think of what is not already contained in their «immediate environment». Therefore, an antelope – like a zebra – seems forced to think of what it perceives only. On the contrary, language allows human beings to detach themselves from their «immediate environment»[39]. If a "means of communication" is a code, which connects signals to objects in the world, then human language is not mainly a means of communication, because the majority of human language signs do not refer to objects and/or events in the world.

The other main definitional character of human language is syntax. Take the case of the syntactic operator *merge*: «the computational mechanism that constructs new syntactic objects Z (e.g., 'ate the apples') from already-constructed syntactic objects X ('ate'), Y ('the apples')»[40]. The interesting point is that *merge* is recursive, that is, it can be applied to a previous application of the very same computational mechanism. Therefore, from "ate the apples" is possible to construct a new sentence, by applying *merge* to this sentence and to another one already formed: "ate the apples" and "drank the water" → "ate the apple and drank the water", and so on. There is nothing similar to *merge* in nonhuman animal communication codes[41]. The combination of negation and *merge* allows human mind to detach itself from the «immediate environment»[42].

The exemplar case of detachment is self-detachment. The personal pronoun "I" is not a simple synonymous of the word "body". In fact, "I" speaks of the body like "*her/his* own body". The "I" and the body are conceived as *two* entities – the latter anatomical, the first psychological – even if both are connected to the same material object. In fact, the "I" *has* a body; this means that the "I" thinks of itself like something separate from it. In this sense, human being has never been an animal, because such a self-separation seems not to exist in nonhuman animals. An antelope, like a zebra, or like any other (nonhuman) animal is the totality of the life it actually lives, nothing more, nothing less. A nonhuman animal coincides with its own life; a human being is detached from

[38] See M. Hauser, M. Konishi eds., *The Design of Animal Communication*, Boston 1999.
[39] See P. Virno, *Saggio sulla negazione*, Torino 2013.
[40] R. Berwick, A; D. Friederici, N. Chomsky, J. Bolhuis, *Evolution, brain, and the nature of language*, «Trends in Cognitive Sciences» 2013, vol. 17(2), pp. 89–98, p. 89.
[41] M. Hauser, M. Konishi eds., *The Design of Animal Communication*, cit.
[42] F. Cimatti, *Il taglio. Linguaggio e pulsione di morte*, Roma-Macerata 2015.

its own body. Language is the «computational mechanism» that separates human being from its own life. The language dispositive breaks human animality off[43].

6. Animality and immanence

Animality is such a condition where life simply adheres to itself, without any self-reflexive margin, without doubts or desires, hopes or regrets. Animality is a life that simply lives the life it is actually living. From this point of view, animality is not restricted to animals or plants; a stone either stays where it happened to stay[44]. Animality does not look for something else it already is. Animality is not motionless, because it favors the intrinsic movement of life. In this sense, animality coincides with immanence: «we will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is the complete power, complete bliss»[45].

Immanence is a difficult concept to think of. When one think of a concept "X" immediately defines it as "non Y". That is, one of the main ways of thinking something consists in opposing it to another concept, its 'contrary', like if each concept had its own contrary. In this case it seems there is no contrary of immanence. Immanence is properly not the contrary of transcendence. If the two concepts were the one the opposite of the other, it would be a continuous transition of one into the other and vice versa, like between idealism and materialism. Immanence properly is such a condition where this never-ending transition stops. Immanence is the life, which lives the life it lives: «The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts. If one were to be confused with the other there would be nothing to stop concepts from forming a single one or becoming universals and losing their singularity, and the plane would also lose its openness»[46]. Geology can offer a useful analogy. In the image here below, one can see the fault that diagonally cuts the geological strata; at the same time, one can see the extremely slow and inexorable continuous movement of the strata in respect of one another. The overall movement is unitary, but the different directions of such a movement can strongly diverge.

[43] G. Agamben, *The Sacrament of Language*, Stanford 2011.
[44] F. Cimatti, *Linguaggio e immanenza. Kierkegaard e Deleuze sul "divenir-animale"*, in «Aut Aut», 363, 2014, pp. 189-208.
[45] G. Deleuze, 1995, *Immanence: une vie…*, «Philosophie», vol. 47, p. 4-7 (Eng. tr. *Pure Immanence. Essays on Life*, A. Boyman ed., Zone Books, New York 2001, p. 27).
[46] G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, *What is philosophy?*, H. Tomlinson G. Burchell eds., Columbia University Press, New York 1994, p. 35.

This image should show how immanence is not at all static, while at the same time, it is capable to sustain within itself divergent and violent thrusts. In this sense, immanence is not the contrary of something else, because it absorbs and neutralizes the distinctions between subject and object, presence and absence, space and time. Immanence is immanence: «concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them. The plane envelops infinite movements that pass back and forth through it, but concepts are the infinite speeds of finite movements that, in each case, pass only through their own components»[47]. Animality is the immanent movement of life.

7. Animality beyond animals

Animality is plenty of animals, but not only animals. Animality is beyond humanistic desire (or condemnation) to rule nature and animals. Animality is life, which has no more needs to be thought of by a human mind. Animality is a life, which remains the very same life while transforming from one mobile form to another one: «the plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as *Nous* and as *Physis.* That is why there are always many infinite movements caught within each other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven, like a gigantic shuttle. To turn toward does not imply merely to turn away but to confront, to lose one's way, to move aside»[48]. Take the following examples: a school of fishes, a drawing of the flood by Leonardo, a galactic spiral. What they have in common is not the material they are made of: what is unchanged between them is the style of movement. A style, which is not transcendent in respect to them. It is a style completely immanent to such a movement. These are not three tokens of a unique type. It is like the situation we found in the geological strata: a *unitary* movement, which passes through different manifestations and force directions. It is always one and the same immanent life, which lives through these three styles of life, which seem to be three to our weak and afraid look only.

[47] *Ibid.,* p. 37.
[48] *Ibid.,* p. 38.

Diverse movements of the infinite are so mixed in with each other that, far from breaking up the One-All of the plane of immanence, they constitute its variable curvature, its concavities and convexities, its fractal nature as it were. It is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept. Every movement passes through the whole of the plane by immediately turning back on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or allowing itself to be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, connections, and proliferations in the fractalization of this infinitely folded up infinity (variable curvature of the plane)[49].

8. Animality and nature

Animality is nature, if and only if nature is no more conceived like a benign and benevolent entity[50]. Life is «immanence of immanence», therefore, it does not foresee any special consideration for human or for animal or vegetable life. Life carries out *its own* life, it does not admit any form of teleology (any teleology is a form of transcendence). There is nothing good in nature, like there is nothing evil in it. Life lives. Animality begins when one neither hopes in nature nor accuses it. Animality begins when humanism gives way to the life of immanence:

> Man (and likewise the other animals) is not born to enjoy life, but only to perpetuate life, to communicate it to others who come after him, in order to preserve it. Neither he himself, nor life, nor anything in this world is properly for him, on the contrary his entire being is for life. — A terrifying, but a true proposition and conclusion of all metaphysics. Existence is not for the existent being, it is not directed towards the existent being, nor is interested in the good of the existent being; if there is any experience of good, it is purely by chance: the existent being is for existence, entirely for existence, this is its only real end. Existent beings exist so that existence exists, the individual existent being is born and exists so that existence continues and therefore existence may be preserved through it and after it. All this is clear considering that the true and only end of nature is the preservation of the species, and not the preservation or the happiness of individuals; a happiness wich does not even exist at all in the world, not for individuals nor for the species[51].

9. Animality and the "mystical"

It is clear, what anti-speciesism has to do, to free animals from the sufferings to whom human beings force them. For this reason, anti-speciesism is a form of ethical thinking, for better or worse. For better, because anti-speciesism can promote new laws and habits which will improve animal life. For worse, because anti-speciesism is still a form of humanism. Anti-speciesism saves the

[49] *Ibid.,* pp. 38-39.
[50] J. Foss, *Beyond environmentalism: a philosophy of nature*, New York 2009.
[51] G. Leopardi, *Zibaldone*, M. Caesar and F. D'Intino eds., Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 2013, p. 1817.

animals at the price of considering them like (more or less developed) forms of humanity (the famous «like us»). Since animality is not an ethical position, it pushes us to do nothing. Animality is not a doctrine, is a way of living: «this irreducible 'I' which is the irreducible basis of my suffering — I have to make this 'I' universal»[52]. To make it «universal» does not mean an aspiration or a hope, because immanence hopes and dreams nothing. On the contrary, it means to remain well fixed on one's own foot. That is, it means to accept to live the life one is already living. To live one's own life, it completely means to disappear into it. Only such a life is «universal», which does not look for something else beyond the actual life it lives: «on the plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon»[53]. To be the life one is living, and to be «already on the absolute horizon». Such a body still exists as an impersonal singularity[54], but it is also completely widespread into the world.

Wittgenstein had a similar idea, when he presented in the *Tractatus* his concept of 'subject': «For the form of the visual field is surely not like this»[55]:

This is the *wrong* way to represent the visual field. Because presents if the subject (the eye) as detached from what she/he is seeing. This is the wrong way to represent the visual field because it presumes that there is a difference between the subject – who watches – and the object, the visual field. On the contrary, the visual field is a unitary scope of visibility. In it, there is light, movement, visibility, and nothing else. What once upon a time was the autonomous subject now coincides with the visual field. When such a condition is attained, it becomes apparent that «the world is independent of my will»[56]: «even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would only be a favour granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no *logical* connexion between the will and the world, which would guarantee it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not something that we could will»[57]. The subject only, thinks of itself to be a voluntary agent who acts on a passive object. However, when s/he realizes the intrinsic movement of life that drags her/him, then animality/immanence appears. At this point ethics is no more possible, nor useful:

[52] S. Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, cit., p. 147.
[53] G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, *What is philosophy?*, cit., p. 38.
[54] R. Esposito, *Third Person*, Cambridge UK [2008] 2012.
[55] L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D. Pears and B. McGuinness eds., Routledge, London and New York [1921] 2001, § 5.6331.
[56] *Ibid.*, § 6.373.
[57] *Ibid.*, § 6.374.

When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou shalt . . .', is laid down, one's first thought is, 'And what if I do not do it?' It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms. So our question about the *consequences* of an action must be unimportant. — At least those consequences should not be events. For there must be something right about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself[58].

The key point is that the value of the action «must reside in the action itself». This is immanence. The perfect adherence to the life one is already living. At this point, the opposition between subject and object is completely vanished. It remains the continuous becoming of life only: «to view the world sub specie æterni is to view it as a whole — a limited whole. Feeling the world as a limited whole — it is this that is mystical»[59]. The «mystical» is not a norm of action, nor a rule or a law. The «mystical» is the condition one reaches when leaving off any desire of being elsewhere. This is the immanent condition of a body, which feels at home into the world: «the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem. (Is not this the reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)»[60]. The «vanishing of the problem» is the condition of someone who considers no more her/his life as a problem to solve; s/he simply accepts the life s/he lives. It is important to stress out that such an acceptance is not a humiliation or a waiver, because they are still acts of will (will means transcendence, separateness, humanism). The life of immanence is beyond will and desire. To 'becomes' world is the «vanishing of the problem».

10. Becoming-animal

Animality does not aim to any end-state, just because animality is immanence, and immanence is complete by itself. However, a human being has never been an animal. Human animality is less known. The only possibility humans have to live immanence is by «becoming-animal». For this reason, it is a «becoming» and not a «returning» animal. The becoming-animal presupposes a completely different experience of language, the «computational mechanism» which produces transcendence and separateness[61]. Only an animal that speaks can desire to get rid of language. Language, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is «the ability [...] to represent all the other strata and thus achieve a scientific conception of the world. The scientific world [...] is the translation of all of the flows, particles, codes, and territorialities of the other strata into a sufficiently

[58] *Ibid.*, § 6.422.
[59] *Ibid.*, § 6.45.
[60] *Ibid.*, § 6.521.
[61] G. Agamben, *L'uso dei corpi*, Neri Pozza, Milano 2014; F. Cimatti, *Il taglio. Linguaggio e pulsione di morte*, cit.

deterritorialized system of signs, in other words, into an overcoding specific to language»[62]. Language is the ability to transform «all of the flows» of life into a «system of signs». No matter exists wich language cannot transform into signs: therefore «this situation gives rise to certain imperialist pretentions on behalf of language»[63], because «language is made not to be believed but to be obeyed, and to compel obedience»[64]. Becoming-animal is properly the attempt to find a way out of such a situation where language «compel obedience» to us. Becoming-animal is such a *human* way of living that tries to resemble animality:

> For if becoming animal does not consist in playing animal or imitating an animal, it is clear that the human being does not "really" become an animal any more than the animal "really" becomes something else. Becoming produces nothing other than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes[65].

«What is real» – this is the key point – «is the becoming itself, the block of becoming». Language transforms all flows into signs, into separate entities wich each stands in isolation against each other. Language first stiffens then stops the flow. Finally, no more flow slides, and what remains is a series of separate entities, some of which say "I" (disembodied subjects), the others are transformed into motionless objects. Becoming-animal is the attempt to put in motion such a frozen field:

> a becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself; but also that it has no term, since its term in turn exists only as taken up in another becoming of which it is the subject, and which coexists, forms a block, with the first […] There is a block of becoming that snaps up the wasp and the orchid, but from which no wasp-orchid can ever descend. There is a block of becoming that takes hold of the cat and baboon, the alliance between which is effected by a C virus. There is a block of becoming between young roots and certain microorganisms, the alliance between which is effected by the materials synthesized in the leaves (rhizosphere)[66].

What does the *human* «becoming-animal» become in the end? What is at stake here is the human organism. As long as the human being is an addition of mind and body, immanence is out of reach. In fact, «becoming-animal» is becoming a unitary corporeity. Deleuze and Guattari propose quite an unusual definition of what a body is. A body is the totality of connections (rhizomes) it can take part of: «on the plane of consistency, a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power

[62] G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, cit., p. 62.
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 238.
[66] *Ibid.*

or degree of potential (latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds»[67]. «Longitude» is its own singularity; «latitude» are all the affective interactions it can participate in. Such a notion of body does not only apply to living objects, because in «the plane of consistency of Nature» this distinction is no longer useful. A completely new and richer world now shows itself, with plenty of strange and unusual individualities:

> A season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date have a perfect individuality lacking nothing, even though this individuality is different from that of a thing or a subject. They are haecceities in the sense that they consist entirely of relations of movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and be affected[68].

We are so sadly accustomed to divide the world into subjects and objects; who speaks and what is spoken; animate and inanimate entities that we do not even realize how poor such an ontology is. «You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life (regardless of its duration) — a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack (regardless of its regularity). Or, at least you can have it, you can reach it. A cloud of locusts carried in by the wind at five in the evening; a vampire who goes out at night, a werewolf at full moon»[69]. If a fog is an individuality, this implies giving up such a special position we assign to ourselves in the world. Only a being that is able to participate in the flow of life can experience a fog as a form of individuality. Someone who feels no longer the conformist need to divide the world into things and places can position himself quietly beside a tree or a sunset, taking part to a unitary haecceity: «this should be read without a pause: the animal-stalks-at-five-o'clock. The becoming-evening, becoming-night of an animal, blood nuptials. Five o'clock is this animal! This animal is this place!»[70]. Where is the animal, and where is the time, in the «the animal-stalks-at-five-o'clock»? Is it still possible to distinguish between the one who does something from the space where its action takes place? In fact a «haecceity has neither beginning nor end, origin nor destination; it is always in the middle. It is not made of points, only of lines. It is a rhizome»[71]. Such a rhizome is an infinite field of hacceities:

> there are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages. Nothing develops, but things arrive late or early, and form this or that assemblage depending on their compositions of speed. Nothing subjectifies, but haecceities form according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects. We call this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds and haecceities, the plane of consistency or composition (as opposed to the plan(e) of organization or development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocality. We therefore call it the plane of Nature, although nature has nothing to do with it, since on this plane there is no distinction between the natural and the artificial. However many dimensions

[67] *Ibid.,* p. 260.
[68] *Ibid.,* p. 261.
[69] *Ibid.,* p. 262.
[70] *Ibid.,* p. 263.
[71] *Ibid.*

it may have, it never has a supplementary dimension to that which transpires upon it. That alone makes it natural and immanent. The same goes for the principle of contradiction: this plane could also be called the plane of noncontradiction. The plane of consistency could be called the plane of nonconsistency[72].

[72] *Ibid.,* p. 266.

¶ Sezione 1/a

Due nature

La contrapposizione tra (anima) animale e natura umana

Articoli/3

*Von der Seele der Tiere und dem menschlichen Denken**

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The intelligence of animals is marvellous; their communication by signs is extremely refined, nobody can deny it. How can one defend the opinion that animals cannot think? My thesis: The mental activities of animals can be explained as psychological processes, they cannot be subsumed under the norms of logics, they are not true or false, they don't contradict each other, they are not necessarily affirmative or negative. By this, thinking activities of men are different from the intelligence of animals.

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Überblick

Es soll zunächst an den Anfang aller Anfänge erinnert werden, an die *arché*, die Schöpfung oder das unvordenkliche Chaos oder den poesielosen Urknall vor über 13 Milliarden Jahren. Er ist Thema der Physik, die nach unserer kolportierten Einsicht in ihren Grundzügen gegen jeden Zweifel resistent ist: der Anfang fand wirklich statt, Raum, Zeit und sich entwickelnde Formen der Energie breiten sich aus bis heute. Die Zäsur, die uns auf dem Weg vom Anfang hin zu uns selbst interessiert, ist die Entstehung von Lebewesen, die räumliche und zeitliche Wahrnehmungen und Vorstellungen entwickelten; dies wiederum war nur möglich mit je subjektiven Vorstellungsbühnen, auf denen Dinge und Ereignisse erscheinen, sie sind Thema der Biologie und Psychologie. Und drittens folgen die besonderen Lebewesen, die nicht nur etwas wahrnehmen und in sich als äußerlich vorstellen, sondern es erkennen können, etwas als etwas: den Anfang als den Anfang, das Ende als das Ende und den Morgenkaffee als solchen. Zu diesem Erkennen und seinem Mitteilen sind wir Menschen befähigt, aber wohl keine anderen Tiere; sie können durch die Jahrtausende vor sich hin

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leben, die Einzeller, die kaledonischen Krähen und die Schimpansen, das uns so vorteilhafte und schädliche Denken ist ihnen dagegen versagt, wenn unsere folgenden Konjekturen zutreffen. Ob diese drei Stufen der kosmologischen Wirklichkeit (13 Milliarden Jahre, größte galaktische Schauspiele), der zweckgerichteten Biologie und Psychologie (Darwin und die Folgen) und drittens des Denkens der Menschen mit ihren Einfällen und ewigen Einwänden für sich und aus sich möglich sind oder ob noch viertens oder erstens ein großer Manitou dazu gehört, als denknotwendig anbietet, das wird hier nicht erörtert, nicht einmal gefragt.

Noch eine Vorbemerkung: Die Ebene, in der unsere Überlegungen angesiedelt sind, ist ein Alltagspragmatismus. Wenn ich Wörter benutze wie 'ich' oder 'Mensch' oder 'rot', dann bin ich nicht gewappnet gegen gelehrte Nachfragen des Typs, woher ich denn überhaupt wisse, was 'ich' oder 'Mensch' etc. bedeute. Ich gestehe gleich: Ich weiß es nicht genau, ich vertraue nur darauf, dass wir uns einigermaßen verständigen können und uns schon jetzt in einem Areal bewegen, in dem Nachfragen möglich sind und als sachlich erörtert oder als eristisch abgewiesen werden können; man bricht dann, wie schon Aristoteles empfahl, das Gespräch ab und spricht über das Wetter oder die letzten Gichtanfälle.

Bekanntlich lassen sich mit ziemlich schmutzigem Wasser ziemlich schmutzige Gläser ziemlich rein waschen, mehr ist hier nicht angestrebt. Aber lassen Sie mich noch in diesem pragmatischen Wegspülen von Irrtümern auf eine spagathafte Zumutung verweisen: Wir sollen uns einerseits in einer wissenschaftlich abgesicherten Welt von Erkenntnissen und damit Wirklichkeiten bewegen, und andererseits sagt jeder hermeneutisch eingestimmte Historiker, dass es selbstverständlich keine objektive Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit gibt, sondern nur subjektive Vorstellungen, die dem historischen Wandel unterliegen. Wir sind Opportunisten und wechseln blitzschnell die Ansicht.

Im übrigen wird versucht, mit der Rede Gedanken herzustellen, die fertigen Überlegungen aufzuheben und sie noch einmal zu erzeugen, jetzt.

1. Der Anfang von Raum und Zeit + (...): „Thank you, nature" (CERN, 4. Juli 2012). Zur Erinnerung

Es muss nach den beglaubigten Erkenntnissen der Physik und Kosmologie einen Anfang von allem gegeben haben, der nicht von unserer Vorstellungs- und Denkfähigkeit begleitet war, sich geräuschlos, wortlos, unvorgestellt und unvorstellbar und absolut unabhängig vollzog. In der Wissenschaft wird mit näher bestimmten Qualitäten von Raum, Zeit und Energiegrößen operiert; diese sind in einer Evolution begriffen und gelangen in ca. 13 Jahrmilliarden zu den Formen, die wir heute vorfinden.

Diese genetische Szene ist in zwei Ebenen zweifelsimmun. Wir können uns nicht skeptisch gegen den Stand der Kosmologie überhaupt wenden, und wir können der Wissenschaft nicht die Grundlage entziehen, indem wir dem

Substrat überhaupt das Sein verweigern. Wir müssten für das erstere eingehen auf die vorliegenden wissenschaftlichen Teilschritte und wären dadurch immer schon weiträumige Ja-Sager statt Skeptiker. Hat das Universum zu dieser Zeit diese oder jene Ausdehnung? Ist es aus diesen oder jenen Elementen zusammen gesetzt? Wie steht es um die Hitzegrade? Nicht mehr: Gibt es sog. Schwarze Löcher, sondern als was genau gibt es sie?

Für das Zweite gilt: Um unseren Generalzweifel nicht nur à la Descartes im je eigenen Geist zu denken, sondern ihn öffentlich zu äußern, etwa in diesem Buch hier, bedarf es der Wirklichkeit der Welt, in der der Zweifel mitgeteilt wird, wir würden uns also regelwidrig selbst widersprechen, wenn wir der Außenwelt ihr doch gehörtes oder gedrucktes Sein absprächen. Aber wie, wenn die öffentliche Mitteilung nur mein Traum ist und mit ihr auch alle andere vermeintliche Wirklichkeit? Das Traumargument sticht nicht, weil der Begriff des Traumes substantiell klingt, tatsächlich aber auf das Gegenteil angewiesen ist; 'Traum' ist ein Relationsbegriff, nicht-wirklich; wer also auf die unwirklichen Träume setzt, braucht ihren handfesten Kontrast, die Wirklichkeit. Und weiter: Die Wirklichkeit einer nur im Inneren gedachten wie auch der geäußerten Rede ist auf eine objektive Wirklichkeit der Rede vieler Subjekte angewiesen; das Denken kann sich nicht selbst im Monolog erdenken, es kann sich nicht selbst ausdenken, auch in Gott nicht und durch Gott nicht. Aber damit greifen wir dem Gang der Ereignisse vor.

Der Anfang von allem kann nur *post festum* zurückberechnet und -gedacht werden, dies kann im Einzelnen irren, ist jedoch pauschal zweifelsimmun.

Zweifelsimmun und doch mit dem Einbekenntnis, die Herkunft des Anfangs nicht zu kennen. Für uns ist unbegreiflich, wie aus ihm das Ergebnis wurde, das es ermöglicht, sich selbst zum Gegenstand dieser Erkenntnis zu machen. Schon in der Antike lachte man über Epikur, der aus bloß mechanischen Prinzipien die Welt herleiten wollte. Wie sollte das möglich sein?

2. Weltgegenstände und -ereignisse als Vorstellungen von Lebewesen. Die Intervention der Psyche und ihrer Bühne mechanischen Prinzipien die zweckbestimmte Welt herzuleiten

Die erste Weltepoche, die wir insgesamt als immun gegen jeden späteren sinnvollen Zweifel annehmen wollten, endet mit einer unsichtbaren Revolution. Vorher gibt es die Welt durch ihre vielen Milliarden Jahre in rasanter Expansion als pures 'An sich ohne Für sich', ohne Hörer, Betrachter, unbemerkt, ohne mitdenkendes Subjekt. Sie endet mit Pflanzen und sich selbst bewegenden Lebewesen. Diese wiederum benötigen äußere Empfindungen, eine innere Erinnerung ebendieser Empfindungen und die Stimulierung einer Handlung zur Lebens- oder Arterhaltung. Die Selbstbewegung also führt äußere Reize mit sich, die äußeren Reize oder Empfindungen werden auf einer inneren, perspektivischen Vorstellungsbühne deponiert und wirken dort attraktiv oder repulsiv; das Ergebnis stimuliert das äußere körperliche Handeln des

Lebewesens. In der Verhaltensforschung wird dieser Kreislauf von außen nach innen und wieder nach außen als ein essentielles Thema besprochen. Hier schon gilt: Die Lebewesen existieren im äußeren objektiven Raum, und dieser Raum wird zugleich einverleibt als perspektivischer Vorstellungsraum jedes einzelnen Tieres und Menschen. Hierauf kommen wir gleich zurück.

3. Die Entstehung des Denkens der Menschen

Denken ist eine geistige Tätigkeit, die wir z. B. jetzt in deutscher Sprache ausüben. Wird der Vortrag übersetzt, ist es *derselbe* Vortrag auch in anderen Sprachen. Kein nicht-menschliches Lebewesen würde dem nach unserer Kenntnis zustimmen; Tiere unterscheiden menschliche Laute offenbar nur als akustische Zeichen, während wir darüber hinaus diese Laute als künstliche Symbole erkennen, die das identische Denken in unterschiedlichen Verlautbarungen ermöglichen. Dasselbe gilt für die schriftliche Fassung; Tiere können verschiedene optische Zeichen als solche wahrnehmen, aber sie erkennen nicht die Identität der verschiedenen Zeichen qua sprachlicher Symbole. Für sie ist der übersetzte Text notwendig ein *anderer* Vortrag. Wir wollen uns im Folgenden über die mentalen Fähigkeiten von Tieren im Grenzbereich des Denkens verständigen. Eine Ausgrenzung der Tiere aus dem Kreis der denkenden Wesen schmerzt oder empört heutzutage jeden korrekt gesinnten Menschen; aber wer behauptet, Tiere könnten sich ihrerseits über unsere Fähigkeiten verständigen, würde nach einigem Zögern doch ausgelacht werden. Auf der *documenta 2012* wurde behauptet, dass Erdbeeren und Feldhasen über uns nachdenken und dass sie das Wahlrecht für Menschen beschlossen haben, aber den Beweis dafür blieb die Leiterin uns schuldig.

Die These

«Beschreibende Sätze in allen menschlichen Sprachen bestehen zumindest aus einem Subjekt und einem Prädikat und erlauben eine Negationstransformation.»[1] Denken in dem hier gemeinten Sinn soll durch diese 'S ist / ist nicht P'-Struktur bestimmt sein. Die Explikation dieser Sätze, Behauptungen oder Urteile findet sich schon bei Platon, der als Beispielsatz das Urteil bringt: «Theätet fliegt»[2], zu ergänzen ist das *notwendig mögliche*

[1] R. G. Millikan, *Die Vielfalt der Bedeutung. Zeichen, Ziele und ihre Verwandtschaft*, Frankfurt a.M. 2008, p. 139; S. 300 u. ö.

[2] Hier wird nur paraphrasiert, was Platon im *Sophistes* 261c6-263e13 ausführt; ihm dient als Beispiel des Denkens oder Urteilens die minimale Verknüpfung von Subjekt und Prädikat, «Der Mensch lernt» (262c9), «Theätet sitzt bzw. fliegt» (263a2 und 8) mit den jeweiligen Verneinungen.; *apophasis* 257b9 u.ö. S. auch Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, 16a. Menschliches Denken und Sprechen sind, weil bezogen auf Seiendes oder sein Gegenteil, notwendigerweise Bejahung oder Verneinung. Platon und Aristoteles nehmen eine Zäsur an zwischen mentalen Möglichkeiten, die auch die Tiere haben, wie z. B. das Unterscheiden (*krinein*) und der menschlichen Denkfähigkeit wie der *dianoia*.

«Theätet fliegt nicht», was hin und wieder vorkam. Am Anfang steht der einfachste Satz aus Subjekt und Prädikat qua Bejahung oder Verneinung. Tiere sind offenbar zur Bildung dieser so einfachen und nützlichen Struktur nicht in der Lage. Sie können, so weit wir wahrnehmen oder erschließen können, nicht denken. Sie müssten wenigstens eine von zwei Bedingungen erfüllen: Sie müssten ihre Denktätigkeit unmittelbar in einer ihrer 'Sprache' mitteilen und / oder es müssten Bereiche ihres Verhaltens nur durch eine Tätigkeit des eben charakterisierten Denkens möglich sein. Tiere, so dürfen wir vorweg annehmen, erfüllen keine dieser beiden Bedingungen; sie verbleiben immer nur in der *Psychologie* und unterwerfen sich nicht der *Logik*, die unser mitteilbares Denken bestimmt oder bestimmen kann. Nichts in der inneren oder äußeren Natur als solcher kann negieren oder widersprüchlich sein, wohl aber unser Denken und Sprechen. Dass umgekehrt unsere psychischen Geschehnisse nicht völlig zum Denken in diesem Wortsinn gehören, versteht sich von selbst, wir imaginieren und assoziieren und fühlen und ersehnen und verabscheuen, halluzinieren und träumen gedankenlos und bilderreich vor uns hin.

Alle Phänome der mentalen Ausstattung von Menschen und Tieren sind als solche so negationsresistent wie die Alpen. Es gibt eine Wissenschaftsfraktion und viele ihrer Anhänger, die ängstlich bedacht sind, dass dies als Wahrheit bitte auch nicht bezweifelt wird; in der politischen Landschaft würden wir sie zu den Repubikanern zählen. Sie können die Negation nicht ausstehen und verbitten sich in erfolgreichen euphorischen Publikationen wie *Wie Tiere denken. Von sprechenden Walen, gläubigen Affen und Vögeln mit Sinn für Kunst* (GEO 2012) so abwegige Fragen wie die einfache: Können Tiere sich widersprechen? Gibt es überhaupt eine Publikation mit dieser neugierigen Nachfrage? Sollen Tiere denken können ohne die Möglichkeit des Widerspruchs? Ohne Ahnung von Logik? So wie die Pflanzen und Steine, aber anders als Menschen, die permanent Einspruch erheben und sich widersprechen können.

Bei den komplizierten wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen zur Frage, ob Tiere denken können, fehlt meistens die Angabe dessen, was denn genau erreicht werden soll, um auf die Frage «ja» oder «nein» zu antworten. Was heißt 'denken', zu dem die Tiere vielleicht nicht befähigt sind? Julia Fischer möchte sich einen weiten Begriff des Denkens offen halten[3]; dadurch umgeht sie die Frage, ob es vielleicht eine harte Zäsur in der Natur gibt zwischen der spezifisch menschlichen geistigen Tätigkeit und der der anderen Tiere, eine Zäsur, die grundsätzlich verhindert, dass sie, die anderen, sich *über* unser Denken oder sonst etwas Gedanken machen. Wir sind der antiquierten Meinung, dass es hierin eine Grenze zwischen Menschen und Tieren gibt; beim Fliegen ist uns der Kondor überlegen, beim Schwimmen jeder Stichling, beim Kriechen die Schlange, aber beim Denken stechen wir alle aus.

[3] J. Fischer, *Affengesellschaft*, Berlin 2012, S. 90, aber damit geht auch die spannende Frage verloren, wo die entscheidende Grenze zwischen Menschen und Tieren ist; die Sprache ohne gleichzeitige Implikation des Denkens ist uninteressant, sicher auch für Humboldt, S. J. Fischer, *Affengesellschaft*, cit., S. 245.

Zu den weiteren Festsetzungen soll gehören, dass die wahr-falsch-Kennzeichnung den Sätzen im diskursiven Denken und Sprechen vorbehalten bleibt. Eine passende Schraube wird man allenfalls als die richtige bezeichnen, das Glucksen des Huhns beim Auffinden von Futter wird von den Küken als willkommen erlebt, aber nicht als wahr oder falsch; welch ein Gelächter auf dem Hühnerhof! Visionen sind nicht wahr oder falsch, sondern gehen nicht in Erfüllung oder doch etc.

Dies also meinen wir, wenn wir von Denken sprechen. Wir haben uns auf Autoritäten von Platon bis zu Ruth Millikan berufen, wir haben den Sachverhalt pragmatisch auf ein plausibles Minimum reduziert und meinen, dass wir damit gerüstet sind, um auf der Tierseite nachzusehen, ob dort die Bedingungen für das so bestimmte Denken gegeben sind.

Im ersten Kapitel unserer Untersuchung sollen Raum und Zeit qua zweckmäßige Vorstellungen von Tieren und Menschen erläutert werden. Die Vorstellungsfähigkeit ist auf keine diskursive Denkleistung angewiesen, sie ist zweckmäßig, aber nicht urteilsförmig. Im zweiten Kapitel wird das räumliche und zeitliche Vorstellungsgeschehen von Tieren daraufhin befragt, ob wir in ihm auf die Operationen stoßen, die zum Denken gehören könnten; auch hier ist der Bescheid negativ; das mentale oder psychische Geschehen bei Tieren wird von uns zwar mit Begriffen und Urteilen zu erkennen versucht, jedoch damit noch nicht von den Tieren selbst so artikuliert. Das dritte Kapitel ist dem Denken gewidmet und der Frage, wie es auf natürliche Weise entstehen konnte. Der Vorschlag zielt auf eine Kooperation vieler Menschen, die eine deiktische Handlung im öffentlichen Raum mit Lauten begleiten, die zu Behauptungen werden, diese Behauptungen können bestritten werden. So entsteht das bejahende oder verneinende Urteil als Keimzelle des menschlichen und nur menschlichen Sprechens und Denkens.

Ein Zirkel, weil hierbei die Logik vorausgesetzt wird? Es sollen weder die vorhergehende Naturgeschichte noch der Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Widerspruch deduziert werden, sondern es werden die Bedingungen mit unseren Sprech- und Denkmitteln rekonstruiert, die das Sprechen und Denken auf natürliche Weise ermöglichen konnten, ohne Wunder, ohne Selbstbescheidung.

Wird nicht in diesem Ansatz das Denken mit dem menschlichen Sprechen identifiziert? Wir kennen das Denken als eine logisch kontrollierbare Tätigkeit, die grundsätzlich sprachlich geäußert werden kann und dadurch ihren öffentlichkeitsfähigen Charakter zeigt. Wenn Tiere urteilsförmig denken können, gibt es, wie schon erwähnt, zwei Zugänge. Sie haben entweder Äußerungsformen, die unserer Sprache gleichen (z. B. Gesang), oder ihr Denken vollzieht sich zwar ohne homologe Mitteilung, kann aber aus dem Verhalten eindeutig erschlossen werden. Benutzt man dagegen die Wörter 'Denken' und 'Gedanken' für alle mentalen Geschehnisse bei Menschen und Tieren, kann man unsere Titelfrage gleich bejahen und sich gemeinsam mit den anderen Tieren einen feinen Tag machen.

Gehört unser Denken in das kognitive Kontinuum der Naturentwicklung, so daß die mentalen Errungenschaften der Tiere alle Ansätze unseres Denkens enthalten, oder gibt es einen Bruch in der Natur, den wir gleichwohl als Naturphänomen erklären können? Wir plädieren für diese zweite These.[4]

3.1. Raum und Zeit

Raum und Zeit bzw. räumliche und zeitliche Dinge und Ereignisse 'gibt' es; sie sind Gegenstand unserer Alltagsüberzeugungen und der besterprobten Wissenschaften. Wer an der wirklichen Wirklichkeit von Raum und Zeit zweifelt und diesen Zweifel äußert, widerspricht sich selbst, wie wir schon sahen: Zum öffentlichen Zweifel benötigt er beides, Raum und Zeit, ein räumliches und zeitliches *extra se*, das mit Maßeinheiten und Uhren zu vermessen ist. Anders aber ist es mit ihrem seltsamen, meist unbemerkten *Double*, der subjektiven räumlichen und zeitlichen, immer perspektivischen Vorstellung. Wer einem Saal sitzt, ist in ihn hereingekommen und hat sich dabei von seiner oder ihrer räumlichen Vorstellung des Saales leiten lassen. Die individuelle Vorstellung antizipiert den wirklichen Saal, in dem man sich gerade befindet, unweigerlich bei jedem, und unweigerlich perspektivisch verschieden. Wenn wir annehmen, dass psychische Tätigkeiten oder Geschehnisse irgendwie *in* den jeweiligen Personen stattfinden (wo sonst?), dann müssen wir die Vorstellung des bestimmten Raumes einbeziehen; sie ist subjektiv, sie ist in uns und auch in den Tieren, für die wir zwangsläufig dasselbe annehmen. Der Raum selbst ist wie die Zeit eine ontologische Gegebenheit, die Vorstellung von Räumlichem und Zeitlichem sind dagegen zweckmässige Einrichtungen der Natur *in* den Lebewesen. Diese Letzteren setzen, im Fall des Raumes, den objektiven Raum voraus und sind subjektive Strategien des Überlebens in der objektiven Lebenswelt. Jeder von uns ist getrennter Binnen-Kosmograph in dem einen Kosmos, und es gehören auch Tiere zu den Kosmographen[5]. Wir finden also auf diese einfache Weise zwei Räume, den objektiven, mit Raumteilen messbaren Weltraum, in dem wir und alle anderen Lebewesen sind, und die subjektive perspektivische Raumarena, die in uns und in gleicher Weise in allen anderen vorstellungsfähigen Lebewesen ist. Diese Differenz des objektiven und je subjektiven Raumes ist nicht bestreitbar und ist trotzdem ein völliges Rätsel. Sie findet sich als hilfreiche Täuschung in

[4] Den Fehlschluß von stammesgeschichtlicher zu mentaler Kontinuität bei Markus Wild zeigt aus neurokognitiver Perspektive A. Nieder, *Der Tierphilosophie anthropomorphe Kleider: Wie stammesgeschichliche Kontinuität mit kognitiver Gleichheit verwechselt wird*, in «Erwägen - Wissen - Ethik», XXIII, 2012, S. 96-98. Vgl. auch R. Brandt, *Tierphilosophie. Antwort auf Markus Wild*, in «Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik», XXIII,1, S. 44-46.

[5] Nikolaus von Kues, *Philosophisch-Theologische Werke*, mit einer Einleitung von K. Bormann, Hamburg / Darmstadt 2002, IV, *Compendium* VIII, S. 31: «Das vollkommene Sinnenwesen, das Sinne und Vernunft besitzt, ist also wie ein Kosmograph zu betrachten, der eine Stadt mit fünf Toren, nämlich den fünf Sinnen, besitzt, durch welche Boten aus der ganzen Welt eintreten und vom gesamten Aufbau der Welt berichten, […].» Wie Tiere, die ebenfalls mit äusseren Sinnen ausgestattet sind, mit den Botschaften verfahren, interessiert Nikolaus von Kues nicht und ist durch die gewählten Metaphern von vornherein ausgeblendet.

der mentalen Tätigkeit der Lebewesen von den Stichlingen über die Grasmücken bis zu unserem Präsidenten. Der Raum ist eine physikalische Weltgegebenheit, die Raumvorstellung oder genauer: die Räumlichkeit eines Teiles unserer Vorstellungen dagegen ein zweckmäßiges Naturprodukt, das sich mit Darwin dechiffrieren lassen muss.

Die Raumvorstellung passt exakt zum objektiven Raum aller anderen und ist doch subjektiv ausgegrenzt, ist schon bei der Grasmücke eine je eigene Bühne, grenzenlos.

Unsere These: Wir entdecken die Entstehung von Sprechen und Denken und damit die vermutliche Grenze zwischen Tieren und Menschen nur, wenn wir die Naturteleologie über die Genese der Raumvorstellung hinaus zur zweckbestimmten Überwindung der räumlichen Distanz durch Zeichen betrachten, Zeichen, die bei den Menschen zu propositional geordneten Symbolen wurden. Wir antizipieren: Die Denk- und Sprachgenese ist ohne den Raum und die Raumvorstellung und die körperliche Gestik im Raum nicht möglich. Die Sprache und das Denken der Menschen gehören entsprechend zur Naturentwicklung der Menschen auf Grund des ganz unwahrscheinlichen Zusammentreffens natürlicher Faktoren. Hirten und Priester hatten dazu Wunder, ein kluger Ausweg, der uns nicht mehr offensteht.

Zur Orientierung: Wir kehren von der analytischen Philosophie zu einem modifizierten Kantianismus zurück, in dem Ästhetik und Logik in neuer Form voneinander getrennt werden. Raum und Zeit und Raum- und Zeitvorstellung sind nicht auf Begriffe reduzierbar. Aber das muss hier noch ganz rätselhaft klingen.

Beginnen wir mit der Phase der Entwicklung von selbstbewegten Lebewesen, als sie lichtempfindliche Zellen ausbildeten und allmählich zu den heute bei Tieren und Menschen üblichen verschiedenen Sehorganen gelangten. Die Pflanzen hielten sich zurück. Während der Tastsinn über das Nervensystem die unmittelbare Gegenwart anderer fester oder flüssiger Körper anzeigt und der Geruchssinn schon über die eigene Körpergrenze hinauszielt und so zur Lebenserhaltung beiträgt, ist der Sehsinn die erste große Als-ob-Veranstaltung der Natur. Die lichtempfindlichen Zellen der Sehorgane übermitteln dem Gehirn auf dem Weg über Nerven bestimmte Impulse, die neuronal verarbeitet und in Form einer optischen Schaustellung vor dem Lebewesen so ausgebreitet werden, 'als ob' das Ferne zum Greifen nahe sei. Dazu bedarf es der zweckgerichteten Umwandlung des zweidimensionalen Sehbildes in ein den haptischen Informationen angepasstes dreidimensional-perspektivisches Abbild des Raumes selbst. Das Tier dort hinten, der andere Mensch hier vorne; der Fernsinn des Auges bringt sie, zerebral vermittelt, in einer 3D-Fern-Seh-Vorstellung zur Erscheinung, so dass sich das Lebewesen von dem Ort, an dem es sich befindet, zu diesem oder jenem realiter bewegen oder vor ihm fliehen

kann. In der Forschung wird von einer «dreidimensionalen Innenwelt»[6], einem «visuellen System»[7] oder einer Raumarena der Lebewesen[8] gesprochen.

Die räumliche Vorstellungsbühne ist so beschaffen, dass sie auch dort aufgeschlagen oder ergänzt wird, wo keine optischen Empfindungen das Lebewesen affizieren. Das höhere Lebewesen stellt sich Räumliches auch hinter einer Wand oder dem eigenen Körper vor; der Hund imaginiert den gerochenen Braten an einer realen Raumstelle, die im Moment nicht sichtbar ist, und orientiert die eigenen Bewegungen in der holistischen Raumarena gemäß dieser Information.

Wir haben es also mit zwei Raumarten zu tun. Es gibt einmal den Raum, in dem wir selbst und andere sinnlich wahrnehmbare Körper plaziert sind und, durch ihre räumlichen Gehirne gesteuert, interagieren; es gibt zweitens den visuell stimulierten Vorstellungsraum, in dem das höhere Lebewesen sich und andere Körper hier und dort hinten wie auf einer großen Bühne plaziert. Wir trennen diese beiden Raumarten in der Praxis nicht voneinander, sondern benutzen ebenso wie die Tiere den bloßen Vorstellungsraum als reale Ergänzung in unserem Lebensraum. Die Verschachtelung wird aktualisiert, wenn wir Menschen z. B. den inneren Vorstellungsraum in bildlichen Repräsentationen nach außen stellen, so bei einfachen Bildern oder auch im Schauspiel. Dazu sind Tiere nicht mehr in der Lage, sie können weder etwas abmalen noch schauspielern. Sie imaginieren zwar etwas nicht Sichtbares auf der inneren Raumbühne, sie antizipieren den Haken, den der Hase vermutlich gleich schlägt, auf ihrer Vorstellungsbühne und rennen schon jetzt in die falsche Richtung, aber sie können dies nicht noch einmal zum äußeren Bild erheben. Sie träumen, aber stellen die Traumbilder nicht im Äußeren für sich und andere dar.

Es kommt eine dritte Raumart hinzu. Gegenüber der Raumtheorie noch des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts gibt es nicht nur Materieteile, die sich auf Grund ihrer Kleinheit der menschlichen Anschauung entziehen wie schon Demokrits Atome, sondern es gibt eine von uns erschlossene physikalische und räumliche Wirklichkeit, die mit anderen Dimensionen operiert, als denen, die uns vorstellbar sind. Am Maßstab unseres und der anderen Lebewesen gemessenen Lebensraumes ist der dritte, erschlossene Raum übermäßig groß oder klein und hat eine partiell andere Qualität; das war für die Wissenschaft vor dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts undenkbar. Heute verliert der physikalische Raum, von dem wir

[6] N.Tinbergen, *Vergleichende Erforschung angeborenen Verhaltens*, Berlin-Hamburg 1979, S. 24-25: «Während also viele Sinne Richtungsangaben machen, ist zur Wahrnehmung auch des *Abstandes* der Reizquelle vor allem das Auge befähigt. So ist es das wichtigste Werkzeug zur dreidimensionalen Innenabbildung der Außenwelt. […] Der Tastsinn läßt manche Tierarten eine dreidimensionale Innenwelt aufbauen.» M. Tomasello, *Die kulturelle Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens. Zur Evolution der Kognition*, Frankfurt a.M. 2002, S. 26: «Alle Säugetiere leben in grundsätzlich derselben sensumotorischen Welt, die in einem Repräsentationsraum angeordnet wird […].» Weder Tinbergen noch Tomasello gehen auf die Herkunft dieses subjektiven Repräsentationsraums ein. Sie würden jedoch sogleich der Annahme zustimmen, dass er darwinistisch akkreditiert, also zweckmäßig sein muss.
[7] R.G. Millikan, *Die Vielfalt der Bedeutung. Zeichen, Ziele und ihre Verwandtschadt*, cit., S. 279.
[8] D. Mainardi, *Nella mente degli animali*, Milano 2006.

ausgingen, schon im 1. Semester seine anschauliche Wirklichkeit. Dieser dritte physikalische Raum ist Gegenstand der Mikro- und Makrophysik und verbirgt sich in Dimensionen und Realitäten, die wir weder anschauen noch vorstellen können. Wir müssen also drei ineinander geschobene Räume unterscheiden, am besten mit drei Namen: Newton, Darwin, Einstein. Mit Newton soll der objektive Raum unserer traditionellen Geometrie und Physik gekennzeichnet sein, mit Darwin die zweckmäßige perspektivische Raumvorstellung der höheren Lebewesen (von Darwin selbst zufällig nicht thematisiert), mit Einstein der Raum, der sich der Vorstellung entzieht, aber den Raum Newtons in sich als Grenzfall begreift. Tiere halten sich, soweit wir wissen, an Darwin und zeigen kein Interesse für Newton oder gar Einstein.

Der Theater- oder Vorstellungsraum der Tiere und Menschen, den die Natur spätestens mit den Sehorganen[9] entwickelt hat, ermöglicht es, das Ferne als präsent anzusehen; der Löwe und der Hai sind hier sichtbar, obwohl sie sich haptisch in dezenter Ferne befinden – die Kleinen sind optisch gewarnt. Die äußere Erfahrung von Tier und Mensch ist ein Geschehen auch auf dieser Sehbühne, es ist jedoch zu unterscheiden zwischen der sinnlichen Vorstellung der jeweils gegenwärtigen Dinge und Ereignisse und der bloßen Imagination der komplementären Gegebenheiten wie des deponierten Fressens hinter der Tür. *Wir und alle Tiere sind im Raum, und der Raum ist, soweit vorstellbar, in uns.* Mit diesem Rätsel vor unserer Körpertür wachen wir jeden Morgen bis zum Ende auf.

Der eine Raum zerfällt also gemäß der heute landläufigen Wissenschaft in drei unterschiedliche Raumarten: Den Raum der Makro- und Mikrophysik, den dreidimensionalen Raum, in dem wir uns bewegen und orientieren, und den isomorphen Vorstellungsraum von Lebewesen. Diese Trennung ist nur objektiv möglich; subjektiv gibt es für Tiere und Menschen den physikalischen Raum nicht, und eine Grenze zwischen dem wirklichen äußeren Raum der Lebenswelt und dem inneren Vorstellungsraum, der inneren Raumarena, lässt sich in der Vorstellungspraxis nicht nachvollziehen.

Ein wichtiges Indiz für die notwendige Trennung von physikalischer und vorgestellter Wirklichkeit liegt darin, dass ein Widerspruch in der räumlichen Vorstellung nicht für die physikalische Wirklichkeit gelten muss: Das sich der Vorstellung Entziehende ist nicht notwendig physikalisch nicht existent. Wir denken uns zwanghaft, dass es ein Kontinuum zwischen unserem Raum, in dem wir gemeinsam mit den Tieren leben und unsere Vorstellungen entwickeln, und dem theoretisch erschlossenen, uns sinnlich unzugänglichen Raum gibt. So vermögen wir auch keine Differenz zwischen dem wirklichen Tier- und Menschenraum einerseits und dem Vorstellungsraum, der Raumarena im Inneren der Lebewesen, zu erkennen.

Ein anderer Unterschied, der uns interessieren wird, ist die perspektivische Ausrichtung des inneren Vorstellungsraumes; hier und nur hier gibt es ein 'hier'

[9] Es ist nicht notwendig, dass mit den Sehorganen auch der Vorstellungsraum entwickelt wird; Fledermäuse scheinen ihn nicht zu kennen.

in der Anschauung jedes Lebewesens, während der Raum als solcher natürlich kein 'hier' kennt. Wir werden gleich das Pendant dieser Dopplung in der Zeit entdecken, und am Ende die Überwindung der perspektivischen Begrenzung, die Menschen und Tiere in ihrer Raum- und Zeitvorstellung teilen, durch die Sprache beim Menschen.

Aus philosophischer Schwerfälligkeit verdrängen wir die Tatsache, dass die Raumarenen bei Tieren und Menschen je subjektive Kreationen sind, die neuronal gestiftet und erhalten werden, wobei die sonst paradoxe Tatsache, dass die Nerven und das Gehirn selbst wiederum räumlicher Natur sind, sich so versteht, dass es sich hierbei um den primären objektiven Raum handelt, den wir jedoch, durch das Gehirn vermittelt, in unserer subjektiven Raumarena etwa bei einer für uns sichtbaren, weil gespiegelten Hirnoperation vorstellen. Am Raum und unserer eigenen Existenz im Raum (*qua res extensa*) öffentlich zu zweifeln ist, wie schon bemerkt, widersprüchlich, weil der mitgeteilte Zweifel beides voraussetzt. Den nur allein gedachten Zweifel der cartesischen *cogitatio* können wir als eristisch vergessen.

Aber an diesem paradoxen Sachverhalt sollten wir kurz stillhalten: Der Vorstellungsraum der Lebewesen muss ein neuronales Erzeugnis eben dieser Lebewesen sein. Sie stellen sich selbst und ihre Mitwelt räumlich vor und sind zugleich der je subjektive neuronale Ursprung der eigenen Raumvorstellung. Das muss für alle Lebewesen gelten: Sie schaffen die Bühne mit ihren lokalisierbaren Neuronen selbst! Auch der *homo sapiens sapiens*, der hiergegen Einspruch erhebt, muss erkennen: Das Gehirn ist als räumliches tastbares anschaubares Phänomen sein eigenes Geschöpf, wir mögen diese Selbst-Erkenntnis vor uns verbergen, wo wir wollen.

Erst durch die innere Bearbeitung von externen Reizen können wir also auch unsere äußeren Wahrnehmungsorgane außerhalb von 'uns' wahrnehmen, meine Augen hier, meine Ohren dort. Dasselbe gilt für die körperliche Selbstwahrnehmung anderer Lebewesen und die reziproke Fremdwahrnehmung. Ich bin hier an dieser Stelle im Raum, dann aber auch in der Wahrnehmung der anderen Lebewesen an eben dieser Stelle in deren äußerem Wahrnehmungsraum.

> Die Tatsache, dass sich viele Tiere auf den direkten Heimweg machen, nachdem sie mit verbundenen Augen in irgendeinen Winkel des ihnen bekannten Territoriums gebracht worden sind, wurde schon häufig als Beleg dafür interpretiert, dass sie über so etwas wie mentale Landkarten verfügen, und zwar nicht nur über topologische Karten in der Art eines schematischen Lageplans, sondern über Repräsentationen eines abgemessenen geometrischen Raumes. […] Auf jeden Fall scheinen sie in der Lage zu sein, eine Art von vielseitig verwendbarer Repräsentation der räumlichen Anordnung eines Territoriums zu erzeugen.[10]

Die dreidimensionale Außen- oder Binnenwelt ist das identische Raster für die Informationen aller äußeren Sinneswahrnehmungen, der Basar, in dem sie sich treffen und ihr Material für die zweckmäßige Bearbeitung im Raum-

[10] R.G. Millikan, *Die Vielfalt der Bedeutung. Zeichen, Ziele und ihre Verwandtschaft*, cit., S. 257.

und Zeit-Gehirn abliefern, mögen es nun Düfte aus dem nahen Garten oder das Klirren der metallenen Fahnen vom winterlichen Kirchturm sein.

Es wird an dieser Stelle gern ein subversiver Joker aus dem kleinstbürgerlichen Revers gezogen: Der Raum bei Tieren ja, aber ihr Raum sei 'ganz anders' als unser Raum. So wie Gott denkt, aber Gott denkt doch ganz anders als wir, please. Nun wird man sich beim Letzteren auf die Lösung einigen können, dass es keine menschliche Erkenntnis des göttlichen Denkens gibt, also ein «vacat» einzutragen und damit auch das vermeintlich tiefsinnige 'ganz anders' als sinnlos zu streichen ist. Umgekehrt beim Raum der Tiere. Die Gazelle kommt in Eigenbewegung und -orientierung zu exakt der Quelle, die wir von hier aus sehen, es ist kein ganz anderer Ort als dieser dort. Damit erledigt sich das 'ganz anders'; Tiere mögen besetzte Raumstücke immer ganz anders sinnlich wahrnehmen, aber an der Identität mit dem Raum, in dem wir uns mit ihnen an einem bestimmten Ort treffen, ist nicht zu zweifeln. Er ist nur subjektiv, weil er in der je eigenen Raumarena perspektivisch lokalisiert ist, aber objektiv in dem Sinn, dass alle sehfähigen Lebewesen denselben perspektivlosen Raum aufspannen.

Tiere und Menschen treffen räumliche (im Vorstellungsraum) Unterscheidungen; Einzeller unterscheiden aus ihrem 'Hier' oben und unten, alle höheren Tiere unterscheiden rechts und links und orientieren sich so am eigenen Körper im Raum. Es kann keine Rede davon sein, dass diese mentalen Leistungen schon Denkakte sind. Derselbe Einzeller bewegt sich zuerst nach oben, dann nach unten, aber kann darin ein Widerspruch liegen?

Tiere und Menschen ergänzen die Räumlichkeit ihrer Vorstellungen durch die Zeitlichkeit. Für alle mit Sinnen ausgestatteten Wesen gelten die elementaren Zeitreihen des Vorher-Jetzt-Gleich und Früher-Später (modal und relational). Wir setzen als selbstverständlich voraus, dass sich höhere Lebewesen in der Vergangenheit orientieren und dass sie irgendwie Zukünftiges als solches antizipieren können und dass die gerichtete Zeitlinie bei Mensch und Tier identisch ist. Nur so ist ein kohärentes Verhalten der Lebewesen mit äußeren Sinnen möglich, nur so sind wir synchrone Weltbürger, die Maus dort, ich hier, die sich gegenseitig vorstellen und beäugen.

> [...] viele Tiere müssen in der Lage sein, zukünftige Sachverhalte zu repräsentieren. […] für die meisten Tiere ist es notwendig, Zeichen für herannahende Raubtiere zu erkennen, und diese Zeichen in ein angemessenes Verhalten zu übersetzen. Die Erzeugung innerer Repräsentationen zeitlich distaler Sachverhalte ist in keiner Weise exotischer als die Erzeugung räumlich distaler Sachverhalte.[11]

Die relationale, von uns messbare Zeit entspricht dem relationalen wirklichen Raum mit den wirklichen Dingen und Ereignissen in ihm, während die modale Zeit das Gegenstück zum subjektiven Vorstellungsraum ist, jetzt und hier.

[11] R.G. Millikan, *Die Vielfalt der Bedeutung. Zeichen, Ziele und ihre Verwandtschaft*, cit., S. 228.

Raum-zeitlich organisierte Nerven verarbeiten die Einwirkungen der äußeren Natur und führen zur physiologisch-psychologischen subjektiven, leibgebundenen Weltformation. Menschen und Tiere erschaffen sich in der identischen zweckhaften Raum-Zeit-Welt, in der sie sich und uns begegnen, ihre je eigenen Selbst- und Weltanschauungen. Mit welchen Algorithmen diese Formationen ermöglicht werden, wie groß der Energieaufwand ihrer Erzeugung ist, wissen wir nicht. Die Raum-Zeit-Vorstellungen und -orientierungen sind selbstverständlich identisch, bei uns nicht größer als bei den Mäusen und Walen, aber perspektivisch sortiert wie bei mir hier und meinem Hauswal dort. Dadurch ist es möglich, dass wir in derselben einen Welt leben, gemeinsam spazieren gehen (von *spatium*, Raum) oder uns gegenseitig umbringen und so unser Dasein und die Raum- und Zeitvorstellungen in ihm und den sonstigen Aufwand beenden.

Wir haben keinen Grund, Tieren räumliche und zeitliche Vorstellungsentwürfe zuzuschreiben, die nicht im natürlichen Lebensprozess fundiert und begrenzt sind. Auf ihn zwecken sie ab, sei es unter der Leitung einer angeborenen Direktive, sei es mit momentaner eigener Steuerung. Bei Zugvögeln wird man beides annehmen; die Steuerung der weiten Strecken übernehmen angeborene Verhaltensmuster, die Feineinstellung beim Anflug auf den Ast erledigt dagegen der Vogelpilot individuell und selbst. Selbst, nicht frei.

Raum und Zeit sind unveränderliche formale Vorgaben der Reize und Sinnesinformationen und des durch sie möglichen äußeren Verhaltens. Wir müssen annehmen, dass beide von den Lebewesen als Vorstellungen gewissermaßen für immer einverleibt wurden, um das Überleben in der gemeinsamen realen Welt zu ermöglichen. Die innere Uhr der sogenannten Taktgeberzellen findet sich zu bestimmten Zeiten an bestimmten Orten der Organismen. Sie ermöglicht das subjektive Abschätzen von Zeitteilen, wobei das Abzuschätzende, die vorgestellte Zeit, vorausgesetzt wird. Nur so geraten wir nicht in die hermeneutische Tiefsinnsfalle des 'ganz anders'.

Die äußeren Sinnesorgane liefern das Material, das von Tieren und Menschen so verarbeitet wird, dass es möglich ist, dass sie einen Ortswechsel durch Lenkung der Schwimm- oder Flug- oder Gehbewegung vollziehen und dass sie den Ortswechsel anderer Wesen als solchen neuronal vermittelt wahrnehmen und genetisch oder am Leitfaden der Erinnerung antizipieren. Raum und Zeit sind objektiv äußerlich, aber auch verinnerlicht, so dass sie für frühere und zu erwartende Erfahrungen verfügbar sind. Das Raubtier nimmt das Beutetier dort hinten wahr und verfolgt es, indem es ihm den Weg, die Bewegung antizipierend, abschneidet. Diese Vorstellung und Bewegung ist intentional und damit zweckorientiert wie der Körperbau und die Organisation der Sinne. Eigenes wahres oder falsches Denken ist für Tiere auch hier überflüssig.

Wir brauchen keine Übersetzung zu leisten, wenn von den Grenzen und Orten eines Tierreviers gesprochen wird: Hier und dort hinten, wie für die Tiere selbst. Die Zeit und die Zeitvorstellung führen zu demselben Ergebnis. Wir sind auf eine wunderbare Weise in keine Utopien ausgelagert, sondern gehören in

denselben einen Weltraum, und wir sind voll synchronisiert, keine Verspätung, und keiner kommt je zu früh.

Die Vorstellung eines die Orientierung und Verortung ermöglichenden Raumes und desgleichen der Zeit kann nicht exklusiv auf ein einziges äußeres Sinnesorgan zurückgeführt werden, sondern dient der Realisierung aller äußeren Vorstellungen als gemeinsame Bühne; ohne sie ist die Vorstellung von Gegenständen und deren Bewegungen und Identität bei den heterogenen äußeren Sinnen nicht möglich. Es gibt viele Arten äußerer Sinnesorgane, allein 41 unterschiedliche Augen sind registriert; es gibt sicher zahllose unterschiedliche Arten, in denen die räumlichen und zeitlichen Inhalte der Wahrnehmungen ausgebildet und erlebt werden; neben diesen subjektiven Ausgestaltungen gibt es jedoch die eine gemeinsame Invariable, die den unterschiedlich organisierten Lebewesen ermöglicht, ungleiche Bewohner der einen Welt zu sein. Eine Probe: Wir können Fehlleistungen von Tieren und Menschen nicht darauf zurückführen, dass für sie der Raum oder die Zeit unregelmäßig waren, dass der Panther beim Sprung sein Ziel verfehlte, weil der Raum sich zusammengezogen oder die Zeit sich verlangsamt hatte, wie immer der subjektive Eindruck war. Desgleichen wird ein abwegiges Laborergebnis nicht damit bei der Prüfung erklärt, dass Raum und Zeit in der Mittagsstunde pausierten. Wir unterstellen für uns und alle belebten höheren Wesen, dass der reale und vorgestellte Raum ein invariables System von Orten und Relationen ist, in dem sich die Lebewesen selbst verorten und in das hinein jeweils subjektive, ego-implizite Dinge, Eigenschaften und Erlebnisse gebracht werden. Diese Verortung durch das Lebewesen bedarf keiner bewussten Tätigkeit oder gar der Begleitung durch das irrtumsanfällige Denken. Raum und Zeit können nicht wahrgenommen werden, und sie sind keine Gegenstände des Denkens der Tiere, und trotzdem müssen wir sie ihnen als ein Apriori aller Erfahrung zugestehen.

Die Analysen der mentalen Fähigkeiten von Tieren setzen die Erstellung der Raum-Zeit-Arena für die Vorstellung äußerer Gegenstände immer schon voraus, etwa bei der Verwendung des Begriffs *äußerer* Sinnesorgane. Was ist dieses 'außen'? Die Augen, Nasen und Ohren gehören zur leiblichen Beschaffenheit der Tiere und Menschen, von denen wir ausgingen. Jetzt haben wir zwei Gegebenheiten entdeckt, die nicht materieller und auch nicht sinnlich-wahrnehmbarer Natur sind und die doch von jedem, auch dem härtesten Materialisten und Sensualisten, als real unterstellt werden müssen, so leid es uns tut: Raum und Zeit. Beide sind übersinnlich, wiewohl den Tieren und Menschen als subjektive Vorstellungen psychisch einverleibt.

Wir brauchen dieser Verrätselung nicht näher nachzugehen, sondern nehmen eine stabile Raum-Zeit-Welt an, die zugleich bei jedem mit äußeren Sinnesorganen ausgestatteten Lebewesen in einer isomorphen Raum-Zeit-Vorstellung in Ausschnitten repräsentiert werden kann. Ohne diese stellvertretenden Vorstellungen hätten die Lebewesen keine Chance zu überleben. Entwicklungsgeschichtlich müssen wir also, von Darwin belehrt, annehmen, dass es einen objektiven, unvorgestellten Welt-'Raum' und dito

Weltzeit gibt und dass die um ihr Leben ringenden Lebewesen sich Raum und Zeit als isomorphe Matrix ihrer Vorstellungen verinnerlichen mussten, nur so hatten sie im Kräftegetümmel eine Chance, bis in die Gegenwart vorzudringen.

Raum und Zeit und deren stellvertretende Vorstellungen bilden im alltäglichen Verhalten von Mensch und Tier die Arena, in der alles stattfindet, sie öffnet die Möglichkeiten und begrenzt und bestimmt sie. B liegt für alle Lebewesen zwischen A und C, der Weg von A nach C führt über B (*mutatis mutandis*), so in der vorgestellten, so in der wirklichen Raumarena. Lokale Änderungen sind Änderungen in Bezug auf diese Örter.

Wir erkennen, wie falsch unsere gleichwohl 'unentbehrliche' Opposition von Innen und Außen ist; als ob die Psyche oder Seele der Lebewesen ein innerer Kasten ist, dessen Schlüssel wir zufällig verlegt haben. Den Kasten gibt es nicht, aber es gibt doch, was mit der Metapher gemeint ist. Der naturalistische Hirnforscher ist ganz ratlos.

In unsere erste Übersicht der mentalen Fähigkeiten von Tieren war unwillkürlich der Begriff der Bewegung geraten. In der eigenen und fremden Bewegung und der Abschätzung ihrer Geschwindigkeit müssen Raum- und Zeitteile kalkulatorisch aufeinander bezogen werden. Wie dies bei Menschen und Tieren geschieht, ist Gegenstand der naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung.

Sinnesorgane sind immer Organe spezifischer Unterschiede, qualitativer (warm – kalt; laut – leise etc.) und räumlicher. Diese Unterscheidungsleistungen der Sinne, ihr *krinein*, ist elementar und besagt nicht, dass die Sinne dazu der Fähigkeit zur Bejahung und Verneinung bedürfen. Die Einzeller unterscheiden oben und unten, aber nicht mit dem Bewußtsein, dass oben nicht unten und unten nicht oben ist. Diese sinnlichen Unterscheidungen können sich auf die feinsten Nuancen von Tönen und Farben etc. beziehen, ohne dass es expliziter Verneinungen bedürfte.

Bezogen auf unsere Leitfrage halten wir fest: Wir können die diskursive Tätigkeit des Denkens sicher nicht mit der Aufgabe der Lebewesen betrauen, eine Raum- und Zeitbühne zu errichten, auf der die vielerlei Vorstellungen agieren können und Bewegungen registriert werden. Also haben wir die Fähigkeit zu denken in der Raum-Zeit-Anschauung nicht entdeckt.

Wenn man einräumt, dass Menschen und Tiere über äußere Sinnesorgane verfügen, dann muss man einräumen, dass sich das Kennzeichen der Äußerlichkeit in beiden Fällen auf den einen identischen Weltraum bezieht; dasselbe gilt für die Zeit: Wenn Tiere über ein Gedächtnis und die Fähigkeit der Antizipation und Identifikation von Ereignissen verfügen, dann ist die zugrunde gelegte Zeit bei Mensch und Tier identisch. Würde dies nicht vorausgesetzt, wäre eine Wahrnehmung wahrnehmender anderer Lebewesen nicht möglich, von ihr waren wir jedoch als zugestanden ausgegangen. Wir könnten nicht mit dem Hund in derselben einen Welt am Fluss Heraklits entlanggehen, und die Fische könnten uns nicht wiedererkennen und aus dem Wasser grüßen. Der Unterschied zwischen uns und ihnen besteht nur darin, dass wir Menschen uns diese selbst nicht wahrnehmbare Voraussetzung aller Wahrnehmung bewusst

machen können, genauer: Wir können sie diskursiv thematisieren, was weder den Fischen noch sonst einem Tier gelingt. Sinnlich wahrnehmen lassen sich die übersinnlichen Vorstellungen Raum und Zeit von niemandem, ihre Existenz leugnen kann man trotzdem nicht.

Die Erstellung einer Raum-Zeit-Arena ist also sicher keine Denkoperation der einzelnen Lebewesen; sie gehört zur irrtumsimmunen mentalen oder psychischen Grundausstattung, auf die das Denken der Menschen keinen Einfluss hat. Raum und Zeit sind intuitiv gewiss als Realitäten und Vorstellungen, alles andere folgt später.

In welchem Hirnareal werden die Raum-Zeit-Vorstellungen bei Tieren und Menschen generiert? Kann man die Räumlichkeit und Zeitlichkeit operativ entfernen? Und: Stellen sich Tiere die Zeit als Linie vor? Oder sind ihre Vorstellungen zwar zeitlich, aber sie selbst doch unfähig, die Vorstellung der Zeit selbst als Linie zu imaginieren? Sicher.

Wenn Tiere etwas vorstellen können, sind sie nach der landläufigen Zweiteilung von Leib und Seele beseelt. Blättert man in den deutschsprachigen Publikationen, wird man kaum auf die sprachliche Wendung einer Seele der Tiere stoßen, als ob man davon peinlich berührt wird. Niemand erhebt jedoch, soweit bekannt, Einspruch gegen die Rede von psychischen Erkrankungen der Tiere; nicht nur Säugetiere, sondern auch Vögel können durch Gefangenschaft psychisch erkranken, zugestanden bis in die Sonntagszeitungen hinein. Aber die Voraussetzung einer psychischen Pathologie, die Seele selbst, dem möchte man nicht zustimmen und wendet sich ab.

Wir sollten noch eine mentale Leistung von Tieren und Menschen erwähnen: Es ist das begrifflose Erstellen einer lebendigen Einheit des Körpergebildes, das sie durch Selbstbewegung im Raum in die Zukunft hinein bestimmen. In und auf allen drei Elementen des Wassers, des Landes und der Luft sind die Lebewesen Dirigenten in der durch ihre neuronale Tätigkeit ermöglichten Raum-Zeit-Welt. Nicht die Flügel, die Flossen und die Beine bewegen das Lebewesen, sondern sie bewegen sich, so wie nicht die Augen das Ereignis an einem anderen Ort erblicken, sondern das Tier oder der Mensch. Das höhere Lebewesen erfährt sich als eine bestimmte Einheit in der Selbstbewegung und der räumlich-zeitlich lokalisierten Sinneswahrnehmung; dieses Selbst gibt es nicht ohne die je eigene mentale Tätigkeit, die den Pflanzen fehlt. Die fundamentale Selbstkonstitution des Lebewesens durch die raum-zeitliche Selbstbewegung und die sensorische Selbstlokalisierung scheint einerseits für jedes Lebewesen notwendig zu sein, sie ist andererseits ein nicht erforschbares Apriori des Lebens; bis der Tod es fallen läßt. Alles ohne propositionales Denken.

Es kennzeichnet die jetzige Tierphilosophie, dass sie sich nicht für die Raum-Zeit-Strukturen der Vorstellungen von Tieren (und Menschen) interessiert, sondern sogleich die logifizierbaren Bereiche der psychischen Anlagen und Tätigkeiten untersucht. Dass Tiere sich in unserem gemeinsamen Weltraum bewegen und orientieren, aber darüber hinaus auch mit räumlichen und zeitlichen, perspektivisch organisierten Vorstellungen ausgestattet sein müssen, wird hin

und wieder erwähnt, wie wir sahen, aber nicht zu einem eigenen Gegenstand der Untersuchung gemacht. Dieses Defizit bedarf wissenschaftsgeschichtlich einer eigenen Untersuchung und Herleitung; es ist zu vermuten, dass die Dominanz der analytischen Philosophie in der Nachfolge von Frege und Wittgenstein die Ursache dieser Verkürzung ist. Auch die Orientierung am Diskurs entfernt den Raum. Man teile einem reinen Geist bei einem telefonischen[12] Anruf mit, was das Räumliche an räumlichen Vorstellungen ist und was *Faust* meint, wenn er vom «verfluchten Hier» spricht, und man wird das Ende des Diskurses wie schon vorher der Logik erleben.

3.2. Gefühl, Bewußtsein, Selbstbewußtsein bei Tieren

«[...] denn es fühlt wie du den Schmerz.» Wohl nicht die Ameisen, aber alle höheren Lebewesen. Wer sie quält, sei, so wünscht man, wieder gequält[13]. Es muss ein rudimentäres Selbstgefühl bzw. Bewusstsein und Selbstbewusstsein von Tieren geben. Das psychische Geschehen auf der Raum-Zeit-Bühne mit den elementaren Kombinationen von Vorstellungen wird angetrieben durch starke oder schwache Lust- und Schmerzimpulse. Wir berufen uns auf den Entwicklungsgang der lebendigen Natur, die bei uns und in derselben einen Weise bei den höheren Tieren die emotionale Attraktion und Repulsion zur Lebenserhaltung eingeführt hat. Schmerz und Lust werden gespürt, sie sind dadurch phänomenal erkennbare Impulse bei Menschen und Tieren. Das begleitende Bewusstsein, die Aufmerksamkeit, kann durch Ohnmacht oder Anästhesie außer Kraft gesetzt werden. Bei Menschen und Tieren gibt es schwere Verletzungen, die sie im Moment einer tiefen Erregung nicht als schmerzhaft spüren; sie sind sich dann der Verletzung nicht bewusst. Eine dieser Erregungsformen ist die Panik, die Menschen und Tiere der Besinnung beraubt und ausser sich bringt. So auch der *raptus sexualis*. Tiere können traumatische Erfahrungen haben, die in der Psychotherapie behandelt werden, teuer und entsprechend seriös.

Tiere und Menschen verfügen über ein Selbstbewusstsein je eigener Art, ohne damit dieses Selbst im Denken zu thematisieren. Man denke an einfache Phänomene wie die oben genannte Selbstverortung oder die Einschätzung der eigenen Körpergröße und des Körpergewichts bei Katzen und Elefanten. Die Selbsterhaltung vollzieht sich bei Tieren durch Verhaltensformen, die zweckmäßig auf das eigene Leben und Wohlleben bezogen sind. Viele Tiere haben die Fähigkeit zu bemerken, dass sie von anderen Lebewesen bemerkt werden. Eine verwandte reflexive Anlage mag dazu führen, dass bestimmte Tiere sich vor einem Spiegelbild auf sich beziehen können. Den Vorgang der Spiegelung können sie sicher nicht als solchen erkennen. Sie wissen nach allen Indizien nicht, was ein Bild ist. Kein Tier nimmt einen Spiegel, um etwas anderes im Spiegel zu betrachten. So haben sie auch den *iconic turn* nie begriffen.

[12] Die Idee mit dem Telefon verdanke ich Bernd Ludwig (Göttingen).
[13] Der Wunsch muss gestattet sein, er soll jedoch nicht in Erfüllung gehen.

Weder beim animalischen Bewusstsein noch Selbstbewusstsein liegt zwingend ein Akt des propositionalen Denkens vor. Alle bisher genannten kognitiven Leistungen bleiben der naturalen Situation verhaftet und sind zweckhaft bezogen auf die Lebenspraxis, an die sie auch in Experimenten durch das Kräftespiel von Lohn und Strafe gebunden bleiben.

3.3. Die Reizverarbeitung im Gehirn und das Verhalten und Handeln

Menschen und Tiere sind Lebewesen in einer Raum-Zeit-Welt; sie erfahren Sinnesreize, die sie zweckorientiert so verarbeiten, dass das Erzeugnis bei Tieren ein lebens- und arterhaltendes Verhalten ist.

Wir wissen heute, wie unglaublich komplex der Import der Sinnesreize ist, in welche verwegene Hirnareale diese Reize geleitet werden, wie kompliziert es im Gehirn zugehen muss, um das art- und individuenerhaltende Verhalten zu erzeugen. Der Umschlag im Gehirn ist jedoch *off limits*, seit Urzeiten sind hier die Fenster und Türen geschlossen, und wir müssen raten oder erschließen, was da vorgehen mag. Die bildgebenden Verfahren zeigen keine Bilder von dem, was wir wissen möchten, sondern nur Abfolgen von Epiphänomenen, die einem anderen Geschehen kausal zugeordnet werden.

Um eine Antwort auf die Frage zu gewinnen, ob Tiere denken können, haben wir jetzt zwei (schon erwähnte) Möglichkeiten. Es wird erstens aus der empirischen Forschung gemeldet, dass Tiere einander als Urteile geordnete Denkakte inklusive Negationen übermitteln, oder wir erschließen aus ihrem Verhalten, dass das bejahende und verneinende Denken im Bereich ihrer Kompetenzen liegt.

Zum ersten: Keine empirische Forschung hat bislang, wenn man die Flut der Publikationen so zusammen ziehen darf, gemeldet, dass sie bei Tieren auf die Mitteilung gestoßen ist, dass irgendetwas Interessenneutrales nicht der Fall sei. Weder bei den Superorganismen[14] noch bei den Einzellern oder höheren organischen Lebewesen hat man offensichtlich dieses sichere Kennzeichen des Denkens gefunden, die mitteilbare Behauptung und ihre Negation. Wenn ein Bedürfnis nicht befriedigt wird, wenn eine bedürfnisbezogene Erwartung nicht erfüllt wird, sind wir im Bereich der vitalen Attraktion und Repulsion oder Leere, aber nicht der Meldung, dass etwas nicht der Fall ist.

Der zweite Weg ist die Erforschung der mentalen Tätigkeit selbst. Im physischen, also raum-zeitlich erstreckten Gegenstand sind hierbei zugelassen die materielle Grundlage von Neuronen und ihre Synapsen, die Kausalbeziehung von Ursache und Wirkung und eine Teleologie, die diese Effektivbeziehung für eine Zweckbeziehung nutzt[15]. Anschaulich können, wie in der übrigen Natur,

[14] Dazu B. Hölldobler und E.O. Wilson, *Superorganismus. Der Erfolg von Ameisen, Bienen, Wespen und Termiten*, Berlin / Heidelberg 2009.
[15] Vgl. die Hinweise N. Tinbergen, *Vergleichende Erforschung angeborenen Verhaltens*, cit., S. 3-7.

nur materielle Gegebenheiten und Raum-Zeit-Beziehungen werden, aber nicht ein Warum und Wozu.

Grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen scheint auch die Erfassung der Gedanken von Forschern, die mit der Beobachtung und Interpretation befasst sind. Die Hirnforschung ist nicht selbstreflexiv, weil sie das forschende und denkende Subjekt nicht als identisches zum Objekt der Erforschung machen kann. Ich meine, wir können dies erweitern: Es werden keine Gedanken als solche erfasst, sondern nur affektive Auswirkungen oder Begleiterscheinungen. Das gilt für Mensch und Tier; oder können wir hoffen, eine Denktätigkeit bei Menschen und – wonach wir suchen – bei Tieren im Gehirn zu finden? Alle physiologischen Befunde sind verknüpft mit vitalen Prozessen, die vom Hirn aus gelenkt werden können und die umgekehrt die Hirntätigkeit beeinflussen. Erregt etwa ein Gedanke Angst oder Freude, lassen sich diese affektiven Regungen genau erfassen; in das Innere des Denkens jedoch, das den Affekt auslöste, gelangte bislang kein Forscher, weder bei Menschen noch bei den, wie wir meinen, gedankenlosen Tieren. Aber wir bewegen uns im Bereich der Empirie und können nur bitten, uns ein Protokoll der in den Gehirnneuronen von Bienen, Elstern oder Affen und Menschen aufgefundenen Gedanken zu übermitteln, in welcher irdischen Kodierung auch immer. Zwei mentale Ereignisse, denen die Forschung im Konsens attestiert, dass sie einen Widerspruch darstellen, wohlgemerkt nicht die gelehrten Aussagen über sie, sondern die neurologischen oder psychologischen Tatbestände selbst. Ein kleiner Widerspruch, ein kurzer Denkakt sollen genügen zur Antwort: Ja, Tiere können denken.

Das Hauptfeld der Forschung ist die Interpretation von Änderungen im neuronalen Bereich und im Verhalten der Menschen und Tiere. Zwischen Neurologie und externem Verhalten liegt die Psychologie, mit deren basaler Raum-Zeit-Struktur wir uns schon befasst haben. Wenn Tiere befähigt sind, sich und andere in die Hierarchie eines Rudels von Wölfen oder einer Schar etwa von Dohlen[16] einzuordnen, wird man versuchen, daraus Rückschlüsse für ihr spezifisches Selbst- bzw. Identitätsbewusstsein zu ziehen.

Wir geben es auf, in der Hirnforschung der Tiere etwas über deren Fähigkeit zu denken zu erforschen. Für das Offenlegen von Denken und Gedanken ist die Hirnforschung bei Menschen und Tieren inkompetent.

Wir können ausschließen, dass sich Tiere zu ihren räumlichen und zeitlichen Vorstellungen selbst verhalten, etwa so, dass sie sich nach einem Detail in einem erinnerten Eigenschaftsbündel fragen: steckte am Hut des Jägers eine Feder, oder wann sie dem Jäger begegnet sind. Insofern wird man nur mit sich selbst organisierenden Vorstellungstätigkeiten rechnen können, die nicht durch ein Ich oder ein einheitliches Bewußtsein beobachtet und dirigiert werden. Kein Tier, so dürfen wir schließen, klagt im Alter über Gedächtnisschwund.

Die raum-zeitlichen Vorstellungen vermögen miteinander zu interagieren und das Lebewesen zu einem zweckrationalen Verhalten zu leiten; aber warum soll dieses psychische Geschehen nach propositionalen Strukturen verlaufen?

[16] *Ibid.*, S. 140.

Es scheint eher so zu sein, dass wir unser Forschungsdenken in die nichtmenschlichen Lebewesen hinein projizieren und so das uns verschlossene Geschehen in alter Ignoranz kolonisieren.

Bringen Tiere die mentalen Voraussetzungen zum Denken mit? Uns interessieren speziell mentale Fähigkeiten, die zu dem eingangs charakterisierten Denken gehören, etwa die Bildung von Begriffen oder das rein gedankliche (nicht assoziative) Erschließen von Sachverhalten. Gedanken werden gedacht, operational nach gewissen logischen Regeln erzeugt, so dass ihre Reproduzierbarkeit beim Hörer gewährleistet ist. Wer von Gedanken von Tieren spricht, sollte zeigen, wie Tiere genau ihre mitteilbaren Gedanken denken, oder sollte auf das Wort 'Gedanken', 'thought' etc. generös verzichten.

Untersuchen wir Begriffe, Urteile und Schlüsse im Hinblick auf ihre Tiertauglichkeit.

Können Tiere Begriffe bilden[17]? Kaum, denn Begriffe gehören in den Zusammenhang von Ober- und Unterbegriffen und sind mögliche Prädikate von Sätzen. Auch so: Begriffe gehören als solche nicht in die Psychologie[18], sondern die Logik, in der den Begriffen eine bestimmte Funktion zukommt. Kein Tier folgt uns, so wollen wir wetten, beim Übergang von der Psychologie zur Logik[19]. Begriffe werden geprägt und benutzt von Subjekten, die eben dies im Prinzip rechtfertigen können. Glücklicherweise gibt es weniger anspruchsvolle Varianten, nämlich wiederkehrende Typen (z. B. die Farbe rot) und Wahrnehmungs- oder Eigenschaftsbündel («bundle or collection of different perceptions»)[20]; sie bilden sich 'stückhaft'[21] heraus aufgrund der subjektiven Bedürfnisse der Arten und Individuen und können relativ konstant sein. Sie genügen zur Steuerung eines bestimmten Verhaltens; es können sich in diese Kollektion z. B. Hasselemente einschleichen, so dass der Hund plötzlich losbellt und die Katze einen krummen Buckel macht; warum nur? An Begriffen wird es nicht liegen. Die *bundles of perceptions* entstehen im Vorstellungsfluss und können sich lange bewähren oder rasch vergehen, mit dieser Kennzeichnug bleiben sie bei Mensch und Tier im Bereich der Psychologie. Sie wechseln in die Logik, wenn sie logische Funktionen

[17] Zu dem verfehlten Ansatz von Markus Wild vgl. die Kritik von A. Nieder, *Der Tierphilosophie anthropomorphe Kleider: Wie stammesgeschichliche Kontinuität mit kognitiver Gleichheit verwechselt wird*,cit., und R. Brandt, *Tierphilosophie. Antwort auf Markus Wild*, cit.

[18] Oder auch Chemie, Alexander Rigos, in «Geo», N. XX, 2013, S. 57: «Und so, als hörten sie einen Satz, geraten die Tiere mit jedem der chemischen Begriffe in zunehmende Erregung.» Die Tiere, die über chemische Begriffe verfügen, sind Ameisen. Sog. Wissenschaftler schätzen nach Rigos (s. 58), «dass Ameisen im Allgemeinen zwischen zehn und 20 chemische Vokabeln verwenden und diese zu Dutzenden Gemischen zu kombinieren vermögen – wenn man so will, also zu Dutzenden von Sätzen.»

[19] Vgl. zu einer einschlägigen Debatte im 17. Jahrhundert R. Specht, *Das Allgemeine bei Locke*, Berlin 2011, S. 112-118 (allgemeine Vorstellungen, Urteile und Schlussfolgerungen bei Tieren).

[20] D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, hrsg. v. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1896, S. 252 – *A Treatise of Human Nature* I 4, 6 («Of Personal Identity»). S.J. Shettleworth, *Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior*, New York-Oxford 1998, p. 221 spricht von 'prototypes'. J. Fischer, *Affengesellschaft*, cit. geht mit der Frage so um, dass sie den Tieren Begriffe zugesteht, der Frage jedoch, wie diese Begriffe sich als solche zeigen sollen, ausweicht.

[21] So N. Tinbergen, *Vergleichende Erforschungen*, cit., S. 104.

übernehmen und sich erstens in ein stabiles Netz von Ober- und Unterbegriffen fügen und zweitens eine Funktion in einem bejahenden oder verneinenden Urteil übernehmen. Es ist nicht entdeckt worden, dass Tiere zu gemeinsamen Tätigkeiten wie Nestbau, Jagd oder etwa Reviermarkierung sinnliche Zeichen austauschen, die tatsächlich für Begriffe stehen und nicht nur von uns post festum so interpretiert werden.

Wie steht es mit Zahlen und Mengen? Ein «grundlegendes Verständnis von Anzahlen und Mengenverhältnissen ist nicht humanspezifisch, sondern im gesamten Tierreich verbreitet.»[22] In der Arbeitsgruppe der kognitiven Neurowissenschaft von Andreas Nieder (Tübingen) wird gezeigt, wie sich Tiere im Problembereich von Zahlen und Mengen verhalten und sich ihre Kenntnisnahme in der Hirnforschung dokumentieren lässt. Nieder spricht Tieren einerseits alle Symbole ab, läßt sie jedoch über abstrakte 'Konzepte' verfügen.

> Basic numerical competence does not depend on language, it is rooted in biological primitives that can already be found in animals. Animals possess impressive numerical capabilities and are able to nonverbally and approximately grasp the numerical properties of objects and events.[23]

In der Sache wird bei den Tieren eine rudimentäre Fähigkeit des Reagierens auf unterschiedliche Anzahlen und Proportionen nachgewiesen, aber damit kein intellektuelles Kontinuum von den Tieren zu den Menschen angenommen[24]. «Animals can only non-verbally estimate numerosity», während wir genau abzählen können, was ohne Sprache nicht möglich ist[25]. Wir wollen diesen intellektuellen Fähigkeiten der Tiere nicht zu nahe treten: Sie reichen auch nach Nieder nicht aus zu den geringsten Rechenoperationen mit den abstrakten Größen, die ein Zahlbegriff voraussetzt. Die «numerical competence», die Nieder findet, ist nicht hinreichend, numerische Identitäten festzuhalten, dazu bedürfte es der sprachlich kontrollierten Begriffe. Daher Nieders strikte Opposition gegen den jeden Versuch, ein mentales Kontinuum zwischen Tier und Mensch herzustellen.

Das Urteil oder der Satz besteht rudimentär aus Namen und (oder) Begriffen, aus Subjekt und Prädikat und kann und muss damit bejaht oder verneint werden. Bejahung und Verneinung widersprechen einander und sind als Behauptungen notwendig entweder wahr oder falsch. Auch hier winken die Tiere ab und wollen mit der Logik nichts zu tun haben. Sie müssten dazu in der Lage sein, das Urteil als Einheit zu begreifen, die auch dann erhalten bleibt,

[22] D. Vallentin et al., *Neurobiologische Grundlagen der Verarbeitung von Anzahlen und Proportionen im Primatengehirn*, in «Neuroforum», II, 2012, S. 196-203, hier S. 196.
[23] A. Nieder, *The Neurol code for Number*, in «*Space, Time and Number in the Brain. Searching for the Foundations of Mathematical Thought*», hrsg. v. S. Dehance u. E.M. Brannon, Elsevier 2011, S. 103.
[24] *Ibid*.
[25] A. Nieder, *Der Tierphilosophie anthropomorphe Kleider: Wie stammesgeschichtliche Kontinuität mit kognitiver Gleichheit verwechselt wird*, cit.

wenn die inhaltliche Verbindung von Subjekt und Prädikat aufgelöst wird, d. h. bei der internen Verneinung.

In der neueren Diskussion gibt es den Begriff «propositionale Einstellung»; er soll auf Haltungen wie die des Glaubens, Meinens, der Überzeugung und damit auch auf mentale Zustände von Tieren zutreffen. Nun ist das Wort etymologisch ambivalent; es kommt von *proponere, propositio* und kann sich einmal auf eine Vorstellung ohne innere Artikulation beziehen, aber auch auf Sätze, also begrifflich artikulierte Urteile der Form «S ist / ist nicht P». Wenn es das Haben von Vorstellungen meint, ist es unproblematisch, sie jedem höheren Lebewesen zuzuschreiben. Der Hund von Pawlow hat die dringende Vorstellung des Eintreffens des Fressens nach dem Klingelzeichen, die Assoziation von beidem durch Gewohnheit führt ihn zum urteilsfreien Glauben, Überzeugtsein, Meinen etc. Diese mentalen Einstellungen gehören zur Zweckausstattung des Seelenlebens der Tiere, Darwin ist unser Zeuge. Wenn jedoch die *propositio* urteilsförmig ist, wird man sie Tieren absprechen, da für Urteile Begriffe benötigt werden und Tiere über keine Begriffe verfügen. Im ersten Fall wird man nicht erwarten, dass die zweckgerichtete Vorstellung auch verneinend ist, im zweiten ist die Möglichkeit der Verneinung der *propositio* eine notwendige Bedingung.

Wenn Tiere nicht urteilen, können sie sich und einander nicht widersprechen. Sie mögen maulen, wenn ihnen etwas nicht passt (in unserer Diktion, das 'nicht'), aber niemals kommt ein Einspruch: «Halt, Sie widersprechen sich!» Alle psychischen Prozesse und Dramen sind ein ruhiger oder wilder und herzzerreißender Fluss, aber ein Widerspruch hat in diesem reinen Sein keinen Ort. Und der Hund, der zugleich bissig und zahm ist? Die Antwort: Er beißt nach außen und ist zugleich zahm nach innen.[26]

Wenn Tiere nicht urteilen, folgt natürlich, dass Tiere keine Urteile zu Schlüssen verbinden können. Sie mögen zu einem Verhalten kommen, das in unserer Sicht das Ergebnis von logischen Schlüssen ist, aber der Weg ist ihnen versperrt; entsprechend steht der Tierphilosoph vor der Frage, wie das Ergebnis genau aussieht und wie ein Weg frei von Wundern von a zu o führt. Der stoische Philosoph Chrysipp hat schon um 380 v. Chr. vermutlich sein Veto eingelegt gegen die Unterstellung, ein Hund verfolge einen Hirsch bei einer Weggabelung am Leitfaden der stoischen Syllogistik: a, b, oder c; nun nicht a oder b, also c[27]. Sowenig es Tieren gelingt, den Raum und dessen Vorstellung geometrisch zu bestimmen und Beweisfiguren zu entwickeln (nicht nur die Bienenwaben ungefähr im Sechseck zu bauen), so wenig ist es ihnen vergönnt, ihrem mentalen Geschehen von Vorstellungen die Form zu geben, die von der Logik verlangt wird. Die Gesetze, die sie beherrschen, sind nicht die der Logik, sondern der Psychologie mit den Kräften der Attraktion und Repulsion und angeborenen ökonomischen Mustern. Sollte nun doch ein Hund seine Beute mit dem

[26] Platon, *Politeia* 375c7-376c5. *Sämtliche Werke*, hrsg. v. E. Grassi, Hamburg 1959, III, S. 112-113.

[27] Vgl. dazu L. Floridi, *Scepticism and Animal Rationality: The Fortune of Chrysippus' Dog in the History of Western Thought*, in «Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie», LXXIX, 1997, S. 27-57.

Syllogismus verfolgen, dann möchte man gern wissen, in welcher Sprache der Syllogismus sich präsentiert bzw. vom Hund formuliert wird. Chrysipp hat diesen Nichtgedanken klugerweise vermutlich abgewiesen. Nicht unwichtig: Die gesamte antike und mittelalterliche Tierphilosophie verzichtete darauf, ihre Aussagen experimentell zu stützen; bei dem Hund hätte man sogleich erkannt, dass das postulierte Nicht-Riechen des dritten Weges experimentell nicht nachgewiesen wurde (Experimentell: Nicht durch wiederholte Erfahrung, sondern das Arrangieren der Bedingungen eines Geschehens! Das gibt es bei aller Tierbeobachtung nicht in der Antike und nicht im Mittelalter).

Wir müssen Tieren die veranschaulichte Vorstellung von Zielen des eigenen und des fremden Verhaltens zubilligen, bei letzterem auch der rein mechanischen Bewegung, etwa bei einem vorbei oder heran fliegenden Ball. Tiere antizipieren in ihrer Raum-Zeit-Arena die Ergebnisse sei es eigener, sei es fremder momentaner Tätigkeiten und tragen das, was noch nicht ist, in die strukturierte Karte ein und bewegen sich dann auf das imaginierte Ende zu[28]. Die Repräsentation des Zieles des eigenen Verhaltens hat eine anleitende Funktion der Attraktion oder Repulsion oder auch des Experimentierens oder Probierens, d. h. des Sammelns von Erfahrungen z. B. zur Überwindung von Hindernissen. Dies alles geschieht, ohne dass sich das propositionale Denken einmischt – glücklicherweise, denn auf das Denken müssten die Tiere und ihre Fürsprecher wohl lange warten.

Wenn Tiere sich Werkzeuge zurecht biegen können, dann werden wir uns bescheiden und gestehen, dass wir den dazu nötigen mentalen Vorgang nicht kennen. Es könnte ein Derivat der angeborenen Fähigkeit zum Nestbau sein[29], es können Assoziationen von zielgerichteten Vorstellungen sein. Wir können deswegen jedoch nicht die Psyche mit Kalkülen bevölkern, die wir uns bei solchen Gelegenheiten ausdenken.

Menschen und Tiere leben in dem einen gemeinsamen Raum und der einen gemeinsamen Zeit; sowohl Menschen wie auch Tiere haben räumlich und zeitlich geordnete Vorstellungen, die sich auch auf Dinge und Ereignisse beziehen, die den Sinnen im Moment nicht präsent sind. Der Hund stellt sich offenbar die Katze vor, die auf dem Baum verschwunden ist; das Raubtier stellt sich die Gazelle vor, die es verfolgt, die aber in einer Bodensenke unsichtbar geworden ist. Tiere wie Menschen entwerfen individuell eine perspektivisch angelegte Raum- und Zeitarena, die in unsere gemeinsame Welt eingepaßt ist. Nur so sind die äußere und innere Erfahrung und die gesteuerten Bewegungen möglich. Die Gefühle von Lust und Schmerz, die Begehrungen und Leidenschaften sind körpergebundene Ereignisse der Einzelwesen, die sich zugleich nach außen wenden; die Tiere sind hierbei überraschend selbstbezüglich und eher autistisch als kommunikativ. Den Schmerz des Hungers erlebt jedes Körperwesen allein und für sich; das den Menschen vorbehaltene Urteilsdenken ist dagegen immer

[28] Vgl. R.G. Millikan, *Die Vielfalt der Bedeutung. Zeichen, Ziele und ihre Verwandtschaft*, cit., S. 262 ff.

[29] Zu den „Kunsttrieben" von Tieren vgl. H. S. Reimarus, *Betrachtungen über die besonderen Artend er thierischen Kunsttriebe*, Hamburg 1773, u. ö.

schon durch seine Form universal, es verdankt sich einer kollektiven Erzeugung und bleibt dem öffentlichen Forum verhaftet. Wie dies möglich wurde, soll am Schluss konjiziert werden.

Der antike Philosoph Aristipp wurde mit einer Gruppe anderer Reisender auf eine Insel verschlagen. Am Strand entdeckten sie eine geometrische Figur im Sand, «Vestigium hominis video! Ich sehe die Spur eines Menschen!» rief der Philosoph aus. Was gab ihm die Sicherheit, dass die Figur nicht durch Zufall von Wind und Wasser geformt worden war? Oder dass eine seltsame Tiergattung diese Figur bei ihren Balztänzen formte? Die Reisenden waren von der früheren Gegenwart von Menschen überzeugt, weil es sich um eine geometrische Beweisfigur handelte, und die Denkoperationen, die zu einem Beweis nötig sind, nach allen Erfahrungen nur Menschen vollziehen[30]. Kein Tier kann denken, dachten die Reisenden kühn, und behielten Recht können.

Metakognition ist die reflexive Erkenntnis des eigenen mentalen Vermögens. Sind Tiere zu dieser Selbstthematisierung in der Lage? Zunächst: Sie können mit Sicherheit nicht zwischen physischen und psychischen Phänomenen als solchen unterscheiden, sie haben mit Sicherheit keine *theory of mind*, die sich nur im Gegensatz zu einer *theory of body* begreifen könnte, doch wohl postcartesianisch ist, es sei denn, einige Tiere hätten einen anderen Seelenbegriff und folgten einer biblischen oder aristotelischen bzw. neoaristotelischen oder gar animistischen Lehre. Ist diese Theorie sprachfrei? Etymologisch legt sich das nahe, weil *theoria* 'Schau' heißt, also 'Seelenschau' wie 'Himmelsschau'. Aber daran dürfte hier nicht gedacht sein; die Entdecker oder Erfinder der neuen animalischen *theory of mind* werden ans Englische gedacht haben. Ist die *theory of mind* angeboren und irrtumsfrei? Oder erwerben die Tiere die Theorie in ihrer Jugend individuell? Ist es immer dieselbe Theorie? Fragen über Fragen im Angesicht größter neuer Autoritäten.

Können Tiere ihre eigenen psychischen Kräfte in ihren Grenzen erkennen? Die Katze 'weiß', wie weit sie ungefähr springen kann; es ist der habituelle Umgang, der sicher nicht darauf angewiesen ist, die eigenen psychischen und physischen Kräfte zu thematisieren, die Katze muss sich nicht propositional sagen, dass der Sprung zum Nachbardach zwar ein wunderbares Flugerlebnis, aber auch das Ende ihres Lebens überhaupt wäre. Sie denkt nicht daran, auf das Nachbardach oder den Mond zu springen. Da sie nicht daran denkt, braucht sie sich die Negation nicht zu eigen zu machen. Wenn man die psychologischen Einsichten von Tieren ihres Theoriecharakters entkleidet und rein praktisch interpretiert, könnte man sie mit Ruth Millikan als «uniception» fassen.[31]

Große und kleine Tiere sind insgesamt unmündig, ihnen können nicht ernsthaft bestimmte Handlungen und eventuell deren Folgen rechtlich 'zugeschrieben' werden. In der deutschen Sprachtradition wird der Begriff der 'Zuschreibung' als Übersetzung der rechtlichen '*imputatio*' benutzt, und wir

[30] R. Brandt, *Philosophie in Bildern*, Köln 2001, S. 194-200.
[31] R.G. Millikan, *What's Inside a Thinking Animal?* in «Welt der Gründe. Beiträge zu den Kolloquien des XXII. Kongresses für Philosophie in München», hrsg. v. J. Nida-Rümelin und E. Özmen, Hamburg 2012, S. 25.

würden mit einem Salto zurück in die Antike und ins Mittelalter springen, wenn wir Tiere für sittlich und rechtlich verantwortlich hielten, auch wenn der Hund dort drüben die Wiedergeburt des Parmenides oder Mephisto selbst sein sollte. Tierisches Verhalten läßt sich 'beschreiben', aber die psychische Ausstattung ist nicht beschreibbar; man wird hier in einem nicht-rechtlichen Sinn von Zuschreibung sprechen, etwa: Wir schreiben Tieren die Fähigkeit des nicht-physischen Leidens zu, etwa beim Tod von Jungen.

3.4. Die Assoziation von Vorstellungen

Der Titel bezieht sich auf eine antike und bis in das 19. Jahrhundert lebendige Theorie der Psyche von Tieren und Menschen, gemäß der es Verknüpfungen von Vorstellungen gibt, die in der Ähnlichkeit, Nähe und kausalen Abhängigkeit von numerisch unterschiedenen psychischen Gegenständen oder Ereignissen begründet sind. Hierbei kann es sich um epistemische oder auch emotionale Eindrücke oder Erinnerungen handeln. Platon und Aristoteles, Leibniz, Hume und Kant nehmen das Assoziationsphänomen als unbezweifelbar an, wie jedes Historische Wörterbuch ausweist. Jeder kennt es durch Selbstbeobachtung oder die Beobachtung des Verlaufs von Gesprächen und Erzählungen. Die für uns entscheidende Frage lautet jedoch: Handelt es sich um ein häufig auftretendes Phänomen, oder gibt es ein Assoziationsgesetz, gemäß dem *alle* psychischen Prozesse überhaupt assoziativ verlaufen? In diesem letzteren Fall wäre unsere Trennung von Psychologie und Logik nicht haltbar, weil das gesamte Denken den Assoziationsprinzipien unterliegt und alle Tiere und Menschen über dieselbe Vernunft verfügen[32]. Dies impliziert einen psychologischen Determinismus; ein im Kausalnetz nicht zu verortendes Menschen-Ich hätte dann ausgeträumt, es wäre als subjektive Illusion leicht aufzuspüren und auszutreten.

Der bekannteste Vertreter dieser Auffassung ist David Hume. Seine gesamte Philosophie folgt der «connexion or association of ideas»; ihre Bestandteile sind Vorstellungen und Eindrücke und deren drei Assoziationsformen, «resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect»[33], dies sind die «elements of this philosophy»[34]. Sie bilden eine gesetzliche Ordnung, wobei das Muster die kosmische Ordnung ist, die durch die Schwerkraft erstellt wird. Newton mit seiner exakten Wissenschaft der Körper dient als Vorbild. Wie immer wir bezweifeln mögen, dass wir die Natur der Kräfte selbst erkennen können, die gesetzliche Ordnung ist nach Hume so wenig im Inneren wie im Äußeren zu leugnen.

Im Kapitel über die persönliche Identität schreibt er: «For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception […].»[35] Nun sollte der Inhalt der Lehre auf ihre

[32] D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, cit., *S.* 176-179.
[33] *Ebd.*, S. 11.
[34] *Ebd.*, S. 13.
[35] *Ebd.*, S. 252.

Darstellung selbst anwendbar sein; man kann also billig von Hume verlangen, in seinem d. h. im ersten Buch des *Treatise* auf das '*I*' zu verzichten und durch die Vorstellungskomplexe, die gebündelten '*perceptions*', zu ersetzen. Das von ihnen getrennte '*I*' ist ja eine Illusion, die damit auf ihre wahre Nichtigkeit reduziert wäre. Hume macht jedoch durchgängig von einem '*I*' Gebrauch, das nicht identisch sein kann mit dem '*myself*', von dem in unserem letzten Zitat die Rede war und das dem '*I*' gegenübersteht. Es muss eine notwendige Instanz sein, von der die Hume´sche Theorie selbst nichts weiß.

Ein zweiter Punkt betrifft die Negation. Es gibt Bestimmungen, die im positiven Naturalismus nicht aufgehen. So die Idee der «non-existence»[36], die nicht aus dem Fundus der naturalen «impressions» kommt, denn die Nicht-Existenz gehört weder zur äußeren noch inneren Natur und ihrem Gravitations- bzw. Assoziationsmechanismus, und man wird sie entsprechend im *bundle of perceptions* vergeblich suchen. Es soll gelten «Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be exsistent»[37]. Aber der *Treatise of Human Nature* beginnt mit dem Satz: «Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover any thing new to the world in philosophy and the sciences than [...]». Das Satzsubjekt ist also das alt-ehrwürdige '*nothing*', vor dem schon Parmenides warnte[38]. Hume beginnt seine Untersuchung mit der Anrufung dieses 'nichts'. Dies scheint zunächst nur eine *façon de parler* zu sein, auf die auch verzichtet werden könnte. Aber erstens ist damit das wenn auch überflüssige Vorkommen dieses Rede-Nichts nicht erklärt, und zweitens ist der gesamte *Treatise* durchsetzt von an sich verbotenen Negationen. Hume widerlegt andere Autoren und widerlegt damit sich selbst, denn die Assoziationsgesetze bilden eine positive Barrikade gegen alle sachhaltigen Verneinungen. Die «elements of this philosophy» sind, wie wir sahen, «impressions» und «ideas» und ihre drei Assoziationsformen, «resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and cause and effect», also ein durchgängig positiv besetztes seelisches Aufkommen, etwas, das nicht ist, ist nicht in Sicht. Wo sind die «impressions» und «ideas» der «existence and non-existence»[39], besonders der letzteren?

Falls die beiden Punkte der Kritik stichhaltig sind, könnte eine gemeinsame Lösung im Rückgriff auf Kant gefunden werden, im «Ich denke» und der Urteilstheorie. Das 'Ich' der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ist für alle Verstandestätigkeit unentbehrlich, und es kann nicht als ein *bundle of perceptions* erkannt werden. Dieses unhinterschreitbare Ich und seine Spontaneität muss als der Grund der Möglichkeit jedes Urteils gedacht werden, und dies ist entweder bejahend oder verneinend (oder unendlich). Die Verneinung braucht also nicht vergebens aus dem Fluß von Perzeptionen herausgewrungen zu werden, sondern entspringt der spontanen Tätigkeit des Denkens in Urteilen.

Und ein letztes Bedenken: «To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct of our souls, which carries us along

[36] *Ebd.*, S. 5.
[37] *Ebd.*, S. 67.
[38] Parmenides Fragment 7: «Denn es ist unmöglich, dass Nichtseiendes sei (...)»
[39] D. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, cit., S. 15.

a certain train of ideas, [...]»[40]. Ist dieser «train of ideas» der Autor eines Werks, dem man zustimmen soll und gegen das man Einwände hat? Dem wird man nicht zustimmen wollen, weil die Möglichkeit der Ablehnung nicht vorkommt.

Die Ansprüche des Hume´schen Determinismus lassen sich auf diese Weise oder anders widerlegen. Damit aber ist die Assoziationspsychologie für Tiere und Menschen, wenn sie nur auf den gesetzlichen Allanspruch verzichtet, frei verfügbar. Der Fall des Pawlow-Hundes kann dann aus seiner deterministischen Betonierung befreit und als lokale Angelegenheit rehabilitiert werden: Wir können sagen: So weit wir wissen, funktioniert hier die künstliche Abfolge von Klingelzeichen und Fressen vorzüglich. Die anschließende Reflexion darüber lässt sich jedoch nicht mehr mit den Mitteln der Assoziationspsychologie rekonstruieren und beurteilen.

Zu den entscheidenden Punkten im Übergang von der Psychologie zum logisch kontrollierten Denken gehört: Die psychologischen, auch assoziativen Vorstellungssequenzen sind privater Natur, das Denken ist nur als öffentlicher Akt erklärbar. Pawlows Hund ist dieses eine trainierte Individuum, das Denken dagegen geschieht in einer wirklichen oder doch möglichen kollektiven Öffentlichkeit. Die Vorstellungen, die das Denken ermöglichen, sind öffentlich fixiert, während die psychologischen Syndrome und Verläufe sich selbst im Mentalbereich des Einzelnen und allenfalls des Du in Nachbarschaftsnähe genügen.

3.5. Das Denken der Menschen

Ein Held unserer Zeit: der sympathische Affenforscher, der alles schon bei den tierischen Vorfahren angelegt sieht. Er erkennt seine Mission darin, gegen die Arroganz von homo sapiens aufzutreten, der sich einbildet, er habe Neues in die Welt gesetzt. Der Gradualist setzt auf Übergänge. Vom Unterschied zwischen Faustkeil und h-moll-Messe will er nichts hören. Und das breite Publikum gibt ihm recht, weil es in seiner Schwankung zwischen dem Affen und dem Genie lieber die Tierseite wählt[41].

Zu den mathematischen Analysen fehlten nähere Angaben, auch zu der Frage, was denn satzähnlich heißt. *Just pronounce the word 'science', and all is okay.*

Als die Tiere sich von den Pflanzen trennten und sich im Raum zu bewegen begannen, brauchten sie eine Hilfe bei der Orientierung: Wohin schwimmt, fliegt oder geht man heute, und wohin lieber nicht? Die aus lichtempfindlichen Zellen entwickelten Augen entstanden an den günstigsten Körperstellen, um Ausschau zu halten und zu warnen und zu verlocken. Keine Pflanze konnte es den Tieren nachtun und Augen gebrauchen und andere und sich selbst sehen und vorstellen.

Beim Überschritt von den Tieren zu den Menschen spielt wieder der Raum und die Ent-Fernung die entscheidende Rolle. Während der Augensinn immer an den einzelnen Körper des Fisches, Säugetieres oder Vogels gebunden war, entwickelten die Menschen im Naturprozess eine mentale und physische

[40] *Ebd.*, S. 179.
[41] P. Sloterdijk, *Zeilen und Tage. Notizen 2008 - 2011*, Berlin 2012, S. 260.

Tätigkeit, durch die sie sich über Geschehnisse im Raum und später über Geschehnisse und Fakten überhaupt informieren und öffentlich austauschen konnten. Das Denken und die sprachliche Mitteilung waren diese natürliche Errungenschaft, mit der die Menschen die Tiere überboten, sich unterwarfen und zum Thema ihrer Vorträge machten.

Können Tiere denken? In der Tradition dieser alten Frage wird 'denken' als diskursive Tätigkeit gefasst, die mit bestimmten versetzbaren Elementen, Symbolen, vorgenommen wird und sprachlich ausgedrückt werden kann. Denken unterliegt der Logik; die Logik ist ein «Begriffssystem, welches das Denken ermöglicht und dem sich jede von denkenden Wesen benutzbare Sprache anpassen muss.»[42] Es werden mindestens zwei Symbole so vereinigt, dass sie verknüpft bleiben, auch wenn sie in der Verneinung das Getrenntsein ihrer Bedeutungen oder gemeinten Inhalte besagen. Wir fixieren das Denken auf die mentalen Operationen, die entsprechend in einem Grundschema von «S ist / ist nicht P» vollzogen werden. «Der Vogel fliegt». Dieser in sprachlichen Symbolen formulierte Satz drückt einen Denkakt aus, den wir bei keinem Tier unterstellen können. Seine grundsätzlichen Eigentümlichkeiten: Die Bestandteile des Urteils sind Namen oder Begriffe, die in Symbolen ausgedrückt werden. Symbole sind im Unterschied zu Zeichen künstliche Setzungen. Der Satz ist negierbar: «Der Vogel fliegt nicht»; er ist wahr oder falsch, er ist im Prinzip in alle menschlichen Sprachen übersetzbar; er kann als Prämisse in einem Schluss dienen, und Schlüsse sind ohne Sätze dieses oder eines anderen Typs nicht möglich. Anders als das Sein und die Natur selbst ist das Denken widerspruchsfähig. Also: Sätze oder Urteile können einander widersprechen und unterliegen dem Satz vom ausgeschlossenen Widerspruch. Z. B.: «Es gibt eine widerspruchsfreie Logik / Es gibt keine widerspruchsfreie Logik». Dagegen: Kein Seiendes ist widersprüchlich, weder der Mond, den man zur Hälfte sieht und der doch rund und schön ist, noch die Atome, unteilbar, und schon sind sie ohne Widerspruch gespalten, noch irgendein anderes Phänomen in der widerspruchslosen physischen und psychischen Welt.

Das notwendig negierbare Urteil findet sich seit Platon in der Logiktradition, wie wir gleich zu Beginn sahen; auch Ruth Millikan beruft sich darauf; das Denken der Menschen entwickele sich mit dem Gebrauch der Sprache qua «representation that has the subject-predicate structure, the predicate being sensitive to a negation transformation.»[43] Tieren sei die Negation unbekannt, weil sie nicht denken. Ruth Millikan nennt als Beispiel die Bienen: «Different bee dances can tell of nectar in different places, but there are no bee dances that say where there isn´t any nectar.»[44] Wenn die Bienen mit hängenden Köpfen und traurigen Mienen zurückkommen, dann entnehmen wir dieser Gestik und Mimik die negative Botschaft «Da ist nichts», aber die Bienen winken ab; dass da 'Nichts' sein bzw. doch nicht sein soll, können sie nicht begreifen.

[42] Th. Nagel, *Das letzte Wort*, Stuttgart 1999, S. 58.
[43] R.G. Millikan, *What's Inside a Thinking Animal?*, in *Welt der Gründe*, cit., S. 4.
[44] *Ibid*. Ich sehe nicht, wie Millikan trotzdem vom Denken und den Gedanken der Tiere sprechen kann.

Ist je eine andere Äußerung irgendeines Tieres nachgewiesen worden, in der es jaulend oder singend und tanzend mitteilt, etwas sei nicht der Fall? Die gesuchte Mitteilung soll explizit sein, also nicht in einem Verhalten bestehen, aus dem zu erschließen ist, dass irgendetwas im Bedürfnisbereich des Tieres nicht da ist.

Alle mentalen Regungen der Tiere gehören in die Psychologie, Stolz und Demut, Aggression gegen andere und Zuneigung zu den Nachkommen, Triebe und Instinkte, das ganze Treiben, das wir auch von Menschen kennen und vieles mehr, wie wir gerne zugestehen. Mit dem ersten Satz oder Gedanken (ob nun als Beschreibung oder, als Derivat, Befehl oder Gebet etc.) wird ein Sprung aus dem psychischen Geschehen in die Logik vollzogen, die völlig neue Gesetze mit sich führt. Einen Gedanken oder ein Urteil zu denken, ist auch ein psychisches Unternehmen, aber nicht nur; mit diesem 'nicht nur' wird der Vorhang geöffnet zu einem neuen Schauspiel auf unserm Planeten.

Wir legen wert auf die explizite Negation, weil an ihr die logisch-künstliche Operation des Urteilens noch sinnfälliger wird als bei der bloßen Bejahung. Eine Negation als solche gibt es nicht im turbulentesten Flussgeschehen des psychischen Verlaufs, sondern erst unter der Obhut logischer Regeln.

Gedanken oder Denkakte lassen sich sprachlich formulieren und mitteilen. Wir sehen uns als verantwortliche Urheber der Mitteilung, obwohl wir nicht genau wissen, wie sich der Sprechakt zum Denkakt, der ihn ermöglicht, verhält. Wir akzeptieren den Hinweis: «Du hättest dir besser überlegen sollen, was du sagtest.» «Bedenke gut, was du schreibst.»

Tierverhalten ist immer spezies- und bedürfnisbezogen. Das sprachlich formulierbare Denken bezieht sich dagegen nicht nur auf Dinge der eigenen oder gemeinsamen Verwendung, sondern kreiert einen nicht mehr subjektiven, sondern objektiven Objektbegriff: Das naturale, nützliche oder schädliche Vorstellungsensemble wird zu einem neutralen, der gemeinsamen Erkenntnis zugänglichen Objekt. Zu denken impliziert das Bewusstsein, dass die eigenmächtige Verknüpfung der Bestandteile des Denkaktes auch nicht zutreffen könnte – gibt es irgendeine Äußerung von Tieren, die auf ein derartiges Bewusstsein schließen läßt? Das Denken setzt die Unterbrechung des bedürfnisbezogenen Verlaufs der Empfindungen und Erwartungen voraus, im Denken nimmt das Subjekt eine eigene Operation mit den Vorstellungen vor, die dadurch zu Begriffen werden. Sie fungieren in einer, gegenüber den bisherigen Verläufen neuen Funktion im Muster «S ist / ist nicht P». Aus psychologischen Ereignissen sind logische Verknüpfungen geworden. Aus dem bloß praktischen Agieren und Kommunizieren der Tiere und Protomenschen wird, bei aller Praxissucht, eine theoretische Einstellung. Der Mensch betritt die Bühne.

Wie konnte die Fähigkeit zu denken und zu sprechen auf natürliche Weise entstehen? Wie konnte aus dem Maulen und Grunzen der Affen, dem Pfeifen der Delphine und dem Gesang der hochbegabten Nachtigall je die menschliche Sprache sich bilden? Alles ohne einen Gott, der die Grammatikalisierung dieser Flut von Lauten vornahm oder den Menschen gleich im Paradies eine

Universalgrammatik schenkte? Es muss für unseren Zweck nicht gezeigt werden, wie diese Genese sich historisch wirklich vollzog, sondern wie sie unter natürlichen Bedingungen denkbar ist. Dass es dafür eine natürliche Lösung geben muss, ist evident.

Vorausgesetzt ist eine biologische Körperentwicklung, die z. B. die Kiefer von der Muskulatur befreit, die zum Fressen von rohem Fleisch nötig ist. Vorausgesetzt ist eine Entwicklung, die die Menschen aus der intensiven Familienbindung freisetzt zu einem Leben in größeren Verbänden und freien Räumen. In einer autonomen Familie genügt eine Kommunikation unter den Mitgliedern, die sich auf die nächsten Bedürfnisse und Gefühle bezieht, mit stimmungsvollem Jammern, Kiechern, Husten. Wir werden auf der Suche nach der Genese des Sprechens und Denkens weder beim Ich noch beim Du fündig und wenden uns an die dritte und letzte Instanz, die anonyme präsente Öffentlichkeit.

Es ist nicht schwer, das Szenario einer möglichen natürlichen Denkgenese zu skizzieren. Die Eckdaten sind Öffentlichkeit, Referenz der Äußerung auf einen Gegenstand öffentlicher Aufmerksamkeit, Auszeichnung dieses Gegenstandes als eines so und so gearteten und die Möglichkeit des Einspruchs. In der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit muss sich diese Konstellation in irgendeiner Form geboten und verstetigt haben. Man kann sich eine Musterszene ausdenken, die diese Bedingungen erfüllt: Das Zeigen auf etwas eindeutig Sichtbares und Identifizierbares in einem öffentlichen Raum, also nicht im Urwald, sondern eher in der Savanne, die lauthafte Benennung und Charakteristik, der Einspruch eines Hordenmitglieds gegen die Äußerung und damit die Kommunikation *über* den Gegenstand, der für alle sichtbar da ist, aber unterschiedlich beurteilt wird. *That´s it.*[45]

Das anthropologisch gesicherte Zeigen enthält die Aufforderung an alle anderen, ihren Blick und ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf ein bestimmtes Etwas dort hinten zu lenken. Das Zeigen behauptet gewissermaßen: Das Etwas dort ist identisch, aus welcher Perspektive es auch gesehen wird; in dem Sinn also: Es ist objektiv dort. Die sich allmählich entwickelnde Rede behält die Aufforderung bei, sie bietet den Hörern eine Anweisung, diesen oder jenen Gedanken herzustellen; die Regeln der Herstellung finden wir in der Logik.

Mit dieser zweckmäßigen Konstellation ist gegenüber allen Formen der affektiven Verlautbarung ein qualitativ neues Niveau erreicht. Unter der Pression der Verbesserung von Lebenschancen wird eine lautliche Kooperation entwickelt, die vom *animal* zum *animal rationale* führt. Die öffentliche Sprache und das sie tragende Denken sind nicht mehr bedürfnisbezogene Nahlaute und psychische Regungen von Du zu Du, feierlich alter ego, sondern sie sind fernbezogen und potentiell interessenneutral, sie können daher an beliebigen offenen Orten ebenfalls entwickelt oder in sie übertragen werden. Die sich ausbildende Menschen-sprache ist daher in alle anderen übersetzbar, weil in allen dasselbe

[45] Die Meinung Wilhelm von Humboldts, es handle sich beim Sprachursprung um eine unbeantwortbare Frage (J. Fischer, *Affengesllschaft*, p. 245), ist nach Darwin unbegründet.

gedacht werden kann. Die Tiere haben diese Wende zum Denken verpasst[46]. Die Menschen schufen dagegen durch Sprache und Denken einen Superorganismus neuer Art, dessen Glieder sich räumlich und später auch zeitlich getrennt reproduktiv verständigen konnten. Damit werden Informationen kostengünstig aufbereitet und sind überall verwendbar, wenn Medien ihrer Übermittlung gefunden sind.

Als essentiell erweist sich eine Größe, die wir gleich zu Beginn einführten: Der Raum, damit aber auch die Zeit. Wir entwickeln das Denken und Sprechen im Anschluss an den Zeigegestus, der nur sinnvoll ist in einem offenen Raum und bei den Adressaten einer menschlichen Gesellschaft, der ersten Form der Öffentlichkeit. Mit dieser Vorstellung haben wir die Verbindung mit der analytischen Philosophie gekappt; sie sucht das Denken als ein selbständiges semiotischen System aus lautlichen Zeichen zu entwickeln und verliert damit die Möglichkeit, Sprechen und Denken schon im Ansatz als raum-öffentliche Angelegenheit zu betrachten[47]. Ohne den Raumbezug gibt es keine Referenz und damit kein Denken. Kommunizieren können auch Tiere, aber sie denken so wenig wie leiblose Geister (soweit wir wissen).

Diese Überlegung steht in einer gewissen Analogie zur «Widerlegung des Idealismus» in Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*[48]. Die bloßen fließenden Vorstellungen im Bewusstsein tragen in sich keine Garantie, sich auf eine vom Subjekt unterschiedene Außenwelt zu beziehen. Erst die Substanz der Dinge im Raum bringt eine Größe ins Spiel, die dem Zeitfluss nicht entstammen kann, d. h. erst der identische beharrliche Körper im Raum ermöglicht es, den Idealismus der Bewusstseinsbestimmungen zu durchbrechen und zu einer objektiven gemeinsamen Welt zu gelangen. Dieselbe Funktion hat in unserem Vorschlag das öffentlich gezeigte räumliche, für alle identische Etwas in der Realgenese des menschlichen Denkens und Sprechens. Die Geste und ihre Lautbegleitung transzendieren das Heulen und Jaulen und Trällern der Wale und Waldbewohner, die nur die affektiven Befindlichkeiten und Bedürfnisse zum Ausdruck bringen und allenfalls koordinieren.

Nun wird man hier eine Frage an Kant ergänzen: Überwindet die solitäre Beziehung auf einen Körper im Raum den Idealismus, oder bedarf es einer Vielheit von Subjekten, die den einen Körper als identischen fixieren und meinen Bewusstseinsfluss verobjektivieren?

Wir hatten moniert, dass der Begriff oder das Wort „Begriff" im Hinblick auf Tiere verwendet wird; von Begriffen spricht man in der Ordnung der Logik, in der empirischen Psychologie dagegen von Eigenschafts- oder Vorstellungsbündeln und Verknüpfungen oder Abstoßungen. Unser Vorschlag zur Genese des menschlichen, logikfähigen Denkens aus den animalischen Strömen psychischer

[46] Wir kommen dieser Sternstunde bzw. diesen Sternenjahrtausenden sicher nicht näher durch die Bemühungen der Glottochronologie. Das Sammeln ohne Idee hilft nicht weiter.
[47] Wenn das Urteil als 'p' (*propositio*) gefaßt wird, ist die Möglichkeit, es auf Anschauung zu beziehen, schon verbaut.
[48] Ich beziehe mich hier nur auf die unter eben diesem Titel gebrachten Ausführungen der 2. Auflage (1787) B 274-279.

Ereignisse muss noch näher erläutert werden. Wir haben die Konstellation des «S ist / ist nicht P» in einer bestimmten kollektiven Situation nachgestellt. Die Mitteilung, sei es der Bejahung, sei es der Verneinung hat einen Überlebenswert, weil sie zeitsparend über die Gegenwart z. B. attraktiver Beute oder repulsiver Gefahr informiert.

Es ist somit Teil einer kooperativen Kommunikation, in der mit der ausgestreckten Hand auf etwas Körperexternes, Fernes gewiesen wird, das sich daraufhin im Hinblicken aller anderen als ein gemeinsames 'Das da' präsentiert, als wäre es nahe. Ohne den offenen Raum konnte die darwinistisch strenge Natur auf das Zeigen verzichten; die urwaldfreudigen Nahsinne der zurückgebliebenen Primaten brauchen den Gestus nicht und begreifen ihn bis heute nicht. Das Natur- (nicht Haus-)tier guckt auf die Fingerspitze, aber nicht den Horizont.

Mit dem distalen Zeigen (oder anderen Formen der demonstrativen Identifikation) bietet sich die Möglichkeit anschließender akustischer Verlautbarungen, die die Referenz des optischen Zeigens teilen. Sie helfen, das gezeigte Etwas genauer zu identifizieren. Hiermit wird eine zirkelfreie Einführung möglich von referierenden Verlautbarungen, die nicht mehr nur selbstbezogene Äußerungen sind, sondern optische und lautliche Bezugnahmen auf etwas bestimmtes Äußeres enthalten, die allmählich verstetigt werden können. Es legt sich nahe, die stimmliche Referenz durch die Verlautbarung der eigenen Emotionen sei es des Schreckens oder des Begehrens oder von weiterführenden Beobachtungen zu ergänzen. Damit kommen zwei Elemente zusammen, das äußere Etwas dort und die je eigene Emotion oder Beurteilung.

Die deklarative Zeigehandlung kann noch nicht bejahen oder verneinen; erst der ergänzenden Verlautbarung kann eine andere entgegengestellt werden, dieser Kontrast ist zu einer Verneinung verkürzbar. Erst die kontradiktorische Verneinung stellt sicher, dass beide dasselbe meinen, aber es unterschiedlich interpretieren. Die immer positive Referenz auf den Gegenstand des Zeigens kann in einer komplexen kommunikativen Situation mit der Erwartung begleitet sein, etwas Negatives zu assoziieren. Jemand zeigt auf den Rücken des Kindes – es hat, so soll eine andere Person assoziieren, den Schulranzen vergessen. Den fehlenden Ranzen selbst kann ich nicht zeigen.[49]

Der Vorteil der Negation zeigt sich in der Öffentlichkeit, in der das Sprechen und Denken entsteht. Die Negation ist keine Sache eines isolierten Kopfes oder der kommunizierenden Sippe, sondern der öffentliche Einspruch eines Gruppenmitglieds. Sprechen und Denken entspringen der Kooperation einer Anzahl von Menschen, für die die Fehlinformation kostspielig werden kann. So wird eine Opposition ohne physischen Kampf möglich.

Das Zeigen und die an das Zeigen sich anschließende oder es begleitende stimmliche Verlautbarung sind kooperative Tätigkeiten, in der eine mitteilbare Äußerung *über* etwas an andere als Ergebnis entsteht. Es ist eine Kooperation zwischen verschiedenen Menschen, zwischen den Sinnen des Sehens und

[49] Anders offenbar M. Tomasello, *Die Ursprünge der menschlichen Kommunikation*, Frankfurt a.M. 2009, S. 92.

Hörens, aber auch zwischen den einzelnen syntaktischen Gliedern eines Urteils oder Urteilsderivats über ein identisches, deiktisch eingeführtes Etwas. Im Urteil tut gewissermaßen jedes Satzglied «das Seine»[50] und kann nicht wie in einer additiven Ordnung vom Typ 'barbarabar', 'hottentottot' problemlos die Stelle des anderen einnehmen. In unserer Grammatik haben Subjekt und Prädikat bestimmte invariante und zunächst unentbehrliche Funktionen, die wir oben mit der Abbreviatur des «S ist / ist nicht P» bezeichneten und als konstante Form gegenüber den wechselnden Inhalten fassten. Wir können jetzt ein arbeitsteiliges System ausmachen, in dem die funktionalen Orte als freie Plätze für konkrete Urteile dienen. Jedes Denken ist angewiesen auf die Besetzung der vakanten Funktionsstellen mit Wörtern in einer bestimmten Sprache. Statt unserer Satzstruktur können andere phonetisch ausgezeichnete Positionen der Funktionszuweisung dienen. Einzufordern beim elementaren Denk- und Urteilsakt ist jedoch die Einheitsstiftung einer äußeren, von der sozialen Gemeinschaft akzeptierten Referenz – das Tier dort hinten – mit einer inneren privaten Meinung, die ihre objektive Anerkennung sucht: «ist ein / kein Löwe» etc. Im 'ist / ist nicht' wird der Geltungsanspruch erhoben, der bestreitbar ist[51]. Das Urteil als Einheit hat die Funktion, ein bestimmtes gemeinsames Äußeres mit einer je subjektiven Charakteristik zu verbinden, das Äußere und das Innere, als Denken rein mental und als Reden zugleich äußerlich und nützlich für den Verband.

Mit diesem Instrument des syntaktisch geordneten, arbeitsteiligen Denkens ist die einzige Weise objektiver, also theoretischer Erkenntnis erreicht, die uns zugänglich ist. Wir können mit dem Denken das tun, was hier gemacht wurde: Das Nichtdenken und das Denken thematisieren und nun hoffen, dass den Ausführungen die Überzeugung folgt, dass es so in Wirklichkeit ist, d.h. dass die Ausführungen nicht widerlegt werden.

Platons Mustersatz ist: «Theätet fliegt». Theätet dort, der den Anwesenden bekannte Mathematiker, wird vom Redenden ein wenig surreal durch die Fähigkeit oder Tätigkeit des Fliegens charakterisiert. Diese subjektive Meinung kann bestritten werden: «Keineswegs! Theätet fliegt nicht».

Hier also werden Subjekt und Objekt in der uns vertrauten Weise unterschieden. Wir erheben in unseren Urteilen *über* Dinge, Tiere und Menschen und alles andere einen Wahrheits- oder Geltungsanspruch; er kann kritisch überprüft und angenommen oder zurückgewiesen werden. Tiere leben inmitten raum-zeitlich geordneter Bündel von Merkmalen, sie können diese jedoch nicht sozial verbindlich als solche bestimmen, sondern beziehen sie unvermeidlich auf ihre Lust oder Unlust und damit auf ihr Überlebensmuster, das ihre Nahkumpanen teilen.

Mit dem Sehen, Zeigen und Sprechen erweitert sich der Mensch durch die Delegation von Funktionen in den Raum hinein. Er ist in allen drei Formen außer sich. Ein Ego im Tunnel gibt es nicht, auch wenn wir uns manchmal in

[50] Platon, *Politeia* 419 ff.
[51] Wir kümmern uns nicht um Derivate wie fiktionale Äußerungen.

ihm verkriechen möchten. Aber wir sind erbarmungslos seit dem Beginn des Denkens außerhalb, außer uns[52], weder im geschlossenen Paradiesgarten noch im ausgedachten Tunnel.

Wir gelangen hier zu einem Fortsetzungsphänomen unserer anfänglichen Raumanalyse. Der Lebensraum, in dem wir uns hier und andere Dinge dort lokalisieren, ist für Tiere und Menschen unweigerlich zugleich ein dreidimensionaler Vorstellungsraum, in dem wir reale räumliche Gegebenheiten repräsentieren und zur imaginären Verfügung stellen. Bei der Rekonstruktion des menschlichen Denkens treffen wir auf ein analoges Phänomen der Verknüpfung von Innen und Außen. Das Denken entsteht in einer bestimmten räumlichen Konstellation einer Vielzahl von Menschen, gewissermaßen als Schaustellung und Rhetorik. Aber das externe Zeigen und Verlautbaren ist begleitet und wird rasch dirigiert von internen Denkakten. Das Sprechen ist verinnerlicht und das Denken kann ohne das Außen nicht entstehen und zu sich kommen – so wie wir im Raum sind und der Raum in uns.

Es ist verlockend, das so exponierte Urteil als den Entstehungsort zweier Eigentümlichkeiten des menschlichen Bewusstseins anzunehmen, des Ich und der Begründung.

Den Einspruch gegen das affirmierende «S ist P» stellt der Neinsager besonders heraus: »Ich dagegen» bin anderer Meinung. Das 'Ich', das hiermit erscheint, ist das des Opponenten, der auch der Proponent sein könnte, beide tragen etwas vor, jedoch in der Form von These und Gegenthese. Dass die bejahende Behauptung überhaupt ein neuartiges Ereignis ist, mit dem die Psychologie in die Sphäre der Logik übertritt, wird unverkennbar deutlich erst in der Konturierung durch den Gegensatz des *alter ego*, «Ich dagegen [...]», kein Kumpan in der Familie und Sippe, sondern der Proto-Bürger der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.

Die Gegenthese führt die Pflicht der Begründung mit sich; und wenn nicht die Pflicht, so doch die Erwartung, weil die Gegenthese kollabiert, wenn ihr Einspruch nicht in einer Einsicht begründet ist, die die These durch ihre Negation ersetzen kann und damit soll.

Wenn man unserer Konjektur folgt, wird man auch den nächsten Schritt mitvollziehen: Im Votum des Opponenten und der Begründung seiner Gegenthese wird man auch die Handlung sehen, die als frei erlebt wird. Es wird der Akt der Negation ohne psychische Notwendigkeit geleistet, und in der Begründung wird die kausale Nötigung der Psychologie durch die eigene, an der Logik orientierte Angabe von Gründen ersetzt.

Jeder ist frei, Wörter nach eigenem Gustus zu verwenden; nach dem *iconic turn* wurde von einem «Denken in Bildern» gesprochen[53]. Aus unserer Sicht begleiten Bilder zwar permanent unsere mentalen Prozesse, das ist ein

[52] Th. Metzinger, *Der Ego-Tunnel. Eine neue Philosophie des Selbst: Von der Hirnforschung zur Bewusstseinsethik*, Berlin 2010.
[53] R. Brandt, *Das Denken und die Bilder*, in «In Bildern denken? Kognitive Potentiale von Visualisierung in Kunst und Wissenschaft», hrsg. v. U. Nortmann und Ch. Wagner, München 2010, S. 29-42.

empirisches psychologisches Phänomen, ein Denken jedoch in Bildern selbst entzieht sich der Nachfrage durch andere Personen: «Was heißt das genau?» «Nenne bitte die Gründe für deine Behauptung» etc. Das Denken, wie wir es hier bestimmten, ist den Regeln der Logik verpflichtet, es kann deswegen öffentlich sein[54], seine Verlautbarungen sind daher notwendig negierbar, sonst könnte es diesen natürlichen Desideraten des Austausches und der Kritik in einer menschlichen Gemeinschaft nicht nachkommen.

Mit der bejahenden oder verneinenden Referenz auf räumliche Dinge oder Ereignisse wird ermöglicht, auch Nicht-Räumliches zum imaginären oder logischen Objekt zu machen, *über* das gedacht und gesprochen wird. Eben dies geschieht in diesen Zeilen. Es wird jedoch behauptet, dass das Denken aus seiner Entstehung räumlich strukturiert ist, auch der abstrakteste Gedanke trägt die Spuren seiner Genese an sich und denkt sich zurück in seine bildliche Entstehung und der Referenz auf 'das da'.[55]

Dogs bark. Das Kind zeigt in ihre Richtung und sagt: «Wauwau!» Oder nur «Wau!» Entzerrt heißt das: Das Kind wendet sich an die begleitenden Personen als seine Öffentlichkeit und sagt ihnen in seiner Sprache, was es denkt: «Das dort ist ein Hund!» Hunde können bellen, ob allein oder in Begleitung, aus irgendeinem dringenden Anlass, ohne zu denken. Nachmachen kann es der Papagei, aber denken und sagen, dass der Hund es ist, der es tut, kann nur der Mensch, richtig oder, wenn es kein Hund, sondern ein Papagei war, falsch. Zur expliziten Negation fehlt dem 'Wauwau' ähnlich wie dem Lachen über etwas und dem Zeigen noch der letzte Schliff des sich entwickelnden Denkens.

Wir sind hiermit zu einer 'Biologie' des Denkens und Sprechens gelangt, indem wir die Funktion der unentbehrlichen Merkmale von beidem in der Kooperation von Menschen in einer bestimmten Phase der Entwicklung aufspürten.

Wenn Menschen in einem öffentlichen Raum zum Austausch von Verlautbarungen des Typs «S ist / ist nicht P» gelangen, dann erreichen sie die Sphäre des ausgeschlossenen Widerspruchs und damit der Logik insgesamt, die es in der Natur nicht gibt, sondern nur im menschlichen Denken. Wie ist der Sprung aus der Empirie und ihrer Kontingenz in diese Notwendigkeit möglich? Es ist *notwendig* unmöglich und also falsch, dass «S ist P» *und* «S ist nicht P» (zugleich etc.), und diese Notwendigkeit ist die Grundlage unseres Denkens, d.h. jedes Denkens und seiner neuen Welt. Wie ist das möglich? Wird das Denken entdeckt oder entwickelt?

Unsere Annahme stellt die Entwicklung des menschlichen Denkens und Sprechens in ein Kontinuum der natürlichen Entwicklung, in dem sich die Herausbildung der beiden Fähigkeiten als Vorteil anbot. In dem – so unsere Verbildlichung – offenen Raum etwa der Savanne ist das Denken und Sprechen ein großer, vielleicht lebenswichtiger Vorteil. Es kann genau vor Feinden gewarnt

[54] E. Kapp, *Der Ursprung der Logik bei den Griechen*, Göttingen 1965.
[55] Dieses Phänomen ist längst bemerkt worden, S. u. a. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1787), § 1.

und auf Beute hingewiesen werden, wobei die entsprechenden Äußerungen durch Hordenmitglieder korrigiert werden können. Die Gruppe verständigt sich in einer zunehmend komplexen Weise über Fernes, als wäre es hier. Wer denkt und spricht, thront souverän in der Mitte und behandelt das Fernste, als wäre es zu ihm gekommen. Wenn dieses Schema oder Muster der Entwicklung von Denken und Sprechen zutrifft, dann ist unser Vorschlag mit einem großen Vorteil verbunden: Er konnte vor Darwin nicht gemacht werden. Es wurden Sprachbringer erdichtet und nach der Aufklärung resigniert festgehalten, die Entstehung von Sprache sei unerklärlich.

Eine einschneidende Stufe im weiteren Fortgang ist die Verschriftlichung zum Zweck der Thesaurierung und öffentlichen Verkündung ohne die körperliche und zeitliche Präsenz der einzelnen Person. Es folgt die Vervielfältigung und Verbindung der Medien und die Delegation traditioneller menschlicher Erkenntnisleistungen an den Computer. Hier setzen die Menschen auf der Basis der Denkleistung das Verfahren der Natur nicht nur in den Institutionen fort wie literarisch bei Platon, sondern auch in Apparaten und ihren Spezifikationen – am Ende wird immer das Muster der Delegation perfektioniert, mit dem die Natur das Leben auf seine Erfolgsbahn brachte. Wohin dieser selbstläufige gestufte Delegationsprozess führen wird, läßt sich nicht voraussagen. In unserer Entdeckungs- oder Entwicklungsskizze konnten wir die Genese der Sprache und damit des sprachlich verfassten Denkens im öffentlichen Raum verfolgen. Der Vorteil dieser Auffassung liegt einmal in der Bodenhaftung des Gedankens; wir brauchen nicht um eine gelegentliche Einhilfe von oben zu bitten. Umgekehrt entgehen wir der Aporie, die entsteht, wenn die Sprache aus den vielfältigen Lautbildungen des Miauens, Blökens oder Bellens im Urwald-Miteinander gewonnen werden soll. Die Grammatikalisierung ist dann ein *deus ex machina*, den die Vernunft sonst meidet.

Vielleicht nimmt der Leser unseren Vorschlag zur Kenntnis, reagiert jedoch mit Zweifel. Wo sind die handfesten wissenschaftlichen Beweise? Wir können keine ausgegrabenen Sitzplätze anbieten, auf denen die Frühmenschen kommunizierten. Wir haben ausgeschlossen, dass das Sprechen und Denken durch eine Verfeinerung tierischer Verlautbarungen entstanden ist; es wäre kein Denken, keine Logik, keine Verneinung in Sicht, sondern nur kommunikative, kooperative Brüderlichkeit.

Die Summe: Wir denken und sprechen und üben dabei eine Tätigkeit aus, die wir von den Tieren nicht kennen. Wir beziehen uns dabei in einer Kooperation auf etwas, *über* das wir denken und reden; dieser Akt enthält notwendig die alternative Möglichkeit der Bejahung und Verneinung und damit des Wahr- oder Falschseins. Er kann öffentlich mitgeteilt werden und lässt sich grundsätzlich als Partitur für alle Sprachen verwenden. Es wurde versucht, einen möglichen natürlichen Ursprung dieses urteilsförmigen, widerspruchsfähigen Denkens aufzuweisen und zu zeigen, dass es zweckmäßig und in sich zweckförmig ist und der Mensch sich denkend und sprechend eine sozial vermittelte Welt zueignet.

Michael Tomasello gelangt zu Formen der Kooperation von Tieren und Menschen, bei denen wir schon als Kleinkinder den Mitgeschöpfen überlegen sind. Kein Affenstamm, kein Krähenclan kennt ein derartiges Zusammenspiel wie die hilfsbereiten Menschen. Nun stoßen wir beim Größerwerden auf keinen Chomsky in uns, sondern würden im Wald bei einem bloßen Gestammel bleiben, das für unsere Mitbewohner jeweils eine bestimmte Signalwirkung haben mag und für das pure Überleben auch ausreicht. Welche Sonderlage in der Natur hat die späteren Menschen dazu genötigt, ihre Kompetenzen zu erweitern, und worin bestehen sie genau? Tomasello versäumt es anzugeben, worauf die Entwicklung hinauslaufen soll. Wann kann der empirische Forscher sagen: Halt, jetzt sind wir beim Sprechen und Denken angelangt? Eben dies müssen wir vorher kennen, sonst wissen wir nicht, was wir suchen. Das Produkt muss z. B. so geartet sein, dass es die Übersetzbarkeit trotz verschiedener Entstehungsorte ermöglicht, es muss sich also deutlich von appellierenden Schreien, vom belustigten Kichern und dem Hilfe-Hilfe-Ruf unterscheiden. Welches also sind die Minimalbedingungen, die wir vor allen empirischen Funden kennen müssen? Wie will Tomasello vom bloßen, wenn auch menschenfreundlich-kommunikativen Verhalten zu dem Denken gelangen, das seine eigenen Gedanken und ihre sprachliche Mitteilung ermöglicht? Und: Welches ist es genau?

Die H-Moll-Messe lässt sich ohne den widerspruchsfähigen Logos des Denkens nicht komponieren und aufführen. Hier sind wir Separatisten und haben versucht, dass man die Trennung von Mensch und Tier aus sachlichen Gründen einnehmen muss – in diesem Punkt. Unabhängig davon verbindet uns besonders mit den sog. höheren Tieren eine starke Empathie und Fürsorge, in Einzelfällen eine beiderseitige Freundschaft, wie es Xenphon in seiner Schrift *Über die Reitkunst* dargestellt hat.[56]

Die monströse Tierferne, wie sie in der Philosophie von Descartes dokumentiert wurde, ist durch die Aufklärung einer nüchternen Bestandsaufnahme gewichen. Wir stehen den Tieren in unserer physiologischen und psychologischen Ausstattung nahe, wir sind Tiere im emphatischen Wortsinn und können zugleich über die große Kluft staunen, die uns von den Tieren trennt. Wir und die nachfolgenden Generationen gehören zu einer Natur, «in ihr leben und weben und sind wir», dieses Zusammen läßt uns davor zurückschrecken, den Tieren und der übrigen Natur vermeidbaren Schmerz und vermeidbare Vernichtung zuzufügen. Wer sind wir, dass wir das dürften?

[56] Xenophon, *Über die Reitkunst*, hrsg. und übers. von K. Widdra, Schondorf 2006.

Testi/1

Sovranità e animalità

Che lettore di Hobbes è Agamben?*

Luc Foisneau

This paper is meant to contribute to the discussion on the contrast between sovereign powers addressing human beings and the transformation of men into animals in specific contexts in which juridical measures and ontological situation diverge. Our aim is to show that Agamben's interpretation of this contrast in terms of a state of exception does not comply with the notion of justice meant by Hobbes when he devised his state of nature. In order to prove it, we argue that the figures of men regressing to the status of a brute that can be hunted, as described by Hobbes, derive from his careful reading of the Statute of Provisors, that allows the chasing of a criminal in certain juridically-determined conditions.

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L'interpretazione della politica di Hobbes proposta da Giorgio Agamben in *Homo Sacer*[1] sarà il nostro filo conduttore per indagare nuovamente le relazioni che intrattengono politica e animalità nell'opera del filosofo inglese. Nei commentari classici di quest'opera, queste relazioni assumono certo diverse forme, ma possiamo dire che, al di fuori una metaforica piuttosto ricca – dal momento che il lupo gioca, com'è noto, un ruolo importante, nell'immaginario hobbesiano – e dello scrupoloso recupero delle fonti – François Tricaud se n'é occupato in maniera esemplare[2] –, esse si riducono in fondo a poca roba. La teoria hobbesiana della sovranità riguarda, come spesso viene ricordato, esseri di diritto, dotati di parola, e in nessun caso le bestie, e lo stato di natura, per naturale che esso sia, non sembra poter aiutare ad attenuare questa constatazione. Si può

* L. Foisneau, "*Souveraineté et animalité : Agamben lecteur de Hobbes*", in Th. Gontier (a cura di), *Animal et animalité dans la philosophie de la Renaissance et de l'âge classique*, Louvain, Éditions Peeters, 2005, pp. 231-244.

[1] Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer I. *Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, Torino 1995 (d'ora in poi Homo sacer I). Il secondo volume è Homo sacer II. *Stato di eccezione*, Torino 2003 (d'ora in poi Homo sacer II).

[2] F. Tricaud, *Homo homini lupus, homo homini deus*, in «Hobbes Forschungen», Berlin 1969, pp. 61-70.

anche ammettere che lo scarto tra sovranità e animalità è talmente rilevante che, nella maggior parte dei commentari, il pensiero di Hobbes è considerato soprattutto nella sua relazione di opposizione al pensiero di Aristotele. Non comincia forse, il *De cive*, con una radicale ridiscussione dell'animale politico del libro I della *Politica*? L'affermazione del carattere naturalmente a-sociale dell'uomo è, di fatto, una risposta diretta alla tesi di Aristotele per cui «è chiaro che l'uomo è animale più socievole di qualsiasi ape e di qualsiasi altro animale che viva in greggi»[3].

La caratterizzazione dell'uomo come animale politico poco si presta, bisogna riconoscerlo, a una teoria giuridica del soggetto di diritto, cui i commentatori hanno spesso cercato di ricondurre il pensiero di Hobbes. L'interesse primario dell'interpretazione di Agamben consiste nello sforzo di sollevare l'ipotesi di una lettura esclusivamente giuridica della politica hobbesiana. Per questo, essa si appoggia sull'ipotesi foucaultiana per cui l'esercizio moderno del potere è in realtà un potere sulla vita, che agisce, da una parte, mediante la *disciplina*, secondo le procedure di una anatomo-politica del corpo umano, e d'altra parte, nella *regolarizzazione* o *normalizzazione*, secondo le tecniche di una bio-politica della popolazione[4]. Così, inscritto nell'«era del bio-potere», l'uomo cessa di essere ciò che era per Aristotele, ovvero «un animale vivente ed inoltre capace di un'esistenza politica»[5], per divenire «un animale nella cui politica è in questione la sua vita di essere vivente»[6]. Secondo questa prospettiva, l'animalità dell'uomo prende un significato politico radicalmente nuovo, poiché lo sviluppo della specie e della disciplina dei corpi divengono materia immediatamente politica. Per sostenere la sua tesi, l'ultimo Foucault si appoggiava su uno studio simultaneo, ma non coordinato, delle tecniche politiche per il cui tramite il potere mette in atto una bio-politica, ovvero «integra al suo interno la cura della vita naturale degli individui»[7], e delle tecnologie del sé, grazie a cui un individuo diviene soggetto. Il progetto di Agamben è di mostrare come queste due linee di ricerca si riuniscano in un punto che Foucault non poteva vedere a causa del suo disinteresse per il modello giuridico della sovranità. Di fatto, questo punto di giunzione riunisce, in un modo che avrebbe sorpreso non poco Foucault, il modello giuridico istituzionale della sovranità e il modello biopolitico del potere. Passando oltre il pregiudizio foucaultiano all'incontro delle teorie della sovranità, Agamben intende dimostrare che la messa in atto delle tecniche di bio-potere emerge non tanto da un arte del governare, quanto da una teoria del potere sovrano. Così può scrivere che «la produzione di un corpo bio-politico è la prestazione originale di un potere sovrano»[8]. Il carattere inatteso di questo accostamento è amplificato dal ricorso alla definizione schmittiana della sovranità.

[3] Aristotele, *Politica* I, cap. 2, 1253a 8, trad. it. a cura di A. C. Viano, Torino 2006.
[4] Cfr. M. Foucault, *La volonté de savoir*, Paris 1976, si citerà dall'edizione italiana, *La volontà di sapere*, a cura di P. Pasquino e G. Procacci, Milano 2013, p. 123 (ed. fr. p. 183).
[5] M. Foucault, cit. p. 127 trad. it. p. 188.
[6] *Ibid*.
[7] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 8.
[8] Ivi, p. 9.

Mentre Foucault aveva sufficientemente esplicitato la sua reticenza rispetto alle teorie giuridico-istituzinali della sovranità, compresa quella di Carl Schmitt[9], Agamben, dal canto suo, intende appoggiarsi sulla definizione schmittiana del sovrano, inteso come «colui che decide della situazione di eccezione»[10], per portare avanti le ricerche di Foucault sul bio-potere. Definire la sovranità in questo modo, non come fonte esclusiva della produzione di leggi, ma come la capacità di decidere di uno spazio di esclusione all'interno stesso dell'ordine giuridico, serve a spiegare il modo in cui il potere sovrano afferma il suo assoggettamento della vita biologica degli uomini. Compresa a partire dal modello romano della vita esposta all'omicidio e non sacrificabile dell'*homo sacer*, questa soggezione risiede interamente nella minaccia che la sospensione delle leggi costituzionali, il regime di eccezione[11], fa pesare sulla vita degli uomini. L'ultimo elemento che ci interessa sottolineare in questo complesso assemblaggio ermeneutico, testimonia del fatto che la biopolitica non è solo, per Agamben, un fenomeno moderno, nel senso in cui Foucault parla di una «soglia di modernità biologica»[12], ma che essa è «antica almeno quanto l'eccezione sovrana»[13], di cui ritrova formulazioni già a partire dall'antichità greca. Se appare nell'epoca moderna, prima di prendere definitivamente piede nel XX secolo, il legame tra sovranità e nuda vita costituisce per Agamben una struttura originaria della politica, in stretta connessione con la tradizione metafisica, nell'accezione della lettura heideggeriana. In breve, e per terminare di delineare i contorni generali dell'interpretazione, la logica per cui la vita animale dell'uomo si trova sottomessa al regime dell'eccezione sovrana dipende, secondo Agamben dal modo in cui si concepisce «l'esistenza e l'autonomia della potenza»[14].

Ciascuno di questi tre elementi – una teoria della bio-politica dovuta a Foucault, una teoria della sovranità dovuta a Schmitt e una metafisica della potenza di origine heideggeriana – gioca un ruolo nella lettura che Agamben propone del pensiero politico di Hobbes. Le domande che il commentatore pone al testo letto, chiaramente non sono le sue, ma, nella violenza di questa interrogazione intempestiva, sorgono problemi che permettono di parlare di una rilettura dell'opera. Quel che vorrei cercare di far apparire, con un esempio, è questo effetto dell'interpretazione sull'opera, che Claude Lefort, parlando di Machiavelli, ha molto correttamente chiamato "lavoro dell'opera".

[9] È quanto si può facilmente dedurre dal passo che segue: «Non si tratta più di far entrare in gioco la morte nel campo della sovranità, ma di distribuire ciò che è vivente in un dominio di valore e di utilità. Un tale potere deve qualificare, misurare, apprezzare, gerarchizzare, piuttosto che manifestarsi nel suo scoppio omicida; non deve tracciare la linea che separa i nemici del sovrano dai soggetti obbedienti; opera distribuzioni intorno alla norma», M. Foucault, *La volontà di sapere*, cit. p. 127 (ed. fr. p. 190); corsivi di Luc Foisneau.

[10] «Souvëran ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet» (C. Schmitt, *Teologia politica. Quattro capitoli sulla dottrina della sovranità*, in *Le categorie del politico*, trad. it. a cura di P. Schiera, Bologna 1972, p. 33.

[11] Per un'analisi dello stato di eccezione schmittiano secondo Agamben, si veda *Homo sacer II,* cap. 2, cit., p. 44-55.

[12] M. Foucault, *La volontà di sapere*, cit., p. 127 (ed. fr. p. 188).

[13] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 9.

[14] Ivi, pp. 51-56; l'espressione citata è a p. 52, ndr.

Il mio scopo non è, in conseguenza, di presentare un elenco delle inesattezze e delle approssimazioni, ma di cercare di comprendere come certe forzature interpretative possono arricchire la comprensione dell'opera. Sarà dunque anche opportuno indicare, all'occorrenza, eventuali prolungamenti della riflessione resa possible dall'interpretazione di Agamben.

Due in particolare sono le questioni su cui concentrerò la mia attenzione: in primo luogo, bisognerà valutare gli effetti ermeneutici prodotti dall'adozione di una definizione della sovranità, in termini di decisione della situazione di eccezione; in secondo luogo, ci si interrogherà sulla natura dei legami stabiliti da Agamben tra il concetto di stato di natura e la nozione di bio-politica.

1. Sovranità e distinzione problematica della violenza e del diritto

Il concetto di sovranità è dibattuto tra due interpretazioni contraddittorie: una ne fa, in ogni Stato, l'origine della norma legale e il principio di una partizione rigorosa tra violenza e diritto; l'altra la considera come il luogo di una collusione tra violenza e diritto, o come il principio di una decisione sulla situazione d'eccezione, nella quale è impossibile distinguere il fatto e il diritto. Questa tensione trova espressione nelle teorie moderne della sovranità, da Bodin fino a Montesquieu e Rousseau, ma per un lettore contemporaneo, essa trae tutta la sua forza alla luce del dibattito tra Schmitt e Kelsen. Alla concezione kelseniana della sovranità come norma suprema della gerarchia delle norme, risponde in effetti la concezione schmittiana, che considera l'atto di sovranità in una decisione di sospendere l'ordine giuridico normale, e di conseguenza nell'istituzione di uno stato d'eccezione. Il lettore di *Homo sacer* potrà dunque legittimamente aspettarsi che la teoria hobbesiana della sovranità sia compresa in sé a partire da questo conflitto che oppone decisionismo e positivismo giuridico. Agamben sceglie invece una via differente: più che dichiarare il suo intento di inscrivere la sua lettura di Hobbes nella prospettiva di una teoria contemporanea della sovranità, parte dalle formulazioni più antiche di questa teoria, in cui pretende di trovare interessi contemporanei. All'opposizione tra Kelsen e Schmitt, sostituisce l'antico conflitto tra Pindaro e Esiodo. Dal frammento 169 di Pindaro, che afferma che «il *nomos* di ogni sovrano (Basileus) dei mortali e degli immortali, conduce con mano più forte giustificando il più violento» [15].

Da un estratto de *Le opere e i giorni*, in cui Esiodo raccomanda a Perse di ascoltare la giustizia (Dikè), e dimenticare la violenza (Bia), rileva che «il *nomos* è il potere che divide violenza e diritto, mondo ferino e mondo umano»[16].

La distinzione tra mondo animale e mondo umano si sovrappone così alla distinzione tra violenza e diritto, perché se i pesci, le belve e gli uccelli si divorano, gli uomini diversamente non si distruggono, poiché Zeus ha fatto loro il dono della giustizia. La differenza tra umanità e animalità corrisponde, di conseguenza, a una partizione rigorosa tra il mondo in cui regna la giustizia,

[15] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 36.
[16] *Ibid.*

e il mondo che la ignora. Il paradosso del frammento di Pindaro sul *nomos basileus*, è di confondere radicalmente questo confine, poiché fa del re sovrano, implicitamente, una belva feroce. È ciò che Platone ha perfettamente compreso, inventando la legge naturale per impedire la confusione sofistica della violenza e del diritto. Contro l'apologia della primalità del diritto del più forte sulla legge, Platone afferma il carattere non violento della legge di natura. Nella prospettiva di questo dibattito classico, ci si potrebbe aspettare che Hobbes venga posto, come per esempio fa Leo Strauss, nella linea del platonismo. Ora, Agamben non ne fa nulla, affermando peraltro che la polemica sofista contro il *nomos* in favore della natura, è «la premessa necessaria dell'opposizione tra lo stato di natura e il *commonwealth* che Hobbes pone a fondamento della sua concezione della sovranità»[17]. Il riferimento all'autorità di Strauss[18] per proporre l'idea che lo stato di natura non corrisponde a un'epoca reale, malgrado il senso generale del passaggio si opponga all'interpretazione straussiana di Hobbes[19], costituisce tutt'al più un processo retorico per attirarsi le simpatie degli interpreti straussiani di Hobbes. Il principio generale dell'interpretazione trova in effetti il suo punto di partenza non tanto nella teoria di Strauss, ma in quella di Schmitt, che si appoggia a sua volta sul frammento di Pindaro per fondare la sua teoria del «*nomos della terra*»[20]. Che il sovrano hobbesiano conservi, all'interno dello stato civile, il suo *jus contra omnes*, è interpretato indizio del fatto che l'esteriorità del diritto di natura costituisce in effetti il punto nevralgico del sistema politico:

> La sovranità si presenta, cioè, come un inglobamento dello stato di natura nella società, o, se si vuole, come una soglia di indifferenza fra natura e cultura, fra violenza e legge, e proprio questa indistinzione costituisce la specifica violenza sovrana[21].

Il fatto che il sovrano conservi il suo diritto su ogni cosa viene interpretato nel senso del frammento di Pindaro, in cui Schmitt trova conferma della sua lettura del *nomos* come divisione territoriale originaria[22].

Si può considerare, al contrario, che questo diritto lasciato al sovrano è la condizione dell'effettività di un ordine giuridico fondato sul rispetto della legge. Tuttavia, non è questo il punto che sottolinea Agamben, che rimarca con insistenza la convergenza tra la teoria hobbesiana e la teoria schmittiana dell'eccezione sovrana: allo stato di natura così considerato è imputata una esteriorità radicale rispetto all'ordine giuridico, la cui natura contrattuale è considerata tutt'al più come un'illusione liberale. L'accento è posto al contrario

[17] Ivi, p. 41.
[18] «Del resto, come Strauss ha sottolineato, Hobbes era perfettamente cosciente che lo stato di natura non doveva essere considerato necessariamente come un'epoca reale, quanto piuttosto come un principio interno allo Stato, che si rivela nel momento in cui lo si considera 'come se fosse dissolto'»; ivi, p. 42. Per quanto riguarda gli scritti di Strauss su Hobbes, si rinvia a L. Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften*, *Hobbes' politische Wissenschaft und zugehörige Schriften – Briefe*, tomo III, Stuttgart-Weimar 2001.
[19] Si rinvia in particolare L. Strauss, *Droit naturel et histoire*, Paris 1986.
[20] Si v. G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 42.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] *Il* nomos *della terra*, a cura di Milano 2006, pp. 62-67.

sul fatto che lo stato di natura è interno all'ordine giuridico. Questa inclusione di un principio, che tutto sembrerebbe dover escludere dal sistema giuridico, favorisce la teoria generale della sovranità, che è stata definita nel primo capitolo di *Homo Sacer* con la formula paradossale: «il sovrano è, nello stesso tempo, fuori e dentro l'ordinamento giuridico»[23].

Esterno all'ordine giuridico, perché ha il potere di sospendere la costituzione, ma allo stesso modo interno a quest'ordine, perché questo potere straordinario gli è riconosciuto legalmente. In un certo senso, non c'è niente di più, in questa formulazione, che l'idea secondo cui, per creare il diritto, bisogna essere esterni al sistema di diritto; ma in un altro senso questa formula implica che il sovrano ha il potere di far esistere una situazione eccezionale, sospendendo l'applicazione delle norme esistenti. In una prospettiva così definita, il sovrano hobbesiano appare come il detentore di un potere esorbitante sulla vita dei propri sudditi, potere inquietante per dei soggetti che hanno bisogno di veder riconosciute le loro libertà ed i loro diritti. Nel *Dialogo sul diritto comune*, nella sezione intitolata *Del potere sovrano*, lo studente di legge si fa eco dei timori del popolo inglese all'epoca della guerra civile: «sarà dunque lecito al re portarci via quello che vuole a suo capriccio, con il pretesto di una necessità, della quale egli stesso si erge a giudice? Ci tratterebbe forse peggio di un nemico? Che altro potrebbe questi pretendere da noi quando già ci prende tutto?»[24]. Tuttavia lo scopo di questo testo non è quello di giustificare lo stabilirsi di uno stato di eccezione all'interno del Regno, in cui il re può fare qualsiasi cosa gli sembri opportuna, quanto piuttosto spiegare che il potere del sovrano in materia militare non dev'essere intralciata dall'azione del parlamento. Se il re non dispone di un potere assoluto di giudizio nell'impiego della forza armata, allora non potrà evitare che i sudditi «vengano abbandonati, o lasciati liberi di trucidarsi a vicenda, fino all'ultimo uomo»[25]. La struttura della sovranità non è dunque tanto quella del divieto, come sostiene Agamben[26], ma quella della *salus populi*, compreso come il rifiuto dell'abbandono del popolo all'arbitrio della guerra civile. Il problema non è tanto quello della sospensione dell'ordine giuridico, ma quello dell'affermazione dei diritti del re, soprattuto in materia fiscale e militare, rispetto alle limitazioni e restrizioni che i parlamentari inglesi sperano di imporgli. La soggezione al sovrano può così esser compresa come il prezzo da pagare per la sicurezza del popolo. Alla riserva del giurista, cui «convince poco che il re abbia il diritto di portar via ciò che vuole ai propri sudditi, con la scusa della necessità», Hobbes

[23] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 19.
[24] T. Hobbes, *Dialogo fra un filosofo e uno studente del diritto comune d'Inghilterra*, trad. it. a cura di N. Bobbio, Torino 1959, pp. 402-403; d'ora in poi *Dialogo sul diritto comune*.
[25] Ivi, p. 406.
[26] «Riprendendo un suggerimento di J. L. Nancy, chiamiamo bando (dall'antico termine germanico che designa tanto l'esclusione dalla comunità che il comando e l'insegna del sovrano) questa potenza (nel senso proprio della *dunamys* aristotelica, che é sempre anche *dunamys me energhein*, potenza di non passare all'atto) della legge di mantenersi nella propria privazione, di applicarsi disapplicandosi. La relazione di eccezione é una relazione di bando», *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 34.

risponde con una formula che riassume insieme lo spirito del suo realismo e la critica dell'utopia:

> Tutti quanti siamo colti dal turbamento, allorché qualcosa viene ad intralciare i nostri desideri; ma la colpa è nostra (…); vorremmo, circa il diritto di proprietà, essere garantiti contro il mondo intero, senza pagarne il prezzo, e ciò non è possibile[27].

Il diritto dei soggetti di vivere in sicurezza ha un prezzo che altro non è se non l'obbligazione di pagare al re l'imposta che egli stabilisce. Se il re ha il diritto di prelevare tutto il denaro che ritiene necessario alla protezione dei suoi sudditi, essi hanno il diritto di conoscere le leggi cui devono obbedire, «poiché certamente le leggi che possono arrecar danno alla vita e ai beni degli uomini non si conoscono mai abbastanza»[28]. La tesi di Agamben supera, di conseguenza, l'obiettivo del pensiero politico di Hobbes, che concepiva il carattere assoluto dei diritti sovrani come la condizione di sicurezza del popolo, e la preservazione delle sue proprietà. Hobbes non ignora per questo la paura che circonda la sovranità:

> un re di siffatto castigo (del mondo a venire) non ha paura, potrebbe spogliarci dei nostri beni, delle nostre terre, della nostra libertà e persino toglierci la vita, se lo volesse[29].

Riconoscendo che questa possibilità non totalmente illusoria («E ciò che questi uomini affermano è vero»)[30], il Filosofo del *Dialogo* esclude addirittura che un sovrano possa volere così annullare o indebolire i suoi sudditi, poiché suppone che il re «ama il suo potere», e non desidererà vederlo diminuito, sminuendo il potere dei suoi sudditi. Cosa resta allora del legame posto da Agamben tra il sovrano e la vita nuda dei suoi sudditi? In che misura questa ipotesi di lettura può chiarire la nostra comprensione dello stato di natura hobbesiano?

2. Lo stato di natura e il divenire animale dell'uomo

Per comprendere l'interpretazione dell'espressione *homo homini lupus*, bisogna tornare all'ipotesi principale dell'opera, che definisce l'essenza della politica a partire dal legame che unisce sovranità e nuda vita. La nuda vita, così chiamata per distinguerla dalla «vita qualificata», o da «un modo di vita particolare»[31], è la vita biologica, o animale, dell'uomo. Considerata dal punto di vista del potere sovrano, questa nuda vita appare essenzialmente come una vita perennemente minacciata dalla morte violenta. L'esempio paradigmatico che ne viene dato è quello dell'*homo sacer* – uomo sacro – secondo il diritto romano che Festus descrive al lemma *Sacer mons* del suo trattato *Sul significato*

[27] T. Hobbes, *Dialogo sul diritto comune*, cit., p. 412.
[28] Ivi, p. 420.
[29] Ivi, p. 426.
[30] *Ibid*.
[31] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 10. Agamben fa qui riferimento alla distinzione greca tra *zoè*, che esprime il fatto di vivere, comune a tutti gli esseri viventi (animali, uomini o dei), e *biòs*, che indicava la forma o il modo di vivere propria a un individuo o a un gruppo, *ibidem*.

delle parole, come «colui che il popolo ha giudicato per un crimine»[32], che non è il permesso di sacrificare, ma che potrà essere ucciso impunemente da chiunque egli incontri. Senza voler addentrarsi nel dibattito erudito sullo statuto esatto di questa figura arcaica, metterò in evidenza, con Agamben, la caratteristica principale, che è doppia; ovvero, *l'impunità per colui che uccide l'*homo sacer, e il *divieto di sacrificarlo*. Legato al diritto romano, l'*homo sacer* trova degli equivalenti nell'antico diritto germanico: la figura del *wargus*, o uomo lupo, e quella del *friedlos*, o «senza pace». Escluso dalla comunità, il «senza pace» poteva essere ucciso da chiunque senza che si configurasse il reato di omicidio. Un'altra figura nota di *homo sacer*, il bandito medievale, legittimamente messo al bando dalla comunità, e come tale suscettibile di essere ucciso, in quanto lo si considerava come già morto. Questo fuori legge viene spesso comparato, nei testi medievali, alla figura mitica dell'uomo diventato animale che è il *loup-garou*, il lupo mannaro, come nel caso del racconto di Marie de France intitolato *Bisclavret*. Tuttavia sarebbe un torto il voler considerare l'*homo sacer* come un frammento di natura selvaggia senza legame alcuno con la civiltà, poiché al contrario è il potere sovrano che fa esistere questa forma inedita di animalità politica, del tutto opposta al *bios politikos* aristotelico. All'animale politico incluso nella comunità pubblica si contrappone l'animale politico escluso all'interno della città stessa. Questa opposizione si inscrive di fatto nel prolungamento del pensiero aristotelico, che dichiara, in un ben noto passo della *Politica*, che chi «non vive in una città, per la sua natura e non per caso, o è un essere inferiore o è più che un uomo»[33]. In ogni caso, lungi dal considerare questa via di esclusione come un'esistenza apolitica, Agamben vi vede una «soglia di indifferenza e di passaggio fra l'animale e l'uomo, la *physis* e il *nomos*, l'esclusione e l'inclusione: le *loup garou*, lupo mannaro, appunto, né uomo, né belva, che abita paradossalmente in entrambi i mondi senza appartenere a nessuno»[34].

Questa figura mitica sarà messa al servizio di una nuova interpretazione del concetto di stato di natura: «é solo in questa luce che il mitologhema hobbesiano dello stato di natura acquista il suo senso proprio»[35]. L'affermazione è senza dubbio eccessiva, poiché nulla permette di sostenere che il concetto di stato di natura possa essere considerato senza un'altra forma di processo come l'elemento di un mito. Si assiste qui a un *golpe* teoretico che riproduce, senza dirlo esplicitamente, quello di Carl Schmitt[36], che nel suo libro del 1938 sostituisce lo studio della mitologia del *Leviatano* alla sua analisi concettuale. L'idea stessa per cui lo stato di natura sarebbe il luogo di un divenire animale dell'uomo è esplicitamente formulata da Schmitt ne *Il* nomos *della terra* (1950): «per Hobbes lo stato di natura é un regno di lupi mannari»[37]. Ad ogni modo,

[32] Citato da Agamben Ivi, p. 79.
[33] Aristotele, *Politica,* cit., I, cap. 2, 1253a 2 (l'articolo riporta in nota 1252a 2, ndr).
[34] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 117.
[35] *Ibid*.
[36] C. Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Feldschlag eines politischen Symbols*, Hambourg 1938.
[37] C. Schmitt, *Il* nomos *della terra*, cit., p. 95.

Agamben non segue strettamente l'ipotesi schmittiana, che si inscrive in una relazione sul diritto delle genti dopo la scoperta del Nuovo Mondo. Piuttosto intende, dal canto suo, attribuire la figura schmittiana del lupo mannaro alla sua ipotesi riguardo lo statuto dell'uomo nello stato di eccezione sovrano. Può così affermare che «quando Hobbes fonda la sovranità attraverso il rimando all'homo homini lupus nel lupo occorre saper intendere un'eco del *wargus* e del *caput lupinum* delle leggi di Edoardo il Confessore: non semplicemente fera bestia e vita naturale, ma piuttosto zona di indistinzione fra l'umano e il ferino, lupo mannaro, uomo che ritrasforma in lupo e lupo che diventa uomo: cioè bandito, *homo sacer*»[38]. È senza dubbio poco fondato il voler far giocare un ruolo così centrale alla formula *homo homini lupus*, che tutto sommato non è che un'espressione introdotta tardivamente nell'opera di Hobbes, nella *Prefazione ai lettori* alla seconda edizione del *De cive* (1647). Questa riserva non deve tuttavia condurci a scartare troppo rigidamente il riferimento alla figura del lupo mannaro nello stato di natura hobbesiano. Anche se non fornisce alcuna prova testuale per la sua tesi, che non cita alcun testo di Hobbes relativo alle leggi di Edoardo il Confessore, che comporterebbe un riferimento al *caput lupinum*, è possible venire in soccorso di Agamben appoggiandosi su un passaggio singolare del *Dialogo sul diritto comune*, che l'interprete non mostra di aver letto. Nella sezione VI di questo dialogo, consacrato alle pene previste dagli *Statutes of Provisors*, chiamati anche statuti del *Praemunire*, lo studente di diritto dichiara quanto segue:

> Cotesto delitto è abbastanza simile a quello per il quale viene proscritto chiunque rifiuta di presentarsi e di sottomettersi alla legge; salvo che le proscrizioni sono precedute da una lunga procedura, ed il condannato viene messo fuori dalla protezione della legge. Ma quanto al delitto contro la legge dei detentori di benefici (…) se il colpevole entro un limite di due mesi dopo aver ricevuto l'avviso non si sottomette alla legge, è colpito subito dalla proscrizione. E questa pena, anche se non capitale, ne è tuttavia l'equivalente, poiché il condannato è costretto a vivere in segreto e alla mercé di coloro i quali conoscono il luogo ove si nasconde, e debbono per forza rivelarlo, se non vogliono correre gli stessi pericoli. *Prima che regnasse Elisabetta, molto si è disputato se chiunque lo volesse non avesse la facoltà di uccidere questo reo, come è lecito uccidere un lupo*. Questa pena è molto simile a quella in vigore presso gli antichi romani, con cui veniva vietato l'uso del fuoco e dell'acqua (*interdictio de aqua et igni*); ed alla grande scomunica papale, per cui chi avesse mangiato o bevuto in compagnia del condannato incorreva nella stessa sanzione[39].

Questo testo mostra chiaramente che Hobbes aveva una conoscenza diretta degli statuti dei *Provisors*, e soprattutto di quelli di Edoardo III (25 Edoardo III, sez. 1, cap. 1, 1351; 27 Edoardo III), e di Riccardo II, che prevedevano una pena di bando e di esposizione alla violenza altrui, simile a quella che minacciava l'*homo sacer*. Questo accenno alle discussioni giuridiche del XIV secolo, relative ai detentori di benefici, a «coloro, cioè, che ottenevano da Roma benefici in questo

[38] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p. 117-118.
[39] T. Hobbes, *Dialogo sul diritto comune*, cit., p. 509-510.

paese (*scil*. Inghilterra)»[40], mostra per lo meno che Hobbes non ignorava affatto il tipo di pena cui Agamben si riferisce, e che queste pene prevedevano di trattare il colpevole come un lupo. C'è qui, senza alcun dubbio, un elemento affatto estraneo al mitologhema dell'*homo homini lupus*, che dà senso all'accostamento effettuato da Agamben tra il tema dell'uomo che è, nello stato di natura, un lupo per l'uomo e la pena riservata dal diritto inglese ai detentori di benefici. Tuttavia appare anche un elemento che permette di validare l'interpretazione globale dell'opera? Nulla di meno certo. Prima di ogni altra considerazione bisogna in effetti porre questo decreto reale (*royal writ*) nel suo contesto, che è quello di una teoria delle relazioni internazionali fondata sul principio di sovranità. Gli *Statutes of Provisors* furono in effetti adottati nel corso del XIV secolo per impedire le ingerenze del papa sul territorio del sovrano inglese mediante l'intermediario delle nomine ecclesiastiche. Lo statuto II di Riccardo, cap. 5, promulgato nel 1392, aveva infatti la funzione di vietare che i sudditi del re di Inghilterra o gli stranieri, si vedano negato dal papa il diritto di godere dei benefici ecclesiastici sul suolo inglese. Così la pena cui incorrono i contravventori, che avrebbero voluto far valere in Inghilterra un diritto conferito da Roma, serviva a sanzionare un conflitto di sovranità tra un potere spirituale e un potere temporale, e non a far emergere la struttura nascosta della sovranità. Per il tramite di questa pena, già molto attenuata all'epoca di Hobbes[41], e molto prima della rottura anglicana, il sovrano inglese poteva imporre un limite rigido alle pretese dei tribunali ecclesiastici di giudicare *in ordine ad spiritualia*. Che in virtù di questo conflitto alcuni uomini si siano trovati esposti alla vendetta popolare sul modo dell'assassinio lecito, costituisce certo una singolarità nell'interrogazione del punto di vista di una antropologia delle pene, ma resta in dubbio la possibilità di assumerlo come paradigma stesso di un potere sovrano. Ciò che piuttosto conviene analizzare, sono gli effetti dei conflitti di sovranità sui soggetti che vi sono esposti, essendo il ritorno all'animalità giuridicamente previsto un effetto singolare della violenza indotta dalla coesistenza mai totalmente pacifica degli stati sovrani.

Agamben interpreta questi effetti in una prospettiva volontariamente polemica, in termini di situazione di eccezione[42], contro l'interpretazione liberale dei fondamenti dello Stato moderno:

> Contrariamente a quanto noi moderni siamo abituati a rappresentarci come spazio della politica in termini di diritti del cittadino, di libera volontà e di contratto sociale, dal punto di vista della sovranità autenticamente politica è solo la nuda vita. Per

[40] Ivi, p. 511.

[41] La situazione descritta da Hobbes non corrisponde che parzialmente al diritto della sua epoca, che non prevedeva l'esecuzione immediata senza altra forma di processo se non nel caso del tradimento, ma non in quello di un'azione civile. Lucien Carrive nota che, in quest'ultimo caso, il fuori legge avrebbe perso solo i beni personali, anche se spesso gli era possibile tutelarli («le hors-la-loi ne perdait que ses biens personnels, et encore bien souvent il lui était possible de les mettre à l'abri» (*Dialogues des Commons Laws*, trad. L. et P. Carrive, Paris 1990, p. 139, nota 3).

[42] Su questo punto, si veda il capitolo primo del tomo II di G. Agamben *Homo sacer*: *Lo stato di eccezione come paradigma di governo*, cit., pp. 9-43.

questo, in Hobbes, il fondamento del potere sovrano non va cercato nella libera cessione, da parte dei sudditi, del loro diritto naturale, quanto piuttosto nella conservazione, da parte del sovrano, del suo diritto naturale di fare qualunque cosa rispetto a chiunque, che si presenta ora come diritto di punire[43].

Sostituendo la coppia nuda vita/potere sovrano alla distinzione schmittiana amico/nemico, Agamben è indotto a proporre un nuovo criterio del politico. Questo criterio implica che le situazioni in cui non esiste un sovrano che esercita il suo potere di vita e di morte su un essere esposto nella sua stessa vita, non sono situazioni politiche. Una tesi del genere conduce logicamente a proporre una lettura anti-liberale di Hobbes, per cui la sovranità dello Stato non appare come la garanzia dei dritti degli individui alla sicurezza, ma come l'espressione di uno smisurato diritto di punire. Non bisogna qui prestare troppa attenzione allo spirito della costruzione giuridica della sovranità da Bodin, e dello spazio dei diritti che essa rende possibile. Senza dubbio Hobbes non ignora il lato oscuro del potere sovrano, e soprattutto il legame che intrattiene con una teologia dell'onnipotenza che si scontra con il controllo di Dio sulla vita degli uomini[44], ma non è una ragione sufficiente per sminuire, come fa Agamben, l'atro aspetto del potere, quello che produce il diritto e organizza uno spazio pacifico. Per meglio comprendere l'articolazione tra queste due dimensioni del pensiero hobbesiano della sovranità, si può far leva sul testo dell'epistola dedicatoria della seconda edizione del *De cive*, in cui Hobbes introduce la celeberrima formula *homo homini lupus*.

Nel primo paragrafo, Hobbes comincia con una critica della critica repubblicana della tirannia dei re. Catone il censore, esprimendo l'opinione del popolo romano, sostiene che «tutti i re siano una razza di belve feroci»[45]. Tuttavia Hobbes ricorda che, per quanto repubblicana fosse, Roma non si comportò diversamente dai re, quando si trattò di sottomettere gli altri popoli d'Italia.

> Ma che specie di bestia era, allora, il popolo romano stesso, che aveva rapinato tutto il mondo per mezzo di comandanti come l'Africano, l'Asiatico, il Macedonio, l'Acaico, e di tutti quegli altri suoi cittadini, che avevano tratto il nome dai popoli che avevano spogliato?

Nessuna uscita, sembra, alla cattura della libertà dei popoli d'Italia dai Romani, che Ponto Telesino compara ai lupi. Appare qui il lato oscuro della sovranità delle repubbliche: quello che esse hanno mostrato ai tempi delle guerre di conquista. Ma Agamben ha troppo rapidamente concluso di non ritenere, dell'epistola dedicatoria, che la sola formula l'uomo è un lupo per l'uomo, poiché, sottolinea Hobbes nel secondo capoverso, l'uomo è anche un Dio per

[43] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer I*, cit., p.118; «questa lupizzazione dell'uomo e umanizzazione del lupo è possibile a ogni momento nella *dissolutio civitatis* inaugurata dallo stato di eccezione».
[44] Sui rapporti dell'onnipotenza di Dio e della questione del male, si rinvia a L. Foisneau, *Hobbes et la toute-puissance de Dieu*, Paris 2000, pp. 147-157.
[45] «Reges omnes de genere esse bestiarum rapacium» (*De cive,* The Latin Version, Epistola dedicatoria, a cura di H. Warrender, Oxford 1983, p. 73; trad. it. a cura di N. Bobbio, *Elementi filosofici sul cittadino*, Torino 1959, p. 57).

l'uomo, se si considera la società civile in cui gli uomini vivono pacificamente gli uni con gli altri. Nella città, di conseguenza, l'uomo accede alla somiglianza con Dio per mezzo della giustizia e della carità, che sono le due virtù della pace. La rapacità delle belve è tuttavia nell'ordine internazionale, poiché a causa della depravazione dei malvagi, gli uomini sono obbligati a ricorrere alle due virtù della guerra, che sono la forza e la furberia. Questa doppia faccia della sovranità, legge naturale all'interno, diritto naturale all'esterno, non implica in nessun modo il capovolgimento, proposto da Agamben, di una liberazione della violenza sovrana all'interno del suo proprio spazio, salvo il tener conto, come ho cercato di fare, degli effetti interni dei conflitti di sovranità.

Contributi/2

Bayle's 'Rorarius', Leibniz and Animal Souls

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Bayle produces a set of three criteria to evaluate views of non-human animal souls. These criteria arise from Bayle's interaction with the extant Modern views on the topic and are meant to capture features that any successful view will have. Bayle criticizes Leibniz's view of animal souls at length for its reliance on the theory of pre-established harmony, entering into a long exchange with Leibniz on the topic, but Bayle never explicitly applies his criteria. This leads some (including Leibniz) to conclude that Bayle thinks Leibniz's view satisfies the criteria. I argue in this paper that Leibniz's view properly satisfies at most one of Bayle three criteria, but that this examination shows a deep tension between two of those criteria.

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1. Introduction

There has been no sustained examination of G.W. Leibniz's view of animal souls in the *New System of Nature* employing systematic criteria contemporary to him[1]. Pierre Bayle offers just such a set of criteria. Bayle never applies his criteria to Leibniz's view, though, and as a result some have thought Bayle took the view strong enough to meet the criteria. Explicitly applying them shows that Leibniz's view is not as strong as it initially appears.

Bayle's criteria arise in the article 'Rorarius' of his *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, wherein Bayle discusses non-human animals. Among Moderns, Bayle sees the disputes about animal souls as primarily arising between Scholastics and Cartesians. From the arguments given by the two camps, Bayle derives three criteria for assessing views on non-human animals. These criteria arise from his sustained, thoughtful interaction with the available views and represent his synthesis of philosophical thinking, religious doctrine, empirical evidence and common sense.

[1] Though there have been thoughtful examinations of what place there can be for non-human animals in Leibniz's ultimate metaphysics (e.g., G. Hartz, *Leibniz's Final System*, New York, 2007) and Leibniz's relationship to biology generally (J. E. H. Smith, *Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life*, Princeton 2011).

Leibniz's view satisfies at most one of the three criteria. The weakness of Leibniz's view is obscured by the fact that, while Bayle discusses Leibniz's view at length in 'Rorarius,' Bayle focuses on rejecting Leibniz's view of pre-established harmony between body and soul[2]. One could easily take the fact that these are Bayle's only stated criticisms to suggest that he was otherwise pleased by Leibniz's view. This is how Leibniz understands Bayle, and contemporary interpreters follow him in this understanding[3].

So, while Leibniz respects Bayle as a formidable opponent — his *Theodicy* is structured in large part as a point-by-point refutation of Bayle[4] and Leibniz takes 'Rorarius' seriously, citing Bayle's keen criticisms of pre-established harmony as helping him sharpen both the content and the presentation of that view[5] — even he does not see the depth of critique incipient in Bayle's criteria[6].

Because Bayle sees himself as a reporter and not an advocate of any particular view, and because his perspective is encyclopedic, to satisfy his criteria would be to satisfy all participants in the discussion about the nature and character of non-human animal souls[7]. Leibniz and his commentators may well think that Leibniz's view does — or should — satisfy everyone in this way, but this interpretation is only viable because Bayle's criteria have never been explicitly applied to the view.

I argue here that Leibniz (and others) are wrong to think that his view satisfies Bayle's criteria, as it satisfies at most one of the three. This is significant because it shows Leibniz's view does not have all the features the religious

[2] Bayle objects specifically to the doctrine of spontaneity (D. Rutherford, 'Bayle's Dog and the Dynamics of the Soul,' in *Leibniz et Bayle: Confrontation et Dialogue*, edited by C. Leduc, P. Rateau, J. Solère, Stuttgart 2015), but Bayle and Leibniz talk of the exchange as being about pre-established harmony more generally, so I shall follow them here.

[3] See Section III below and D. Des Chene, '*Animal* as Category: Bayle's "Rorarius,"' in *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by J.H. Smith, Cambridge 2006.

[4] Bayle's writing occasioned Leibniz to write the *Theodicy* and much as been written about Bayle's influence on that work; see J. Israel,'Leibniz's *Theodicy* as a Critique of Spinoza and Bayle — and Blueprint for the Philosophy Wars of the 18th Century,' C. Mercer, *Prefacing the* Theodicy, and K. Irwin, *Which "Reason"? Bayle on the Intractability of Evil*, all in the generally useful *New Essays on Leibniz's Theodicy* edited by L. M. Jorgensen and S. Newlands, Oxford 2014.

[5] For Leibniz's praise of Bayle in particular, see G.W. Leibniz, *Clarification of the Difficulties Mr. Bayle has Found in the New System of the Union of Soul and Body*, in *Philosophical Papers and Letters* edited by L. E. Loemker, Dordrecht 1989, esp. pp. 492 and G.W. Leibniz, *Reply to the Thoughts on the System of Pre-Established Harmony contained in the Second Edition of Mr. Bayle's Critical Dictionary*, *Article Rorarius*, in *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, cit. esp. pp. 574.

[6] Chronologically, the exchange on pre-established harmony consists of Bayle's *Dictionary* article 'Rorarius' Remark H, pp. Leibniz's response cited above, 'Rorarius' Remark L, and Leibniz's further response (also cited above). Comparatively little has been written about this exchange, but T. Ryan, *Pierre Bayle's Cartesian Metaphysics: Rediscovering Early Modern Philosophy*, New York 2009 and Rutherford (*Bayle's Dog and the Dynamics of the Soul*, cit.) treat the issues related to pre-established harmony at length.

[7] For Bayle as reporter, see J. R. Maia Neto, *Bayle's Academic Skepticism*, in *Everything Connects: in Conference with Richard Popkin*, edited by J. E. Force and D. S. Katz, Leiden 1998 and J. R. Maia Neto, *Academic Skepticism in Early Modern Philosophy*, in «Journal of the History of Ideas» LVIII/2, (1997), pp. 199-220.

thinking of the time, common sense, and our philosophical reflections would want for a view. This may not be a problem for Leibniz in the end, though, as my examination also suggests that the second and third criteria as formulated by Bayle are ultimately mutually unsatisfiable[8].

2. Bayle on Moderns: the Genesis of his Criteria

Bayle primarily address the Scholastic and Cartesian views on animal souls[9]. These groups agree that only humans are capable of rational thought but differ radically with respect to non-human animals. Scholastics, following Aristotle, take non-human animals to have only sensitive souls: they are thus capable of perception and memory but not reason. Cartesians, following Descartes, take non-human animals to be mere machines, that is, to have no mind (or soul) at all. Bayle thinks each of these positions is ultimately untenable in light of the critiques issued by the other.

In outline, Bayle, adapting the Scholastic reasoning, argues that the Cartesian view is untenable because it cannot explain the cleverness of non-human animals. If the Cartesian position is to be tenable, it must be able to account for the behavior we observe in non-human animals. In particular, Bayle claims, it must explain those extraordinary instances of sagacity and cleverness we see in them[10].

Because these behaviors so closely resemble human reasoning behaviors, the Cartesian is put into a dilemma: either he will succeed in giving a mechanical explanation of non-human animal behavior, eschewing appeals to minds and reason, or not. If the Cartesian succeeds, the same explanation will be available for human reasoning behavior, *contra* the fundamental tenant of Cartesianism that only human animals have minds. If he fails to account for similar behaviors

[8] Citations to Bayle's *Dictionary* will be given in reference to the canonical English translation from 1709, reprinted in 1737: P. Bayle, 'Rorarius,' in *Historical And Critical Dictionary,* edited and translated by P. Desmaizeaux, London 1737. There is reason to think Bayle authorized this translation by his friend Desmaizeaux and the text in it closely matches Bayle's original (unlike the other, unauthorized, and greatly enlarged editions made available in England in the period.) The Popkin translation (Indianapolis, 1991) is reasonably complete with respect of 'Rorarius,' but does include several passages from Remarks D and F, nor the article 'Pereira' (P. Bayle, 'Pereira,' in *Historical And Critical Dictionary,* edited and translated by P. Desmaizeaux, London 1737).There are no substantive differences, to my eye, in the passages I cite here between the Desmaizeaux and Popkin editions.

[9] Des Chene (*Animal as Category: Bayle's Rorarius*, cit.) is the only prominent English-language working-through on Bayle's arguments against the Cartesians and Scholastics. My exposition of Bayle's general anti-Scholastic and anti-Cartesian arguments below is indebted to it, though it does, at times, depart from Des Chene's.

[10] E.g., the dog who refrains from eating his master's food though he is hungry, horses that react violently after forced mating with a relative, and dogs that avenge their masters. These examples come from *Rorarius*, cit., Remark B alone; there are many other examples throughout 'Rorarius' and 'Pereira.' Part of what makes Bayle's catalog so important is that — unlike, e.g., Locke (see J. Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, edited by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford 1975, II.ix-xi) — he gives us an explicit list of different behaviors that need to be accounted for.

across different groups, this demonstrates the insufficiency of mechanical explanation.

Bayle argues that the Scholastic position that attributes a sensitive but non-rational soul to non-human animals is also problematic. The reasons for this are again dilemmatic: either sensitive souls are capable of great sagacity, in which case the difference between them and purportedly rational souls is *ad hoc*, or they differ greatly, leaving us with no explanation of the sagacious behavior of non-human animals.

This recounting simplifies Bayle's arguments, but it is worth noting that Bayle's full argument turns on the Scholastic claim that souls embedded in matter are incapable of rational thought. It is from this claim that Bayle shows the account to be insufficient[11].

In sum, the Scholastics marshal evidence of animal sagacity to show that non-human animals must be closer to humans than the Cartesians allow. Bayle accepts this evidence and uses it to show that it destabilizes the Scholastic position, too. The Scholastics must also find a way to make humans and non-humans close, but not *too* close (else they lose the purported difference in kind of soul).

Bayle synthesizes his argumentation against these views into criteria for any view on non-human animal souls, occasioned by the final Scholastic case study he gives. Father Gabriel Daniel, an French Jesuit historian, posits a 'middle being' between material substance and spiritual substance to explain why animals are capable of some things — but not everything — that humans are. Scholastic restrictions on what matter is capable of, have figured in Bayle's previous assaults, so Daniel's compromise seems a wise one, designed to avoid just these issues while maintaining the core of the Scholastic position: animals have a soul, on Daniel's view, but it is not entirely immaterial, like a human soul.

In response, Bayle makes the clearest statement of what a view of non-human animal souls must do, laying out three *desiderata* for a theory. He finds that Daniel's 'middle being' satisfies none of them:

> It remains for me to shew the insufficiency of Father Daniel's hypothesis. I. We want a system, which maintains that the souls of beasts are mortal: but this cannot be proved by supposing a middle being between a body and spirit: for such a being is not extended: it is therefore indivisible; nothing but annihilation can destroy it: diseases, fire, and sword, cannot hurt it; and therefore it is in that respect of the same nature and condition with spirits, and human souls. II. We want a system whereby it may appear that there is a specific difference between the souls of men and those of beasts: but this middle Being does not afford it; for if the soul of a beast, being neither a body nor a spirit, has nevertheless sensations, the soul of man will be able to reason, tho' it be neither body nor spirit, but a middle being between both. It is a more difficult thing for a being destitute of sense to arrive to the perception of a tree, than for a sensitive

[11] To complete the argument: if this is the case, then the capacities of the souls posited depend on the organs to which they are attached. But because the kinds of organs a soul is attached to is merely a contingent feature, a human soul similarly situated would have similar capacities. Thus, a distinction in kind is unmotivated. See the discussion below (Section 5) as well.

being to acquire the faculty of reasoning. III. We want a system, that gives an account of the surprising skill of bees, dogs, apes and elephants; and you talk of such souls in beasts, as have only sensations, without thinking and reasoning. If you consider it well, you will be sensible that such a soul is not sufficient to explain the phænomena. Father Daniel confesses it in another place of his book…[12]

Bayle makes three explicit demands here. First, the view must make the souls of non-human animals mortal. Second, it must outline a 'specific difference' between the souls of humans and non-human animals, aside, presumably, from the mortality of the former. Third, a theory must explain the apparent instances of reasoning in non-human animals.

Daniel's 'middle being' fails to show why beast souls should not then be simple (that is, unextended and having no parts), and hence immaterial. If they are immaterial, they cannot be subject to natural generation and corruption, so they would be immortal, failing the first desideratum.

'Middle being' also fails to show how a soul that is sensitive could fail to be rational, because it does not show why those different types of soul should have some of the same capacities — the more difficult ones, on Bayle's view[13] — but not all. Finally, 'middle being' does not, hence, explain the actions of beasts because it fails to show how a being that lacked reason could be as clever as beasts in fact are.

3. Leibniz, Generally

Bayle assesses Leibniz's view rather more favorably, praising Leibniz as providing at least one satisfactory answer to his objections. He then complains that Leibniz's view is wed to a highly dubious metaphysical system. Bayle's evaluation is based entirely on Leibniz's *New System of Nature:* Bayle explicitly cites the *New System*, summarizes it fairly, and Leibniz's subsequent response does not reformulate any of these points. Thus, both thinkers agree that the *New System* presents the view under discussion. While Leibniz revised his views later, the view under discussion is exclusively the one presented in Leibniz's *New System*.

Bayle sees Leibniz's view as consisting in several theses, as he summarizes it in '*Rorarius*', Remark H. First, Leibniz claims that animals are always organized: they are not matter that comes to be organized. Second, because matter alone cannot be unified into a single subject, non-human animals must have a «form, which is simple, indivisible, and only one being» (Bayle's gloss). Third, Leibniz holds that this form of organization is never separated from the animal to which it is wed, so there cannot be generation or death in nature. Leibniz sets human souls aside from this, implying that they are not necessarily caught up with matter.

[12] P. Bayle, 'Rorarius', Remak G.
[13] *Ibid.*, Remak F.

Bayle concludes that Leibniz's «hypothesis frees us from part of the difficulties»[14]. Some interpreters follow Leibniz himself in taking Bayle to be entirely satisfied that Leibniz's view resolves the problems raised for other views. As Des Chene puts it, «pre-established harmony, despite its benefits, is too much to swallow» for Bayle[15]. Leibniz himself claims that Bayle is satisfied with the view on animal souls. Leibniz says of Bayle:

> He does not reject what I have said about the conservation of the soul or even that of the animal, but he still does not seem satisfied with the way I have tried to explain the union and intercourse of the soul and the body…[16]

The rest of Bayle and Leibniz's exchange focuses exclusively on pre-established harmony. This is appropriate, given the emphasis Bayle places on it in his original comments, but in no way rules out other, unexplicated criticisms. This interpretation, however, takes it that the only objections Bayle has to the view are the expressly noted objections that target pre-established harmony[17].

In general, this reading of Bayle seems to overstate how pleased Bayle should have been with Leibniz's view. In particular, the notion that Bayle should have only objected to pre-established harmony is false. Bayle's detestation of pre-established harmony does not entail that Bayle should not reject Leibniz's view of non-human animal minds/souls for other reasons. Note that Bayle says only that Leibniz's hypothesis "frees us from *part* of the difficulties" (emphasis added), and that Bayle's immediate move is to praise the system for what it gets right, before criticizing pre-established harmony. None of this suggests that Leibniz's system is a perfect account of non-human animal souls, or that Bayle thought it entirely satisfactory considered independently of pre-established harmony. Nor should he, as it fails at least two of his criteria.

4. Leibniz and the First Criterion (Mortal Souls)

Bayle's first criterion is that an account of non-human animal souls should make the souls of non-human animals mortal. It should have been apparent to Bayle that Leibniz's view fails to meet this criterion because it explicitly insists that the souls of beasts are eternal.

Leibniz's reasoning, in outline, rests on the claims that non-human animals constitute real unities and that real unities cannot be material[18]. In order to

[14] *Ibid.*, Remark H, p. 909.
[15] Des Chene, *Animal as Category: Bayle's Rorarius*, cit., p. 218
[16] G.W. Leibniz, *Clarification of the Difficulties Mr. Bayle has Found in the New System of the Union of Soul and Body*, cit., p. 492
[17] T. Ryan, *Pierre Bayle's Cartesian Metaphysics*, cit., and D. Rutherford, *Bayle's Dog*, cit., both treat the exchange on pre-established harmony at length but do not address whether Bayle was satisfied by the rest of Leibniz's view. Whether this is because they, like Des Chene, take Bayle to be satisfied or because that topic is not germane to their work is not clear.
[18] All quotations from the *New System* are from G. W. Leibniz, *A New System of Nature,* in *Philosophical Essays*, edited and translated by R. Ariew and D. Garber, Indianapolis 1989. G.

constitute true unities, they must be indivisible[19]. Because they are indivisible, they are not subject to natural generation or corruption, that is, coming together or coming apart. Because generation and corruption are the only ways in nature of coming to be or ceasing to be, it must be that non-human animal souls do not arise from generation (or dissolve in corruption) but instead can only be subject to Godly creation and annihilation[20]. Consequently, they have always existed[21].

Bayle demands that the souls of beasts be mortal; Leibniz insists that they are immortal. So Leibniz's view does not satisfy this first criterion. Why, then, does Bayle praise Leibniz? It is because Leibniz circumvents the criterion; his view does not bring about the unacceptable consequences that led Bayle to reject immortal souls for beasts. Bayle argues that if we extend the doctrine of the immortality of the soul to beasts

> …into what an abyss do we fall? What shall we do with so many immortal souls? Will there be for them also an Heaven and a Hell? Will they go from one body to another? Will they be annihilated as the beasts die? Will God create continually an infinite number of spirits, to plunge them again so soon into nothing? How many insects are there which only live a few days? Let us not imagine that it is sufficient to create souls from the beasts which we do know, those that we do not know are far the greater number. The microscopes discover them to us by the thousands in a single drop of liquor. Many more would be discovered if we had more perfect microscopes. And let no man say that insects are only machines; for one might better explain by this hypothesis the actions of dogs than the actions of pismires and bees[22].

The main argument here is dilemmatic: if non-human animal souls were immortal, either they would be preserved upon bodily death or they would not.

If they are preserved, this generates problems with the number and character of souls: not only would there be too many, as noted above, but they either would be apt to reward and punishment or would transmigrate from body to body. Both consequences are unacceptable, to Bayle, so this disjunct is unacceptable.[23]

The other disjunct—that beasts' souls are annihilated at death—is even more hideous. Bayle says that if

W. Leibniz, *New System*, cit., p. 139: «I perceived that it is impossible to find *the principles of a true unity* in matter alone».

[19] «I saw that these forms and souls must be indivisible, as our mind is» (*NS,* p.139).

[20] «For, since every [[*simple*]] *substance* which has a true unity can begin and end only by miracle, it follows that they can begin only by creation and end only by annihilation» (*NS*, p. 140). In the Ariew and Garber translation, double square brackets indicate Leibniz's own later additions.

[21] «The forms constitutive of substances must have been created together with the world, and must always subsist» (*NS,* p. 140).

[22] P. Bayle, *Rorarius*, Remark E, p. 906.

[23] The substantive reasoning for this part of the argument comes from Remark C. If beasts were apt to reward and punishment, they would have to be rational, which this view denies (p. 902). If they were preserved but not apt to reward and punishment, they must be re-incorporated (because they are material souls). This later line of reasoning is evident from Bayle's response to Leibniz's view in Remark H (p. 910).

these souls are annihilated, when beasts die: where is then the constancy of GOD? He creates souls, and soon annihilates them. He does not deal so with matter: he never destroys it. He therefore preserves the less perfect substances, and destroys the more perfect. Is this the part of a wise agent[24]?

A God that would create durable, immortal souls that existed for only a finite amount of time, only to annihilate them upon some change in matter — which God does not annihilate — would not be a wise and just God. Any view that entails that immaterial souls are destroyed must thus be false.

Leibniz's view avoids these consequences by preserving the beast's form attached to its body. On Leibniz's view, non-human animal souls are not annihilated with the beast's (seeming) death, nor do they transmigrate. This is because the souls of beasts are always in some organized parcel of matter, though that parcel may be very minute in comparison to its entire mature body (*NS,* 140-141). Bayle praises Leibniz, noting that, were this not the case, ovens would play a great role in the life of souls. Ovens that incubate eggs would have the power to bring souls into being by creating the conditions for a material body to come about. Ovens could also annihilate souls, too, as «many sorts of animals may be destroyed; if they are put in an oven a little too hot»[25]. If souls existed only when gross bodies existed, ovens would have enormous power over souls. But this power should be reserved only to God. Bayle sees that Leibniz's view avoids this issue by making animal souls eternal, along with their minute parcel of matter.

On Leibniz's view, animal souls cannot be brought into being (or destroyed) by any mechanical change, and they do not transmigrate because they are wed to a continuous parcel of matter. So despite the fact that Leibniz's view does not satisfy the criterion *per se*, it solves the same problem. Bayle capitulates the point, saying:

Mr. Leibniz's hypothesis removes all those difficulties for it induces us to believe, 1. That God in the beginning of the world created all the forms of all bodies and consequently the souls of beasts. 2. That those souls have subsisted ever since, being inseparably united to the first organized bodies in which God placed them. This exempts us from the necessity of recurring to the metempsychosis or transmigration of souls, which otherwise we must have done[26].

Bayle fully accepts a circumvention of this criterion rather than a satisfaction of it. Bayle treats this *desideratum* not as a criterion *per se* but rather as circumscribing responses to arguments that our intuitions and other philosophical views generate. When assessing the first criterion, Bayle uses it as a guide; its force rests on the argumentation that underwrites it.

[24] *Ibid.*, Remark C, p. 902.
[25] *Ibid.*, Remark H, p. 909.
[26] *Ibid.*

5. Leibniz and the Second Criterion (A Specific Difference)

Using these same evaluative standards with the second criterion produces a different result: Leibniz's view nominally satisfies the second criterion, but it does not answer the arguments that generated it. If Bayle uses the same evaluative standards for the first and second criteria, Leibniz will fail at least one of them.

Bayle's second criterion demands a 'specific difference' between the souls of humans and beasts, that is, it must make humans and non-human animals different kinds of thing. This difference cannot be given in terms of rationality: simply identifying only one group as rational is not sufficient, as the non-rationality of beasts is to be proved. Bayle's criticism of Daniel's 'middle being' illustrates this: while 'middle being' that is neither fully corporeal or spiritual would put a specific difference between the two, it fails to establish the difference in rationality that it seeks on the basis of this supposed difference in substratum.

Leibniz thus cannot merely note a difference in reasoning capability. Rather, if there is to be a difference in rationality, some *other* specific difference must be identified between the two sorts of souls. Leibniz's system answers that requirement directly: non-human animal souls are *always* wedded to matter. Unlike human souls, non-human animals always have a body, whether that body's organs are enfolded or expanded, enmeshed in a larger system of matter or a very minute one.

Human souls, by contrast, constitute minds. Of minds, Leibniz says:

> We must not indiscriminately confuse minds or rational souls [with other forms or souls], minds being like little gods in comparison with them, made in the image of God, and having in them some ray of the light of divinity. That is why God governs minds as a prince governs his subjects, whereas he disposes of other substances as an engineer handles his machines. Thus minds have particular laws, which place them above the upheavals in matter[27].

And because they follow these 'much higher laws' than the physical laws which govern matter (and thus the souls that are enmeshed in matter), minds

> are exempt from anything that might make them lose that quality of being citizens of the society of minds; God has provided so well that no changes of matter can make them lose the moral qualities of their personhood[28].

Human souls — that is, minds — do not depend on matter the same way that non-human animal souls do for Leibniz. This is necessary for minds to be always subject to God's moral laws that ensure that the world is «adjusted for the happiness of the good and the punishment of the wicked»[29].

The argument turns on the claim that humans must always be subject to reward and punishment. As such, they must always maintain the same

[27] G. W. Leibniz, *New System*, cit., p. 140.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 141.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

capacities (i.e., rationality, will, knowledge of the good, *etc.*). Because souls that consist of a certain form organizing matter depend on the state of their organs for their capacities, human souls must not be a certain form organizing matter. Thus human souls must be different in kind from non-human animal souls. The ultimate difference between humans and non-human animals is that only humans are subject to moral law. From this difference, Leibniz derives a difference in how their souls relate to matter.

Leibniz does identify a difference in kind that goes beyond the seemingly *ad hoc* distinctions Bayle identified the Scholastics as propounding. Because one sort of soul must always be wedded to matter and the other cannot be constituted in this way, they are fundamentally different kinds of thing.

Bayle should object that, for Leibniz, the predicates 'subject to moral law' and 'rational' are too intimately related to establish this difference in kind. Leibniz argues from the former to the latter, but the opposite entailment should hold for Leibniz as well, given his characterization of reason as entailing certain critical, interrogative capacities[30]. Being rational should make one subject to moral law. Saying a group is (or is not) subject to moral law is tantamount to saying that it is (or is not) rational. The two predicates are extensionally equivalent, then, and as Bayle protests drawing the distinction in the latter terms, he should protest drawing the distinction in the former terms, as well.

One might think that problems arise for Leibniz only on the stronger claim that the two categories are necessarily equivalent. To determine if this is the case, consider if some evidence could establish rationality independently of any evidence that established moral status. If some evidence could do this, it would open space between rationality and being subject to moral law. Religious evidence that humans are subject to divine governance and, crucially, that non-human animals are not, might suffice. But this evidence cannot be drawn from or based in any way on observations of or reasoning about the similarities and differences between humans and non-human animals, as this begs the question.

There is disagreement, however, about what Christian theology teaches on this question. What matters most here is that Bayle himself seems to think that religious authorities disagree about the nature and status of animals. Thus an appeal to religious authority will not provide Bayle with the clear evidence needed in the absence of considerations of rationality. It is also not clear that religious claims that humans and non-human animals differ in more than just their reasoning ability are not ultimately based on comparisons of reasoning ability[31].

[30] Those necessary to determine the 'reasons for things,' as he puts it in the *New Essays* (II.xi). Those would seem to be part-and-parcel of moral accountability.

[31] For evidence of disagreement between religious authorities, see Bayle's disputation of Malebranche's Remarks about Augustine in P. Bayle, *Rorarius*, Remark C. Similarly, Bayle's arguments against using freedom of the will to distinguish man from beast at the end of 'Rorarius,' Remark F follow the general form of the argument I propose here. Note also Europe's history of putting animals on both ecclesiastical and juridical trial; see, for instance, W. Ewald, *Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?*, in «University of Pennsylvania Law Review» CXLIII, 1995, pp. 1889-2149, particularly section I.

Leibniz does not appeal to any such religious evidence in the *New System of Nature*, so it is not clear whether he would endorse this approach. Further, it is not clear that Bayle would allow appeals to such specifically religious evidence. Consistent with his dealings with the Scholastics, Bayle should require Leibniz to produce *non-theological* underpinnings for the claim, as it is the soul's relationship to matter that constitutes the specific difference on both views[32]. What such non-theological underpinnings might be for him is unclear.

Leibniz seems an apt target for some of Bayle's other anti-Scholastic arguments. In particular, Leibniz's view falls afoul of Bayle's arguments regarding «sucking children, naturals, and mad men»[33]. Infants pose a problem insofar as they do not have rational capacities but still have human (and, ergo, on the Scholastic view, rational) souls:

> Aristotle and Cicero, at the age of one year, never had more sublime thoughts than those of a dog; and if they had lived in the state of infancy thirty or forty years, the thoughts of their souls had never been anything but sensations and little passions for play and eating: it is therefore by accident, that they have surpassed beasts[34].

Leibniz has claimed that minds — i.e., human souls — are always apt to God's moral reward or punishment. From this, he derives that human souls must not be constrained by matter, as they must always maintain their (rational) capacities (and knowledge) across change of their material bodies. But infant Aristotle is not rational, seeming to put the lie to Leibniz's claim that human souls must always have the capacities necessary for being morally judged.

Later Leibniz can appeal to his claim that humans *come to have* rational souls: he claims that "Human spermatic animals" that is, the seed of the natural machine that will become a human body, "are not rational and do not become rational until conception settles that these animals will have a human nature"[35]. More needs to be said for this to solve the problem of post-conception infants developing rational souls, but it does secure that changes in status with respect of body can create changes with respect of soul that eventually produce an apt candidate for moral reward and punishment.

There is little reason to attribute this particular view to the Leibniz of the *New System*, though[36]. This change does not solve the underlying problem,

[32] When considering the Scholastic view that the materiality of soul in animals is the specific difference, Bayle says: «But how do they prove that? I suppose they only argue upon the principles of natural reason, without having recourse to scripture or the doctrines of religion; and I ask of them one good proof, to shew that the souls of beasts are corporeal, and that ours is not?» (*Rorarius*, Remark F).
[33] *Ibid.*, Remark E, p. 906.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] G. W. Leibniz, *Principles of Nature and Grace*, § 6, p. 209.
[36] One might think his claim that rational souls are «exempt from anything that might make them lose the quality of being citizens of the society of minds» (*NS,* p. 141) counts against such an attribution. But the claim from *Principles* only suggests that material souls can turn into rational souls; this quote only denies change of rational souls into material souls. This leaves open the possibility that God transmutes material souls into a rational ones, though not the reverse.

either: while it introduces change of souls into the system, which was needed, that change still depends on a material process (conception). The material process of conception functions the same way here that developing particular organs functioned in determining whether Aristotle grew to be rational in Bayle's objection to the Scholastics. This leaves Leibniz needing to explain how a contingent, material process (conception) could settle a difference in kind of soul. Leibniz must decouple change of soul from material change, and while the introduction of the *Principles* claim makes change of soul possible, it does not do this decoupling. Leibniz might be able to respond in other ways, but this would move him further from the *New System* and the view that Bayle considered.

By interrogating the view in the same way that he did similar Scholastic views, Bayle would have shown Leibniz's view to fail the second criterion. This is despite the fact that Leibniz nominally satisfies it, a reversal of the first criterion, where Leibniz fails the criterion as stated but satisfies the arguments. Whichever evaluative standards Bayle uses — satisfaction of the criterion as stated, or of the underlying arguments — Leibniz fails one of the first two criteria. This shows that interpreting Bayle as only objecting to pre-established harmony is mistaken.

6. Leibniz and the Third Criterion (Explaining Animal Reasoning)

The final criterion is that a system must explain the 'surprising skill' of beasts, that is, explain how non-human animals come to act the way they do. Bayle provides a partial catalog of the capacities to be explained. For instance, by considering the hungry dog that avoids his master's food, Bayle concludes that beasts must be capable of memory, drawing conclusions, and comparing ideas[37]. Through other examples, Bayle concludes that non-human animals must also be capable of guilt and vengeance[38], acting with design, improving with experience, foreseeing what's to come, cunning, precaution, docility[39], and the power of abstaining or acting[40], i.e., what constitutes free will on Bayle's view. At a minimum, any view must explain these capacities in non-human animals if it is to make sense of what we observe of their behavior.

As Bayle's discussion of the Cartesians and Scholastics shows, not all explanations of these capacities are going to be acceptable, all things considered. Bayle applies this criterion dilemmatically: whatever explains these capacities in non-human animals is going to either be the same as or different from whatever explains these capacities in humans. If it is the same, this explanation may undermine the specific difference set forward in answer to the second criterion, as with the Scholastics. If it is different, the number of shared capacities and the depth of the similarity Bayle once explained will make motivating that difference difficult, as with the Cartesians.

[37] P. Bayle, *Rorarius*, cit., Remark B, p. 901
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] P. Bayle, *Rorarius*, cit., Remark F, p. 907.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 908.

Leibniz must find a middle path. His psychological story must be consistent with the specific difference he identified before. But he has also claimed that humans and non-human animals both constitute true unities and that these unities ultimately account for whatever we observe of their behavior.

Leibniz's *New System* does not detail a psychology for non-human animals that would explain their behavior without appealing to reason, it does not detail any psychology at all. We know what such a system would look like for Leibniz, because Leibniz offers one in the *New Essays on Human Understanding* II.ix-xi. Such a story is completely absent from the *New System*, which does not even draw the distinction between knowledge of reasons and empirical inference the *New Essays* account depends on.

Whether Bayle would have found that system sufficient is an interesting but perhaps unanswerable question. It would be anachronistic to include the psychological story from the posthumously published *New Essays* in Leibniz's-system-as-understood-by-Bayle, which is what I am evaluating[41].

We can say, however, that given his other claims, whatever answer the Leibniz of the *New System* gave would likely be unstable. Leibniz implies that non-human animals depend for their capacities on the state of their organs, unlike humans. But if non-human animals depend on the state of some material system for their capacities, and the human capacities relevant to moral punishment and reward are independent of them, there must be two different ways of accounting for, e.g., foresight: one that depends on the physical condition of the body and another that does not. Some part of the explanation of human and non-human animal reasoning must differ, making it so that any psychological story will fail the third criterion.

7. Bayle's Commitments and the Criteria

Clearer and stronger answers to the second criterion make satisfying the third criterion more difficult, as greater specific difference requires greater difference in explanation of the faculties involved. Difference great enough to *satisfy* the second criterion (even nominally, as Leibniz does) would seem to make the third criterion unsatisfiable.

Bayle's second and third criteria being mutually unsatisfiable is somewhat surprising; taken together, they simply seek to delineate humans from non-human animals. This seems appropriate: insofar as we observe similarities (and differences) in the behaviors of humans and non-human animals, those similarities (and differences) must be taken account of in our explanations of that behavior. The criteria broadly understood, then, should not produce a

[41] While the *New Essays* were completed in 1704, they were not published until 1765. A similar view — though less fully explicated — is offered in the *Monadology* and *Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason.* There is no reason to believe that Bayle had access to the manuscripts and all were published after Bayle's death. For a list of Leibniz texts Bayle read, see T. Ryan *Pierre Bayle's Cartesian Metaphysics*, cit., p. 97.

problem unless the phenomenon is itself internally incoherent. That would not seem to be the case here, suggesting that the mutual unsatisfiability of Bayle's criteria comes from Bayle's particular formulation of them. To see why Bayle's criteria are so strong, it is useful to look to Bayle's other commitments. Bayle's religious inclinations strengthen the second criterion; his skepticism strengthens the third[42].

The notion that non-human animals might have souls like ours — or that we might have souls like those typically attributed to them — is a matter apt for moral panic among the religious. Bayle is aghast at the possibility, saying:

> One cannot, without horror, think of the consequences of this doctrine, *The soul of men and the soul of beasts do not differ substantially, they are of the same species, the one acquires more knowledge than the other, but these are only accidental advantages, and depending on an arbitrary institution*[43].

The 'consequences' Bayle lists, some of which are discussed above, are all religious in character. This was not an uncommon opinion among religiously inclined thinkers. Descartes, for instance, says that he has spent so much time arguing that animals are mere machines because, aside from denying the existence of God, there is no error

> that leads weak minds further from the straight path of virtue than that of imagining that the souls of the beasts are of the same nature as ours[44].

It is incumbent on believers, then, to show that non-human animals differ in kind from humans, and that this difference matters for our moral status. Because moral status and rationality are to-be-proved, though, the specific difference cannot be given in terms of rationality (or result directly from religious evidence). Thus the second criterion must be formulated strongly enough to itself indirectly ensure that animals are not rational. Bayle's religious commitments demands he draw the second criterion strongly enough to produce just such a difference.

Bayle differs from Descartes, Leibniz, Daniel, and others involved in these debates, though, insofar as his skeptical heritage demands that he see non-human animals as minimally different from humans. Seeing non-human animals as having capacities similar — or even superior — to humans is common in the

[42] While there remains disagreement about the exact relationship Bayle thinks reason ought to have to faith, work exemplified by Labrousse (1964) shows Bayle's religious commitments to be sincere. For an opposed perspective, see G. Mori, *Bayle Philosophe*, Paris 1999, but note also the rejoinders to this position by K. Irwin, *Bayle on the (Ir)rationality of Religious Belief*, «Philosophy Compass» VIII/6, (2013), pp. 560-569, and T. Lennon, *Reading Bayle*, Toronto 1999 and Id., *What Kind of a Skeptic Was Bayle? in* «Midwest Studies in Philosophy» XXVI, (2002), pp. 258-279.

[43] P. Bayle, *Rorarius*, cit., Remark E, p. 906, emphasis original.

[44] R. Descartes, *Discourse on Method*' in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. I., edited by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, Cambridge 1985.

skeptical tradition. Sextus Empiricus[45], Montaigne[46], Charron[47] and others all produce arguments that trade on or support the human-like capabilities of non-human animals.

Bayle is skeptical of attempts to identify a difference in capacities between humans and non-human animals: significantly, no piece of behavioral evidence adduced in 'Rorarius' supports the view that non-human animals are different from humans. Bayle believes that humans and non-human animals are extremely similar, and this is evinced by the long list of shared capacities he adduces.

Ultimately, Bayle's criteria demand both that non-human animals differ in kind from humans and that they share the same capacities, making his criteria mutually unsatisfiable. That Bayle's religious commitments and skepticism play a key role here can be seen from how other thinkers avoid this problem. Leibniz, for instance, shares some of Bayle's religious commitments but not his skeptical point of view, and while he does see that humans and animals are similar, he does not need to accommodate the *extreme* similarity that Bayle sees. Hume, in contrast, shares Bayle's skeptical point of view but not his religious commitments; Hume works to accommodate the tight similarity between humans and non-human animals but not any (religiously-motivated) difference in kind[48]. Both thinkers endeavor to satisfy Bayle's criteria, broadly understood, but they do not endeavor to satisfy them on Bayle's terms, perhaps because neither found that they could while maintaining consistency.

Bayle's criteria were meant to outline a position that would mollify all involved in the debate, but instead they reveal a fundamental tension between the human desire to see ourselves as different in kind from other kinds of animals and our every day observations of similarity in our behavior. Bayle's catalogue of animal behaviors and philosophical views are important contributions, but perhaps more important in the end is his repeated insistence that prior views were unstable and the resultant elucidation of these criteria. It is only by showing clearly what we demand of a view of non-human animals that we can see the extreme tension in any account that wants to make sense of both strong religious and skeptical/naturalistic commitments.

[45] See J. Annas and J. Barnes, *The Modes of Scepticism*, Cambridge 1985, ch. 4.
[46] M. Montaigne, *Apology for Raymond Sebond*, edited and translated by R. Ariew and M. Grene, Indianapolis 2003, esp. pp. 15-47, and R. H. Popkin, *The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza*, Berkeley 1979, esp. pp. 45, 51.
[47] R. Kogel, *Pierre Charron*, Geneva 1972 pp. 120, and M. C. Horowitz, *Pierre Charron's View of the Source of Wisdom,* in « Journal of the History of Philosophy» IX /4, (1971), pp. 443-457.
[48] D. Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature* (edited by D. F. Norton and M. Norton, Oxford 2000), § 1.3.16, and Id., *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (edited by T.L. Beauchamp, Oxford 1999), § 9. In both sections, Hume argues by analogy that humans must have the same mental mechanisms that produce non-human animal inference (see D. Boyle, *Hume on Animal Reason*, in «Hume Studies» 29 (2003), pp. 3-28). *Treatise* Book 2 makes similar arguments regarding the passions.

Contributi/3

Nuda vita come animalità

Un argomento di ontologia sociale contro Giorgio Agamben*

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In this paper, through the tools of social ontology, we criticize the concept of "anthropological machine" theorized by the italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. According to Agamben, the "machine" produces a hierarchy (animal-human-citizen), but we argue that his perspective is still anthropocentric. We substitute the dispositif of inclusion/exclusion with a cascade scheme, where every point of the scheme is considered as a social object. In the end, we show how this perspective allows to consider animality as a primary condition of possibility of all other divisions.

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"Già l'elemento animale, in ognuna delle sue forme,
viene sempre più completamente sottomesso al calcolo
e alla pianificazione (pianificazione sanitaria, allevamento).
Ma poiché l'uomo è la materia prima più importante,
ci si può aspettare che, sulla base delle attuali ricerche della chimica,
un giorno si possano creare fabbriche per la produzione
artificiale di materiale umano"

Martin Heidegger, *Oltrepassamento della metafisica*

1. Ontologie politiche

In *Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, il primo volume della serie filosofica *Homo sacer*, Giorgio Agamben, utilizzando in maniera paradigmatica[1] alcuni

* In questa sede presentiamo la prima parte di un più ampio lavoro di ricerca congiunto, tuttora in corso, presso il centro di ricerca *Labont*, volto a rileggere categorie filosofico-politiche contemporanee alla luce del pensiero sull'ontologia dell'animalità.
[1] Il metodo archeologico utilizzato da Agamben è considerato uno dei punti più deboli della sua prospettiva filosofica (cfr. L. De La Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben. A Critical Introduction*,

topoi della tradizione antica, in particolare aristotelica, distingue due tipi di vita: *bìos* e *zoé*. Mentre il *bìos* indica «la forma o maniera di vivere propria di un singolo o di un gruppo»[2], la *zoé* esprime un'esistenza non specializzata, «il semplice fatto di vivere comune a tutti gli esseri viventi»[3]. La vita specializzata, tuttavia, nella lettura del testo aristotelico proposta da Agamben, non è qualcosa di dato, bensì il risultato dell'esclusione della *zoé*[4].

In uno dei suoi testi più discussi, *L'aperto*, Agamben ha ribadito che, da un punto di vista operativo, il dispositivo di esclusione funziona anche nella produzione di quell'ente particolare che è l'essere umano: «in quanto è in gioco la produzione dell'umano attraverso l'opposizione uomo/animale, umano/inumano, la macchina funziona necessariamente attraverso un'esclusione (che è anche e sempre già una cattura) e un'inclusione (che è anche e sempre già un'esclusione)»[5]. Così come il *bìos* si articola mediante l'esclusione inclusiva della *zoé*, ed è precisamente tale esclusione a produrre una forma di vita specializzata, allo stesso modo l'umano si definisce a partire dall'esclusione della vita animale. La "soglia di modernità biologica", ovvero quel momento in cui la vita stessa diviene affare e posta in gioco delle strategie politiche, viene da Agamben significativamente retrodatata rispetto all'intuizione di Foucault fino a non essere più storicamente situabile, divenendo piuttosto un astorico paradigma che esibisce la struttura stessa del *pouvoir*. Secondo Agamben il nucleo originario del potere sovrano, quel potere che secondo Foucault doveva perdere il ruolo fondamentale che la tradizione politica moderna gli aveva consegnato, per essere sostituito da una analitica del potere, ovvero delle forme concrete e microfisiche[6] attraverso le quali qualcosa come il potere si manifesta, consiste nella «produzione di un corpo biopolitico»[7]. In questo modo, dunque, la prestazione specifica del potere sovrano diviene la possibilità di iscrivere il nudo fatto di esistere all'interno

Stanford 2009). Esso ruota intorno alla nozione di "paradigma", che Agamben sviluppa a partire dal lavoro di Michel Foucault e da quello di Thomas Kuhn. Con il termine paradigma Agamben indica una forma di conoscenza analogica (sulla scia dell'opera di Enzo Melandri) che sostituisce al modello della logica dicotomica un modello bipolare. Lo scopo del paradigma è la possibilità di «rendere intellegibile una serie di fenomeni, la cui parentela è sfuggita o può sfuggire allo sguardo dello storico» (G. Agamben, *Signatura rerum. Sul metodo*, Torino 2008, p. 33), ponendo la propria storicità nell'incrocio fra diacronia e sincronia.

[2] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita*, Torino 2005, p. 3.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] L'interpretazione proposta da Agamben del testo aristotelico ha suscitato nella comunità scientifica non poche perplessità. In un articolo del 2010 James Gordon Finlayson ha rigettato in toto la lettura agambeniana, mostrando come non sia in alcun modo presente in Aristotele la divisione fra due tipi di vita. Nello specifico, secondo Finlayson, la distinzione aristotelica fra *zēn* ed *eu zēn* non equivarrebbe alla distinzione fondamentale fra nuda vita e vita politicamente caratterizzata; questo farebbe vacillare, se non l'impianto teorico proposto da Agamben, quantomeno il suo riferimento costante alla presunta separazione operata da Aristotele e, attraverso un movimento tipico dell'argomentazione di Agamben, estesa all'intero mondo greco (Cfr. J.G. Finlayson, *"Bare Life" and Politics in Agamben's Reading of Aristotle*, in «The Review of Politics», n. 72, 2010, pp. 97-126).

[5] G. Agamben, *L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale*, Torino 2002, p. 42.

[6] Cfr. M. Foucault, *Microfisica del potere: interventi politici*, a c. di A. Fontana e P. Pasquino, Torino 1977.

[7] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer*, cit., p. 9.

di una serie di dispositivi politici. La separazione, che è comunque sempre una connessione, di politica e nuda vita, di *bios* e *zoé*, definisce la struttura profonda della politica occidentale e, con essa, il destino degli individui catturati in tale macchina:

> la politica è il luogo in cui il vivere deve trasformarsi in vivere bene, quasi che ciò che debba essere politicizzato fosse già sempre la nuda vita. […] La politicizzazione nella nuda vita è il compito metafisico per eccellenza, in cui si decide dell'umanità del vivente uomo, e, assumendo questo compito, la modernità non fa che dichiarare la propria fedeltà alla struttura essenziale della tradizione metafisica[8].

Agamben, sulla scia delle riflessioni di Toni Negri[9], ritiene che le categorie politiche che permettono tale divisione aderiscano sostanzialmente all'ontologia classica[10] che, in Occidente, si rivela essere profondamente aristotelica. Ad esempio, la dialettica fra potere costituente e potere costituto, analizzata da Emmanuel Sieyès e da Carl Schmitt, secondo Agamben non è altro che una figura politica della distinzione aristotelica fondamentale fra la *dýnamis* e l'*enérgheia*:

> […] il potere costituente, una volta pensato in tutta la sua radicalità, cessa di essere un concetto politico in senso stretto e si presenta necessariamente come una categoria dell'ontologia. Il problema del potere costituente diventa allora quello della costituzione della potenza e la dialettica irrisolta fra potere costituente e potere costituito lascia il posto a una nuova articolazione del rapporto fra potenza e atto, il che esige nulla di meno che un ripensamento delle categorie ontologiche della modalità nel loro insieme. Il problema si sposta, così, dalla filosofia politica alla filosofia prima (o, se si vuole, la politica viene restituita al suo rango ontologico)[11].

La caratterizzazione ontologica di una strategia politica permette ad Agamben di far giocare il dispositivo esclusione-inclusione su livelli differenti, fino a pensare l'intera politica occidentale, in tutte le sue accezioni, come una gigantesca macchina percorsa da esclusioni inclusive e inclusioni esclusive. È questo il caso, come abbiamo accennato, della frattura e dell'articolazione delle categorie di umano e animale. Il dispositivo che permette la separazione e la ri-articolazione della coppia uomo/animale è definito da Agamben «macchina antropologica», nella doppia accezione antica-moderna. La macchina antropologica dei moderni funziona «escludendo da sé come non (ancora) umano un già umano, cioè animalizzando l'umano, isolando il non-umano nell'uomo»[12]; la versione della macchina proposta dagli antichi opera simmetricamente, ovvero produce il dentro mediante l'inclusione del fuori: «il non uomo attraverso l'umanizzazione

[8] Ivi, pp. 10-11.
[9] Cfr. A. Negri, *Il potere costituente. Saggio sulle alternative del moderno*, Carnago 1992.
[10] Sul problema della connessione fra ontologia e politica nel pensiero di Agamben cfr. R. Borislavov, *Agamben, Ontology, and Constituent Power*, in «Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe», 13 (II), 2005, pp. 173-184; M. Abbott, *The Figure of this World: Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology*, Edinburgh 2014.
[11] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer*, cit., p. 51.
[12] Id., *L'aperto*, cit., p. 42.

di un animale: […] lo schiavo, il barbaro, lo straniero come figure di un animale in forme umane»[13].

Ciò che sosterremo in queste pagine, contro Agamben, è che queste due proprietà dell'essere vita siano in realtà l'animalità, e che proprio per andare incontro alla proposta di Agamben sia necessario aggiungere una terza polarità – ovvero la cittadinanza: l'unica vita specializzata possibile entro il sistema socio-economico contemporaneo. Agamben segue uno schema a due posti con questa struttura:



Anche la nostri tesi è dotata di una struttura metafisica in una prospettiva di ontologia politica. Tuttavia, in accordo con il contemporaneo dibattito in ontologia, parleremo piuttosto di "oggetti"[14]. Definiamo l'animalità come un oggetto naturale (ma, vedremo poi, è possibile caratterizzarla anche come oggetto sociale) che fa da base, ovvero ne costituisce il fatto bruto o, detta in altri termini, l'iscrizione di partenza[15], per altri due tipi di oggetti, ovviamente sociali, che sono l'umanità e la cittadinanza[16]. Rispetto alla macchina antropologica di Agamben proponiamo dunque uno "schema a cascata":

Vita ⟶ Animalità ⟶ Umanità ⟶ Cittadinanza

[13] Ivi, p. 43. Un'interessante ricostruzione del problema agambeniano della macchina antropologica, con un riferimento esplicito al funzionamento del dispositivo all'interno di una prospettiva neoliberale, è stata proposta da Robin Mackenzie, *Bestia Sacer and Agamben's Anthropological Machine: Biomedical/Legal Taxonomies as Somatechnologies of Human and Nonhuman Animals' Ethico-Political Relations*, in «Law and Anthropology. Current Legal Issues», 12, pp. 485-523.

[14] Cfr. P. Valore, *L'inventario del mondo: guida allo studio dell'ontologia*, Utet, Torino 2008.

[15] In accordo con l'analisi dell'ontologia sociale fornita dai teorici del "documento" - per una censimento recente cfr. L. Caffo, M. Ferraris, *Documentality*, special issue, in «The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry», 97, II (April), Oxford University Press 2014.

[16] Un'analisi preliminare di questo argomento, sconnessa da una critica ad Agamben, è in L. Caffo, *J. Derrida: umanità/animalità, ontologia sociale e accelerazionismo*, in «Animot: l'altra filosofia», I, 1 (2014), pp. 12 - 27.

Prima di tutto è fondamentale capire che "animalità" è una categoria che comprende, in accordo con la letteratura recente sul tema[17], anche i vegetali, in modo da non riproporre, a parti ampliate, la classica (e fallace) distinzione tra umani e animali derivata dalla vulgata cartesiana. In secondo luogo è bene rilevare che la nostra analisi dello sviluppo storico che hanno seguito i due oggetti sociali "umanità" e "cittadinanza" sarà critica e non analitica. Ci baseremo, quindi, sul lascito della filosofia del "secondo Derrida": la compressione ontologica operata dalla parola "animale" è il motore primario di numerosi problemi metafisici e politici che spesso non vengono ricollegati a tale questione.

2. L'ascensore di Francoforte

Lo schema a biforcazione proposto da Agamben costituisce il nucleo originario della macchina antropologica: esso tratteggia bordi metafisici a ciò che è, *de facto*, un marchingegno politico. Anche la nostra tesi si avvale di un simile gioco politico-metafisico, ma ne modifica radicalmente la struttura. Chiamiamo il nostro asse politico, che ruota attorno al meccanismo metafisico, "ascensore di Francoforte". Sia un'immagine proposta da Max Horkheimer:

> Vista in sezione, la struttura sociale del presente dovrebbe configurarsi all'incirca così: su in alto i grandi magnati dei trust dei diversi gruppi di potere capitalistici che però sono in lotta tra loro; sotto di essi i magnati minori, i grandi proprietari terrieri e tutto lo staff dei collaboratori importanti; sotto di essi — suddivise in singoli strati — le masse dei liberi professionisti e degli impiegati di grado inferiore, della manovalanza politica, dei militari e dei professori, degli ingegneri e dei capoufficio fino alle dattilografe; ancora più giù i residui delle piccole esistenze autonome, gli artigiani, i bottegai, i contadini e tutti gli altri, poi il proletariato, dagli strati operai qualificati meglio retribuiti, passando attraverso i manovali fino ad arrivare ai disoccupati cronici, ai poveri, ai vecchi e ai malati. Solo sotto tutto questo comincia quello che è il vero e proprio fondamento della miseria, sul quale si innalza questa costruzione, giacché finora abbiamo parlato solo dei Paesi capitalistici sviluppati, e tutta la loro vita è sorretta dall'orribile apparato di sfruttamento che funziona nei territori semi-coloniali e coloniali, ossia in quella che è di gran lunga la parte più grande del mondo. Larghi territori dei Balcani sono una camera di tortura, in India, in Cina, in Africa la miseria di massa supera ogni immaginazione. Sotto gli ambiti in cui crepano a milioni i *coolie* della terra, andrebbe poi rappresentata l'indescrivibile, inimmaginabile sofferenza degli animali, l'inferno animale nella società umana, il sudore, il sangue, la disperazione degli animali... Questo edificio, la cui cantina è un mattatoio e il cui tetto è una cattedrale, dalle finestre dei piani superiori assicura effettivamente una bella vista sul cielo stellato[18].

In questa descrizione di Horkheimer esistono, formalmente, tutte le categorie che compongono il nostro schema metafisico: in cima troviamo i cittadini; più in basso ecco gli umani, significativamente descritti solo attraverso

[17] F. Cimatti, *Animale*, in *A come Animale: voci per un bestiario dei sentimenti*, a cura di L. Caffo e F. Cimatti, Milano 2015, pp. 9 - 26.
[18] M. Horkheimer, *Crepuscolo. Appunti presi in Germania (1926-1931)*, trad. it. di G. Backhaus, Torino 1997, pp. 68 - 70.

le loro caratteristiche corporee; ancora più in basso gli animali. Consideriamo questa descrizione, come è del resto nota, come un "grattacielo": la nostra tesi è di immaginare che al suo interno non vi sia staticità bensì, almeno in alcuni piani, un certo dinamismo. Infatti all'interno del grattacielo è collocato un ascensore che ha come pulsantiera il nostro schema metafisico: nel grande grattacielo della vita ogni ente può essere promosso a cittadino o massacrato fino alla riduzione a "niente più che animale". In questo senso, il gioco della macchina biopolitica consiste precisamente nell'utilizzo spregiudicato e senza posa della pulsantiera come operatore ontologico. Affinché il grattacielo continui ad esistere e il suo ascensore a funzionare, tuttavia, è assolutamente necessario che le forme di vita al suo interno siano state istituzionalizzate, ovvero caratterizzate come oggetti sociali che sopravvengono all'oggetto naturale. Una volta venuta meno tale istituzionalizzazione, ovvero bloccato il convenzionale passaggio da una condizione ad un'altra, la pulsantiera si inceppa e l'ascensore non può più funzionare.

3. Ontologia sociale all'opera

L'animalità è la condizione di possibilità tanto dell'umanità che dell'ontologia sociale del cittadino: seguendo il darwinismo, gli umani altro non sono che un tipo specifico di animali[19], e i cittadini, a meno di non voler accettare alcune analisi zoopolitiche contemporanee[20], sono tipicamente degli esseri umani[21]. Il motivo per cui queste tre entità non sono sovrapponibili è il portato politico dell'ontologia sociale che, al contrario di come tradizionalmente si pensi (a causa, soprattutto, del lavoro di John Searle[22]), non è un'operazione eticamente ingenua. Infatti, essa presuppone una precisa idea di natura umana, una teoria politica di sfondo e alcune implicazioni morali decisive[23]. La maturità scientifica raggiunta dall'ontologia sociale ci impone di considerare con serietà tali implicazioni.

3.1 Il primo distacco

Il primo distacco, quello tra l'animalità e l'umanità, avviene con quell'operazione, prima ontologica, poi epistemologica, che permette a Michel Foucault di definire l'uomo «un'invenzione recente»[24]: le scienze sociali

[19] Abbiamo in mente soprattutto C. Darwin, *L' origine dell'uomo e la selezione sessuale*, trad. it. a cura di P. Fiorentini e M. Migliucci, Milano 2010.
[20] Nel senso della proposta di S. Donaldson, W. Kymlicka, *Zoopolis*, Oxford 2011. Sul tema si veda anche l'analisi di M. Ferraris, *Zoopolis*, in L. Caffo, *Chi muore e chi no? Ricerche di filosofia della morte*, n.s. *Animal Studies: rivista italiana di antispecismo*, 3, 2013, pp. 5-8.
[21] Va da sé che noi rifiutiamo la cittadinanza animale perché è la stessa categoria di "cittadinanza" che in questa sede intendiamo porre radicalmente in discussione.
[22] Cfr. J. Searle, *La costruzione della realtà sociale*, trad. it. A. Bosco, Torino 2005.
[23] Un lavoro che mostra in modo decisivo le implicazioni nascoste, etiche e politiche, delle diverse teorie di ontologia sociale è T. Andina, *The Disenfranchisement of Justice. An Ontology for Social Reality*, London-New York, in corso di stampa.
[24] M. Foucault, *Le parole e le cose. Un'archeologia delle scienze umane*, trad. it. di E. Panaitescu, Milano 2010, p. 413.

creano l'immagine dell'umano attraverso l'analisi di alcune qualità che lo distinguerebbero, in modo inequivocabile, da quello che Jacques Derrida ha definito il «vivente in generale». La biforcazione metafisica proposta da Agamben si basa su questo originario dato, per il quale l'umanità farebbe specie a parte. Il problema politico consisterebbe, a questo punto, nell'impedire la disumanizzazione dell'umano. Detto in altri termini: la posta in gioco della macchina antropologica, che ne fa un dispositivo di potere senza eguali, consiste nella possibilità di separare nell'umano una componente umana e una componente animale, in modo da poter agire sulla seconda senza alcun genere di mediazione possibile. In questo Agamben si pone sul solco di alcuni celebri *topoi* filosofici:

> L'animale non parla, l'umano sì (Cartesio)
> L'animale non ha un volto, l'umano sì (Levinas)
> L'animale non muore, l'umano sì (Heidegger)

Se pur in maniera critica, e senza inciampare in stereotipi tipici della tradizione filosofica occidentale sull'animale e l'animalità, Agamben non discute di animali, bensì li usa. Nella sua prospettiva l'animalità diviene un operatore politico-ontologico utilizzato per discutere, e problematizzare, le categorie di umanità, di disumanità e di inumanità. Ciò che permette la biforcazione umano/animale nella storia della filosofia è, formalmente, la creazione dell'oggetto sociale "umano" su cui si articola la prima e fondamentale frattura: l'umanità, appunto, come "specie a parte" - la specie parlante, pensante, sofferente o morente. E non sono bastate, evidentemente, le migliaia di ricerche di Animal Cognition a dimostrare l'assurdità di tale distacco[25]: la filosofia, con le sue infinite macchine teoriche, prosegue imperterrita nel considerare l'umano come essere separato, a statuto speciale e padrone di questa realtà.

3.2 Il secondo distacco

Il secondo distacco, quello tra l'umanità e la cittadinanza, si articola storicamente in diverse fasi. Dal punto di vista teorico, la *Dichiarazione dei diritti dell'uomo e del cittadino* del 1789 ne rappresenta il paradigma di funzionamento: «le dichiarazioni dei diritti rappresentano la figura originaria dell'iscrizione della vita naturale nell'ordine giuridico-politico dello Stato-nazione»[26]. La congiunzione *et* presente nel titolo opera una scissione tra due concetti che tuttavia, allo stesso tempo, dovrebbero essere sinonimi: l'essere umano *e* il cittadino in quanto l'essere umano non è il cittadino – la necessità di specificare la qualità "cittadino" significa che le due cose, già da principio, non devono coincidere. In questo modo la "cittadinanza" diventa un oggetto sociale

[25] Cfr L. Caffo, *In the Corridors of Animal Minds*, in «Journal of Animal Ethics», 4 (1, 2014), pp. 103-108.
[26] G. Agamben, *Homo sacer*, cit., p. 140.

di ordine superiore: la sua base è, tecnicamente, l'oggetto sociale "umanità". Il problema etico-politico, sia nella macchina antropologica di Agamben che nel nostro ascensore, è costituito da coloro che vengono esclusi dal processo di riconoscimento della cittadinanza.

3.3 Distacchi fittizi

Il distacco è, in entrambi i casi, fittizio: le qualità attraverso cui avviene la costruzione di questa specifica ontologia sociale della vita sono esse stesse costruite. Si tenga bene in mente questa tesi. Se in 3.1 abbiamo evidenziato, a campione, alcune qualità filosofiche, sappiamo che più genericamente le capacità che articolano la vulgata dell'umanità sono razionalità, linguaggio, teoria della mente, ecc. E, dall'altro lato, quelle che articolano la cittadinanza sono il rispetto dello Stato, i diritti e doveri naturalizzati, ecc. Fiumi di letteratura hanno mostrato quanto tutto ciò sia fallace: il linguaggio, a meno di non voler dire "lo stesso linguaggio" (un'argomentazione banalmente assurda), è presente anche in altri animali, e così la teoria della mente, la capacità di provare dolore[27], ecc. L'oggetto sociale "umanità" non è il prodotto di un'emersione quanto, piuttosto, di una creazione certosina articolata, tradizionalmente, su qualità inesistenti o caricaturali. Non siamo entro il linguaggio dell'ontologia sociale ma si pensi, per un attimo, al noto aforisma della *Gaia Scienza* di Friedrich Nietzsche:

> L'uomo è stato educato dai suoi errori: in primo luogo si vide sempre solo incompiutamente, in secondo luogo si attribuì qualità immaginarie, in terzo luogo si sentì in una falsa condizione gerarchica in rapporto all'animale e alla natura, in quarto luogo escogitò sempre nuove tavole di valori considerandole per qualche tempo eterne e incondizionate, di modo che ora questo, ora quello degli umani istinti e stati, venne a prendere il primo posto e in conseguenza di tale apprezzamento fu nobilitato. Se si esclude dal computo l'effetto di questi quattro errori, si escluderà anche l'umanesimo, l'umanità, e la "dignità dell'uomo"[28].

L'articolazione fondamentale dello schema metafisico "animalità/umanità" regola le nostre vite, ma il confine è assolutamente arbitrario, non biologico, e basato su qualità che, come mostra Nietzsche, conducono a quella forma di umanesimo che, nel nostro linguaggio, coincide con una visione antropocentrica. Il distacco è fittizio anche nell'articolazione gerarchica umanità/cittadinanza, e le conseguenze dal punto di vista etico altrettanto tragiche. L'unica vita degna di essere vissuta è, oramai, quella del cittadino: ciò che cittadino non è va respinto, scacciato: su di esso si può inaugurare un'attività venatoria[29] senza precedenti.

[27] Per una rassegna articolata sullo stato dell'arte delle ricerche in *animal cognition* cfr. K. Andrews, *Animal Cognition*, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/cognition-animal/>.

[28] F. Nietzsche, "Aforisma 115", in Id. *La Gaia Scienza e Idilli di Messina*, a cura di F. Masini e M. Montinari, Milano 1965, p. 156.

[29] Sul problema del potere come operazione di caccia si veda il brillante saggio di G. Chamayou, *Le cacce all'uomo. Storia e filosofia del potere cinegetico*, trad. it. di M. Bascetta, Roma 2010.

Il XXI secolo ha scoperto luoghi tanatopolitici peculiari, talvolta tristemente sorprendenti. Ricostruire l'odierna "geografia dell'eccezione"[30] significherebbe individuare i luoghi e i modi attraverso cui la biopolitica si rovescia in tanatopolitica e in necropolitica[31], ovvero quei luoghi nei quali la posta in gioco dei rapporti di potere consiste nella possibilità di dare la morte piuttosto che di preservare la vita. Che siano le coste francesi, il mediterraneo, Rosarno, Camp Delta a Guantanamo Bay[32], tali spazi esibiscono una manifestazione e un esercizio del potere in forza di una gerarchizzazione tra forme di vita. La segmentazione gerarchica fra semplicemente umano e cittadino fa sì che la nuda vita, il grado infimo, prodotto senza posa, dell'umano, abbia traslocato dai lager ai barconi alla deriva.

La critica proposta da Agamben non mira alla messa in discussione della prospettiva antropocentrica, bensì unicamente alla ridiscussione di una certa forma di antropocentrismo: è verso un antropocentrismo locale, o debole, che muove la filosofia di Giorgio Agamben. Il nostro ascensore di Francoforte, di contro, è una radicale messa in discussione di qualsiasi forma di antropocentrismo. Di fatto proponiamo l'idea che sia possibile far collassare ogni forma di discriminazione maldestramente derivata dal piano metafisico, produttrice di gerarchie assolutamente arbitrarie, attraverso quello che ci sembra essere una sorta di inverso "divenire animale".

4. L'inverso divenire animale

Agamben non propone soluzioni che non siano perlopiù – e non che non sia già molto – lo smascheramento del funzionamento della macchina antropologica. I dispositivi che dovrebbero costituire la *pars costruens* della sua proposta filosofico-politica – inoperosità, potere destituente, uso[33] – mirano, de facto, a orizzontalizzare le gerarchie interne all'umano mantenendo, tuttavia, inalterato il rapporto di dominio rispetto alle altre forme di vita, che rimangono sin dal principio escluse dalla macchina antropologica. Se la macchina antropologica produce l'umano a partire da ciò che non è ancora umano o, viceversa, produce il non più umano a partire da ciò che già era umano, una

[30] Sul concetto di "geografia dell'eccezione" cfr. C. Minca, L. Bialasiewicz, *Spazio e politica. Riflessioni di geografia critica*, Padova 2004, pp. 317-329.
[31] Cfr. A. Mbembe, *Necropolitics*, in «Public Culture», 15 (I), 2003, pp. 11-40.
[32] Sul caso esemplare di Guantanamo è stata prodotta una vastissima letteratura. Si vedano perlomeno: F.E. Johns, *Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception*, in «European Journal of International Law», 16 (IV), 2005, pp. 613-635; C. Aradau, *Law transformed: Guantanamo and the 'other' exception*, in "Third World Quarterly", 28 (III), 2007, pp. 489-501; C. Federman – D. Holmes, *Guantanamo Bodies: Law, Media, and Biopower*, in «Media Tropes», 3 (I), 2011, pp. 58-88; M. Hasian, *Biopolitics and Thanatopolitics at Guantanamo, and the Weapons of the Weak in the Lawfare over Force-Feeding*, in «Law & Literature», 26 (III), 2014, pp. 343-364.
[33] Non è peregrino ricordare che Agamben, in fin dei conti, argomenta in favore dell'anarchia passando attraverso un sentiero metafisico. Sull'anarchismo di Agamben cfr. L. Fabbri, *From Inoperativeness to Action: On Giorgio Agamben's Anarchism*, in «Radical Philosophy Review», 14 (I), 2011, pp. 85-100.

volta interrotta essa continuerebbe a funzionare su un altro piano gerarchico, ribaltando semplicemente il rapporto di dominanza/assoggettamento, senza metterlo mai realmente in discussione. Il funzionamento della macchina antropologica di Agamben è, per sua stessa definizione, inarrestabile.

Nella nostra analisi l'animalità, intesa come oggetto sociale, rappresenta l'unico stadio dell'essere (il punto zero del vivente) che consente ciò che il linguaggio filosofico ha tradizionalmente definito "immanenza": la vita in quanto vita. In questo senso l'animalità non è la zoé, bensì il punto di partenza di entrambi i diagrammi metafisici: la condizione di possibilità di ogni altra possibilità. Il divenire animale, in quanto appunto "divenire", non è per definizione un "ritorno" quanto, piuttosto, una scelta di indirizzo per il futuro: il "divenire animale" è una prassi politica volta a eliminare, quantomeno in punta di principio, il concetto stesso di rapporto di dominanza. Come scrive Felice Cimatti:

> il divenire-animale è il movimento che va oltre la soggettivazione. […] Il divenire-animale non va inteso come un processo di animalizzazione, come se fosse un 'tornare' animale. In realtà non c'è nessun animale a cui tornare, l'animalità del divenire-animale non è nel passato bensì nel futuro, è da costruire non da restaurare[34].

Con animalità intendiamo la vita in quanto vita. La sfida di una filosofia e di una politica dell'animalità è la sfida inversa a quella di Agamben. Ciò che va progettato in una prospettiva post-umana è il divenire-singolare dell'umano, l'idea che l'animalità dell'umano coincida in ogni punto con il suo essere singolare. Se il rapporto di dominio funziona attraverso progressivi distacchi che producono socialmente l'oggetto animale, l'oggetto umano e l'oggetto cittadino, nella nostra prospettiva un tale rapporto è reso semplicemente impossibile. Tornando all'immagine dell'ascensore proposta inizialmente, dovremmo immaginare infiniti piani che non possono però più, a questo punto, disporsi verticalmente: la moltitudine di singolarità, di corpi proiettati verso la loro animalità, manda in cortocircuito la pulsantiera che funzionava come operatore ontologico. L'ascensore non può più funzionare, e resta solo il rizoma che

> collega un punto qualsiasi con un altro punto qualsiasi, e ciascuno dei suoi tratti non rimanda necessariamente a tratti dello stesso genere, mettendo in gioco regimi di segni molto differenti ed anche stati di non-segni. […] Rispetto ai sistemi centrici (anche policentrici), a comunicazione gerarchica e collegamenti prestabiliti, il rizoma è un sistema acentrico, non gerarchico e non significante[35].

Il rizoma è l'animalità: una continua ricerca dei volti nascosti dall'angoscia della posizione eretta.

[34] F. Cimatti, *Filosofia dell'animalità*, Roma-Bari, 2013, p. 138.
[35] G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, *Mille piani. Capitalismo e schizofrenia*, 2 voll., trad. it. a cura di G. Passerone, Roma 1997, pp. 33 sgg.

¶ Sezione 1/b

Una natura

La continuità tra anima animale e anima umana

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N. 18, 2015 (II) - Confini animali dell'anima umana. Prospettive e problematiche

Articoli/4

«Si dimostra incontra noi crudelissima fiera»

Animals and the debate about the sexes in Moderata Fonte's *Il merito delle donne*

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In this paper I seek to analyse animal metaphors and comparisons in Moderata Fonte's *Il merito delle donne* (1600), a women-authored contribution to the early modern debate about the sexes. I would like to argue that Fonte links men with animals to emphasise their cruelty towards women and tries to establish the benevolent relationship between animals of the same species as a normative model for the relationship between the sexes.

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Women stand between men and animals[1], but closer to the latter than to the «absolute perfection of men»[2], according to Giovanni della Casa, author of the well known courtesy book *Galateo overo de' costumi,* in his tract about the «most entertaining question whether one should take a wife». The claim of a hierarchical order of nature was one main line of conflict[3] of the *querelle des sexes*[4], the debate about men and women that took place roughly between 1400

[1] With the terms 'animal', 'woman' and 'man', I follow the way these terms are used in my early modern sources – I am aware, however, that the terms have been problematized in modern scholarship.

[2] «Est enim nostrum inter genus atque pecudum vim omnio mulierum medie atque interiecta natura, sed spatio audquam pari; multo enim proprius ad belluarum ruditatem, quam ad virorum absolutionem perfectionemque accedunt». G. della Casa, *Una questione piacevolissima*: se si debbe prendere moglie; Galateo, Turin 1991, p. 79. For a discussion of this passage in the context of the early modern debate about the sexes: S. Segler-Meßner, *Von der Entdeckung der Selbstbestimmung zur Diskussion über die Stellung der Frau: der Wandel der Geschlechterbeziehungen in der italienischen Renaissance*, in *Frauen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Lebensentwürfe in Kunst und Literatur*, edited by A.-M. Bonnet and B. Schellewald, Cologne 2004, p. 8.

[3] See G. Bock, *Frauen in der europäischen Geschichte. Vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, Munich 2000, pp. 34-5.

[4] Though the term 'querelle des femmes' (debate about women) is used more commonly, I use the more general 'querelle des sexes' (debate about the sexes) to emphasise that the debate was

and 1700 in several European countries[5]. Women were typically thought to be less rational and more subject to their passions than men[6], a conviction based on Aristotle's biology and its early modern transmission and reception[7]. The most basic differentiation between humans and animals concerns rationality. «Huomo: Animal ragionevole»[8] is for example how man is defined in the first edition of the *Vocabulario degli accademici della Crusca* from 1612, following the Aristotelian paradigm of humans as the only creatures with language and reason[9]. The traditional view of women as being deficient in precisely the same faculty as animals gave way to a symbolic association between them[10]. Animals could be employed to signify 'otherness' and served as markers of difference[11]. Both animals and women seemed equally in need of domestication[12].

not merely about women, but about men as well. Participating in the debate allowed for male self-fashioning (see for example V. Finucci, *The Manly Masquerade. Masculinity, Paternity, and Castration in the Italian Renaissance*, Durham/London 2003) and men were explicitly discussed – at least in texts like Moderata Fonte's *Il merito delle donne*. In this choice I follow Judith Bösch's argument for a change of terminology: J. Bösch, «Universalmente ogni donna desidera esser omo»: *Weiblichkeitskonstruktionen und Männlichkeitskrise in Castigliones* Libro del Cortegiano*, in Geschlechterstreit am Beginn der europäischen Moderne. Die Querelle des Femmes*, edited by G. Engel et al., Königstein im Taunus 2004.

[5] For the querelle, see for example P. Benson, *The invention of the Renaissance woman: the challenge of female independence in the literature and thought of Italy and England*, University Park (PA) 1992; C. Jordan, *Renaissance Feminism*, Ithaca, NY 1992. On different ways of interpreting the querelle in modern scholarship see M. Zimmermann, *The Old Quarrel: More Than Just Rhetoric?*, in *The* Querelle des Femmes *in the Romania. Studies in Honour of Friederike Hassauer*, edited by W. Aichinger et al., Vienna 2003.

[6] On Renaissance concepts of femininity and their dependence on Aristotle see I. Maclean, *The Renaissance notion of woman*, Cambridge 1995, pp. 28-46; M.R. Sommerville, *Sex and subjection – attitudes to women in early modern society*, London 1995, pp. 8-39; C. Jordan, *Renaissance feminism*, cit., pp. 11-94.

[7] For our context, the debate whether Aristotle's account of women is biased and sexist or whether it actually represents a coherent philosophical position is irrelevant – throughout history, it did provide «devastating catchphrases» (M.C. Horowitz, *Aristotle and Woman*, in «Journal of the History of Biology» 92 (Autumn) (1976), pp. 183–213, p. 203, a feminist reading of Aristotle) for misogynists. Sabine Föllinger gives a more balanced view: S. Föllinger, *Differenz und Gleichheit*, Stuttgart 1996. On the modern debate about Aristotle's view on women, see R. Mulgan, *Aristotle and the political role of women*, in «History of Political Thought» 152 (1994), pp. 179-202.

[8] *Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca*, Venice 1612, p. 411.

[9] Aristoteles, *Politik*, translated and edited by E. Schütrumpf, Hamburg 2012, 1253a.

[10] Several examples can be found in this collection of translations and introductions to early modern male-authored text about women: J.D. Campbell, *In dialogue with the other voice in sixteenth-century Italy. Literary and social contexts for women*, Toronto 2011. Sandra Plastina discusses the symbolic relation between woman and dog: S. Plastina, *Donne e animali: papere, cani e galline*, in «Bruniana & Campanelliana» xvii, 1 (2011), pp. 151-162. For an overview on modern scholarship linking Feminism and Animal Studies: L. Birke, *Intimate Familiarieties? Feminism and Human-Animal Studies*, in «Society & Animals» 104 (2002), pp. 429-436.

[11] See for example the works of Erica Fudge, who states: «the animal emerged as humanity's others», and that «the animal is always present as a marker of human status» E. Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England*, Ithaca/London 2006, p. 2. Ead., *Perceiving animals. Humans and beasts in early modern English culture*, Basingstoke 2000, p. 31.

[12] This is Juliana Schiesari's terminology. She demonstrates in detail how similar for example Leon Battista Alberti treats the education of animals and women: J. Schiesari, *Beasts and beau-*

However, animal metaphors and comparisons could just as well be used to argue for the opposite position, *against* the superiority of men, as the Venetian women writer Moderata Fonte[13] did. I would like to argue in this paper that Fonte in her dialogue *Il merito delle donne*[14] on the one hand links men with animals to emphasize their cruelty towards women and on the other hand tries to establish the benevolent relationship between animals of the same species as a normative model for the relationship between the sexes. In the first part of this paper, I will focus on the various types of animal metaphors and comparisons Fonte uses, which in the second part of this paper I will contrast with one rather unusual passage about animals, men and women in Fonte's dialogue. This will shed light on one of Fonte's argumentative strategies and additionally on possible uses of animal images in the *querelle des sexes.*

1. Nature and harmony: animal/men comparisons

The *merito delle donne*, posthumously published in 1600 in Venice, is one of the first extensive female contributions to the early modern debate about the sexes. Seven female protagonists – married and unmarried, young and old, widowed and unwilling to marry[15] – meet in a beautiful, paradise-like garden where men are absent[16]. The dialogue is divided into two «giornate» (days). While on the first day, the interlocutors debate the relationship between the sexes and the vices of men, on the second day they focus on a large array of diverse topics, which serve to both educate and entertain. They talk about natural phenomena, food and its nutritional qualities; medicine, astrology, poetry and the like – the discussion forms an almost encyclopaedia-like scope of knowledge[17].

ties: animals, gender, and domestication in the Italian Renaissance, Toronto 2010, p. 54. Recently, she has argued for a continuum linking animals and humans in Italian Humanist thought: Ead., *Rethinking Humanism: Animals and the Analogic Imagination in the Italian Renaissance*, in «Shakespeare Studies» 1 (2013), pp. 54-63.

[13] For Fonte's biography, see P. Malpezzi Price, Moderata Fonte: *Women and Life in Sixteenth-Century Venice*, Madison (NJ) 2003, pp. 27-39, and also Daria Martelli's comprehensive work on Moderata Fonte and her time: D. Martelli, *Polifonie: le donne a Venezia nell'età di Moderata Fonte* (seconda metà del secolo XVI), Padua 2011, pp. 501-535.

[14] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*: *ove chiaramente si scuopre quanto siano elle degne e più perfette de gli uomini*, Mirano 1988.

[15] Fonte uses the term «stato» to describe the different social positions of the seven women: Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 14.

[16] The absence of men as a fundamental condition for a free conversation among women is highlighted in the beginning of the dialogue and continually emphasized. Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 21; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, translated and edited by V. Cox, Chicago 1997, p. 53.

[17] Suzanne Magnanini and Sandra Plastina see the second part of the dialogue in proximity of the «selva»-genre, collections of useful and entertaining knowledge. Merdith K. Ray emphasizes the practical information and sees it in tradition of the «libri di segreti». S. Magnanini, *Una selva luminosa: The Second Day of Moderata Fonte's Il merito delle donne*, in «Modern Philology» 1012 (2003), p. 280, pp. 288-90; S. Plastina, *Filosofe della modernità – il pensiero delle donne dal Rinascimento all'illuminismo*, Rome 2011, p. 53; M.K. Ray, *Prescriptions for Women: Alche-*

Fonte discusses animals primarily in the second half of the dialogue, as parts of the natural world, as food and as «gran meraviglie […] di natura»[18], great marvels of nature, anecdotal sources of wonder and amusement. Many species are covered: different types of birds[19], fish[20], exotic animals[21] and livestock[22]. Fonte seems to have used mostly Pliny as a source, but probably other authors as well[23].

One passage is especially interesting for our context. The interlocutors discuss whether there exists a natural enmity between certain animals: cat and mouse, wolf and lamb, fox and chicken; does one hunt the other because of some kind of hatred between them[24]? No, says speaker Corinna, whose predominant role in the second part of the dialogue is to share her knowledge about the natural world with the group[25], their differences are merely due to their «natural instinto» (natural instinct), since nature happened to make one animal food of another[26]. A few lines prior to this exchange, Corinna had refused to tell the other interlocutors more about animals, because «Plinio ed altri autori ne trattano diffusamente»[27] («Pliny and the other authorities on the subject have already discussed these and other animals at length»[28]). Pliny however, as Virginia Cox pointed out in a footnote in the English translation[29], did see different species as being enemies to one another. Cox suggests that this emphasis on the natural instinct may be seen as underlining Fonte's strategy of exposing «the unnatural character of men's ill-treatment of women»[30]. However, Fonte's and Pliny's animal enmities are different from one another: the passages where Pliny writes about animal enmity usually do not treat species who are food source and

my, Medicine and the Renaissance Querelle des Femmes, in *Women Writing Back / Writing Women Back*, edited by A. Gilleir, A. C. Montoya and S. van Dijk, Leiden/Boston 2010, p. 136.
[18] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 116; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 190.
[19] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 83 f; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 131 f.
[20] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 90 f; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 141 f.
[21] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 105 f; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 159 f.
[22] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 106 f; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 160 f.
[23] This assessment follows the commentary work done by Virginia Cox for the English translation of the text and Daniela Hacke for the German translation. M. Fonte, *Das Verdienst der Frauen*, translated and edited by D. Hacke, Munich 2001. For the medieval tradition of bestiaries and its continuation in the Renaissance: S. Cohen, *Animals as disguised symbols in Renaissance art*, Leiden 2008, pp. 1-50.
[24] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 112; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 166.
[25] Corinna is also discussed as the most likely alter ego for author Fonte herself, see for example: P. Malpezzi Price, *A Woman's Discourse in the Italian Renaissance: Moderata Fonte's* Il merito delle donne, in «Annali d'Italianistica» VII (1989), pp. 165-181, p. 171; A. Chemello, *Gioco e dissimulazione in Moderata Fonte*, in M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, Mirano 1988, p. xiv; S.G. Ross, *The birth of feminism: Woman as Intellect in Renaissance Italy and England*, Cambridge (MA) 2009, p. 280. Sharon L. Jansen warns not to take this potential identification too seriously and alludes to the differences between Fonte and her protagonist. S.L. Jansen, *Reading Women's Worlds from Christine de Pizan to Doris Lessing: A Guide to Six Centuries of Women Writers Imagining Rooms of Their Own*, New York 2011, p. 62.
[26] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 112; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 167.
[27] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 111.
[28] M. Fonte, *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 166.
[29] *Ibid*., footnote 97.
[30] *Ibid*.

natural prey[31] to each other, but more or less equally strong enemies of different species. The famous battle of elephant and dragon/snake («draco») is a good example, about which he writes: «What other cause could anybody adduce for such a quarrel save Nature arranging a match between a pair of combatants to provide herself with a show?»[32] Pliny and Fonte write about different types of animal enmities. While in this light I am not sure that Fonte's statement against animal enmity is directed at Pliny, it still seems plausible that Fonte's animal passages form arguments for a better relationship between the sexes. We should keep this in mind when looking at other animal passages of Fonte's text.

Several times throughout the dialogue, Fonte links or contrasts men and animals with one another. Women, on the other hand, are rarely compared to animals in her text, and also not in a positive sense: Once, the suffering of a wife with a jealous husband is described as being confined within walls «a guisa di bestie»[33] («like animals»[34]), once the education of a young wife is implicitly compared to taming an animal[35]. Concerning men, Fonte uses four different types of comparisons: Men who are metaphorically like certain animals because they mean danger for women, and, secondly, men's behaviour towards women in comparison to the way particular animals behave towards women. Thirdly, Fonte compares the way men treat animals to the way they treat women, and finally, the way animals of the same species treat one another to the relationship between men and women.

Men, the interlocutors agree for example, can be compared to crows, because they mean bad fortune for women[36]. On the notion that the number of wild animals must surely be greater than the number of domestic animals, interlocutor Leonora takes up the thread and says that there are more of them than one would think, going unrecognised. She asks rhetorically:

> […] quanti leoni, quante tigri, quanti orsi vi sono che non si mettono a conto con gli altri? Anzi che sono più crudeli e terribili[37]?
>
> How many lions are there, how many tigers, how many bears that we forget to include in the total? How many even more savage and terrifying creatures[38]?

It is very clear that the metaphor about undetected predators in the house is pointed at men. Interestingly, similar metaphors were in other places

[31] The German word «Fressfeinde» captures the relationship neatly. For friendship and enmity between animals see Pliny, *Natural History*, Volume III, Libri VIII - XI, translated and edited by H. Rackham, London 1967, book ix, chapter lxxxviii, 185, p. 287, and Id., *Natural History*, Volume III, Libri VIII - XI, cit., book x, chapter xciv, 203, p. 423.
[32] «Quam quis aliam tantae discordiae causam attulerit nisi naturam spectaculum sibi ac paria conponentem?» Pliny, *Natural History*. Volume III, Libri VIII - XI, cit., book viii, chapter xii, 34, pp. 26-27. Leo Maier kindly pointed this out to me.
[33] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 33.
[34] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 68.
[35] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 37. See also note 12.
[36] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 85; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 135.
[37] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 104.
[38] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 158.

analogously used to devalue women: In Giovanni Boccaccio's *Corbaccio*, for example[39]. Fonte takes up this image of men as dangerous animals again with another comparison of men and lions, in which men are not presented *as* lions like in the aforementioned passage, but as *worse than* them when it comes to their respective behaviour towards women. In this respect, the lion in fact is not that bad at all:

> Io ho udito dire che'l leone di natura generosa ha sempre risguardo a i più umili e non gli nuoce e che veggendo un uomo ed una donna insieme, più tosto lascia la donna e la vuole con l'uomo, quasi che per natural instinto conosca la nostra umiltà ed inocenza e ci abbia pietà, egli che è fiera terribile ed inumana. Di modo che la fiera fa con noi officio d'uomo e l'uomo, che tante volte ci nuoce a torto, si dimostra incontra noi crudelissima fiera[40].

> I've heard that the lion, that noble beast, always shows sympathy for the most humble creatures and does not harm them: in fact, when a lion comes across a man and a woman together, it tends to leave the woman alone and attack the man as though it sensed our humility and innocence through some natural instinct and took pity on us – ferocious, savage beast though it is. So that the beast behaves toward us as men should, while men, who so often injure us without reason, behave toward us in a manner befitting the most savage of beasts[41].

Leonora here takes up the alleged 'humility' of lions towards women to contrast it with the bad way men treat women. The legend of the compassionate lion might stem from Pliny's *Natural History*[42], where he explains the lion's behaviour not with the 'innocence' of women, but with a women's pledge to the lion's mercy. This not presented as fact, but as a debatable opinion: «Se ciò è vero, o falso, la vita lo giudichi» («Whether this is true or false, life will tell you»[43]).

The compassionate behaviour of lions provides a mirror for men's cruelty towards women. That men and women are of the same species for Fonte is source to normative claims about the right behaviour of men towards women, human to human. We find an example for this position in a rhetorical speech

[39] See G. Boccaccio, *Opere in versi*, Milano 1965, p. 501. Myrtha de Meo-Ehlert kindly called my attention to this passage.
[40] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 104.
[41] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 158.
[42] In Ludocivo Domenichi's translation, the passage reads: «Solo il leone fra tutte le fiere e misericordioso inverso chi le prega, non offende chi si getta in terra, e quando Egli usa crudeltà, assalta piu tosto gli huomini, che le donne, e non tocca i bambini, se non quando egli ha gran fame». Plinius Secundus, *Historia naturale di G. Plinio Secondo, tradotta per M. Lodovico Domenichi*, Venice 1580, p. 231. Both Virginia Cox and Daniela Hacke mention this in their notes to the translations. In the modern edition: *Pliny, Natural History*. Volume III, Libri VIII - XI, cit., book viii, chapter xix, 48, pp. 36/37.
[43] Plinius Secundus, *Historia naturale di G. Plinio Secondo, tradotta per M. Lodovico Domenichi*, cit., p. 231. The translation is my own. In the modern edition: Pliny, *Natural History*. Volume III, Libri VIII - XI, cit., book viii, chapter xix, 48, pp. 38/39. The figure of the compassionate lion does occur in other sources as well, for example in Giovanni Villani's *Nuova Cronica*, in a passage that is quoted in the Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca, cit., p. 726. Myrtha de Meo-Ehlert pointed this out to me.

that the perhaps most radical interlocutor, Leonora, directs at men in the name of the female sex in the second part of the text. We will get back to both the character Leonora and her speech later on. She contrasts the relationship man/animal with the relationship between the sexes:

> Deh di grazia, se si allevano e fansi le spese a gli animali brutti, a cani, gatti, uccelli e simili, perché non a noi, che siamo nate d'un ventre con voi di quell'istessa carne e sangue che sete voi ancora[44]?

> For pity's sake, when you happily pay for and nourish brute animals in your household – dogs, cats, and birds – why are you so unwilling to do the same for us, when we were born from the same womb as you and are of the same flesh and blood[45]?

In treating women cruelly, men show themselves as the cruellest of beasts. Cruelty, Erica Fudge has pointed out for the discourse about animals in early modern England, was seen not as a characteristic of animals, but as specifically human: «By being cruel, humans destroy other humans, but more significantly in this discourse, they destroy their own humanity and descend to the status of the beast»[46]. Fonte's remark that there is no enmity between animals, only instinct, points in the same direction. Animals that belong to the same species do not eat or hurt one another, they care for their young regardless of the offspring's sex, and in this, humans should follow their example.

It is precisely this pledge to the common humanity of the sexes that forms the underlying argument of most animal/men comparisons in the text, different as they may be otherwise. The commonplace that one wolf does not eat another wolf is for example used as an image for men supporting one another[47]. Another example is the story of a «pesce nobilissimo», a most noble fish, who never abandons his conspecifics even in greatest danger. Leonora interrupts:

> […] e che dovrian poi far gli uomini verso di noi? Che siamo una cosa istessa con loro? E pur sempre ci opprimono […][48].

> […] what should men not be prepared to do for women? For are we not of the same species as them? And instead they oppress us […][49].

In the first part of the dialogue, Fonte contrasts the selfless devotion of animals to caring for their young with the disregard of men to provide appropriately for their daughters: Providing them with suitable dowries and entitling them to the compulsory portion of their inheritance. Merely one interlocutor insists that her father did care for her properly, to which protagonist Corinna replies:

[44] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 133.
[45] Altered: Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 190.
[46] E. Fudge, *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England*, cit., p. 68.
[47] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 116; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 171.
[48] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 94.
[49] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., pp. 145-146.

[…] uno non fa numero, e poi di ciò non mi maraviglio; maravigliome solamente che si come tutti gli animali irrazionali in genere s'affaticano per allevar i loro figliuoli ed in spezie il pelicano si cava co'l becco il proprio sangue così anco tutta la spezie de gli uomini, ma con via maggior carità, non facci co i propri figliuoli il simile che fé vostro padre con voi[50].

[…] one swallow does not make a summer. Besides, what you say does not surprise me. What surprises me is rather that men do not all behave as well as your father did, when we consider that irrational beasts, from whom less charity may be expected, work hard to care for their young, and the pelican in particular is prepared to suck its own blood from its breast to nourish its offspring, motivated purely by paternal love[51].

Because of his behaviour the pelican, allegedly nurturing his offspring with his own blood, is a traditional Christian symbol, emblematic for Jesus Christ sacrificing himself for the sake of humanity[52]. This adds another dimension to this context: fathers who do not care for their children not only act against the way members of one species should treat each other but also against Christ's example.

All the animal metaphors and comparisons we have looked at so far serve to support one common underlying narrative: Men act *against nature* when they neglect their daughters and treat women cruelly. Animal comparisons, as can be seen from these examples, are arguments that are based on assumptions about nature, which serve as a source for normative claims about the way humans should live together and treat one another.

However, there is one exceptional passage in Fonte's text that counteracts the usage of animal metaphors and images we analysed so far and that at the same time inverts the way the relationship between men and women is usually described in the dialogue. It is the peculiar story of a dream that is retold as part of the framework plot, which narrates the encounters of the seven speakers. For the second part of my paper, we will turn to an interpretation of this passage.

2. Like cat and mice

The garden in which the interlocutors meet is property of the perhaps most radical of all protagonists, the young widow Leonora, who refuses to marry again[53] and acts as a constant reminder of the defects of men[54]. On the second day, upon their arrival at Leonora's place, the host tells the group about «uno strano insogno», a strange dream she had this very morning:

[50] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., pp. 28-9.
[51] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 62.
[52] Following for example the *Physiologus*: *[Pseudo] Epiphanius, Sancti Epiphanii ad Physiologum*, Antwerp 1588, p. 31.
[53] *M. Fonte, Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 21; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 53.
[54] For Leonora as the group's conscience, see S. Kolsky, *Wells of Knowledge. Moderata Fonte's* Il merito delle donne, in «The Italianist», 13 (1993), pp. 57-96, p. 85.

[…] mi pareva (forse, perché iersera ne ragionammo) d'esser alle mani con questi uominacci e che facesse una gran ruina e fatto d'arme, tagliandone molti a pezzi e uccidendoli, di maniera che gli metteva tutti in fuga e in tal rumore, che con grande affanno svegliatami, essendo già il giorno chiaro trovai che tutta questa rimanotta era occorsa tra la mia gattesina ed alcuni valenti soriconi, o topi, come vogliamo dire, delli quali aveva, ella fatto tal macello che tutta la mia camera era di sangue e morti ripiena; e così il mio insogno è rimaso ispianato[55].

I dreamed (perhaps because of our conversation yesterday evening) that I was fighting hand to hand with some of those dreadful men and that I was wreaking havoc on them and giving no quarter, hacking them to pieces and massacring so many that they were all put to flight. There was so much noise that I woke up, terrified, to find that it was already day – and then I realized that all this racket had been caused by a battle between my little cat and a troop of valiant mice of which she had made mincemeat, so that my room, when I woke, was full of blood and corpses. So that explained my dream[56].

The story is presented as a «burla» (joke), to which the other interlocutors react with laughter. Leonora suggests both a reason and a cause for the dream: while its reason may have been the debate of the previous day, in which the women discussed the vices of men, its direct cause was the fight between cat and mice that paralleled and simultaneously enacted the dream. Leonora, who dreamt of defeating a group of men, is matched by the 'little cat' – noticeably the cat is female, «la mia gattesina» – who actually hunted mice, which in turn stand for the «uominacci», a devaluing variant of the term «uomini» (men).

Modern English knows the expression 'cat and mouse game', and so did Renaissance Florentine: «giocare come il gato col topo» which in the *Vocabulario della Crusca* is featured as a phrase based on the habit of cats to play with mice before killing and eating them[57]. Cats, they write, are kept within the house because of their particular enmity with mice, whom they kill. The expression contains notions of playfulness and cruelty, as well as the certainty of the cat's superiority and an imbalance of power: eventually, the cat will kill the mouse.

In dream and reality, the description of the scene depicts blood, slaughter and corpses, and thus indicates a rather wild and violent behaviour of both Leonora towards the *uominacci* in her dream and of the cat towards the mice. It fits with the characterisation of Leonora throughout the dialogue to let her, of all seven speakers, recount this dream – Leonora, whom the group sometimes mocks for being excessively harsh towards men[58], and who could well be imagined by the reader as favouring a more hands-on approach to the dispute between the

[55] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 73.
[56] Slightly altered: Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 119.
[57] «Quando l'ha preso, e lungamente giucato, se 'l mangia, e hattelo di vita privato». *Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca*, cit., p. 378. As the source for the expression, they specify Piero del Nero's *Libro o Trattato di sacramenti.*
[58] For example M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., pp. 104, 112, 181; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., pp. 158, 166, 258.

sexes. In fact, in one passage towards the end of the second day, she envisions women to fight men like the amazons did:

> Vorrei che fusse quel tempo […] che vorrei che noi donne tutte si armassimo come quelle antiche Amazzone ed andassimo a combattere contra questi uomini[59].
>
> I'd like to see us women arming ourselves like those Amazons of old and going into battle against these men[60].

This image of female ferocity stands in contrast to other passages of the dialogue, where Fonte promotes the useful stereotype of the 'naturally' gentler women. Due to their allegedly colder and moister bodily complexion[61], women can be seen as «più umane e mansuete, meno inclinate ad essequire i nostri desideri che gli uomini»[62] («*more humane* and gentler than men and less prone to carry out our desires than men»[63] [my emphasis]). Fonte asserts men greater ferocity and disorderly appetites, that is: less control of their passions, on the basis of their greater bodily heat compared to women. Hence, it is not surprising that Leonora's amazon fantasy is immediately recaptured by another speaker who says that she, being a «donna di pace» («women of peace»), would not accompany Leonora in such an enterprise.

The dream inverts the way Fonte usually describes the relationship between men and women. Men are depicted as having unrightfully usurped supremacy over women, both on the level of society and on the level of home and family. One famous passage from the first part of the dialogue reads like this:

> Questa preminenza si hanno essi arrogata da loro, […] ci vogliono tiranneggiare, usurpando si arrogantemente la signoria, che vogliono avere sopra di noi; e la quale anzi dovremmo noi avere sopra di loro […][64].
>
> This pre-eminence is something they have unjustly arrogated to themselves. […] they want to tyrannise, […] usurping the dominion over us, which we should on the contrary have over them[65].

At great length, the first part of the discourse is devoted to a detailed description of the miseries that male family members can mean for women: jealous husbands, disloyal sons, careless fathers and deceitful lovers, just to name a few. The best chance of changing this situation on the level of society

[59] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 163.
[60] Changed: Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 230.
[61] For Fonte, the so-thought cold and moist body complexion of women is not reason for their inferiority, as it is usually interpreted (see note 6): she sees it as having a curbing effect on the passion.
[62] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 47.
[63] Changed: Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 83.
[64] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 26.
[65] I have changed the English translation to this quote, but it is based on: Ead., *The Worth of Women,* cit., p. 59. See also Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 104; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 158.

seems to lie in pledges to men's compassion[66]. While the absence of men is often emphasised during the debate, their reactions to the discussions are nonetheless imagined: «O se gli uomini […] ci sentissero un poco a far questi ragionamenti […]»[67] («[…] if men could have heard what we've been saying […]»)[68]. In the aforementioned speech that Leonora directs at men in the second day of the dialogue, she asks men to show mercy towards women and to judge her pleading for a fairer relation between the sexes «non come parte interessata, ma come giustissimi giudici»[69] («not as interested parties, but as the most impartial of judges»[70]).

3. Conclusion

We have seen that the expressive cruelty of Leonora's dream of fighting men, and the corresponding fight of cat and mice might be explained in the choice of character and its place, the dream. Leonora's personality is *different from the other women* and allows aggressiveness – while the other six speakers still comply with the stereotype of women being the naturally gentler sex, Leonora counteracts it. Additionally, the dream could be seen as offering an unproblematic framework for unruly things to happen. We had a look at the way the story of the dream contrasts with how the distribution of power between the sexes is usually described in the dialogue. Finally, it has been shown in the first part of this paper how Fonte employs animal metaphors and comparisons to remind men of the common humanity of both sexes and hence of how 'naturally' benevolent the relationship between the sexes should be. Animal comparisons work with assumptions about nature, and serve as a source for normative claims about the way humans should live together and treat one another.

Ideas about nature constituted one of the major lines of conflict of the Early Modern debate about the sexes. Constance Jordan has identified two «challenges» for defendants of women of the time: The thought of *natural* female inferiority, deriving from the hierarchical order of nature, and of a *natural* division of labour – they both belong to what Jordan calls the concept of «natural law», that was seen as underlying all of God's creation[71]. Moderata Fonte, like other writers of her time arguing for the worth of women[72], counteracted these ideas. She points for example to the legendary rule of the amazons, implicitly

[66] For this persuasive element, see also J. Levarie Smarr, *Joining the Conversation. Dialogues by Renaissance Women*, Ann Arbor 2005, pp. 226-27.
[67] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 71.
[68] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 116., see also Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., pp. 169-170; M. Fonte, *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 238.
[69] Ead., *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 132.
[70] Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 190.
[71] C. Jordan, *Renaissance feminism*, cit., p. 66.
[72] For example Lucrezia Marinella (L. Marinella, *The nobility and excellence of women, and the defects and vices of men*, translated and edited by A. Dunhill, Chicago 1999) and Arcangela Tarabotti (A. Tarabotti, *Paternal Tyranny*, translated and edited by L. Panizza, Chicago/London 2004), see also note 5.

proving the possibility of a different division of labour, a different order of society and women's ability to rule and fight[73]. She emphasises the potential intellectual equality of the sexes and the need of a similar education[74]. She works to destabilise the idea of the naturally inferior women, but still uses notions of nature as sources for arguments and normative claims. We can see this by her use of animal metaphors and comparisons.

The comedic potential of the story about Leonora's dream, however, lies exactly in overturning all these rational arguments, and in being so utterly aggressive. I would like to propose a reading as a fantasy of self-empowerment: Of being of the stronger species, the stronger sex, of behaving not ladylike at all. But since all the interlocutors know it does not work this way, they laugh and get back to their discussion.

[73] M. Fonte, *Il merito delle donne*, cit., p. 163; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 230. In her other major work, the *Tredici canti del Floridoro*, Fonte demonstrates women's equal potential amongst other things with the female warrior Risamente: Ead., *Floridoro: a chivalric romance*, translated by J. Kisacky, Chicago 2006, Canto 4, 1-5.
[74] Ead., *Il merito delle donne,* cit., p. 168; Ead., *The Worth of Women*, cit., p. 236.

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Articoli/5

Giordano Bruno

Heroism, Metamorphosis and Animality*

Saverio Ansaldi

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The question I wish to ask is the following: why does Bruno appeal to the theme of "speculative" heroism in a work of magic? What are the relationships between heroism, magic and animality? Can magic be equated with heroism? Or is the nature of the mage different from that of the hero? To begin answering the question, we must, in my opinion, revisit the theme of the relationship between heroic frenzy and animal frenzy, as presented by Bruno in *The Heroic Frenzies*. In this context, the relationship between heroism, metamorphosis and animality, highlighted in *The Heroic Frenzies*, is at the heart of Brunian magic.

***

In the second part of the *Lampas triginta statuarum* (1587-1590), one of the major works devoted to magic, Giordano Bruno defines the application modalities of the «invention method» of the images described in the first part and founded on the principle of the great chain of being (*schala naturae*). Bruno's intention is to highlight the correspondence between the order of nature and that of the human soul, as man's intellectual faculties are capable of creating a mental order that *reflects* the natural order. This analogy is based in particular on the relationship that exists between the natural metamorphosis of beings and the action of the imagination. Human knowledge must indeed be based on the power of images and Bruno intends to specifically make use of the power of the imagination to develop a method of «inventive» knowledge, applicable to the field of physical metamorphosis. This method is, for Bruno, the fundamental tool of natural magic.

It is in this context that Bruno proceeds to classify things according to their proximity to or distance from the «superior level» (*gradus supremus*) of beings. The result is a «ladder of nature» composed of thirty levels, among which are, for example, in ascending order, void, shadow, matter, atoms, water, earth and

metals[1]. As such, Bruno also offers a «ranking» of living beings on the natural ladder according to their faculties and, in particular, what he calls their «strength of apprehension» (*vis apprehensionis*), depending on their ability to «feel» (*sensus*). Living beings can thus be classified on the natural ladder according to «genus» that are defined by their «participation» in a specific degree of sensation and apprehension.

At the lowest ranking, Bruno places the «zoophytes» (*zoophyta*), that is to say, beings who seem to possess only the sense of touch[2]. After zoophytes come the «brutes», «who seem to feature a greater number of external senses or who possess all»[3]. After the brutes come beings endowed with imagination, who are able of combining the activity of the external senses with that of the internal senses, in other words, those who possess memory or the power of «estimation», according to the terminology of Avicenna's *Liber de Anima* that Bruno repeats here[4]. On the fourth level of the classification feature beings distinguished by the action of their «rational substance» (*substantia rationalis*), which is greater than the power of imagination, but inferior to intelligence (*intelligentia*). These are the beings who possess reason, which is the medium between the senses and the intellect[5].

The last level is occupied by «heroic nature and substance» (*natura et substantia heroica*), which characterises all beings who do not yield to the action of the senses and live in the intellectual sphere, in virtue of a purer spirit[6]. But, Bruno continues, «even if we can assume that such a nature belongs to the human race, the sages nonetheless feel that the predicate 'man' can only be equivocally attributed to heroes, to those who strive for perfection in the speculative sciences and to those who have not reached perfection, as indeed we can only equivocally attribute the predicate 'man' to the dead and the living. There is indeed a greater difference between heroes and men than between idiots, horses and elephants»[7].

Bruno goes on to say that the difference between animated species is not dependent on their external form or physical conformation but rather on their «interiority», since, in fact, from the perspective of apprehension, many animals are closer to men than to monkeys, even though these latter are similar to men in

* Translated from the French by Jeremy Daly.

[1] G. Bruno, *Lampas triginta statuarum*, in *Opere magiche*, Latin text, under the direction of M. Ciliberto, edited by S. Bassi, E. Scapparone, N. Tirinnanzi, Milan 2000, pp. 1304-1306: «Constat nobis, iuxta vere physicam et antiquam philosophiam plerumque rerum maxime congruentem naturae, schala naturae triginta gradibus».

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 1308: «Sunt zoophyta, hoc est ea quae solum tactus sensum indicant».

[3] *Ibid.*: «Sunt bruta, quae vel pluribus, vel omnibus sensibus externis praedita videntur».

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*: «Est substantia rationalis, quae per rationem mediat inter sensum et intellectum, et habet actus onfra intelligentiam et supra imaginationem».

[6] *Ibid.*: «Est natura et substantia heroica, utpote his proprie est attributa quae sensum lenociniis non decipiuntur, captivantur, sed puriore spiritu intellectualiter magis vivunt».

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 1308-1310: «Quae natura licet in hominum genere intelligatur, indicant tamen sapientes hoc nomen hominis aequivoce dici de heroibus et perfectis per scientias speculativas et de aliis non perfectis, sicut aequivoce dicitur de mortuo et vivo: et forte maior differentia est inter istos, quam sit inter idiotas homines et equos et elephantes».

the arrangement of their limbs[8]. Bruno thus manages to distinguish a substantial degree of difference between two types of «nature»: one that is characterised by the use of reason, and another that is defined by the use of the intellect, a superior faculty to reason. «Men» belong to the first type, while «heroes» belong to the second. However, the interest of the argument summoned here by Bruno particularly lies in the gap between these two types of nature: indeed, there is a wider gap between men and heroes than between men and animals. That is to say that beings on the fourth level are closer to those found on the third and second than those on the fifth – i.e. heroes. While the beings from the first to the fourth level of the great chain of being – zoophytes and natures that possess «rational substance» – constitute a relatively logical series connected by successive transformations presupposing those preceding them, the fifth level represents a true leap forward in the gradual structure of living beings. «Heroic substance» signifies perfection on the ladder of living beings, since it allows for the realisation of intellectual bliss.

It is also due to the following that, according to Bruno, certain men are closer to animals than to heroes: because of their weak rational substance, these men can not reach the last level of heroic substance and, as a result, present behaviours and properties that render them similar to beasts. Reciprocally, certain animals possess sensitivity that sometimes renders them very close to men with rational substance. It is important to emphasise that, in this regard, the arguments summoned by Bruno in this part of the *Lampas triginta statuarum* refer only to the use of a purely «internal» power and do not appeal to «external» conformity, that is to say, power arising from organic and corporeal conformation, such as in *The Cabala of Pegasus*. In this work, indeed, Bruno clearly insists on the substantial homogeneity between the soul of man and that of animals. The difference between men and beasts is a difference of «figure» (*figurazione*), since the soul «of man is similar in its generic and specific essence to that of flies, oysters, plants and all that is animated or has a soul»[9]. It is the «figure», that is to say, the species of body (*specie di corpo*) that determines the difference between the souls of men and beasts, because «according to the diversity of complexions and members, [the soul] acquires different levels and perfections of spirit and operations»[10].

We know that in *The Cabala of Pegasus*, Bruno invokes the hand to highlight the difference between men and animals because, although «it is possible that many animals may have more sense and a more informed intellect than man»[11], animals are deprived of appropriate instruments to use this intellect, notably the hand, the «organ of organs», as Bruno specifies. Hands allow men to build «institutions of doctrine, inventions of discipline, congregations of citizens, structures of buildings and so many other things that are signs of greatness and human excellence and which make man the truly undefeated triumphant victor

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 1310.
[9] G. Bruno, *La Cabale du cheval pégaséen*, in *Œuvres Complètes*, tome VI, Paris, 1994, p. 94.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

over the other species»[12]. The «material complexion» (*material complessione*) or «figure» of their bodies prevents «universal intelligence» (*universale intelligenza*), with which both animals and men are endowed, from expressing and asserting itself in actions of excellence – that is to say, heroic actions. In *The Cabala of Pegasus*, the heroism that human nature can reveal depends thus on the relationship between the intellect and the hand, and therefore comes from the work of «civilisation», a construction that deeply engages the minds as well as the bodies of men[13].

In the *Lampas triginta statuarum*, however, Bruno insists exclusively on the strength and power of the intellect as a prerequisite to the affirmation of heroic nature. Therefore, in her commentary on this passage of the *Lampas triginta statuarum*, Nicoletta Tirinnanzi rightly highlights Bruno's Averroist theme of intellectual beatitude from the speculative sciences as well as the use of a specific Ficinian problematic from the *Platonic Theology*. «Heroic» nature is distinguished from «human-animal» nature because of an exceeded limit, an exceptional effort to conquer the beatitude of intellectual knowledge beyond any fixed «assignment» in the great chain of being. This beatitude does not come from divine grace or natural destiny but from the intellectual effort that man is capable of achieving in infinite nature in metamorphosis. From Bruno's point of view, man has no specific «dignity» in this nature, which is always the result of relentless speculative activity in the infinity of material life[14].

This theme of the limit and excess of «heroic» nature in relation to «human-animal» nature, as it is formulated in the *Lampas triginta statuarum*, has led me to formulate my problematic. The question I wish to ask is the following: why does Bruno appeal to the theme of «speculative» heroism in a work of magic? What are the relationships between heroism, magic and animality? Can magic be equated with heroism? Or is the nature of the mage different from that of the hero?

To begin answering the question, we must, in my opinion, revisit the theme of the relationship between heroic frenzy and animal frenzy, as presented by Bruno in *The Heroic Frenzies*. I will focus my analysis in particular on the Fourth Dialogue of the First Part. I will only recall in this regard that Bruno, from the *Argument* that introduces *The Heroic Frenzies*, insists that his research targets divine love and does not concern «the effects of an obstinate vulgar love,

[12] *Ibid*.
[13] On this subject, cf. the classic works of F. Papi, *Antropologia e civiltà nel pensiero di Giordano Bruno*, Florence 1968; M. Ciliberto, *La ruota del tempo. Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno,* Rome 1986; N. Ordine, *Le mystère de l'âne: essai sur Giordano Bruno,* Paris 1993.
[14] G. Bruno, *Lampas triginta statuarum*, cit., p. 1570-1571. Here Bruno particularly refers to Averroës' *Proemium in Libros Physicorum*, as well as Chapter 2 of Book X of Marsilio Ficino's *Theologia platonica*. N. Tirinnanzi's interpretation essentially echoes the treatises formulated by M. Ciliberto, *La ruota del tempo. Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno*, cit.; Id., *Umbra profunda. Studi su Giordano Bruno*, Rome 1999; Id., *L'occhio di Atteone. Nuovi studi su Giordano Bruno*, Rome 2002.

animal and bestial»[15]. We know that here Bruno conducts a controversial anti-Petrarchan polemic based on Ficino's famous distinction between divine love (*amor divinus*) and bestial love (*amor ferinus*)[16]. Indeed, he asserts that «my first and principal, secondary and subordinate, final and ultimate design in this work to which I have been called, was and is to signify divine contemplation and present the eye and ear with other frenzies, not those caused by vulgar love, but those caused by heroic love»[17].

In the eyes of Bruno, Petrarchan poetry is «melancholic» poetry that celebrates the love for a woman in flesh and bone and is therefore unable to rise to divine frenzy. More generally, in *The Heroic Frenzies*, Bruno takes a position in debates raised, especially in Italy from the first half of the 16th century, by the numerous commentated editions of Aristotle's *Poetics*. These discussions concerned, in particular, the status and function of poetry based on the Aristotelian definition of the poet as «the one who creates a representation» or as an «imitator of images», like a painter[18]. We also know that the issue of Petrarchism was at the centre of poetic controversies in England in the late 17th century and that *The Heroic Frenzies* is targeted at Petrarchan poets like Philip Sidney[19].

At the end of the Third Dialogue of Part I, Bruno clearly associates, as in *Lampas triginta statuarum*, «heroic frenzy» with «ultimate happiness», corresponding to perfection in the speculative sciences, according to the terms employed by Peripatetics and Averroës. He particularly emphasises the fact that «[f]or in this condition of ours we cannot desire or attain greater perfection than that which is ours when our intellect through the medium of some noble intelligible species is united either to the separate substances, as some say [the Averroists, ed.], or to the divine mind, if we employ the idiom of the Platonists»[20]. But this perfection, adds Bruno, lies not so much in full and complete comprehension of divine unity - impossible to achieve by man - but in the effort with which his finite intellect tries to understand it, according to his own possibilities within infinite material. «It is enough that all attempt the journey. It is enough that each one do whatever he can; for a heroic mind will prefer falling or missing the mark nobly in a lofty enterprise, whereby he manifests the dignity of his mind, to obtaining perfection in things less noble, if not base»[21].

[15] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies* [Electronic Version], retrieved from http://www.esotericarchives.com/bruno/furori.htm, 1964.
[16] Cf. M. Ficino, *Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love*, tr. by. J. Sears, Thompson, Dallas 1985, chap. VII. For Plato's passage, cf. *Phaedrus*, 265a. On this theme, cf. G. Canziani *Le metamorfosi dell'amore. Ficino, Pico e i* Furori *di Bruno*, Milan 2001.
[17] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 3, cit.; argument of the Nolan.
[18] Cf. Aristote, *Poetics*, 1640b 8.
[19] Cf. J. C. Nelson, *Renaissance theory of love: the context of Giordano Bruno's* Eroici Furori, New York 1958; P. Sabbatino, *Giordano Bruno e la «mutazione» del Rinascimento*, Florence 1993; M. P. Ellero, *Lo specchio della fantasia. Retorica, magia e scrittura in Giordano Bruno*, Lucca 2005.
[20] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 3, cit.
[21] *Ibid.*

It is in this respect that Bruno evokes the famous image of the «wheel of metamorphoses», already at the centre of *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*. Indeed, he writes, «this conversion and change is symbolized in the wheel of metamorphoses, in which a man is placed at the top, a beast lies at the bottom, one half-man and half-beast descends from the left, and one half-man and half-beast ascends from the right»[22]. The highly paradigmatic character of this image, as well as the Plotinian and Ficinian terminology used here by Bruno, should not deceive us: it is clearly emphasised that this metamorphosis is only accomplished in the cycle of infinite material and that it does not presuppose any form of ultimate ascension to hierarchically-ordered divine transcendence. Unlike Ficino, Bruno believes that the «heroic conversion» of man takes place entirely within material infinity in metamorphosis and that it corresponds to the maximal use of the intellect and intellectual will. These are precisely the methods and forms of this «use of the faculties» that distinguish the heroic lover from the man who yields to bestial nature[23].

The impossibility of man leaving the «wheel of metamorphoses» determines the specific meaning that Bruno attributes to the difference between the «heroic lover» and the man endowed with a bestial nature. Following the example of Jupiter, who assumes the form of a beast because of the affection he feels for inferior and multiple things but who, remembering his dignity, then resumes his divine form, the heroic lover must go through all the metamorphoses of infinite life, including those that come from the body and those that make of him a «beast», in an attempt to comprehend, by the intellect and intellectual will, divine beauty and goodness[24]. The end of the Third Dialogue of Part I of *The Heroic Frenzies* is based entirely on the need for the heroic lover to pass through the «animal» condition, that is, through infinite matter, to attain the «perfection» of the speculative sciences. It is a journey that in no way corresponds to a «blockage» of the wheel of metamorphoses, nor to a prolonged permanence in animality or bestiality – that is, confined to a state entirely determined by the affections of the body. The need to pass through the bestial condition allows for appreciating the true value of the frenzy's «nobility» – by comprehending the beauty and divine goodness grasped in the cycle of metamorphosis[25].

This analysis of the frenzy, based on the theme of animality, is taken up and developed in the Fourth Dialogue, particularly from the famous example

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.* For the difference with Ficino, cf. M. Ficino, *Platonic Theology*, translated by M. J. B. Allen, Harvard 2006, VI, 2.

[24] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 3, cit. The example of Jupiter caught in the wheel of metamorphoses naturally refers to *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast* and the theological-political question of «sacrifice». Cf. A. Ingegno, *La sommersa nave della religione. Studio sulla polemica anticristiana del Bruno,* Naples 1985; G. Sacerdoti, *Sacrificio e sovranità. Teologia e politica nell'Europa di Shakespeare e Bruno*, Turin 2002; on the relationship between *The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast* and *The Heroic Frenzies* in regard to the «wheel of metamorphoses», cf. F. Raimondi, *La Repubblica dell'assoluta giustizia. La politica di Giordano Bruno in Inghilterra*, Pisa 2003.

[25] Cf. A. Ingegno, *Observations sur les concepts de* furor *et de métamorphose*, in *Fureurs, héroïsme et métamorphoses*, dir. by P. Magnard Louvain 2007, pp. 7-21.

of Actaeon, who as we know plays the model of the heroic lover[26]. The figure of Actaeon is indeed presented by Bruno and based on animal metaphors that highlight the characters and forms of his frenzy. In the poem by Tansillo, which illustrates the «capture of divine wisdom» carried out by Actaeon, as well as in the extended commentary by Bruno, it is clear that the frenzy is inseparable from a *devenir-animal*, to use Machiavellian terminology[27]. What does Actaeon in fact do? He «unleashes the mastiffs and the greyhounds», symbols of the intellect and will, «near the traces of the wild beasts», that is to say, «the intelligible modes of ideal concepts», who reside «among the waters», namely in infinite nature or «in the mirror of similitudes». It is in seeing nature, «the power and external operation» of divinity, that «the great hunter […] becomes the prey». Indeed, «this hunter set out for prey and became himself the prey»[28].

Actaeon is, *simultaneously*, hunter and prey: «this hunter set out for prey and became himself the prey through the operation of his intellect whereby he converted the apprehended objects into himself […] And he becomes the prey by the operation of the will whose act converts him into the object»[29]. As a hunter, Actaeon must appeal to his «dogs», that is, his «intelligible modes» and his will, which are unleashed in search of the «wild beast» – the good, wisdom and beauty. And «[o]nce he was in their presence, ravished outside of himself by so much beauty, he became the prey of his thoughts and saw himself converted into the thing he was pursuing. Then he perceived that he himself had become the coveted prey of his own dogs, his thoughts, because having already tracked down the divinity within himself it was no longer necessary to hunt for it elsewhere»[30].

What is the meaning of this decisive passage in *The Heroic Frenzies* in light of our problematic? In my mind, it resides entirely in the need for the heroic lover – Actaeon – to confront *animal metamorphosis* in order to achieve union with infinite nature. This nature is the wild beast (*la fiera boscareccia*) that cannot initially be hunted by Actaeon's «dogs» (*i mastini* and *i veltri*) and that then transforms Actaeon himself into prey. This means that the «animal nature» can only be known by Actaeon by a process – hunting – which presupposes an action by «animal thoughts», that is to say, thoughts that «searched […] outside himself», as Bruno states. But the hunt ends with a radical metamorphosis and

[26] G. Bruno *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 4, cit.: «Actaeon represents the intellect intent upon the capture of divine wisdom and the comprehension of the divine beauty.» For the complete study of Actaeon, cf. M. A. Granada, *Giordano Bruno. Universo infinito, unión con Dios, perfección del hombre*, Barcelona 2002; M. Ciliberto, *L'occhio di Atteone. Nuovi studi su Giordano Bruno*, cit.; F. Papi, *La costruzione delle verità. Giordano Bruno nel periodo londinese*, Milan 2010.

[27] It is indeed evident that Bruno takes up and develops here, according to a new perspective, the famous Machiavellian problematic of Chapter 18 of *The Prince*, devoted to the need for the «Prince» to «know well how to utilise beast and man.» Cf. N. Machiavel, *Le Prince*, Paris 2000, Chapter 18, p. 149 - 153. On the relationship between Bruno and Machiavelli, cf. M. A. Granada, *Giordano Bruno. Universo infinito, unión con Dios, perfección del hombre*, cit.; Id., *El umbral de la modernidad*, Barcelona 2000.

[28] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 4, cit.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Ibid.*

he «becomes the prey of his own dogs», since Actaeon understands that the divine nature resides in him «by virtue of the regenerated intellect and will»[31].

The heroic frenzy, of which Actaeon is the model, is therefore inconceivable outside of a double *devenir-animal*: the first corresponding to the intellectual knowledge of nature through intelligible modes – the dogs – and the second identifying the will that converts him into the beloved thing and makes him the prey – an animal. Actaeon in this way understands that only love for natural knowledge – the endless quest for infinity – can transform and metamorphose his own nature. «Actaeon becomes the prey of his own dogs, pursued by his own thoughts, turns his feet and *directs his new steps;* is renewed for a divine course […] *toward the densest places,* toward the deserts, toward the region of incomprehensible things: from the vulgar and common man he was, he becomes rare and heroic, rare in all he does, rare in his concepts, and he leads the extraordinary life»[32].

It is thus in virtue of this *devenir-animal* that Actaeon leaves the «bestial» condition of sensual love to acquire a heroic nature. Exceeding bestial love only takes place by the metamorphosing passage through animal nature. Herein also lies the richness on the Brunian reflection on the relationship between heroism and animality. Heroism, as the love of knowledge, is only conceivable as a voluntary conversion to the speculative sciences, oriented towards «the mirror of similitudes» and applied to the «shadows» of divine nature. It is the love for the knowledge of material nature in all its «animal» forms, that is to say, living and multiple, that transforms Actaeon from an ordinary man into a «heroic frenzy». The heroic metamorphosis of Actaeon, which allows him to leave «the world of folly, of sensuality, of blindness, and of illusion», and start «to live by the intellect; [to live] the life of the gods», symbolises from this point of view the *devenir-animal* of human nature, without which the transformation of intellectual power in speculative beatitude is not possible.

Actaeon's heroism is not the result of an immediate conversion arising from a pardon or divine gift: it always comes from his «virtue» and his *studio*, his willingness to go in search of wisdom and release his dogs in pursuit of the wild beast. Only then can Actaeon «[*direct*] *his new steps* … toward the region of incomprehensible things», and «[feed] upon ambrosia and [become] drunk with nectar»[33], i.e. that he accesses a «new life», entirely governed by love, which «has the power to transform the heart into that other nature to which it aspires»[34]. The love of knowledge that impelled Actaeon in pursuit of the «sublime prey» hidden in the woods – in the multiplicity of matter, moving shadows of divine unity – represents the sole cause of his «new life» and the «renaissance» of his nature.

This last point also seems crucial to understanding the meaning of Bruno's reflections on this subject. It is indeed clear that, in infinite matter in motion,

[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*

only heroic metamorphosis can allow human nature to reach the vision, in the shadow, of divinity[35]. Furthermore, this metamorphosis still presupposes the need to confront the «contradictions» of matter and the prerogatives of animality. Therefore, the metamorphosis of Actaeon, through his *devenir-animal*, is reminiscent of Nietzsche's «three metamorphoses» of Zarathustra. Like Actaeon, Zarathustra must go through the cycle of the «three metamorphoses» (camel, lion and child) before reaching the «game of creation» and the innocence of the future. And like the metamorphoses of Actaeon, those of Zarathustra also imply «forgetting and beginning anew», forgetting his animality and beginning anew the «game of his creation» – his will for power. Bruno and Nietzsche here undoubtedly trace the outlines of a philosophy of metamorphosis based on the variation and perpetual transformation of «human-animal» power into heroic and superhuman power[36].

Another question is nevertheless necessary in this regard. Can the frenzy completely leave the human-animal life to only live a «heroic» life? Bruno is well aware of this difficulty and underlines the issues in the pages that follow the description of Actaeon's heroic frenzy. This means that the theme of exceeding animality by the frenzy is even more articulated than the example of Actaeon predicts. Bruno writes: «How shall I be able to feed upon the intelligible species alone, the food for the intellect, if my substance is a composite?»[37]. This question is asked by the soul, that is to say, by the natural form that structures and orders the human compound, made of body and mind. «Come, come, oh my fleeting thoughts, my rebellious heart. Let the sense live on sensible things and the intellect upon intelligible things. Let matter and the corporeal subject be the support of the body, and the intellect be satisfied by its own objects; so that this complex continue to subsist, so that there be no dissolution of this machine, whose spirit unites the soul to the body»[38].

Through the voice of the soul, Bruno thus seems to again question the very meaning of Actaeon's heroic enterprise. Hence the other essential question that the soul asks of the «heroic thinkers»: «Does it seem natural to you that creatures should refuse the animal or the human life in order to live the divine life when they are not gods but only men and animals? It is a law of fate and of nature that each thing work according to the condition of its nature»[39]. These questions asked of the «heroic thinkers» by the soul bring out all the difficulties

[35] See S. Ansaldi, *Giordano Bruno. Une philosophie de la métamorphose*, Paris 2010.
[36] Cf. F. Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, Erster Teil, Von der drei Verwandlungen, Augsburg 1984. On the relationship between Bruno and Nietzsche, which has not been systematically studied, cf. D. Morea - S. Busellato *Nietzsche e Bruno. Un incontro postumo*, Pisa 1999; M. A. Granada, *Giordano Bruno. Universo infinito, unión con Dios, perfección del hombre*, cit., in particular pp. 331-363; P. Invernizzi, *Bruno e Nietzsche. Uomo eroico ed Oltreuomo*, http://www.secretum-online.it/default.php?num=1568, May 2011. For more in general on the relationship between Nietzsche and the philosophies of the Renaissance, cf. C. Bouriau, *Nietzsche et la Renaissance*, Paris 2015.
[37] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 4, cit.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*

in regard to exceeding human-animal nature by the heroic frenzy. Indeed, this excess implies breaking the laws of nature (*legge della natura*), which assign to each being his own conditions of life. Thus, from the position of the soul, human nature belongs to the same order as animal nature, as it consists of body and thought, flesh and spirit, sensitivity and reason. «Therefore let the sense feed itself according to the law of sensible things, the flesh according to the law of the flesh, the spirit according to the law of the spirit, the reason according to the law of the reason; let them not be confused or troubled with one another»[40].

The discourse of the soul is that of reason, which recalls the importance of not leaving a «human-animal» life, mindful of the requirements of the body. The heroic frenzy represents, from the point of view of the soul, a veritable separation from natural law since it establishes a split, even within human nature. «Therefore you transgress when, seduced by the beauties of the intellect, you leave the other part of me in danger of death. Whence have you engendered this perverse and melancholy humour of breaking certain natural laws of the true life, a life you hold in your power, for an uncertain life that is nothing if not a shadow beyond the limits of the imaginable?»[41]. The frenzy of love, as Ficino perfectly demonstrated in his *Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love*, is rooted in melancholy and forgetting the desires of the body[42]. This is why it represents, in this sense, a real «perversion» of the natural law of «human-animal» nature, which implies considering both the love of the intellect and the desires of the body. Thus, Bruno states, «[b]y these and similar arguments the soul, pleading the cause of its more infirm part, seeks to recall the thoughts to the care of the body»[43].

In this regard, Bruno points out that it is not about contrasting two types of souls, one that would be close to the body and to matter and the other close to the intellect, because «there are not two contrary essences, but only one essence subject to two extremes of contrariety»[44]. Rather, it is about understanding the effects that come from «the impulse of the one and the other potency or faculty»[45]. What consequences can be drawn from the elevation of the soul to the intelligible world – that of the «frenzy» – or from its descent to the sensitive faculty and activities related to the body? Bruno's answer is thus: he states that, in fact, «there are three degrees of intelligences – those in which the intellectual dominates over the animal, called celestial intelligences; those in which the animal prevails over the intellectual, called human intelligences; and others in which the two balance each other as in the intelligences of demons or heroes»[46].

In regard to the «ranking» of living beings to be established in the *Lampas triginta statuarum*, Bruno provides no definition of animal intelligence as such,

[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] Cf. M. Ficino, *Commentary on Plato's Symposium on Love*, cit., particularly the 7th discourse.
[43] G. Bruno *The Heroic Frenzies*, I, 4, cit.
[44] *Ibid.*
[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Ibid.*

but rather *links* the criterion for defining different degrees of intelligence to animality. Therefore, although the ranking is less accurate and comprehensive than that of the *Lampas*, the relationship between humans, animals and heroism remains most important. What then signifies that heroic (or demonic) intelligences are those where animals are equal to the intellectual? This means that intelligences follow the natural movement of the wheel of metamorphoses. While celestial intelligences are not subject to the downward descent and animal-human intelligences do not ascend, the heroic intelligences are those that must constantly struggle to climb up and avoid falling down. It is in this sense that animals can equal the intellectual. This fight or combat is precisely that highlighted by Bruno during the discourse of the soul, which constantly reminds the intellect of the action of the body's affectations. Bruno continues,

> [f]or that reason souls can be known to ascend or descend by their affections, to come from above or from below, to be on the way of becoming beasts or gods, according to their specific natures […] for the human soul need not have the power to become the soul of a brute[47].

The heroic soul is that which rises «by virtue of contemplation, or is transported above the horizon of the natural affections» and is therefore, «conquered by its most lofty thoughts, as though dead to the body […] and although it continues to live in the body, the soul vegetates there as if dead and is present in the body as an animate potency incapable of any action»[48]. Unlike an *animal-human* soul or intelligence, which lives entirely according to the body's operations and its sensitive nature, the heroic intelligence, by its elevation in the wheel of metamorphoses, forgets its human-animal nature and leads *another* life, where «the operations of the soul as a composite are delayed, enfeebled, and debilitated»[49]. The heroic intelligence no longer struggles with the thoughts of the body, like the human soul where the animal prevails, because it can, by virtue of the *equality* between the intellectual and the animal, exercise *all the power* of the intellect. That is why «there are degrees of loves, affections, and frenzies, according to the degrees of greater or lesser light of cognition and intelligence»[50].

It is, therefore, in these terms, at the end of the Fourth Dialogue of Part I of *The Heroic Frenzies*, that Bruno illustrates the «passage» of the animal frenzy to the heroic frenzy, emphasising the need to fully exceed the level of human intelligence, where the animal prevails over the intellectual. In light of these findings and to return to our initial question, why is the classification of living beings that is found in the *Lampas Triginta Statuarum* more articulated and complex than that of *The Heroic Frenzies*? Why does Bruno, in this magical work, introduce additional levels in the great chain of being and intelligence? Because it is precisely in this work that he defines the *heroism of the mage*. What

[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*
[49] *Ibid.*
[50] *Ibid.*

then is this type of heroism? And can we specifically speak of magical heroism? I will respond to these questions in the affirmative[51].

To my eyes, magical knowledge effectively presupposes a double heroism. Why? Because the mage must first acquire knowledge to be able to act, as Bruno alleges in the *De magia naturalis* – which specifically arises from a heroism of knowledge[52]. The mage's knowledge, in fact, consists of two types of knowledge. The magician must indeed, on one hand, know the methods of the constitution of images in terms of the human mind and, on the other hand, agree to the laws of the «community of things» and possess «an overall understanding of the universe» to be able to act «civilly»[53]. A work like the *Lampas triginta statuarum* is devoted to the first type of knowledge, while the *De magia naturalis* and *De Vinculis* are devoted to the second. This means that the acquisition of magical knowledge is borne out of a specific frenzy, leading the mage to go beyond his human-animal nature in view of «civil» action. What is, in this context, the meaning of the mage's civil action? It lies in the fact that the mage can act on the human-animal nature of other men, that is to say, the «linkables», according to the terminology of *De Vinculis*.

Here we again find the question of metamorphosis. The mage must not only transform his «animal-human» into a heroic nature, but he must also metamorphose the nature of others by *simultaneously* and *continuously* metamorphosing his own heroic nature. This implies a double metamorphosis, which affects two kinds of distinct natures: firstly, the mage-hero metamorphoses the nature of the «linkable» on which he exerts his action – the human-animal, according to the ranking of beings presented in the *Lampas triginta statuarum*; secondly, this process of metamorphosis affects his own, *already heroic* nature, which continues to metamorphose itself, because any magical action presupposes a reciprocal relationship between the «linker» and the «linkable», as Bruno clearly stresses in *De Vinculis*. The mage is indeed always involved in a double process of transformative action and metamorphosis – of himself and others[54].

In this context, the relationship between heroism, metamorphosis and animality, highlighted in *The Heroic Frenzies*, is at the heart of Brunian magic. Nevertheless, it is clear that both heroisms should in no way be confused: if the heroism of the frenzy comes from a solitary «contraction» of the power of thinking, then that of the mage is related to a sort of multiple «dissemination» of his power to act[55]. It is nonetheless both fury and magic that are based on a

[51] On the continuity between frenzy and magic, see S. Bassi, *L'arte di Giordano Bruno. Memoria, furore, magia*, Florence 2004.
[52] G. Bruno, *De Magia naturali*, in *Opere Magiche*, cit., p. 166 : «A philosophis ut sumitur inter philosophos, tunc magus significat hominem sapientem cum virtute agendi».
[53] G. Bruno, *De Vinculis in genere,* in *Opere Magiche*, cit., p. 416 : «Nihil tandem esse videtur quod a civili speculatione sub forma huiusce consyderationis (quatenus vel vinciunt vel vinciuntur vel vincula quaedam sunt vel horum circumstantiae) possit esse alienum».
[54] *Ibid.*, XXIX, p. 450. Cf. on this point, B. Pinchard, *Au péril des liens*, in P. Magnard (dir.), *Fureurs, héroïsme et métamorphoses*, cit., pp. 91-105.
[55] Cf. G. Bruno, *De Vinculis in genere*, cit., VI, pp. 422-424, where Bruno opposes the multiple talents of the mage to the «heroic delight» of certain philosophers, such as Anaxarchus, Epi-

«heroism of knowledge», in other words, the acquisition of specific knowledge, in virtue of which the frenzy and mage «exceed the ordinary», since both «do not go about speaking and acting as mere receptacles and instruments, but as chief inventors and authors»[56]. Bruno recalls that the heroic frenzies are «not the rapture of one caught in the snare of bestial passion under the law of an unworthy fate; but a rational force following the intellectual perception of the good and the beautiful comprehensible to man»[57].

Like frenzy, magic is conceivable and only becomes possible from an extraordinary effort of understanding and mastering the art of memory, that is to say, the science of the «composition of images»[58]. This art involves understanding perfection in the speculative sciences, a long journey of research and of learning the truth, far from all «delight» or free gift from the deity[59]. Ultimately, the perfection that characterises both the frenzy's momentum and the mage's art always involves exceeding one's «human-animal» nature, arising from an «excessive» and metamorphosing affirmation of one's power to act and to know within the great chain of being[60]. Highlighting the forms and methods of this excess is without doubt one of the major contributions of Giordano Bruno's philosophy to the question of the relationship between man and animal.

curus or Diogenes, who «showed to have attained a life similar to that of the gods.»

[56] G. Bruno, *The Heroic Frenzies,* , I, 3, cit.

[57] *Ibid*.

[58] Cf. P. Rossi, *Il tempo dei maghi*, Milan 2006, pp. 79-102.

[59] Cf. G. Bruno, *Lampas triginta statuarum*, cit., p. 928: «Animae cibum esse veritatem, utpote quae in eius substatiam, veluti proprium nutrimentum, transmutabilis est, [esse] constat: perfectio et finis huius nutrimenti est lumen contemplationis».

[60] The theme of exceeding the «human-animal» nature goes back to the broader question of *anthropogenesis*. For a study of this question and its relationship to the notion of animality, cf. G. Agamben, *L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale*, Torino 2002.

Articoli/6

Natural Theology and the Origin of Instincts

Debating the Divine Government of Animals in Early Nineteenth-Century Britain

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In recent years, Robert M. Young's well-known description of natural theology as the «common context» which in early nineteenth-century Britain sanctioned the alliance between science and religion has been questioned in many respects. In what follows, Young's view is further discussed by focusing on the study of animal faculties. First, I contend that in the first half of the century there could be extensive disagreement over the manner in which the deity governed animal behavior. Secondly, by presenting the perspective of Henry Brougham (1778-1868) I argue that natural theology was now more willing to ascribe to animals some degree of intelligence. Finally, I provide some considerations on the importance of these developments for the emergence of the evolutionary explanations of animal faculties.

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1. Fragmenting the «Common Context»

In a seminal 1969 address, historian of science Robert Young defined natural theology as the «common context» which in early nineteenth-century Britain sanctioned the alliance between science and religion[1]. At the time, he argued, every scientific discovery was understood within an interpretative framework in which both the existence and the attributes of God could be derived from the study of nature. This common context would later be «fragmented» by the advancements of secular science culminated in the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* (1859). Thenceforth, Victorian culture would witness a significant

[1] R.M. Young, *Natural Theology, Victorian Periodicals, and the Fragmentation of a Common Context*, in C. Chant, J. Fauvel (ed. by), *Darwin to Einstein: Historical Studies on Science and Belief*, Harlow 1980, pp. 69-107.

separation of science from its early theological background, and the beginning of a potentially conflictual relationship between science and religion.

Today, the historiographical view of natural theology as «common context» is generally (and often unconsciously) taken for granted by scholars who write in support of Darwinism from an atheist or agnostic standpoint. In this case the depiction of natural theology as perfectly widespread and unchanging over the decades is functional to the portrayal of Darwinism as subversive of theological systems and religious beliefs. To give an example, evolutionary psychologist Steve Stewart-Williams has recently argued:

> Before 1859, science seemed only to strengthen the design argument. It revealed a universe with vastly more order an intricacy than anyone had expected to find: the clockwork precision of the orbit of the planets, the minute detail found in biological structures, the mathematical beauty and economy of the physical laws knitting together the universe. In revealing these hidden wonders, science increased people's awe at God's craftsmanship and ingenuity. […] This was the case, at least, until Darwin came along and stole the spotlight[2].

Another assumption which underlies accounts of this sort is that nineteenth-century natural theology was perfectly epitomized by what we now regard as its most popular expression, namely William Paley's *Natural Theology* (1802). Some scholars, for example, have described the eight *Bridgewater Treatises* (1833-34), centred as they were on the analogy between natural bodies – especially biological structures – and the products of human craftsmanship, as the mere «fine-tuning» of Paley's theological perspective[3].

In more recent years historians have significantly downplayed this view of pre-Darwinian natural theology. While it may be reasonably argued that the relationship between science and religion was less controversial in the first half of the century than in the second, yet the context of early nineteenth-century natural theology was not as straightforwardly uniform as Young and others have assumed.

[2] S. Stewart-Williams, *Darwin, God and the Meaning of Life: How Evolutionary Theory Undermines Everything You Thought You Knew*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 47-48. A similar point of view may be found in R. Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker*, Harlow 1986, p. 6; D.C. Dennett, *Atheism and Evolution*, in *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism*, ed. by M. Martin, Cambridge 2007 (see esp. pp. 147-148); V.J. Stenger, *God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows that God Does not Exist*, London 2007, esp. pp. 47-52; A. Attanasio, *Darwin. Emozione, Coscienza, e Disegno divino*, in C. Darwin, *Taccuini filosofici. Taccuini «M» e «N», Note sul senso morale, Teologia e selezione naturale*, ed. by A. Attanasio, Torino 2010, pp. VII-LIX. Natural theology has been described as a «Kuhnian paradigm» by evolutionary biologist M. Pigliucci, *Biology's Last Paradigm Shift: The Transition from Natural Theology to Darwinism*, in «Paradigmi», XXX, 2012, pp. 45-58. The same idea of the impact of Darwinism on natural theology may be found in several contributions by F.J. Ayala, e.g. *Darwin's Explanation of Design: From Natural Theology to Natural Selection*, in «Infection, Genetics and Evolution», X, 2010, pp. 840-843.

[3] This thesis is contended for in D.W. Gundry, *The Bridgewater Treatises and their Authors*, in «History», XXXI, 1946, pp. 140-152, and P. Addinall, *Philosophy and Biblical Interpretation: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Conflict*, Cambridge 1991.

To begin with, it is now clear that Paley's point of view was not nearly as generally accepted as such accounts seem to imply. There were several theologians in Britain who seriously doubted that natural theology could be invested with the apologetic importance it had played in Paley's system. In Cambridge many were alarmed by the kinship between the argument from design and philosophical deism, which was precisely one of those perspectives repudiated by orthodox theology as materialistic and irreligious[4]. Others (e.g. William Irons) were similarly concerned that an overemphasis on the natural evidence of God's existence could weaken the devotee's reliance on the Scripture: from their point of view, natural theology was apologetically not only unserviceable but dangerous. What is more, quite differently from Paley, several of the authors of the *Bridgewater Treatises* made it clear that, while they were looking for the "wisdom of God" in the expediencies and contrivances of nature, they were not providing a formal "proof" of God's existence. Rather, in their eyes it was the devotee's prior faith in God that allowed to see his hand at work in natural processes[5]. Last but not least, some theological thinkers utterly rejected the anthropomorphic propensities of natural theology, pointing at the mysteriousness of creation as the most fundamental element around which a new theological creed should be established. This stance on natural theology is well exemplified by an anonymous review appeared on the radical weekly *The Leader*, where the attempts to detect the hand of God in nature and history were denounced as no less than «blasphemies»[6].

If we confine our analysis to the works of those who wrote in support of natural theology, we find extensive disagreement concerning how they conceived God's design. As a matter of fact, the notion of a God-craftsman was being replaced by the idea that God's design resided in the general plan rather than in the minute details of nature. Such plan could reside either in the structural unity of the living, as for Richard Owen, or in the constancy of the laws governing natural phenomena. Quite evidently, the latter point of view – promoted by two

[4] Cf. A. Fyfe, *The Reception of William Paley's* Natural Theology *in the University of Cambridge*, in «British Journal for the History of Science», XXX, 1997, pp. 321-335.
[5] Cf. T. Chalmers, *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Adaptation of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man*, London 1833, vol. II, pp. 269-271, 290; J. Kidd, *On the Adaptation of External Nature to the Physical Condition of Man*, London 1833, pp. viii-ix; W. Whewell, *Astronomy and General Physics considered with reference to Natural Theology*, London 1833, pp. 343-344. On the publication and reception of the *Bridgewater Treatises* cf. J.R. Topham, *Science and Popular Education in the 1830s: the Role of the "Bridgewater Treatises"*, in «British Journal for the History of Science», XXV, 1992, pp. 397-430; Id., *Beyond the "Common Context": The Production and Reading of the "Bridgewater Treatises"*, in «Isis», LXXXIX, 1998, pp. 233-262; Id., *Biology in the Service of Natural Theology: Paley, Darwin, and the "Bridgewater Treatises"*, in *Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins*, ed. by D.R. Alexander, R.L. Numbers, Chicago-London 2010, pp. 88-113.
[6] *The Hand of God in History*, in «Leader», II, 1851, p. 109. On the theology of the *Leader* see M. Francis, *Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life*, Stocksfield 2007, chap. vii, and F. Morganti, *Evoluzionismo e teologia naturale: il caso di Herbert Spencer*, in «Esercizi filosofici», IX, 2014, pp. 27-42 (esp. pp. 31-36).

influential authors as Robert Chambers and Baden Powell[7] – was far from hostile towards an evolutionary understanding of natural processes[8]. It may be added that even Charles Darwin had been initially friendly towards the conception of "design by natural laws"[9].

Interestingly enough, the same plurality may be observed by focusing on a more limited subject such as the study of animal faculties and the problem of animal instincts. On the one hand, all natural theologians agreed on the divine origin of instincts. The operations of animals, they argued, were too well adapted to external circumstances, too uniform among the members of the same species, and too perfectly developed at birth to be attributed to experience or to the intellectual faculties of animals (provided they possessed them at all). Animal instincts revealed so perfect a design – i.e. a correspondence of means to ends – that in no way could it have been conceived by the mind of the animal. In other words, instincts amounted to a form of intelligence that outclassed the intellectual skills of animals, being the product of that higher intelligence responsible for the very existence of animal creation.

Virtually every natural theologian accepted this conception of instinct. Some version of the above line of argument may be found in the works of William Paley, John Fleming, Thomas Hancock, Alexander Crombie, Algernon Wells, John Macculloch, Henry Brougham, and others, while being still largely accepted in encyclopaedias[10]. The same view had also belonged to many eighteenth-century authors: not only natural theologians such as John Ray, William Derham, and Joseph Addison, but also philosophers of very different perspectives such as Charles Bonnet, Hermann Reimarus, and Thomas Reid. And it should not be forgotten that Isaac Newton had asserted that animals instincts «can be the effect of nothing else than the wisdom and skill of a powerful

[7] On Chambers and Powell see respectively J.A. Secord, *Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret Authorship of "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation"*, Chicago-London 2000, and P. Corsi, *Science and Religion: Baden Powell and the Anglican Debate (1800-1860)*, Cambridge 1988 (trans. It. *L'evoluzionismo prima di Darwin. Baden Powell e il dibattito anglicano, 1800-1860*, Brescia 2014).

[8] On nineteenth-century British natural theology cf. J.H. Brooke, *Natural Theology and the Plurality of Worlds: Observations on the Brewster-Whewell Debate*, in «Annals of Science», XXXIV, 1977, pp. 221-86; A. Fyfe, *Publishing and the Classics: Paley's "Natural Theology" and the Nineteenth-Century Scientific Canon*, in «Studies in History and Philosophy of Science», XXXIII, 2002, pp. 729-751; J.C. Livingstone, *Natural Sciences and Theology*, in D. Fergusson (ed. by), *The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology*, Oxford 2010, pp. 141-164.

[9] Cf. for instance P. Casini, *Darwin e la disputa sulla creazione*, Bologna 2009. Among the massive literature on Darwin's impact on natural theology see also P.J. Bowler, *Darwinism and the Argument from Design: Suggestions for a Reevaluation*, in «Journal of the History of Biology», X, 1977, pp. 29-43; D. Ospovat, *The Development of Darwin's Theory: Natural History, Natural Theology, and Natural Selection, 1838-1859*, Cambridge 1981; D. Kohn, *Darwin's Ambiguity: The Secularization of Biological Meaning*, in «British Journal for the History of Science», XXII, 1989, pp. 215-239; A. La Vergata, *L'equilibrio e la guerra della natura. Dalla Teologia naturale al darwinismo*, Napoli 1990.

[10] Cf. for instance *Instinct*, in *The Cyclopaedia; or, Universal Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Literature*, ed. by A. Rees, London 1819-20, vol. XIX, 1819 (unpaged); W.P. Alison, *Instinct*, in *The Cyclopædia of Anatomy and Physiology*, ed. by R.B. Todd, London 1836-59, vol. III, 1847, pp. 1-29.

ever living agent, who being in all places, is more able by his will to move the bodies within his boundless uniform sensorium […] than we are by our will to move the parts of our own bodies»[11].

However, in the first half of the nineteenth century natural theologians began to experience substantial disagreements over the manner in which the deity concretely directed animal behaviour by means of instinct. Was God directly controlling animal bodies the way he controlled physical bodies by means of gravitation – as implied by Newton's statement – or was he operating by means of intermediary causes? Were these causes metaphysical or physical in character? Could they be expressed in terms of general laws or not? Each of these possibilities seemed to solve important theological concerns on one side, while it opened different problems on the other. Also, beside these more genuinely theological difficulties, natural theologians began to pay more attention to the psychological side of the issue. Compared to the previous century, they were now apparently more willing to ascribe to animals some degree of intelligence. Theologically speaking, this was not without consequences, since to credit animals with intelligence was to admit that their activity was to some extent released from God's direct interposition. This in turn raised the further difficulty of establishing reliable criteria with which to relate specific behaviours either to the instinctive or to the rational faculty. What is more, among the many who assigned to animals a certain degree of intelligence there were some who believed that between the intelligence of animals and that of humans there was, after all, only a difference of degree.

The acceptance of what I shall refer to as the hypothesis of animal intelligence can be largely seen as an attempt to digest the more radical scientific and philosophical theories mostly elaborated on the continent. John Brooke has convincingly argued that nineteenth-century British natural theology was characterized by the attempt to assimilate within a theologically sustainable framework the secular science developed in France, e.g. by Laplace, Lamarck, and Saint-Hilaire[12]. It is reasonable to assert that this very process of assimilation affected the study of animal mind as well. In the first half of the century we find several sensationalist, associationist, and even transformistic assumptions circulating in the theological literature on animal faculties. This may be seen as a reaction to the philosophies of Condillac, Helvétius, Hume, Erasmus Darwin, William Smellie, and others. In the eyes of natural theologians these authors had placed too much importance on the faculties of animals and had thus disregarded God's role in the supervision of animal behaviour. Accordingly, they needed to show that those assumptions, including the hypothesis of animal intelligence, could be accepted without substantially altering the general frame of natural theology.

[11] I. Newton, *Opticks: or, A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections and Colours of Light*, 3rd ed., London 1721, p. 379.
[12] Cf. J.H. Brooke, *Scientific Thought and its Meaning for Religion: The Impact of French Science on British Natural Theology, 1827-1859*, in «Revue de synthèse», CX, 1989, pp. 33-59.

In what follows I will offer, with the above considerations in mind, a sketch of the study of animal mind in early nineteenth-century Britain. Also, in the fourth and last section I will provide some considerations on the importance of these developments of natural theology for the emergence of the evolutionary explanations of animal faculties, which seem to call for an adjustment of the image of evolutionary thinking as mere subversion of natural theology.

2. Some Explanations of God's Superintendence of Instincts: John Oliver French and William Kirby

From March to October 1824 the *Zoological Journal* published a long essay entitled *An Inquiry respecting the True Nature of Instincts*. The author was John Oliver French[13], a naturalist and natural theologian who supported a rather orthodox view of instincts. Nature, he argued, exhibited throughout its operations clear signs of a moral and intellectual agency for which no particular aggregation of matter nor natural phenomenon could be held responsible. This was true even of that portion of nature which at first sight may seem to act independently from God's decrees, i.e. the so-called «brute creation»; as a matter of fact, it was precisely in the instinctive operations of animals that God's moral and intellectual purposes were most evident.

French's argument was far from original. Since animals were evidently unable to conceive the moral and intellectual qualities they exhibited in their behaviours, nor the purposes they were attaining, there followed that those qualities and purposes had been established by a higher power endowed of both morality and intelligence. The activity of such power was the only hypothesis which could adequately account for the sagacity, the moral character, and the purposiveness of instincts. And yet, how did the deity factually superintend the actions of animals?

According to French, two were the extremes equally to be avoided. On the one hand, there were those – such as Helvétius and Erasmus Darwin – who had credited animals with the same faculties of humans. On the other, there were those who had seen animal instincts as the immediate manifestation of divine agency. The latter, French noticed, had been the opinion of English essayist Joseph Addison (1672-1719), who had written in support of the orthodox view of instinct in two papers appeared in July 1712 in Addison's own daily *The Spectator*[14]. In those pages Addison had quarrelled against the attribution of reason to animals, defending the idea that the apparent sagacity of animals could be exclusively the result of God's providence. The thesis that animal instincts were the effect of God's direct agency had been contended for also in the 31st Query of Newton's *Opticks*. Addison was probably aware of Newton's opinion,

[13] Unfortunately, I have not been able to uncover any biographical information on this author, nor to my knowledge has anybody else.
[14] Cf. *The Works of the Right Honourable Joseph Addison*, ed. by R. Hurd, 6 vols., London 1844-46, vol. II, 1844, pp. 457-464.

as he explicitly suggested that God's held to instinct the same relation he held to gravitation.

> There is not, in my opinion, anything more mysterious in nature than this instinct in animals […]. It cannot be accounted for by any properties in matter, and at the same time works after so odd a manner, that one cannot think it the faculty of an intellectual being. For my own part, I look upon it as upon the principle of gravitation in bodies, which is not to be explained by any known qualities inherent in the bodies themselves, nor from any laws of mechanism, but, according to the best notions of the greatest philosophers, is an immediate impression from the first mover, and the Divine Energy acting in the creatures[15].

The analogy between instinct and gravitation – which was destined to achieve a certain popularity in the following century[16] – was meant to indicate that instinct, not differently from Newton's principle, was to be understood as an ultimate property of bodies, which could explain certain phenomena while being unsusceptible of further explanation.

Yet, apart from agreeing on the general idea of God's responsibility in contriving animal instincts, not everyone was willing to accept the notion of God's immediate action on animal bodies[17]. According to the German deist Hermann Reimarus (1694-1768), Addison's hypothesis was contradicted by the fact that in performing their instincts animals could sometimes err. He believed that «those imperfections in the operations of animals, as well as in ours, have their true source in the limited forces of nature»[18]. From this point of view, the deity had created every kind of natural bodies, including animals, only to subsequently withdraw himself from creation.

French was similarly concerned about Addison's conception, but for different reasons. The price of ascribing instincts to the immediate action of the deity, he argued, was that of reducing animals to «perfect automata», overlooking «that sense of life and existence derived from the class of conscious powers which it is evident they possess, and which manifestly constitutes the enjoyment of sentient being»[19]. French praised Addison for correctly acknowledging that the purposiveness of instincts could not be the result of organization. Yet, he criticized him for not admitting that animals were more than mere machines. The *via media* between Addison's solution and the hypothesis of animal intelligence was the postulation of indirect control exercised by the deity upon animals. The

[15] *Ibid.,* p. 460.
[16] The analogy is alluded to, for example, in T. Hancock, *Essay on Instinct, and Its Physical and Moral Relation*, London 1824, p. 9; J. Mason Good, *The Book of Nature*, London 1826, vol. III, pp. 11-17; H. Brougham, *Dissertations on Subjects of Science connected with Natural Theology: Being the concluding volumes of the New Edition of Paley's Work*, London 1839, vol. I, pp. 64-68.
[17] Perhaps it should be added that Newton himself had not been so straightforward on the relationship between God and gravity as some later readers have implied.
[18] H.S. Reimarus, *Observations physiques et morales sur l'instinct des animaux, leur industrie e leurs moeurs*, 2 vols., Amsterdam 1770, vol. II, p. 21.
[19] J.O. French, *An Inquiry respecting the True Nature of Instincts, and of the Mental Distinction between Brute Animals and Man*, in «Zoological Journal», I, 1824, p. 5.

manner in which French conceived such intermediary agency is well epitomised by the following quote:

> Certain it is, from the wondrous indications of moral design, intellect, and science, discoverable in the actions of brute animals, that […] we must allow them to possess only a subordinate consciousness and discrimination determinable to natural objects; and overruled and directed by powers or agencies operating in them above the sphere or stream of their own proper consciousness, and which powers or agencies must be of a moral, intellectual, and scientific order: thus that brutes are governed by such agencies, good and evil, but under the control of Providence; and that such agencies act by impressions upon their conscious nature, but unperceived by it in a moral or intellectual sense; effecting such operation by means of connate inclinations implanted in their nature, and disposing them to receive the impressions; and which inclinations appear to constitute the ground or basis upon which is formed that lower species of consciousness, volition, and discrimination, which seems the proper attribute of the brute animal[20].

French was here postulating two opposing non-physical agencies respectively good and evil, i.e. angelic and demonic. He believed that only a double agency of this sort could account for the «mixed nature» of animals such as the sea lion, «the males of which species manifest the most singular tenderness towards their young progeny, and at the same time a savage and persecuting disposition towards their females»[21]. Again, he made it clear that, while they displayed some moral purpose, animals could be considered neither responsible for nor aware of those purposes. To be sure, they could be credited with a «natural» form of freedom, but not with the moral and intellectual form which, conversely, belonged exclusively to humans. To attribute humanlike faculties to animals would have rendered the bee «a perfect political moralist», and the cuckoo a rival of the most refined philosophers[22].

Animals were thus entirely devoid of intelligence: the relation between instinct and intelligence was not of affinity but, as Reimarus had argued, merely of analogy. Both faculties implied the adoption of certain means to the pursuit of certain ends; yet, in the case of instinct the correspondence of means to ends was too perfect to be the result of animal intelligence, being rather a sign of God's intelligent plan. Accordingly, reason could be defined as «a deduction of intellect within the conscious perception of the subject whose actions exhibit it», while instinct amounted to «a similar deduction of intellect, not within, but above the conscious perception of the subject whose actions exhibit it»[23].

A decade later, a rather different stance on the subject would be offered by William Kirby (1759-1850) in his own *Bridgewater Treatise*, entitled *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Creation of Animals, and in their History, Habits, and Instincts* (1835). Kirby's general purpose was to

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 7.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

reconcile «the study of the *word* of God with that of his *works*»[24]. Quite distant from Paley, he belonged to those British naturalists whose main response to scientific progress was that of reinterpreting the Scripture in the light of the latest discoveries. In Kirby's own *Bridgwater* – not differently from the others – the attempt to "prove" the existence of God from the study of natural sciences was entirely absent. He believed that while the understanding of God's design was utterly impossible, it was nonetheless human duty to seek the divine in the unfolding of natural processes:

> I shrink into very nothingness, when I reflect that such a miserable worm as I am, so fallen and corrupted, should presume to lift its thought so high, and lose itself in the depths of the unfathomable ocean of Deity. He has, however, commanded us to seek him, and assured us we shall find him if we seek him humbly and sincerely – he hath set before us his works and his words, in both of which he has revealed himself to us[25].

Affiliated to the High Church, Kirby was alarmed by the possible social consequences of the circulation of French materialistic science. Yet, reluctant to take part in the political dispute, he took up the study of natural sciences and entomology, thus fighting a rear-guard battle. Kirby's scientific ideal, interested as he was in conveying a theologically reassuring view of the new science, was perfectly embodied by the project of the *Bridgewater Treatises*. In his mind the very idea of "innovation" was intimately connected to social change and to the overturning of the *status quo*. Accordingly, in opposition to the philosophy of "second causes" – e.g. those endorsed by Laplace and Lamarck – he promoted a philosophy in which nature was organized hierarchically and God had full control of creation. The subject of instinct would prove ideal to the purpose.

Not differently from many other naturalists and natural theologians, Kirby believed that there was «no department of Zoological Science that [furnished] stronger proofs of the being and attributes of the Deity, than that which relates to the instincts of animals»[26]. He accepted the classical view of instinct as an "infusion" of knowledge operated by the deity. Referring to what was probably the most commonly employed instance of animal instincts – and later crucial testing-ground of Darwin's theory of natural selection[27] – he observed that bees were able to build a perfectly hexagonal cell only because taught «by an infallible teacher»[28]. As for French, his main problem was therefore that of ascertaining the actual instruments of God's government of animal behaviour.

Addison's supposition of God's immediate presence in the mind of animals was «contrary […] to the general plan of Divine Providence, which usually

[24] W. Kirby, *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Creation of Animals, and in their History, Habits, and Instincts*, 2nd edit., London 1835, vol. I, p. xviii.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 231.
[26] *Ibid.*, II, p. 220.
[27] See F. Prete, *The Conundrum of Honey Bees: One Impediment to the Publication of Darwin's Theory*, in «Journal of the History of Biology», 33, 1990, pp. 271-290.
[28] W. Kirby, *On the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God*, cit., II, p. 237.

produces effects indirectly, and by the intervention and action of means or secondary causes»[29]. Like Reimarus, he was also of the opinion that Addison's hypothesis did not account for the existence of errors. While undoubtedly «all instincts are from God», yet «if God were [animals'] *immediate* instructor, would it be possible for the flesh-fly, as I have seen that she does, to mistake the blossom of the carrion-plant for a piece of flesh, and lay her eggs in it; or for a hen to sit upon a piece of chalk, as they are stated to do, instead of an egg?»[30]. Nor was the problem solved by French's intermediate intelligence; as a matter of fact, the occurrence of mistakes was incompatible with the action of any heavenly intelligence. In addition, Kirby saw as entirely irrational the idea that animals were alternatively under the dominance of a good and an evil agency – that a bee, for example, could act by the interposition of a good agency when collecting pollen, and of a bad agency when stinging an enemy.

Kirby believed that instincts «invariably follow the development of the organization; are neither the result of instruction, nor of observation and experience, but the action of some external agency upon the organization, which is fitted by the Omniscient Creator to respond to its action»[31]. As instincts could not be the effect of God's direct interposition nor of some intermediate intelligence, he proposed that God made use of a number of physical agencies – namely light, fire, and air – which were biblically symbolized by the cherubim, i.e. the four-face and four-wing creatures recurrently described in the Old and New Testament (e.g. Ez 1,6; Ap 4,7-8). By operating on the brain and nerves of animals, those physical agencies were thus responsible for the execution of instinctive behaviours. Interestingly enough, Kirby conceded that God could occasionally «suspend» the regularity of this physical action on the mind of animals, allowing the influence of their own faculties, including intellect: «Sight, hearing, scent, taste, touch, perception, influence the will, and direct each animal to the points in which its instinctive actions are to commence; and so far instinct is, as it were, *mixed* with intellect»[32]. He then added that intellect was

[29] *Ibid.,* p. 230.
[30] *Ibid.,* p. 231.
[31] *Ibid.,* p. 238. Long before the appearance of his own *Bridgewater Treatise*, Kirby had co-authored – with William Spence (1783-1860) – the renowned *Introduction to Entomology* (1815-26). Curiously enough, that work had offered a rather different definition of instinct. While that work equally assumed the idea of instinct as the product of God's design, in the chapter expressly dedicated to instincts one could perceive how that idea was considered as nothing more than a «confession of ignorance». In other words, in that case – differently from Kirby's *Bridgewater* – the idea of instincts as «unknown faculties implanted in their constitution by the Creator» did not constitute a positive statement on the nature of that faculty. Such contrast is easily explained by the fact that the chapter on instinct of the *Introduction* was written by Spence ALONE, who was closer to an empiricist view of science, which in his eyes should be as free from theological assumptions as possible. In the chapter on instinct of his own *Bridgewater*, Kirby would was write: «It is not without considerable reluctance that the author of this essay takes the field, in some degree, against his worthy friend and learned coadjutor» (*op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 222). On Kirby and Spence see J.F.M. Clark, *History from the Ground Up: Bugs, Political Economy, and God in Kirby and Spence's "Introduction to Entomology" (1815-1856)*, in «Isis», XCVII, 2006, pp. 28-55.
[32] W. Kirby, *On the Power, Wisdom, and Godness of God*, cit., vol. II, p. 278.

to instinct what repulsion was to gravity, i.e. a principle of limitation capable of determining the conduct of sentient beings as the latter did with inorganic bodies.

What lesson can we draw from Kirby? His quarrel with French was emblematic of a concern that natural theologians had with the apparent imperfections of animals behaviours. This was a problem of theodicy. Not differently from others, Kirby believed that distancing God from his own creation – that is, tolerating a certain amount of autonomy in nature – was a way to relieve him from the responsibility for the imperfections which would inevitably and spontaneously occur. At the same time, his hypothesis of intermediate physical agencies as an explanation of animal instincts should be seen as a reaction towards Laplace's and Lamarck's philosophies of nature. In accepting the idea of mundane agencies acting on the nervous system of animals, Kirby was in fact arguing that the study of natural causes *per se* did not amount to a neglect of God's superintendence of the world. The whole point of Kirby's introductory analysis – not to the say of the *Bridgewater Treatises* in general – was the rejection of the "philosophy of secondary causes" and its attempt to dispense with God's active role in the unfolding of natural processes. At the same time, scientific analysis required that some distance be set between God and nature, in order to allow the very inquiry into the laws of nature which was at the core of scientific enterprise, and which no credible theology of nature could do without.

It may be argued that this was a quite unstable compromise. God operated by means of secondary causes, yet he was not responsible for the occurrence of imperfections; laws of nature were independent enough to be the object of scientific study, yet they ought to be seen as the result of God's providential plan. The boundary between God and nature was, to say the least, still uncertain.

Few years later, a completely different answer to the problems raised by the study of animal faculties would be provided by he who may be regarded as the most important scholar of animal psychology of the first half of the nineteenth century, i.e. British statesmen Henry Brougham. As we shall see, Brougham would retrocede to a Newtonian-like view of God's government of animal instincts, but at the same time his conception would prove much more radical, and to some extent more secular, than any natural theology had been before.

3. Henry Brougham and the Hypothesis of Animal Intelligence

Paley's *Natural Theology* was not without its readers and supporters. Between 1835 and 1839 Scottish physician Charles Bell (1774-1842) – formerly author of the fourth *Bridgewater Treatise* – and British statesman Henry Brougham (1778-1868) coedited a new illustrated edition of Paley's book. The two-volume new edition was preceded by *A Discourse of Natural Theology* (1835) and followed by the two-volume *Dissertations on Subjects of Science connected with Natural Theology* (1839) both written by Brougham. Brougham was a Whig politician who had been one of the founders of the *Society for the Diffusion*

of the Useful Knowledge (1826), before serving as Lord Chancellor under the government of Charles Grey (1830-34). In the 1830s he was pleased by the success of the *Bridgewater Treatises*, in which he saw a form of theologically safe science which could serve the purpose of educating the lower classes. As explained by J.R. Topham, in his eyes the *Bridgewater* provided «a working epitome of contemporary science, uncorrupted by radical ideas, and set out in a relatively systematic and introductory form – exactly the sort of meat which the Broughamites thought would produce rationality, respectability and religion among the working classes»[33].

In the *Discourse* Brougham defended the idea of natural theology as a necessary auxiliary to revealed theology: «All the soundest arguments in behalf of the latter presuppose the former to be admitted»[34]. The miracles on which the latter is based could be due to «fraud or malice», and thus could never constitute alone a solid foundation of Christian theology. Those miracles could be the proof solely of some supernatural powers, without representing in themselves a testimony of either the wisdom or the goodness of their author. Accordingly, «it is plain that no sufficient evidence can ever be given by direct Revelation alone in favour of the great truths of religion»[35].

The main thesis of the *Discourse* was the exact coincidence between the inductive inquiry and the inference of design. For instance, the scientific facts constituting the anatomical knowledge of the eye were proofs of intelligent adaptation to light *per se*, and the same held for the most important truths of anatomy and natural history. Once established that certain structures served certain purposes, the existence of an intelligently ordered plan was already ascertained, without requiring further argumentative passages.

> These are facts learnt by induction; the inductive science of dynamics shows us that such mechanism is calculated to answer the end which, in point of fact, is attained. To conclude from thence that the mechanist contrived the means with the intention of producing this end, and with the knowledge of the science, is also strictly an inference of induction[36].

Needless to say, the same held for instincts[37]. Brougham regarded instincts as mental phenomena «wholly unconnected with any exercise of animal reason»[38].

[33] J.R. Topham, *Science and Popular Education in the 1830s*, cit., p. 420. On Brougham's effort to popularize science among the lower classes see J.G. Crowther, *Statesmen of Science*, London 1965, pp. 9-73. On his philosophical approach cf. G.N. Cantor, *Henry Brougham and the Scottish Methodological Tradition*, in «Studies in History and Philosophy of Science», II, 1971, pp. 69-89. Lastly, for an analysis of the *Discourse* and its reception cf. J.D. Yule, *The Impact of Science on British Religious Thought in the Second Quarter of the Nineteenth Century*, Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge 1976, pp. 187-235.
[34] H. Brougham, *A Discourse of Natural Theology, showing the Nature of Evidence and the Advantages of the Study*, London 1835, p. 202.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 207.
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 37.
[37] *Ibid.,* pp. 56-68.
[38] *Ibid.,* p. 73.

While animals were not entirely devoid of reason, the rationality intrinsic to their instincts was something for which only the deity could be responsible. In each particular case, deciding whether a certain behaviour was due to instinct or to reason might not be an easy task. Yet, in principle, the distinction between the two faculties was unquestionable. Rational actions were described as those «which vary with circumstances novel and unexpectedly varying; they imply therefore the adaptation of means to an end, and the power of varying those means when obstacle arise»[39]. Conversely, pure instincts had nothing to do with the faculty of reason and were thus to be considered as cogent proofs of design. Bee-cells, for instance, were the same in every part of the world, equally perfect and equally crucial to the survival of the species. Their perfection was obviously due to such a geometrical ability that could belong to nobody else but the creator of the bees. Again, the inference from nature to design was implied in the very observation of instincts: «The process of reasoning is not like, but identical with, that by which we infer the existence of design in others (than ourselves) with whom we have daily intercourse. The kind of evidence is not like, but identical with, that by which we conduct all the investigations of intellectual and natural science»[40]. This amounted to saying that to infer God's plan from the observation of nature was epistemologically identical to inferring an intentional mind from any other purposive human behaviour. By the same token, one could not deny the existence of design without doubting the very existence of the mind of the others.

The first volume of Brougham's *Dissertations* would be entirely devoted to problems of animal psychology. That work was a long dialogue between Brougham and John Charles Spencer, Viscount Althorp (1782-1845), who had served as Chancellor of the Exchequer under the government of Charles Grey. Around 1836 between the two it had occurred an epistolary exchange precisely on the issue of instinct. Historian Joe Bord has confirmed that the content of the the letters and that of book are substantially coincident[41].

In the book Brougham endorsed a rather classical distinction between instinct and reason. In acting instinctively, he wrote, «the animal works positively without knowledge and in the dark. She also works without designing anything, and yet she works to a certain defined an important purpose»[42]. Instincts displayed an amount of knowledge which could not have been derived from experience. Besides, instincts were infallible and uniform among the members of the same species. Rational behaviour diverged from instinctive not in grade but in kind: a rationally acting animal would operate «intending and meaning, and, in a word, designing to do what he accomplishes»[43]. The choice of the verb "to design" was far from accidental. Brougham was hinting at the thesis –

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[40] *Ibid.,* p. 78.
[41] Cf. J. Bord, *Science and Whig Manners: Science and Political Style in Britain, c. 1790-1850*, Basingstoke-New York 2009, pp. 94-101.
[42] H. Brougham, *Dissertations*, cit., vol. I, p. 18.
[43] *Ibid.*

already contended for in the *Discourse* – according to which the epistemological warranty concerning God's design was the same as in the purposive actions of sentient individuals. Any action displaying purpose is to be referred to some sort of intelligence. Some of these actions, however, are too perfect, too sophisticated to be the product of any mundane intelligence, and they are thus accountable for only in terms of God's providential plan.

This point would soon mark the divergence between the two discussants, a divergence which we may take as representative of two different positions circulating at the time among natural theologians. Althorp did in fact endorse the view that God acted on the mind of animals by means of laws, identified in turn in the sense of "gratification" triggered by the execution of certain actions. On the other hand, by referring to the position of Newton and Addison, Brougham adopted the hypothesis of God's immediate presence in the mind of animals. What is here important to stress is the absolute consistency between Brougham's view of the divine government of instincts and his own epistemological approach to the theory of design. In his opinion, the very analogical foundation which required an explanation of natural phenomena in terms of "design" was a good reason to endorse Newton and Addison's view. He believed that the only possible warranty for the attribution of some purposive phenomenon to an intelligent cause was a comparison with one's own intelligence. But when we perceive design in ourselves, we only perceive some sort of volition or intention, rather than the operation of some law. Accordingly, in Brougham's opinion, the idea of explaining purposiveness in terms of laws, as implied by Althorp, was entirely unwarranted from an inductive point of view: for that was not the sort of design that natural philosophers were allowed to infer, nor the individuals to attribute to each other in ordinary life. Conversely, what individuals attributed to each other was the action of a mental principle, of an intelligence, directly exerting its powers during the execution of purposive behaviour. Accordingly, «we have reached the important position, that our argument for the existence of a designing cause at all in the universe rests on no better, indeed on no other foundation, that our argument that instinctive action proves an interposition of the Deity at each moment»[44].

Nor Brougham found any value in the classical objection based on the occurrence of mistakes. Since God acted directly on the mind of animals, so the objection goes, he should be held responsible for those mistakes; as in the case of the flies which, mistaking the smell of the flower *Stapelia irsuta* for that of putrefying meat, lay their eggs where they cannot breed their offspring. In Althorp's opinion such mistakes were easily explained by the hypothesis of a desire implanted in the mind of the animal, «for the law would be to follow that smell, and this law is obeyed»[45]. And yet, since that law would still operate according to God's design, Brougham replied, the difficulty would be the same in one case as in the other. Was there not, in Althorp's hypothesis, «a defect, or

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 95.
[45] *Ibid.,* p. 108.

imperfection in the general law, detracting, *pro tanto*, from its adaptation to work its undoubted purpose? […] Then is it not just as inconsistent with His perfections, to believe He has made a faulty statute, as to suppose that He makes a mistake in particular cases?»[46].

Brougham's position may appear rather conservative. Not only did he accepted the traditional view of instinct, but he also endorsed a rather "invasive" view of the action of the deity which, although for very precise epistemological reasons, seemed to rule out the possibility of inquiring into the laws of instinctive behaviour. Instinct, not differently from gravitation, may explain certain phenomena but was not in itself susceptible of any explanation. And yet, precisely the inductive method which he rigorously clung to would lead Brougham to endorse two controversial positions: the hypothesis of animal intelligence, and the view that between the mind of animals and that of humans there was a mere difference of degree.

As we have seen, Brougham firmly believed that instinct and intelligence were two radically distinct faculties. For this reason he rejected the positions of Erasmus Darwin and William Smellie, who had rendered the distinction between instinct and intelligence far too feeble. Because of their undeniable constancy over time, instincts could not have, as Darwin had believed[47], a "traditional" origin: «The bee, 6000 years ago, made its cells as accurately, and the wasp its paper as perfectly, as they now do»[48].

However, all this did not prevent Brougham from observing that intelligence was not exclusive of humans. Nearly half of the first book was in fact devoted to the issue of animal intelligence. Brougham and Althorp could easily provide a long list of instances which seemed to prove the case[49]. Curiously enough, one of these instances came precisely from the *Zoonomia*, where Darwin had described a wasp removing the wings of a fly it had preyed upon, in order not to be caught in the wind when carrying it; an instance which in Darwin's opinion indicated no less than «the power of reason in a wasp, *as it is exercised among men*»[50].

Yet Brougham was aware that the whole issue of animal intelligence could not be settled solely by listing instances of presumed intelligent actions, requiring on the contrary the establishment of reliable criteria with which to tell intelligent from instinctive behaviours. He thus resorted to a number of empirical criteria based on the observation of the animal in either common or unusual circumstances. An action performed in ordinary circumstances could be both instinctive or intelligence. It was undoubtedly instinctive if it consisted in something which reason alone could not accomplish, as in the case of bee-cells. In other cases, it was reasonable to conclude that some degree of intelligence was

[46] *Ibid.,* p. 109.
[47] Cf. E. Darwin, *Zoonomia; or, the Laws of Organic Life*, London 1794-96, vol. I, 1794, pp. 135-184.
[48] H. Brougham, *Dissertations*, cit., vol. I, p. 26.
[49] *Ibid.,* pp. 119-134.
[50] E. Darwin, *Zoonomia*, cit., vol. I, p. 183, italics added.

at work: «I mean where the means are varied, adapted, and adjusted to a varying object, or where the animal acts in artificial circumstances in any way»[51].

Not surprisingly, such strictly inductive (but one may also say anecdotal) approach led Brougham to criticise the view that regarded intelligence as proportional to the size of the brain[52]. The adoption of such view – which had been contended for by Lamarck and Julien-Joseph Virey – would imply overlooking the numberless instances of intelligence among insects, such as those listed in Kirby and Spence's *Introduction to Entomology*. To Brougham, that criterion should appear entirely arbitrary, based as it was on the unwarranted and aprioristic assumption of a strict correspondence between mental development and organic complexity. The sole reliable criterion was thus the observation of a certain behaviour in relation to circumstances. The parasitic behaviour of the cuckoo, for example, could not be the result of mere instinct, «for there are abundant proofs of her also building when she cannot find a nest, and then she lays in her own, and hatches and rears her brood»[53]; a statement in defence of which Brougham did not hesitate to refer to the great adversary of the theological doctrine of instinct, i.e. Erasmus Darwin[54].

Yet there was another not too popular opinion which Brougham contended for on similar bases, namely the existence of a mere difference of degree between the intellectual abilities of animals and those of humans. Brougham argued that no animal was devoid of consciousness and of a passive form of memory. In addition, animals could be also credited with both abstraction and comparison. Brougham observed that no human being, no matter how «stupid», was entirely devoid of the power of classifying things, which he considered as an entirely automatic inferential ability: «He can tell a man from a horse. How? By attending to those things in which they differ»[55]. Any person provided with eyes and the faculty of language would be perfectly capable of indicating as "white" both a piece of paper and a spot of snow. Therefore, the question became whether it was reasonable to deny the same ability to animals. In Brougham's opinion this was not the case:

> Unquestionably all animals know their mates and their own kind. A dog knows his master, knows that he is not a dog, and that he differs from other men. In these very ordinary operations we see the animal mind at one time passing over certain resemblances and fixing on differences; at another time disregarding differences and fixing only on resemblances. Nay, go lower in the scale. A bull is enraged by a red colour, be the form of the body what you please. A fish is caught by means of a light, be it of any size or any form[56].

[51] H. Brougham, *Dissertations*, cit., vol. I, p. 135.
[52] *Ibid.,* pp. 154-167.
[53] *Ibid.,* p. 148.
[54] *Ibid.,* p. 149.
[55] *Ibid.,* p. 193.
[56] *Ibid.,* p. 194.

These were not, as Althorp argued, the result of mere sensation. In the case of a raging bull, for instance, the received sensation included both a certain shape and a certain colour, and yet the animal ignored the first and concentrated on the second, an operation possible solely on the basis of the faculty of abstraction. As if not enough, Brougham argued that animals were able to employ «conventional signs» by means of which they communicated with each other.

> How else are we to explain their calls? The cock grouse calls the hen; the male the female of many animals. The pigeon and the fieldfare and the crow make signals; and the wild horse is a clear case of signals. All this implies not only Abstraction, but that very kind of Abstraction which gives us our language. It is in fact a language which they possess, though simple and limited in its range[57].

Thus, the faculty of abstraction lay at the foundation of animal language, no less than it lay at the foundation of human language, although in the former case it was not combined to an equally developed ability of articulating sounds.

Conclusively, Brougham could argue that the difference between the mind of animals and that of humans was merely of degree. The lesser development of animals was still responsible for the lesser advancements they had made in the course of history: «Clearly this different external conformation, together with their inferior degree of reason, is sufficient to account for brutes having been stationary, and for their being subdued to our use, as the Deity intended they should, when He appointed this difference»[58]. In Brougham's opinion the hypothesis of a difference of degree was thus entirely sufficient to account for the incredibly different results accomplished by animals and humans respectively.

More importantly, Brougham was convinced that both the hypothesis of animal intelligence and that of the difference of degree left completely untouched the theory of design. Not only did he referred to the «station» accorded by the Creator to each species, but he explicitly asserted that any hypothesis concerning animal mind would leave wholly unaltered the inference of design: «The whole question is one of relations and connexions. Adaptation, adjustment, mutual dependence of parts, conformity of arrangement, balance, and compensations, everywhere appear pervading the whole system, and conspicuous in all its parts»[59]. As long as they acknowledged such relations, then, Brougham's hypotheses were thus far from jeopardising the theory of design.

The case of Brougham is thus an indication of the fact that the whole idea of animal intelligence was no longer intolerable to natural theology[60].

[57] *Ibid.,* p. 196.
[58] *Ibid.,* pp. 198-199.
[59] *Ibid.,* p. 205.
[60] To be sure, Brougham had not been the first natural theologian to contend for the hypothesis of animal intelligence. See for instance J. Fleming, *The Philosophy of Zoology; or a General View of the Structure, Function, and Classification of Animals*, Edinburgh-London 1822, vol. I, pp. 215-241; W. Kirby and W. Spence, *An Introduction to Entomology: or Elements of the Natural History of Insects*, 5th edit., London 1828, vol. II, pp. 460-523; A. Wells, *On Animal Instinct: A Lecture delivered before the members of the Mechanics' Institute, Colchester, on Monday evening, November 25, 1833*, Colchester 1834; J. Macculloch, *Proofs and Illustrations of the Attributes*

While natural theologians had formerly seen in that hypothesis an inadmissible exception to God's supervision of nature, now they were induced to downplay that assumption in response to those philosophies, such as Erasmus Darwin's, which had emphasised the ability of animals of acting intelligently, i.e. of adapting their behaviour according to varying circumstances. Consequently, the idea of unintelligent animals was no longer an inalienable element of the theory of design. In the last section I shall briefly discuss the special role played by Brougham in the development of Charles Darwin's views on instincts, before turning to some general considerations concerning the first developments of evolutionary psychology.

4. The Descent of Evolution

R.J. Richards was the first to notice how Charles Darwin was induced to test natural selection as an explanation of instincts only after reading Brougham's *Dissertations*[61]. Previously he had accepted the "Lamarckian" (so to speak) notion of instinct as "hereditary habit", i.e. the hypothesis that instincts were nothing but habits acquired by individuals and then passed on to their offspring. The reading of Brougham convinced him that for many instincts such explanation did not hold. To give an example, where Brougham described the ability of bees of using, like the finest geometricians, the minimum of wax required to build their cells, Darwin scribbled on his copy of the book: «astonishing on my Th[eory] that infinite attempts should have reach the perfection which mathematics requires – this instinct has same relation to geometry, which the eye has to optics»[62]. As we know, the stance of natural theology – that is, the idea of instinct as concretion of divine intelligence – was based on the impossibility of attributing any complex behaviour to the individual faculties of animals, including intelligence. Yet this was precisely the kind of hypothesis on which Darwin had been working. Now he clearly saw that it was not plausible that the bee had gradually acquired the knowledge required for the construction of the cells. In order not to fall back to the theory of design, he had to look for an alternative explanation; the most obvious he could resort to was natural selection.

of God, from the Facts and Laws of the Physical Universe: Being the Foundation of Natural and Revealed Religion, 3rd edit., London 1843, vol. I, pp. 509-554. On Fleming and Macculloch see respectively J. Burns, *John Fleming and the Geological Deluge*, in «British Journal for the History of Science», XL, 2007, pp. 205-225, and G. Hull, *John MacCulloch, MD (1773-1835): A Dedicated Geologist*, in «Journal of Medical Biography», XV, 2007, pp. 235-240.

[61] R.J. Richards, *Instinct and Intelligence in British Natural Theology: Some Contribution to Darwin's Theory of the Evolution of Behavior*, in «Journal of the History of Biology», XIV, 1981, pp. 193-230. See also F. Morganti, *Darwin e l'intelligenza degli animali: dai "Notebooks" al saggio sui vermi*, in *Darwiniana. Evoluzione e comunicazione. Dai vermi all'intelligenza artificiale*, ed. by S. Bucchi and S. Gensini, Pisa 2014, pp. 25-39 (esp. pp. 27-31).

[62] M.A. Di Gregorio (ed. by), *Charles Darwin's Marginalia: Vol. 1*, with the assistance of N.W. Gill, New York 1990, p. 93.

What is here interesting to observe is that Darwin was induced to apply the hypothesis of natural selection to the origin of instincts only after getting better acquainted with a traditional argument of natural theology, i.e. the alleged absurdity of the hypothesis that the most astonishing skills of animals rested on their rational faculty. What he did was to turn this argument against the theory of hereditary habits he had previously adhered to. This in turn suggests that between the two conflicting hypotheses he acknowledged the existence of a common ground, namely the assumption of the somehow intelligent nature of instincts.

Yet the influence of natural theology on Darwin was not solely of this negative kind. In early 1839 he had written on one of the folios of his *Notebook* N: «L[r]. Brougham Dissert. on subject connected with Nat. Theology. – says animal have abstraction because they understand signs. – very profound. – concludes that difference of intellect between animals & men only in Kind. – probably very important work»[63]. That Darwin spoke in eulogy of the idea of a difference «only in kind» was evidently due to a *lapsus*, considering that Brougham himself had utterly rejected the thesis of «an essential and specific diversity» between the mind of animals and that of humans[64]. Thus, in Brougham's work Darwin found an important validation of the theses of animal intelligence and of the difference of degree. Other examples of animal intelligence Darwin would find in the works of William Spence, Jonathan Couch, and Edward P. Thompson[65] (among the others).

Yet, it is my contention that what exerted an enormous influence on the early developments of evolutionary psychology was the very assumption that instinct amounted to a form of intelligence. This oriented the theoretical and empirical study of animal faculties, which would now consider the intelligence of instinct as truly belonging to animals rather than being instilled by the deity.

One way of reinterpreting such assumption may be found in Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Psychology* (1855). Spencer conceived life and mind in terms of correspondence between internal and external changes. In Spencer's very definition of life and mind the idea of a fundamental adaptation between organism and environment was implied. The acknowledgment of such correspondence belonged equally to Spencer and natural theologians. What changed was the explanation: it could be asserted, wrote Spencer, either that «there is a pre-established harmony between the inner and outer relations», or that this harmony «arises from the fact, that the outer relations produce the inner relations»[66]. Thenceforth, Spencer would show how intelligence could be decomposed to its ultimate elements, namely the cognitions of likeness and unlikeness between external objects, and then followed in its historical growth,

[63] P.H. Barrett *et al.* (ed. by), *Charles Darwin's Notebooks, 1836-1844: Geology, Transmutation of Species, Metaphysical Enquiries*, Ithaca 1987, p. 580.
[64] H. Brougham, *Dissertations*, cit., vol. I, p. 199.
[65] Cf. J. Couch, *Illustrations of Instinct, deduced from the habits of British Animals*, London 1847, and E.P. Thompson, *The Passions of Animals*, London 1851.
[66] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology*, London 1855, p. 523.

dependent on a process of mental association. Clearly, then, he maintained the assumption that the laws of nature were somehow framed so as to preserve a fundamental balance between each life-form and its environment. Obviously, rather than ascribing such balance to the deity, he explained it as a result of natural adaptation. Yet he did not get rid of the belief in a beneficial and spontaneous congruence between the inner faculties of creatures and the outer circumstances in which they operated. In Spencer's account, as soon as the circumstances grew in complexity, organisms developed more complex forms of cognition which allowed them to respond properly to those changes. In this perspective, the possibility of a failure in the adaptive process was barely taken into consideration, and the nature itself of the process allowed Spencer to optimistically envision a future of perfect «adjustment» of life to external conditions[67]. While he renounced the deity of natural theology, Spencer preserved the conviction that the course of evolution, and the historical development of mind, exhibited throughout its unfolding the marks of harmonious adaptation and «beneficent necessity».

The other way in which nineteenth-century evolutionary thought naturalized, or rather "mundanised", intelligence lied in the theory of instinct as "lapsed intelligence". The expression was coined in the early 1870s by George Lewes, in an article on *Nature* in which he saluted Douglas A. Spalding's recent experiments on young chicks as a validation of the hypothesis advanced in his forthcoming *Problems of Life and Mind*[68]. Here he argued that instinct, while «frequently cited to prove the doctrine of Innate Ideas, may best serve to illustrate the doctrine of evolution». Then he explained:

> The marvel and mystery of Instinct naturally render it a favourite topic in the writings of those who oppose the experiential School. Instinct is often regarded as so superior to Intelligence in the certainty of its action, that nothing except Creative Wisdom is admitted in explanation of it; while from other sides it is regarded as so removed from all community with Intelligence, that it is declared to be the blind action of a mechanism, not the operation of a rational Soul. Psychogenesis seems to me to teach the direct contrary of all this. It teaches that Instinct is organised Experience: i.e., *undiscursive* Intelligence […][69].

Three elements from this passage need to be emphasized: first, Lewes's denial that the existence of instincts constituted in itself a refutation of empiricism; second, his belief that to explain the origin of instincts there was no need to invoke the intervention of the deity; and third, his suggestion that between instinct and intelligence there was no clear demarcation, instinct being itself a form of intelligence.

In this article I have provided a sketch of the debate on animal faculties occurred in pre-Darwinian nineteenth-century natural theology. My main concern was to highlight the diversity and richness of the solutions offered to the problem of instinct by natural theologians, as opposed to the historical view

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 620.
[68] G.H. Lewes, *Instinct*, in «Nature», VII, 1873, pp. 437-438.
[69] G.H. Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind*, 5 vols., London 1874-98, vol. I, 1874, p. 226.

of natural theology as an unchanging set of beliefs, at least until the appearance of Darwin's *Origin*. The last point I am here making is that the emphasis of evolutionists on the intelligent origin of instincts – i.e. the hypothesis that instincts originated as intelligent actions, which were then rendered automatic by repetition and were finally passed on to the progeny – is accountable for only by reference to the conception of instinct which for a long time was held by most natural theologians. In other words, their insistence on the intelligent character of instincts was due to the natural-theological background that still permeated the culture of their time. The hypothesis of "lapsed intelligence" – which in the following years would be further explored by George J. Romanes[70] – was thus meant to replace the old theory of instinct as divine intelligence. As an indirect validation of this hypothesis, it could be easily shown that in late nineteenth century those who contended for a view of evolution still tinged with natural theology were far from friendly towards the hypothesis of lapsed intelligence, which they saw as an unwarranted attribution to nature of a feature (namely, intelligence) which could only belong to the Creator[71]. However, an in-depth analysis of the late-Victorian debates on animal instincts is necessarily to be postponed to a future occasion.

[70] Cf. for instance G.J. Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals: With a Posthumous Essay on Instinct by Charles Darwin*, London 1883. On Romanes see R.J. Richards, *Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior*, Chicago-London 1987, pp. 331-385; J.S. Schwartz, *Out of Darwin's Shadow: George John Romanes's Efforts to Popularize Science in "Nineteenth Century" and Other Victorian Periodicals*, in «Victorian Periodicals Review», XXXV, 2002, pp. 133-159; F. Morganti, *Intelligence as the Plasticity of Instinct: George J. Romanes and Darwin's Earthworms*, in «Theoretical Biology Forum», CIV, 2011, pp. 29-46.

[71] Cf. R.H. Hutton, *Is "Lapsed Intelligence" a Probable Origin for Complex Animal Instincts?*, London 1878; R.H. Hutton, *Instinct and Design*, in «The Spectator», LVIII, 1885, pp. 306-307 (reprinted in Id., *Aspects of Religious and Scientific Thought*, ed. by E.M. Roscoe, London 1899, pp. 120-127); St. G.J. Mivart, *Instinct and Reason*, «Contemporary Review», XXV, 1874, pp. 763-788; St. G.J. Mivart, *Organic Nature's Riddle*, in «Fortnightly Review», XXXVII, 1885, pp. 323-337, 519-531; W.L. Gildea *et al.*, *Symposium: Is There Evidence of Design in Nature?*, in «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society», I, 1889-90, pp. 49-76. See also Romanes's reply to Mivart: *Professor Mivart on Instinct*, in «Fortnightly Review», XXXVIII, 1885, pp. 90-101.

Articoli/7

La théologie à la campagne

Exorcisme et excommunication des insectes en France au XVIII[e] siècle

Éric Baratay

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The requests for the authorisation to excommunicate or exorcise harmful animals provide a glimpse into the cultural and religious depths of the 18th century. They give the reasons, the ceremonies demanded and the hopes raised. They also bring the compromises traded between orthodox theological interpretations and the ideas of the majority, the confusion maintained here and there, and thus the various ways of handling holy affairs. They also shed light on the peasants' perceptions of agricultural scourges, popular and cultivated conceptions of the animal and its place in nature and religion.

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La question de l'animal agite la pensée philosophique depuis l'Antiquité et la pensée théologique depuis la christianisation[1] mais les débats suscités ne sont pas gratuits. Ils ont des répercussions concrètes dans la vie quotidienne, jusque dans les campagnes les plus reculées comme en témoigne l'usage d'exorcismes d'insectes au XVIII[e] siècle en France, au moins dans le diocèse de Besançon pour lequel les archives[2] ont conservé 110 lettres de clercs de paroisses ou de laïcs demandant à l'archevêché l'autorisation d'excommunier ou d'exorciser des animaux ravageant les cultures. Cela concerne 97 paroisses entre 1729 et 1762, avec une forte concentration en 1755-1757 et 1761-1762[3]. Voici l'une de ces lettres:

[1] Pour celle-ci, voir J. Voisenet, *Bestiaire chrétien. L'imagerie animale des auteurs du Haut Moyen Âge (V[e]-XI[e] s.)*, Toulouse 1994, et Id., *Bêtes et hommes dans le monde médiéval, le bestiaire des clercs du V[e] au XII*e *siècle*, Tournai 2000; É. Baratay, *L'Église et l'animal (France, XVII[e]-XX[e] siècle)*, Paris 1996.

[2] Archives départementales du Doubs, cartons G 121 (1729-1756) et G 122 (1757 à 1762).

[3] 1729: 1; 1730: 2; 1753: 1; 1755: 8; 1756: 21; 1757: 24; 1761: 5; 1762: 21; non datées: 27, mais leur rangement intercalé semble suggérer leur date, ce qui donnerait 1755: 15; 1756: 33; 1757: 28; 1762: 25. Sept demandes sont en latin, les autres en français.

à Cendrey ce 1er may 1756. Monsieur, je viens vous prier de faire expédier une permission pour excommunier les insectes qui sont dans la paroisse de Cendrey et comme mr le Curé est absent de demander que son vicaire aye la permission de les excommunier parce que le besoin est pressant agréer mes respects les plus profonds c'est dans ces sentiments que j'aye l'honneur d'être Monsieur votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur Floquet ptre vicaire de Cendrey le présent porteur vous remettra l'argent qu'il faudra.

Gardons-nous de croire en une pratique extraordinaire. L'excommunication et l'exorcisme d'animaux sont attestés en Europe du XIV[e] siècle au début du XIX[e] siècle. En France, il y eut un procès avec excommunication de coléoptères ravageant les vignes en Maurienne en 1587, une autorisation du pape Paul V pour exorciser des dauphins décimant les bancs de poissons à Marseille en 1612, une autre, la même année, de l'évêque d'Autun contre des nuisibles, des adjurations de chenilles à Aix-en-Provence en 1623 et 1636, dans le diocèse de Clermont en 1670, celui de Grenoble en 1673, etc[4]. Ces rites ont été peu étudiés[5] bien que la peur des mauvaises récoltes, des famines, des disettes ou des chertés ait longtemps tenaillé les populations et que les dégâts occasionnés par les animaux ravageurs pouvaient être considérables. Dans ce diocèse de Besançon, des prêtres parlent de pertes totales, d'anéantissement, de privation de récoltes, de grande misère. Les fléaux agricoles n'ont toutefois suscité que quelques études centrées sur les lectures chrétiennes[6] tandis que les remèdes proposés par l'Église, pourtant longtemps la seule à en offrir, sont rarement évoqués[7].

1. L'occasion des calamités agricoles

Monsieur, Les armées innombrables de rats qui ravagent les campagnes, portant partout la désolation et l'effroi, ont engagé mes paroissiens à recourir aux remèdes salutaires que leur offre l'église cette tendre mère dans de si affreuses conjonctures. Je vous prie, donc, monsieur, de m'accorder la permission de satisfaire leurs désirs en invoquant le ciel par les prières et cérémonies accoutumées, pour obtenir de dieu l'extinction d'un fléau si terrible.

[4] É. Baratay, *L'Église et l'animal (France, XVIIe-XXe siècle)*, cit., partie 1.
[5] B. Arbel, *Sauterelles et mentalités: le cas de la Chypre vénitienne*, en «Annales E.S.C.», XLIV, 5, 1989, p. 1057-1074; C. Chêne, *Juger les vers. Exorcismes et procès d'animaux dans le diocèse de Lausanne (XV[e]-XVI[e] siècle)*, Lausanne, Cahiers Lausannois d'histoire médiévale, 1995.
[6] J. Desanges, *Témoignages antiques sur le fléau acridien*, in *L'homme face aux calamités naturelles dans l'Antiquité et le Moyen Âge*, éd. par J. Jouanna et al., Paris 2006, p. 221-235; M.-C. Pitassi, *Je châtie tous ceux que j'aime: la providence en question*, in *L'invention de la catastrophe au XVIII[e] siècle*, éd. par. A.-M. Mercier-Faivre et C. Thomas, Paris 2008, p. 63-74; L. Secondy, *Quand l'Église faisait la pluie et le beau temps*, in *Météorologie et catastrophes naturelles dans la France méridionale à l'époque moderne*, éd. par A. Blachard et al., Montpellier 1993, p. 101-110; F. Walter, *Catastrophes. Une histoire culturelle, XVI[e]-XXI[e] siècle,* Paris 2008, p. 37.
[7] N. Lemaître, *Prier pour les fruits de la terre. Pour une étude des bénédictions* in *Fêtes et liturgie*, Madrid 1988, p. 103-120; J. Delumeau, *Un dossier de bénédictions*, in *Idem*, p. 291-298. Ces rites ont aussi été un peu étudié en Europe, de A. Franz, *Die kirchlichen Benediktionen in Mittelalter*, Freibourg im Brisgau 1909, à P. Boglioni, *Il santo et gli animali nell'Alto Medioevo*, in *L'uomo di fronte al mondo animale nell'Alto Medioevo*, Spoleto 1985, II, p. 935-991.

Comme celle du curé de Franxault, datée du 5 septembre 1753, les lettres commencent souvent par l'évocation des animaux. Les deux tiers ne parlent que d'«insectes», voire de «*nociva animalia*», sans doute en paraphrasant le rituel local («*Conjuro vos insecta et nociva animalia* [...]»)[8]. Les autres messages citent des «poux et autres insectes», des «rats, chenilles, grenouilles et autres insectes», «les insectes et en particulier [...] les souris» à Dommartin, etc. Voici la liste des animaux accusés: insectes (90 mentions), chenilles (8), vermisseaux (6), vermines (5), sauterelles (2), hannetons (2), poux (2), rats (2), souris (2), moucherons (1), grenouilles (1). Notre sentiment de confusion vient du fait que nous ne vivons plus dans le même univers culturel. Ce qui nous semble désigner des catégories vagues, ou proches voire synonymes, ou très éloignées, est en fait amalgamé ou différencié par les situations: les vermisseaux sont associés à la destruction des racines des blés, les vermines à l'attaque des arbres, et les souris aux ravages des semailles, en étant ainsi distinguées des rats. Autrement dit, les animaux sont définis *par ce qu'ils font et non par ce qu'ils sont*. Nous avons là un exemple de cette zoologie populaire en vigueur jusqu'au début du XX^{e} siècle, qui classe les bêtes selon des analogies de comportement ou d'attitude vis-à-vis des hommes, pas en fonction des morphologies

Ce ne sont pas les naturalistes de l'époque qui pourraient inciter à penser autrement, car ils ne s'accordent pas sur la notion d'espèce et sur sa pertinence. Alors que Linné prône une conception close et étanche (ensemble d'individus semblables engendrant, par la reproduction, d'autres individus semblables aux premiers), Buffon la rejette et soutient l'idée d'une porosité des espèces, qui se rejoindraient et se combineraient par les hybrides. Cela ne facilite pas le travail d'identification et de différenciation, par exemple des insectes et des myriapodes dont l'habituelle confusion est présente dans nos demandes amalgamant insectes, chenilles, vermisseaux, vermines. Le mélange est accru par la vieille croyance en la génération spontanée, faisant naître les bêtes de la matière, minorant la ressemblance morphologique au profit du contexte d'apparition censé être le vrai générateur, une idée évoquée depuis longtemps, d'Aristote à saint Augustin, encore en débat chez les savants de l'époque et bien perceptible dans ces campagnes lorsque les prieurs de la confrérie de saint Vernier écrivent que «les pluies presque continuelles dans cette province ont formé un grand nombre d'insectes particulièrement de vermisseaux»[9].

Dès lors, on ne peut dire si les distinctions entre sauterelles et hannetons, rats et souris sont réelles, ni trancher sur ce que signifient moucherons, chenilles ou vermisseaux, ceux-là nommant aussi bien des parasites que des larves d'insectes depuis le haut Moyen Âge au moins. On peut penser que les vermisseaux associés à la destruction des céréales et des prairies sont les larves des hannetons déjà présents au Moyen Âge dans les Alpes et le Jura jusqu'à 700-800 mètres. Après avoir été pondues dans le sol l'année précédente, ces larves éclosent en mai, se

[8] *Rituale Bisuntinae Dioecesis*, Vesoul, 1705.
[9] S. d. (1755). Voir J. Roger, *Les Sciences de la vie dans la pensée française du XVIII^{e} siècle*, Paris 1963; Aristote, *De la génération des animaux*, Paris 1961, p. 120-122; Saint Augustin, *La Cité de Dieu*, dans *Oeuvres*, Paris 1960, p. 165-167.

nourrissent des racines jusqu'en septembre puis hibernent, et cela deux ans de suite avant de se transformer en hannetons dévorant les feuillages des arbres[10]. Que des grappes de larves soient trouvées en terre, que des fléaux durent deux ou trois ans, que les arbres soient attaqués, semblent confirmer cette hypothèse, mais il faut rester prudent car d'autres animaux devaient s'inviter.

Ces bêtes menacent les «fruits de la terre» écrivent les desservants en traduisant l'expression latine «*terrae frugibus*» du rituel diocésain. À la différence des bêtes, ce terme vague ne semble pas le produit d'une méconnaissance (ou d'une autre connaissance) des cultures mais d'une volonté de ne pas importuner par des détails. Car des clercs montrent qu'ils sont bien informés, comme le curé de Sainte-Colombe qui écrit, en 1762, que les «moucherons» sont «en si grand nombre dans les champs ensemencés de pois du territoire [...], s'insinuant dans l'endroit où la fleur doit naître ils rongent et font fléchir les tiges sur leurs pieds». Des lettres évoquent les dégâts portés aux cultures, les ravages commis sur les arbres, notamment sur les glands des chênes, en compromettant le pacage forestier des troupeaux, ou sur les fleurs des fruitiers. La plupart des demandes datées relèvent du printemps, les autres de l'été, quelques-unes du début de l'automne et de la fin de l'hiver, ce qui est cohérent avec le cycle végétal. En avril-mai, sont attaqués surtout les vergers et les vignes, puis les céréales en fin de printemps 1757, durant l'été 1762, en septembre-octobre 1755 et 1756 (semailles d'automne). Vergers et vignes attaqués au printemps appartiennent souvent à des paroisses de plaines ou des premiers coteaux du Jura, alors que les céréales ravagées plus tard sont situées en des paroisses de moyenne montagne. Autrement dit, les demandes semblent porter sur les cultures essentielles des paroisses, différentes selon les altitudes, en leurs périodes critiques de développement ou de production.

De rares indications font poser la question du climat: des poix «presque desséchés» en juillet 1762 mais des «pluies presque continuelles» en 1755 indiqueraient des temps exceptionnels. Or, les années 1751-1756 sont, en France, fraiches et pluvieuses, ce qui favorise la multiplication des bestioles, alors que les années 1758-1765 connaissent des printemps et des étés ensoleillés, chauds, assez secs, incitant les bêtes à étendre les ravages sur une végétation éprouvée, moins nourrissante[11]. Cela expliquerait la concentration des demandes sur quelques années, comme recours exceptionnels à des situations d'exception. Pourtant, si des requêtes trahissent un affolement inhabituel, d'autres révèlent une pratique plutôt courante, ce qui doit faire songer à un autre facteur.

2. La pression des fidèles

à Monseigneur Monseigneur l'archevêque de Besançon, prince du st empire Supplient humblement les habitants de voitteur, nevy, et [?] composant la paroisse de voitteur, et disent qu'il y a danger qu'il ne se répande dans leurs différents territoires des

[10] C. Chêne, *Juger les vers. Exorcismes et procès d'animaux dans le diocèse de Lausanne (XVe-XVIe siècle,* cit., pp. 42-45.
[11] E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire du climat depuis l'an mil* [1967], Paris 1983, t. I, p. 68, 115.

insectes et autres vermisseaux qui endommageraient leurs blés, ils ont même reconnu qu'il y en avait déjà quelques-uns. C'est pourquoi ils recourent à vous, monseigneur, à l'effet d'obtenir la permission de maudire lesdi insectes, et employer les prières, et exorcismes portés dans le rituel diocésain contre lesdi insectes, et ils continueront leurs voeux pour la conservation de votre grandeur. Ce 25 avril 1756. Mottet Curé de Voitteur.

À l'instar de ce curé, la moitié des auteurs fait état de la sollicitation pressante des paroissiens. Certains égrènent les conditions des requérants («échevins, bourgeois et habitants»[12]) pour renforcer leur requête. Treize suppliques sont même signées par des laïcs: échevins, fabriciens, fermiers... Plutôt qu'un refus du desservant, il semble s'agir d'une stratégie concertée pour que la hiérarchie se rende compte de l'importance des dégâts, de la pression des fidèles, et pour qu'elle accepte la demande. L'insistance transparaît dans le vocabulaire utilisé. Si le tiers des rédacteurs ne qualifie pas les dommages ou n'utilise que le terme vague de «fléau», les autres usent d'expressions plus nettes, modérées pour certains (les bêtes gâtent, endommagent, incommodent, font tord, préjudice, dégâts), exprimant la panique et l'urgence pour la majorité: les animaux détruisent, ravagent, désolent, dévastent, dévorent, font périr. On peut corréler cela avec les dates d'envoi: autant les lettres usant d'expressions modérées sont à peu près réparties le long des mois et des années, autant celles qui affichent une panique sont plus concentrées sur les mois de printemps, notamment de mai, période cruciale de croissance végétale, et sur les années 1756 et surtout 1757, justement celles du maximum de demandes, et donc apparemment plus difficiles que les autres. La panique semble réelle.

Cependant, la demande n'apparaît pas comme la dernière solution à laquelle on se rallierait dans une situation devenue sans espoir: une seule requête reconnaît que les bêtes gâtent «depuis longtemps»[13] les fruits de la terre. La grande majorité indique que les destructions sont en cours, avouant ainsi donner au rite une valeur curative. Un tiers précise que le fléau débute, voire que le risque n'est qu'à craindre comme à Voiteur ci-dessus. Il s'agit de «se prémunir» écrit un vicaire[14], une attitude suggérant une laïcisation des fléaux, déjà signalée par des historiens pour le XVIII^{e} siècle[15], qui fait moins porter la responsabilité sur Dieu que sur la nature, et qui incite à vouloir agir en prévention. La pression et l'urgence apparaissent bien dans la dizaine de requêtes demandant que l'autorisation soit envoyée au plus vite[16] tandis qu'une quinzaine indiquent que les porteurs remettront la somme exigée, dans l'espoir de hâter la réponse[17].

Cela montre la diversité des usages. Il s'agit d'une pratique exceptionnelle pour beaucoup de clercs lors d'années exceptionnelles où paroissiens et clergé,

[12] Vauvillers, 1761.
[13] Mièges, S. d. (1757).
[14] Châtillon-sur-Saône, S. d. (1757).
[15] J. Delumeau, *Rassurer et protéger*, Paris 1989, p. 375-383, et les nuances de F. Walter, *Catastrophes. Une histoire culturelle, XVIe-XXIe siècle*, cit., pp. 9-12.
[16] Cerre-les-Noroy, 1756, Saint-Hippolyte, 1755, Mercey, 1756.
[17] Exemples: Meurcourt, 1762, Serqueux, 1762.

déroutés par l'ampleur des dégâts, se tournent vers des rites peu usités. Toutefois, d'autres clercs se montrent habitués, notant par exemple que la situation est la même que les années précédentes. Le curé de Fêche-l'Église demande une autorisation pour le mois d'août 1756 tout en souhaitant «que la permission soit encore pour le printemps prochain en cas ces insectes ou d'autres nous inquiètent»! Onze paroisses ont ainsi deux ou trois demandes consignées dans les registres pour des années souvent successives ou rapprochées. Cet ensemble est très dispersé dans le diocèse, ce qui ne peut faire soupçonner un jeu d'émulation. Son point commun est de souvent solliciter tôt, dès avril-mai avec l'apparition des bestioles ou leurs premières attaques. On pourrait croire en une prudence acquise au regard des dégâts antérieurs mais elle est souvent présente dès la première demande. Il faut invoquer la ferveur religieuse locale, qui peut inciter à vite se confier à l'Église, et/ou l'esprit d'initiative du desservant, car nombre de ces paroisses appartiennent aux zones religieuses de l'époque[18].

Cependant, clercs et paroissiens peuvent passer d'un groupe à l'autre en cas d'années successives de calamité. Le curé d'Aiglepierre, qui ne semble pas avoir sollicité l'archevêché en 1756, écrit dès avril 1757 pour des chenilles apparaissant à peine, parce qu'elles «ont privé de toutes sortes de fruits l'an passé». Il reste que tous se rejoignent sur la croyance en l'efficacité du rite, ce «prompt remède» écrit le curé de Moffans en 1757. Mais que veulent exactement les fidèles et leurs prêtres?

3. Une théologie confuse

> Monsieur. Je me donne l'honneur de vous adresser la présente pour vous prier de me faire expédier un exorcisme ou excommunication contre les insectes qui dévastent notre territoire. Assurément si cela continue il n'y resterat rien dans les champs ny vergers, n'y ayant plus rien sur les arbres. La présente porteuse vous remettera ce que vous luy direz pour la rétribution dudit exorcisme [...].

Beaucoup demandent un exorcisme, d'autres une excommunication, certains une fulmination, qui se rapproche de la précédente par la condamnation qu'elle formule, voire une bénédiction[19]. Or, le rituel diocésain ne prévoit que l'exorcisme des insectes et autres «*nociva animalia*». Il y a donc une distorsion assez forte (un cas sur trois) entre la procédure officielle et les demandes, mais certaines montrent qu'il y a confusion de fond (comme ce curé de Passenans en mai 1755 ou les habitants de la Chapelle-d'Huin qui demandent «des lettres d'excommunication pour exorciser ») ou simplement de forme, comme cette lettre anonyme sollicitant «un exorcisme ou communément dit excommunication des insectes»[20].

Pourquoi ces amalgames, à nos yeux, entre des procédures différentes pour nous, l'exorcisme chassant les démons d'un corps possédé alors que

[18] M. Rey (dir.), *Les diocèses de Besançon et Saint-Claude*, Paris 1977, p. 125.
[19] 63 demandes d'exorcisme, 19 d'excommunication, 12 de fulmination, 1 de bénédiction. Les autres lettres sont vagues ou n'évoquent que les buts recherchés.
[20] S. d. (1757) et S. d. (1756), non signé, paroisse de Vaux.

l'excommunication retranche un fidèle de la communion de l'Église, et pourquoi appliquer ces procédures aux bêtes? Pour ce dernier point, l'usage est légitimé par deux précédents, longtemps indiscutables, bien connus des populations et sans cesse évoqués depuis le XIVe siècle au moins: Jésus exorcisa un homme et les démons allèrent se réfugier dans des porcs qui se précipitèrent dans les eaux; saint Bernard excommunia des mouches ayant envahi un monastère et les fit ainsi mourir[21]. Leur exemple justifie, entre XIVe siècle au moins et XVIIe siècle, les nombreux cas d'exorcismes, de processions du Saint-Sacrement au milieu des cultures ravagées (comme l'évoque d'ailleurs une lettre du diocèse de Besançon)[22] et d'excommunications.

De son côté, l'amalgame se comprend en retraçant l'histoire de ces rites. Le seul cas bien analysé est celui du diocèse de Lausanne, qui connut des procédures officielles d'excommunication d'insectes entre milieu du XVe siècle et début du XVIe siècle. Il montre, quand on le replace dans l'histoire longue de l'excommunication, que ces procédures représentent un cas parmi d'autres de la forte vulgarisation de l'excommunication à la fin du Moyen Âge, ce qui permit de l'étendre aux bêtes dans un contexte de chasse aux sorcières, incitant à diaboliser les animaux nocifs, et de confusion entre malédiction et excommunication, opérée par les communautés monastiques et les rédacteurs des vies des saints du Moyen Âge central. L'excommunication étant une mesure grave, surtout s'il s'agit de la majeure qui écarte de la communauté des fidèles et encore plus de l'anathème qui retranche du corps de l'Église, envoie dans les ténèbres, remet à Satan en s'apparentant à une malédiction, une procédure judiciaire d'encadrement fut installée comme pour les hommes: citation des bêtes accusées, sommations sous la forme de monitions, procès en bonne et due forme, condamnation à l'excommunication aggravée en anathème si les exorcismes pratiqués avant ou après le procès n'ont pas été efficaces.

Là réside l'origine de la confusion entre exorcisme et excommunication: ce qui était deux rites différents et pas automatiquement successifs dans une procédure a été confondu en un seul par des populations désireuses d'obtenir la sentence la plus grave, l'excommunication «que toute créature doit craindre» dit une requête de 1503, et cela a transformé l'exorcisme en condition nécessaire mais pas suffisante[23]. Pour les populations qui les sollicitent, processions, prières et procédures ont pour but de placer le territoire des cultures, donc des hommes, sous la protection de Dieu, d'assimiler cet espace profane à un espace sacré, de bénéficier des armes spirituelles les plus fortes pour une protection maximale. D'où l'attrait de l'excommunication, qui sortirait les bêtes de la communauté

[21] *Mt*, 8, 30-32; 21, 19-20, *Mc*, 5; 11, 20-21, *Lc*, 8, 32-33; J. de Voragine, *La légende dorée*, Paris 1967, t. II, p. 119.
[22] Ronchaux, S. d. (1755).
[23] C. Chêne, *Juger les vers. Exorcismes et procès d'animaux dans le diocèse de Lausanne (XVe-XVIe siècle)*, cit., p. 62-91, 127-159 (citation); L. Little, *La morphologie des malédictions monastiques*, en «Annales *E.S.C.*», XXXIV, 1 (1979), pp. 43-60; V. Beaulande, *Le malheur d'être exclu? Excommunication, réconciliation et société à la fin du Moyen Âge*, Paris 2006, pp. 8, 24-32, 259-264.

des créatures de Dieu, de la communauté d'une Église étendue à toute la création, qui les désarmerait, voire les ferait mourir en les renvoyant dans le néant. D'où la confusion, évoquée dès le XVI^e siècle[24], avec l'exorcisme qui vise à faire partir les bêtes au loin mais qui brandit aussi le spectre de la malédiction si elles n'obtempèrent pas.

Or, cette tentation de l'excommunication et cette confusion avec l'exorcisme sont le fait d'une bonne partie du clergé jusqu'au XVIII^e siècle, comme le montrent l'imprimé distribué à ses curés par l'évêque d'Autun en 1648, pour «excommunier et exterminer les chenilles et autres insectes», le rituel du diocèse de Châlons, de 1653, ou le monitoire utilisé à la même époque dans le diocèse de Besançon, qui devait être lu au prône pour prévenir les bêtes et leur intimer l'ordre de disparaître, qui les menaçait d'une «peine d'excommunication», de les déclarer «anathèmes et maudits»[25], l'anathème étant bien considéré, par les contemporains dissertant sur ces monitoires, comme une excommunication[26]. Et l'usage d'un monitoire est encore en vigueur dans le diocèse de Besançon au XVIII^e siècle car les rédacteurs des lettres disent attendre l'envoi de l'autorisation de pratiquer *et* d'un texte[27]. S'agit-il du monitoire du XVII^e siècle ou d'un autre plus récent, qui n'est pas conservé dans les archives? Le fait que les habitants de la Chapelle-d'Huin demandent des «lettres d'excommunication pour exorciser» peut faire croire à la première solution et cela expliquerait en partie le maintien de l'amalgame entre les deux procédures

Cependant, des théologiens émettent de fortes réserves à partir du milieu du XVII^e siècle. L'excommunication ne peut concerner que des hommes baptisés, car les animaux «n'ont ni raison, ni jugement, ni volonté et par conséquent ne sont capables de faire bien ou mal (...), ni de s'amender ou de reconnaître leur faute». Prétendre que la sentence s'adresse au diable est tout aussi absurde, puisqu'il est exclu dès les origines. Reste à expliquer l'exemple fondateur de saint Bernard en le réinterprétant: ce n'était qu'une malédiction informelle et seule sa vertu fit mourir les mouches, une force réservée aux saints, impossible aux hommes ordinaires[28]. Ces réserves sont nourries par la crainte des superstitions,

[24] *Discours de Mgr Guillaume Le Blanc évêque de Grasse et de Vence à ses diocésains touchant l'affliction qu'ils endurent des loups en leurs personnes et des vermisseaux en leurs figuiers*, Tournon, Michel, 1598, p. 199.
[25] T. Schmitt, *L'organisation ecclésiastique et la pratique religieuse dans l'Archidiaconé d'Autun de 1630 à 1750*, S. l., 1952, p. XC; *Rituel à l'usage de l'Église et diocèse de Châlons*, Lyon, Cusset, 1653, p. 383-384; Archives départementales du Doubs, G 860, fol. 13, formulaire de l'Officialité, première moitié du XVII^e siècle (?).
[26] Théophile Raynaud, *Tractatus de monitoriis ecclesiasticis*, (1610) Lyon, Boissat, 1636, 2^e partie, chap. XII, p. 575, et Gaspar Bailly, *Traité des Monitoires, avec un plaidoyer contre les insectes*, 1668, texte publié par L. Ménabréa, *De l'origine, de la forme et de l'esprit des jugements rendus au Moyen Âge contre les animaux,* en «Mémoires de la société académique de Savoie», XII, 1846, p. 128 et S.
[27] Lemuy, 18 octobre 1729, Franxault, 5 septembre 1753, etc.
[28] J. Éveillon, *Traité des excommunications et monitoires* [1651], Paris, Couterot, 1672, p. 520-526; J.-B. Thiers, *Traité des superstitions*, (1679) Paris, Nully, 1704, tome I, p. 486-487; P. Le Brun, *Histoire critique des pratiques superstitieuses,* (1702) Paris, Delaulne, 1732, tome I, p. 429-430.

d'autant que les nouveaux clercs de la réforme catholique se montrent sensibles aux critiques protestantes et au rationalisme cartésien. Ils deviennent hostiles à nombre de cérémonies, notamment celles concernant les animaux: entrée dans les églises pour être protégés par un saint, apposition des clefs de l'église ou des évangiles pour guérir des maladies, messe pour la bonne croissance ou la guérison, mais aussi procession du Saint-Sacrement pour chasser les ravageurs, et donc excommunication. Ce qui gêne, c'est moins la confusion des rites que les déductions sur la nature animale. Ce qui se joue, c'est la définition des animaux, leur appartenance à l'Église, que le Christ avait suggéré en enjoignant aux apôtres d'aller prêcher à toutes les créatures (Mc 16, 15) mais que le clergé s'efforce sans cesse de désamorcer depuis saint Paul. Il faut empêcher que l'animal soit l'égal de l'homme et refuser une notion d'Église étendue à toute la création, d'une communauté des créatures. Ce n'est pas un hasard si tout cela s'inscrit dans un rejet de l'animal hors de la sphère religieuse, mené dans le cadre de la réforme tridentine et traduit par l'interdiction des bêtes dans les églises et les cimetières, la suppression ou la relégation du bestiaire décoratif, la réécriture des vies des saints en éliminant les interventions animales devenues choquantes, la méfiance envers le symbolisme animalier, etc.[29]

En réalité, la crainte de la concurrence des sorciers et des guérisseurs oblige les clercs à accepter les demandes tout en œuvrant subtilement. D'abord, en codifiant les rites tolérables: les nouveaux rituels issus de la réforme catholique contiennent peu à peu des formules de bénédiction des bestiaux et d'exorcisme des ravageurs. Les bénédictions préventives, analogues à celles pour les maisons, les navires, les récoltes, ravalent l'animal au rang d'objet matériel. L'exorcisme est toléré, puisque le Christ l'a pratiqué, mais réinterprété par les théologiens: il doit être autorisé par Dieu et porter sur le démon «qui, sous la permission de Dieu, se sert souvent des créatures irraisonnables pour nous nuire», pas sur les bêtes «comme ayant quelque intelligence et étant maîtresses de leur action, ce serait absurdité et superstition; absurdité, parce qu'elles n'ont point de raison [...]; superstition, parce qu'on leur attribuerait une vertu comme divine d'agir par elles-mêmes au-dessus de leur puissance»[30]. Toutefois, cette lecture n'est pas réaliste pour les bêtes à la différence des hommes, des maisons ou des glaciers pour lesquels l'exorcisme chasse les démons tandis que la bénédiction qui suit place sous la protection de Dieu. Exorcisées, dépossédées, les bestioles resteraient sur place et auraient besoin... de manger! Ce serait inacceptable pour les populations qui veulent que le rite chasse ou tue.

C'est en profitant de l'incapacité des populations à différencier les rites, en laissant croire que l'exorcisme porte sur les bêtes que la hiérarchie peut le substituer à l'excommunication. À Villard-Reculas, dans le diocèse de Grenoble en 1678, les habitants demandent un exorcisme car «ils sont persuadés qu'aussitôt

[29] É. Baratay, *L'Église et l'animal (France, XVIIe-XXe siècle)*, cit., partie 2, et Id., *Le christianisme et l'animal: une histoire difficile*, en «Ecozon@: European Journal of Literature, Culture and Environment», 2, 2011-2, p. 120-138.
[30] J. Éveillon, *Traité des excommunications et monitoires*, cit., p. 523-525, s'appuyant sur la *Somme théologique*, 2 pars., 2 part., qu. LXXVI, art. 2.

qu'un prêtre a fait l'exorcisme, ces animaux meurent ou s'en vont en pays désert», ce qu'on se garde de démentir[31]! La confusion permet d'être intransigeant envers l'excommunication et de la faire disparaître dans la seconde moitié du XVII[e] siècle. En 1670, des paroisses du diocèse de Clermont avaient encore obtenu de l'official un procès et une menace d'anathème contre des chenilles, mais il n'en est plus de même en 1690 lorsque des habitants demandent au vicaire général la nomination d'un curateur pour défendre d'autres chenilles lors d'un futur procès. Le vicaire général se contente de prescrire l'exorcisme et les prières du nouveau rituel de 1656. Dépités, les habitants se retournent vers le bailli qui accepte de nommer un curateur, de juger l'affaire et d'enjoindre aux bêtes de se retirer dans un territoire accordé, mais sans pouvoir menacer d'excommunication[32]. De fait, pour pouvoir substituer un rite à l'autre, la hiérarchie crée et entretient la confusion parmi les populations et même le bas clergé. Le rituel du diocèse de Besançon, paru en 1705, ne parle que d'exorcisme tout en menaçant encore de malédiction, d'exécration, d'extermination, répondant ainsi aux buts des demandeurs, qui parlent de malédiction, de destruction, d'extermination, rarement de chasser. En dissociant l'excommunication de la malédiction, le clergé protège la première tout en gardant les finalités espérées de la seconde, et finalement délaisse saint Bernard excommuniant les mouches pour le Christ maudissant le figuier stérile et le faisant mourir.

4. La cérémonie

Monsieur, Les insectes ravagent nos campagnes, je vous demande la permission de faire les exorcismes, j'ay déjà indiqué une procession mercredy prochain pour cet effet. J'ay l'honneur d'être très respectueusement, Monsieur, votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur, Chatelain, Curé de mercey le grand. Le 23 may 1756.

On ne dispose pas des réponses de l'archevêché et l'on ne sait pas si l'accord était automatique. On ne dispose pas, non plus, de récit des cérémonies et l'on doit s'en tenir au rituel pour construire un canevas des paroles, des chants, des gestes et des itinéraires. L'affaire commence par la lecture au prône d'un monitoire demandant aux bêtes de partir. Les archives ne livrent qu'un texte du XVII[e] siècle:

Il a pleu à Monseigneur le Révérendissime Vicaire général en l'archevêché de Besançon donner mandement de malédiction en forme d'anathème contre les chenilles, mouches, rattes et aultres animaux qui mangent et dégastent les arbres, vignes, blez et aultres fruicts de la terre, riere le territoire de ce lieu; pour le bien mettre en exeqution, je vous dirai qu'il est nécessaire de recourir à Dieu avec pleurs et larmes et le prier nous pardonner nos faultes et péchés car sans doubte c'est pour iceulx qu'il nous a envoyé telle punition et partant s'il y a ici personne qui soit en sentence d'excommunication ou en péché mortel, je l'admoneste de procurer son absolution

[31] Secrétaire du cardinal Le Camus, cité par R. Chanaud, *Folklore et religion dans le diocèse de Grenoble à la fin du XVII[e] siècle: les visites pastorales de Mgr Le Camus*, en *La religion populaire*, numéro spécial de «Le monde alpin et rhôdanien», 1977, p. 102.
[32] L. Ménabréa, *De l'origine, de la forme et de l'esprit des jugements rendus au Moyen Âge contre les animaux*, cit., p. 111.

et se réunir à Dieu, demandant pardon de bon coeur et moi qui suis commis à l'exeqution dudict mandement en vertu d'iceluy et derrière obédiance voire sur peine d'excommunication, j'admoneste lesdites chenilles, mouches, rattes, aultres animaux meangeans et dégastans lesdits fruits de la terre d'incontinant et sans délay s'en aller hors le territoire et n'y nuisent davantage aultrement et en tant ils ne le fassent je les mauldis de la part de Dieu les déclarant anathèmes et maudits et déclareray tels jusques à tant qu'il ayt pleu à Dieu monstrer en ses effects dont nous le devons tous prier[33].

S'il était encore en vigueur au XVIII[e] siècle, ce monitoire n'a pu qu'entretenir la confusion puisqu'il menace «d'excommunication» en déclarant «anathèmes et maudits», l'anathème étant considéré comme une excommunication à l'époque de la rédaction de ce texte[34]. Mais l'essentiel ici est la lecture religieuse: les fidèles doivent se repentir et les grands pécheurs se rallier à Dieu pour assurer le succès du rite, s'il a lieu, car Satan n'a pu s'emparer de ces bêtes qu'avec l'autorisation divine. Cela révèle une vision du monde où Dieu intervient sans cesse auprès des hommes, directement ou en autorisant Satan et en utilisant toutes les créatures, notamment les animaux ainsi dotés d'un rôle religieux important, particulièrement accepté, évoqué, médité du Moyen Âge au XVII[e] siècle. L'animal est un signe ou un symbole pour évoquer le divin, les personnes célestes, les vertus et les vices, les fidèles et les pécheurs, mais aussi un modèle à suivre ou à fuir, un serviteur de Dieu, des saints ou du démon. Il intervient pour aider les chrétiens sur le chemin du salut, pour les aiguillonner, voire pour leur nuire[35]. Invoqué lors de la disparition des poissons à Marseille en 1728 ou de l'épisode la Bête du Gévaudan en 1764[36], ce rôle d'aiguillon est cité dans quelques-unes de nos lettres, d'autant que la vermine accusée est depuis longtemps associée à la chute, ses dégâts symbolisant les dégradations provoquées par les péchés, et au démoniaque destructeur, par les contacts étroits avec la terre et les dévorations.

Cependant, ce rôle religieux régresse fortement au XVIII[e] siècle avec la coupure, évoquée plus haut, entre sacré et profane, esprit et matière, créatures spirituelles (anges, hommes) et matérielles, religion et nature. Justement, une autre lecture chrétienne l'emporte dans les lettres: il faut prier pour que le Dieu miséricordieux détourne, arrête ou repousse ce «fléau» qui prend une dimension naturelle et devient un simple dérèglement de la nature[37]. Cela renvoie à une autre conception du monde, de plus en plus fréquente dans le clergé de l'époque: la nature machine, révélée par la révolution scientifique, théorisée par le cartésianisme, n'a plus de rôle religieux tout en ayant été créée pour l'homme par le Grand Horloger et en restant contrôlée par ce Grand Ingénieur. Cela va de

[33] Archives départementales du Doubs, cartons G 860, fol. 13, formulaire de l'Officialité, première moitié du XVII[e] siècle (?).
[34] T. Raynaud, *Tractatus de monitoriis ecclesiasticis* [1610], Lyon, Boissat, 1636, 2[e] partie, chap. XII, p. 575.
[35] J. Voisenet, *Bêtes et hommes,* cit., p. 322-323; É. Baratay, *L'Église,* cit., partie 1.
[36] «Mandement de M. l'évêque de Marseille portant ordre de faire des prières publiques pour demander à Dieu de rendre à la Mer son ancienne fertilité», *Mercure de France*, novembre 1728, p. 2273-2276; Mandement de l'évêque de Mende, décembre 1764, dans R. Dubois, *Vie et mort de la Bête du Gévaudan*, Liège 1988, pp. 156-163.
[37] Lemuy, 1729, Saint-Laurent-la-Roche, S. d. (1755), Sainte-Colombe, 1762.

pair avec l'émergence de la notion d'animal nuisible, qu'une lettre mentionne[38], et avec l'effacement du démon, jamais évoqué dans nos lettres alors qu'il apparaissait comme l'instigateur des ravages au XVII[e] siècle et qu'il est encore mentionné dans le rituel de Besançon de 1705.

Revenons à la cérémonie. Après la lecture du monitoire, se déploie sur plusieurs jours toute une préparation spirituelle, ponctuée, selon les lectures du drame, de confessions pour expier les fautes ou de supplications pour se faire entendre de Dieu. Si les bêtes restent, le jour du cérémonial arrive. À l'église, les paroissiens récitent le *Veni Sancte Spiritus* avec les prêtres et chantent certaines prières des jours des Rogations. Puis une procession solennelle conduit l'assemblée sur les lieux des ravages, tout en chantant les Litanies. Sur place, succèdent une lecture des Psaumes, une oraison de l'officiant, la bénédiction des assistants et la récitation de l'exhortation spéciale, inscrite dans le rituel, prononçant l'exorcisme des animaux pour les libérer des démons, la bénédiction des fruits de la terre pour les protéger des bêtes, et conjurant ces dernières de quitter la paroisse sous peine de malédiction et d'extermination. Après cela, elles devaient avoir le bon goût de déguerpir ou de mourir!

On ne sait s'il y eut à Besançon d'autres demandes d'exorcisme après 1762. Mais on sait que le clergé français se montre hostile aux rites agraires entre le dernier tiers du XVIII[e] siècle et les années 1840, parce qu'il adhère au rationalisme des Lumières et se montre sensible aux critiques des philosophes, tel Voltaire qui écrit, en faisant lui aussi la confusion entre les rites: «Et des excommunications, en userez-vous? Non, il y a des rituels où l'on excommunie les sauterelles, les sorciers et les comédiens. Je n'interdirai point l'entrée de l'église aux sauterelles, attendu qu'elles n'y vont jamais»[39]. Dans ce contexte, il se pourrait bien que le nouvel archevêque de Besançon, Antoine-Clériadius de Choiseul, nommé en 1755, promu cardinal en 1761, ait décidé d'arrêter les exorcismes d'animaux après 1762, alors même qu'il fait expurger bréviaire, missel et manuel dans un souci de s'en tenir aux seules Écritures, et qu'il abandonne la liturgie bisontine[40]. De fait, les exorcismes sont en fort déclin en France, d'autant que les ravages des bêtes sont de plus en plus interprétés comme des phénomènes naturels par une zoologie, une botanique et une climatologie en plein essor. Le renouveau des rites agraires à partir des années 1840, sous l'impulsion d'un clergé nouveau, soucieux de renouer avec la religion d'avant les Lumières, de ne plus céder aux libres penseurs, ne concerne pas les exorcismes comme l'illustre l'épisode des ravages des sauterelles en Algérie en 1866: alerté par leur publicité médiatique, ému par les conséquences économiques, l'évêque de Nîmes publie une lettre pastorale pour expliquer le phénomène, reprenant l'interprétation de la main de Dieu, le courroux divin étant le produit de l'indifférence religieuse des populations d'origine européenne, mais il se garde de proposer l'exorcisme, seulement un changement de conduite morale et religieuse[41]!

[38] Bougnon, S. d. (1756). Sur tout cela: É. Baratay, *L'Église,* cit., partie 2, et Id., *Zoologie et Église catholique dans la France du XVIII[e] siècle (1670-1840): une science au service de Dieu*, en «Revue d'histoire des sciences», XLVIII, 1995, vol. 3, pp. 241-265.
[39] *Dictionnaire philosophique*, dans *Oeuvres complètes*, Bâle, Tournesein, 1786, t. XXXIX, p. 218.
[40] M. Rey (dir.), *Les diocèses de Besançon et Saint-Claude*, cit., p. 123.
[41] H. Plantier, *Lettre pastorale sur l'Algérie désolée par le fléau des sauterelles*, en *Instructions, lettres pastorales et mandements*, éd. par L. Giraud, Nîmes, 1867, t. IV, p. 441-451. Sur le catholicisme du XIX[e] siècle: É. Baratay, *L'Église,* cit., partie 3.

¶ Sezione Seconda

L' "umanità"
nell'animalità

¶ Sezione 2/a

Animali che sentono

Gnoseologia animale come esempio/contro-esempio di quella umana

Articoli/8

*Albert the Great on Animal and Human Origin in his Early Works**

Katja Krause

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Among historians of philosophy and science, Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280) is well-known for his scientific outlook on animals. His mature commentary on the *De animalibus* (after 1258) has been praised for its revival of a *scientia de animalibus*, covering animal diversity in its psycho-physiological nature, generation and habitat, and the causes that lead to this diversity. Far less attention has been paid to the genesis of this scientific outlook, found in his early theological works. This lack of attention, however, has resulted in two gaps in the literature. On the one hand, we have not fully appreciated Albert's motivations and reasons for his mature scientific decisions. On the other hand, we have not fully grasped the systematic impact that his appropriation of the *scientia de animalibus* had on the developments of related systematic fields, such as his eschatology and theological anthropology. The purpose of this paper is to begin to address this second gap in the literature. I show how and why Albert's systematic integration of the Aristotelian model of animal epigenesis into his eschatology and theological anthropology resulted in a thorough modification of his Christian conception of the human soul's *creatio ex nihilo* in his mature works.

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1. Ahead of the Pack: Animals and Science

When it comes to animals, Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280) is highly regarded for his «scientific» outlook on them[1]. For decades of present-day

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[1] Cf. H. Balss, *Albertus Magnus als Zoologe*, Munich 1928; C. Hünemörder, *Die Zoologie des Albertus Magnus*, in *Albertus Magnus Doctor Universalis 1280/1980*, ed. by G. Meyer OP and A. Zimmermann, Mainz 1980, pp. 235-248; G. Guldentops, *The Sagacity of the Bees. An Aristotelian topos in thirteenth-century philosophy*, in *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, ed. by C. Steel, G. Guldentops, and P. Beullens, Leuven 1999, pp. 275-296; K.F. Kitchell Jr and I.M. Resnick, *Introduction: The Life and Works of Albert the Great*, in *Albertus Magnus On Animals. A Medieval Summa Zoologica*, ed. by id., Baltimore-London 1999, pp. 1-42; M. Tkacz, *Albert the Great and the Revival of Aristotle's Zoological Research Program*, in

scholarship, his famous commentary on the *De animalibus* (after 1258)[2] has been praised for having (re-)established the sciences of biology, zoology, and ornithology[3]. His synthetic moves concerning content and genre have been among the latest subjects of great esteem[4]. His natural scientific method, including observation and experiment and relying on suppositional necessity (as opposed to absolute necessity), has long been acclaimed as ground-breaking[5]. Yet what stands at the heart of all these accomplishments, so we are told by scholarship, is Albert's intrinsic interest in animals. For, unlike his Platonic-Augustinian predecessors, who relegated animals to the fringe by considering them mere footprints of God (*vestigia Dei*)[6], Albert fully engages with animal life. On the basis of his autonomous conception of the natural sciences[7], Albert's *De*

«Vivarium», XLV, 2007, pp. 30-68; B. Roling, *Die Geometrie der Bienenwabe: Albertus Magnus, Karl von Baer und die Debatte über das Vorstellungsvermögen und die Seele der Insekten zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, in «Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales», LXXX, 2013, pp. 363–466; M. Tkacz, *Albert the Great on Logic, Knowledge, and Science*, in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, ed. by I.M. Resnick, Leiden 2013, pp. 507-540.

[2] Approximately in the 1210s, Michael Scot translated the Arabic compilation of Aristotle's *Historia animalium*, *De partibus animalium*, and *De generatione animalium* into Latin and entitled it *De animalibus*. Extant 13th century commentaries include Peter of Spain's and of Peter Gallego's commentaries. Albert's commentary, however, was most influential for later developments and commentators. Cf. B.G. Dod, *Aristoteles latinus*, in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600*, ed. by N. Kretzmann et alii, Cambridge 1982, pp. 45-79, here p. 77; M.J.C. de Asúa, *The Organization of Discourse on Animals in the Thirteenth Century. Peter of Spain, Albert the Great, and the Commentaries on* De Animalibus, unpubl. dissertation, Catholic University of America 1991, pp. 5-26; K.F. Kitchell Jr and I.M. Resnick, *Introduction: The Life and Works of Albert the Great*, cit., p. 39.

[3] Cf. K.F. Kitchell Jr and I.M. Resnick, *Introduction: The Life and Works of Albert the Great*, cit., p. 33.

[4] Cf. M.J.C. de Asúa, *The Organization of Discourse on Animals*, cit., pp. 229-233.

[5] Cf. W.A. Wallace OP, *Albertus Magnus on Suppositional Necessity in the Natural Sciences*, in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, ed. by J.A. Weisheipl OP, Toronto 1980, pp. 103-128; K.F. Kitchell Jr and I.M. Resnick, *Introduction: The Life and Works of Albert the Great*, cit., pp. 27-34; M. Tkacz, *Albert the Great and the Revival of Aristotle's Zoological Research Program*, cit., p. 30-68; M. Tkacz, *Albert the Great on Logic, Knowledge, and Science*, cit., pp. 507-540.

[6] Cf. K.F. Kitchell Jr and I.M. Resnick, *Introduction: The Life and Works of Albert the Great*, cit., pp. 22-27.

[7] Cf. Albertus Magnus *Physica* I.1-4, ed. Coloniensis 4/1, 1-8. Secondary sources cf., for instance, E.A. Synan, *Introduction: Albertus Magnus and the Sciences*, in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, cit., pp. 1-12; B.M. Ashley OP, *St. Albert and the Nature of Natural Science*, in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, cit., pp. 73-102; M.D. Jordan, *Albert the Great and the Hierarchy of Sciences*, in «Faith and Philosophy», IX, 1992, pp. 483-499; A. Zimmermann, *Gedanken Alberts des Großen zu den Zielen und Leitlinien der Naturforschung*, in *Dombau und Theologie im mittelalterlichen Köln. Festschrift zur 750-Jahrfeier der Grundsteinlegung des Kölner Domes und zum 65. Geburtstag von Joachim Kardinal Meisner*, ed. by L. Honnefelder, N. Trippen, and A. Wolff, Cologne 1998, pp. 429-437; H. Anzulewicz, *Zwischen Faszination und Ablehnung: Theologie und Philosophie im 13. Jahrhundert in ihrem Verhältnis zueinander*, in «Archa Verbi», Subsidia I, 2007, pp. 129-165; L. Spruit, *Albert the Great on the Epistemology of Natural Science*, in *Erfahrung und Beweis. Die Wissenschaften von der Natur im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert*, ed. by A. Fidora and M. Lutz-Bachmann, Berlin 2007, pp. 61-75; H. Anzulewicz, *Alberts Konzept der Bildung durch*

animalibus covers animal diversity in its psycho-physiological nature, generation, and habitat on the one hand, and the causes that lead to this diversity on the other. In short, we are told that Albert's scientific approach to animals in his mature work of the *De animalibus* presents us with the foundations of animal study for centuries to come[8].

This reading of Albert's scientific outlook on animals is highly persuasive and there is much valuable scholarship to draw on. Yet despite this acclaim and renown that Albert's scientific outlook on animals in his mature works has received, it is remarkable that there have been only very few studies on the *development* of this scientific outlook on animals, which is found in his early theological works[9]. One possible reason for such a shortcoming may be that Albert scholarship has so far applied an implicitly positivist outlook of progression to his *corpus*[10]. Analysing what we would nowadays consider his scientific works

Wissenschaft, in *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee*, ed. by L. Honnefelder, Berlin 2011, pp. 382-397; S. Donati, *Alberts des Großen Konzept der scientiae naturales: Zur Konstitution einer peripatetischen Enzyklopädie der Naturwissenschaften*, in *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee*, cit., pp. 354-381; H. Möhle, A*lbertus Magnus und die Vielheit der Wissenschaften*, in *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee*, cit., pp. 301-331; D. Twetten and S. Baldner, *Introduction to Albert's Philosophical Work*, in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, cit., pp. 165-172; D. Twetten, S. Baldner, and S.C. Snyder, *Albert's Physics*, in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, cit., pp. 173-219.

[8] Cf. references in note 3.

[9] H. Anzulewicz, *Die aristotelische Biologie in den Frühwerken des Albertus Magnus*, in *Aristotle's Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance*, cit., pp. 159-188; H. Anzulewicz, *Albertus Magnus und die Tiere*, in *Tiere und Fabelwesen im Mittelalte*r, ed. by S. Obermaier, Berlin 2009, pp. 29-54.

[10] In the history of science, or rather the meta-history of science, such approaches to the material have long been identified, scrutinised for their limitations, and partly overcome, cf. A. Debus, *Chemists, Physicians, and Changing Perspectives on the Scientific Revolution*, in «Isis», LXXXIX, 1998, pp. 66-81. Jump-started in the middle of the 20th century by the two famous historians of science Dame Frances A. Yates and Walter Pagel, these meta-debates decidedly take into consideration the full *corpus* of a thinker within which his scientific developments occur. In one of his early requests to a still selective community of historians of science, the late Walter Pagel urged that scientific practices be changed and, «instead of selecting data that 'make sense' to the acolyte of modern science, … [the historian of science] should therefore try to make sense of the philosophical, mystical or religious 'side-steps' of otherwise 'sound' scientific workers of the past—'side-steps' that are usually excused by the spirit or rather backwardness of the period. It is these that present a challenge to the historian: to uncover the internal reason and justification for their presence in the mind of the savant and their organic coherence with his scientific ideas. In other words it is for the historian to reverse the method of scientific selection and to restate the thoughts of his hero in their original setting. The two sets of thought—the scientific and the non-scientific—will then emerge not as simply juxtaposed or as having been conceived in spite of each other, but as an organic whole in which they support and confirm each other» (Original in W. Pagel, *William Harvey's Biological Ideas: Selected Aspects and Historical Background*, Basel/New York 1967, p. 82., quoted from A. Debus, *Chemists, Physicians, and Changing Perspectives on the Scientific Revolution*, cit., p. 70). One should add here that the initial reception of Yates and Pagel stimulated research into hermetic and, what we would potentially consider «esoteric» themes. Yet this should be regarded as an overreaction to the predominance of positivist approaches at that time. Contemporary scholarship takes more nuanced stands and applies Yates' and Pagel's insights to the complete *corpora* of a wide range of historical thinkers, as is evident from Debus' discussions and contemporary scholarship, which is itself more inclusive in that it takes the balanced approaches to these *corpora* that Yates

as the principal object of study over the large remainder of his works, it seems that, on the basis of present-day selection criteria, Albert's treatment of animals is implicitly regarded as a linear trajectory that culminated in the «scientific» summit of the *De animalibus*. What appears to be a fully developed *scientia de animalibus* is thought to be sufficiently progressive and worthy of our attention. Yet, such an implicit positivist outlook with its present-day selection criteria would have arguably been alien to Albert himself. He instead engaged with animals across his entire *corpus*. He developed many of his final words on them in his early theological works[11], writing them against the background of his reconciliatory motivations and theological anthropology[12].

If we therefore consider Albert's outlook on animals apart from its early theological context of genesis, we may not only fail to see his motivations, justifications, and reasons that underlie his key scientific decisions on animals. Even more serious than this shortcoming in content may be two gaps in his systematic concerns. By focussing predominantly on Albert's *De animalibus*, we may fail to uncover how and why he solidified some systematic criteria over the course of his *corpus*, whereas he subjected others to integrative reinterpretations in light of, what he considered, more fundamental principles. Most importantly, though, we may overlook the systematic impact that Albert's appropriation of the *scientia de animalibus* had on the developments and resulting conceptions of related systematic topics or other fields of inquiry. We may, for instance, find it difficult to answer pressing questions about his move away from a paraenetic treatment of animals in his moral theology to a literal engagement with animals in his systematic theology[13]. We may find it similarly difficult to see his achievements in reconciling Aristotelian explanations on the nature of animals with Christian explanations on the nature of humans. We may find it hard, too, to understand his systematic integration of the Aristotelian account of animal epigenesis into his eschatology and theological anthropology and the resulting modification of his Christian conception of the human soul's *creatio ex nihilo* in his mature works.

and Pagel called for in the first place. In other words, the practice of contemporary history of science is to give as much weight to the «hard science» as to aspects that we would nowadays consider «non-scientific». Thanks a lot to Sietske Fransen (MPIWG Berlin) for drawing my attention to these meta-debates in the history of science and for discussing them with me.

[11] Cf. H. Anzulewicz, *Die aristotelische Biologie in den Frühwerken des Albertus Magnus*, cit., pp. 159-188; H. Anzulewicz, *Albertus Magnus und die Tiere*, cit., pp. 29-54.

[12] On Albert's systematic theology, cf. especially H. Anzulewicz, *The Systematic Theology of Albert the Great*, in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, cit., pp. 15-67. On Albert's conception of theology in general cf., for instance, M. Burger, *Albertus Magnus. Theologie als Wissenschaft unter der Herausforderung aristotelisch-arabischer Wissenschaftstheorie*, in *Albertus Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee*, cit., pp. 97-114; M. Olszewski, *The Nature of Theology According to Albert the Great*, in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Sciences*, cit., pp. 69-104; W. Senner, *Zur Wissenschaftstheorie der Theologie im Sentenzenkommentar Alberts des Großen*, in *Albertus Magnus Doctor universalis 1280/1980*, cit., pp. 323-343; I. Craemer-Ruegenberg, *Albertus Magnus. Völlig überarbeitete Neuauflage der Originalausgabe,* ed. by H. Anzulewicz, Leipzig 2005, pp. 52-68.

[13] This topic is briefly addressed in H. Anzulewicz, *Albertus Magnus und die Tiere*, cit., pp. 32-34.

The purpose of my paper, then, is to discuss this last point in greater detail and to show how Albert integrates the Aristotelian model of epigenesis for the origin of animal souls in his early eschatology and theological anthropology on the one hand, and how and why this integration resulted in his concoction of a model of epigenetic creationism for the human soul on the other. In this way, I elucidate the prominent systematic role that Albert assigns to animal epigenesis. Due to its constraints, however, my study can only be a humble beginning of a fresh look at the role of animals in Albert's *corpus*. Yet it is hopefully a step in the direction of a new and deeper appreciation of their systematic value. What I cannot cover here, yet what is ultimately required to complement my study, is Albert's reliance on the body of his Aristotelian sources. These, so it seems, would account for the precise facilitation of Albert's systematic integration of the models of epigenesis and *creatio ex nihilo*.

In what follows, then, I proceed in three steps. I first expose Albert's theological model of absolute psychological creationism for the origin of the human soul as found in the midst of his theological project. This first section serves to uncover the inherent tensions in this model and its inconsistent application of fundamental principles. In a second step, I turn to Albert's model of epigenesis for the origin of animals and their souls, also found in the midst of his theological project. This section serves to show how this Aristotelian model broke into Albert's theology and how its systematic appeal lay in its inherent consistency in contrast to the model of absolute psychological creationism for the human soul. I also identify this consistency as a driving factor for Albert's systematic reconception of his model of *creatio ex nihilo*. As a final step, I turn to a brief revision of Albert's innovative model of epigenetic creationism for the origin of the human soul in his mature works. This last section serves to show how Albert accomplished the systematic integration of both models, unifying the causal origin for human and animal sensitive and nutritive souls. With this move, I contend, Albert could consistently account for the union of the soul and of the composite in animals and humans alike. But he could also remain truthful to his theological commitments, against the background of the Neoplatonic principle of *opus naturae est opus intelligentiae*.

2. Separating the Sheep from the Goats: The Human Soul's Origin *ab extrinseco*

When Aristotle's *libri naturales* together with the accompanying Peripatetic works arrived in Paris in the early decades of the 1200s, they were received with a two-fold attitude: they were studied diligently in the private sphere on the one hand and set aside with caution in the public sphere on the other[14]. By the

[14] Concerning the condemnations and use of Aristotle's *libri naturales* at the University of Paris before 1255, cf. C. Lohr, *The New Aristotle and «Science» in the Paris Arts Faculty (1255)*, in *L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles): Actes du Colloque international*, ed. by O. Weijers and L. Holtz, Paris 1997, pp. 251-269. Concerning the

late 1260s, however, all these works had duly arrived at the University of Paris: they had become the standard curricular readings at the arts faculty and they constituted the philosophical toolkit for theologians, lawyers, and physicians alike[15]. This remarkably rapid appropriation of an entirely new system of thought was greatly aided by Albert the Great's commentaries on the entire *corpus Aristotelicum*, which he concluded in 1268. Arguably, Albert's decision to make all these works «intelligible to the Latins», as he famously declared around 1251 in his commentary on the *Physics*, was a pivotal moment for the rise of Aristotelianism in the Latin West[16]. But was it equally such a moment for the question of the origin of human and animal souls? Looking at the complete *corpus Albertinum*, one has to say that this is not the case. While Albert devotes his upmost attention to this topic in his *De animalibus* and his *Liber de natura et origine animae* (both after 1258), he begins to think about it much earlier in his career. This we can easily gather from his earliest systematic theological works that predate the first of his commentaries on the *corpus Aristotelicum* by roughly a decade[17]. For it is here that Albert begins to carve out his largely unchanging

constitutions of the *Ordo praedicatorum*, which heavily regulated the use and study of secular literature as well, cf. *Constitutiones antiquae Ordinis Praedicatorum* II.28, in *De oudste constituties van de Dominicanen*, ed. by A.H. Thomas, Leuven 1965, p. 361.7-11.

[15] G. Leff, *Das Trivium und die drei Philosophien*, in *Geschichte der Universität in Europa*, ed. by W. Rüegg, vol. 1, Munich 1993, pp. 279-302; J. North, *Das quadrivium*, in *Geschichte der Universität in Europa*, cit., pp. 303-320; A. García y García, *Die Rechtsfakultäten*, in *Geschichte der Universität in Europa*, cit., pp. 343-358; N. Siraisi, *Die medizinische Fakultät*, in *Geschichte der Universität in Europa*, cit., pp. 321-342.

[16] Cf. Albertus Magnus *Physica* 1.1.1, ed. Coloniensis 4/1, 1.9-14. In this paper, all Latin quotations are taken from the following works: Albertus Magnus, *Commentarii in II Sententiarum*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 27*, ed. by S.C.A. Borgnet, Paris 1894; —; *Commentarii in IV Sententiarum* (dist. XXIII-L), in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 30*, ed. by S.C.A. Borgnet, Paris 1894; — *De IV coaequaevis* (=*Summa de creaturis*, pars I), in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 34*, ed. by S.C.A. Borgnet, Paris 1895; — *De animalibus libri XXVI*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters XV-XVI*, 2 vols., ed. by H. Stadler, Münster 1916-1920; — *De bono*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 28*, ed. by H. Kühle et alii, Münster 1951; — *Liber de natura et origine animae*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 12*, ed. by B. Geyer, Münster 1955; — *De sacramentis*, *De incarnatione*, *De resurrectione*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 26*, ed. by A. Ohlmeyer, I. Backes, and W. Kübel, Münster 1958; — *De natura boni*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 25/1*, ed. by E. Filthaut, Münster 1974; — *Physica*, pars I, libri 1-4, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 4/1*, ed. by P. Hossfeld, Münster 1987; — *Quaestiones*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 25/2*, ed. by A. Fries, W. Kübel, and H. Anzulewicz, Münster 1993; — *De homine*, in *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia 27/2*, ed. by H. Anzulewicz and J. R. Söder, Münster 2008; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae I.50-119*, in *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia 5*, ed. by Commissio Leonina, Rome 1889; Aristotle, *De animalibus*, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation, Part Two: Books XI-XIV: Parts of Animals*, ed. by A. van Oppenraaij, Leiden/New York/Cologne 1998; Aristotle, *De animalibus*, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation, Part Three: Books XV-XIX: Generation of Animals*, ed. by A. van Oppenraaij, Leiden/New York/Cologne 1992; *Albertus Magnus on Animals. A Medieval Summa Zoologica*, ed. and trsl. by K.F. Kitchell Jr and I.M. Resnick, Baltimore/London 1999. All translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.

[17] For the dates of the different works in the *corpus Albertinum*, cf. *Zeittafel*, in *Albertus Magnus und sein System der Wissenschaften*, ed. by Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Münster 2011, pp. 28-31.

model on the epigenesis of the animal soul in juxtaposition to and in the context of his absolute creationist model on the origin of the human soul[18].

Perhaps the most general way in which Albert distinguishes animal nature from human nature evolves around what he takes to be their specific difference: humans are rational animals, whereas brutes are irrational animals. This standard Aristotelian distinction between animals and humans is even sharpened when Albert famously declares that humans do not differ just specifically from animals, but almost generically. Humans, we learn from his *De animalibus*, differ «in more than species from the brutes and they seem to have a certain difference in genus over them since they participate in animality itself in respect to a power which is different from that in other animals»[19]. Albert's overly optimistic view of the human difference here does not present us with a standard Aristotelian view, but it certainly suits his take on Aristotelianism that is deeply informed by his Christian commitments. In order to account, then, for the origin of such a generic difference of humans from animals, Albert initially resorted to the prevalent theological model of his times: absolute psychological creationism, as I call it[20]. This model maintains not only that the rational human soul originates from God's *creatio ex nihilo*, but most importantly that it does so in its totality. Albert's commitment to this model in his early works runs deep, for in the first passage ever where he brings it to the forefront, he does not simply provide an account of the generic difference between humans and animals on its basis. Rather, he applies this model to a theological argument for the resurrection of the human body.

> The [truth] of the human body[21] is other than that of other bodies. For other bodies have their form caused by nature, just as the bodies of brutes, because, as the Philosopher says in his book *De animalibus*, the nutritive and sensitive [form] is caused

[18] These early theological works roughly fall into two realms of systematic theology. On the one hand, they comprise the two moral theological treatises *De natura boni* and *De bono*. On the other, they comprise the five doctrinal treatises *De sacramentis* (sacramentology), *De incarnatione* (Christology), *De resurrectione* (Eschatology), *De IV coaequaevis* (theology of creation), and *De homine* (theological anthropology); cf. H. Anzulewicz, *The Systematic Theology of Albert the Great*, in *A Companion to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy, and the Science*s, cit., pp. 15-67, here esp. pp. 38-57. These latter doctrinal treatises decidedly follow the lead of the contemporary theological *summae* and Peter Lombard's *Sententiae* in method and content. Covering important parts of creation as hierarchically ordered reality that stems from and strives towards God, these treatises proved highly responsive to Aristotelian insights, particularly with regard to the sublunary living realm of creation.

[19] Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XX.2.6, ed. Stadler p. 1319.40-42; trsl. as in *Albertus Magnus on Animals. A Medieval Summa Zoologica*, cit., p. 1407.88: «Plus igitur quam specie differt a brutis, et videtur ad ipsa quamdam habere generis differentiam, cum ipsam animalitatem secundum differentem potestatem ab aliis animalibus participet». For an illuminating secondary source on this matter, cf. also G. Guldentops, *Albert the Great's Zoological Anthropocentrism*, in «Il mondo animale, Micrologus», VIII, 2000, pp. 217-235.

[20] Concerning the traditional model of *creatio ex nihilo* as, for instance, in Clement of Alexandria, cf. H. Karpp, *Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie. Biblische Anthro-pologie und philosophische Psychologie bei den Kirchenvätern des dritten Jahrhunderts*, Gütersloh 1950, pp. 92-131.

[21] This is the narrower topic of the question, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De resurrectione* 1.6, ed. Coloniensis 26, p. 248.39; 1.6.5, ed. Coloniensis 26, p. 251.23-24.

by the nature in the semen. But the substantial form of the human body is the rational soul, which is infused from the outside [*ab extrinseco*] by the creator and which does not come from nature [*a natura*], as the Philosopher says in the same work. This is why from the conjunction of the body to this [form] another disposition [*potentia*] can be caused [in this body] that is not perfected by nature but by the creator[22].

Albert's main point in this passage from his *De resurrectione* (before 1244) is that due to the distinctive origin of the human rational soul from divine *creatio ex nihilo*, the human body possesses a distinctive corporeal disposition for divine perfection. This distinctive disposition thus serves Albert as the proximate explanatory principle for human corporeal resurrection, whereas the human soul's origin from God constitutes the remote explanatory principle. At the same time, though, Albert sharply contrasts this creationist human psychological origin with a philosophical model of animal psychological origin. Since the animal soul arises from the natural cause of the male semen, the animal is incapable of possessing a distinctive corporeal disposition for divine perfection. This is why it is not subject to corporeal resurrection and why its psychological as well as corporeal teleology lies in the realm of nature.

In order to strengthen his argument for the different corporeal teleologies of humans and animals Albert even goes so far as to draw on Aristotle's famous distinction between *ab extrinseco* origin and *a natura* origin from his *De animalibus*: the human rational soul comes «*ab extrinseco* from the creator», whereas the animal sensitive soul comes «*a natura*». Yet Aristotle himself would neither have subscribed to Albert's absolute psychological creationism for the human soul, as Albert takes for granted here, nor to a resulting corporeal disposition for the resurrection in virtue of this creation. Instead, the Stagirite reserved extrinsic causality for the rational part of the human soul alone[23].

To make his argument work fully, though, Albert implicitly grounds it on two additional systematic commitments. On the one hand, he grounds it on the famous Neoplatonic scheme of egress-regress and, on the other, on the principle of substantial union of the composite. The Neoplatonic egress-regress scheme commonly maintains that any being that originates from God directly must — in some way or another — return to Him directly. Consequently, since the human soul originates directly from God's *creatio ex nihilo*, it must return to Him directly upon the corruption of the human body, and in Albert's eyes

[22] *Ibid.* ed. Coloniensis 26, p. 252.8-19: «Ad aliud dicendum, quod aliud est de humano corpore quam de aliis corporibus. Alia enim corpora habent formam causatam a natura sicut corpora brutorum; anima enim vegetabilis et sensibilis causantur a natura, ut dicit Philosophus in libro De animalibus, quae est in semine. Sed forma substantialis corporis humani est anima rationalis, quae ingreditur ab extrinseco per creantem, et non est a natura, ut dicit ibidem Philosophus. Et ideo ex coniunctione corporis ad illam potest causari aliqua potentia quae non completur per naturam, sed per creantem». Cf. also Albertus Magnus, *De homine,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, pp. 565.47-566.39.

[23] Cf. Aristotle, *Gen. An.* II 3, 736a27-29; Aristotle, *De animalibus* XVI 3, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation*, ed. van Oppenraaij, p. 74. Ps.-Aristotle, *De causis proprietatum elementorum*, c. 1, Venetiis 1560, f. 281rA. Cf. also Albertus Magnus, *De homine,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 73.11-34; p. 83.36-37.

it does so in the beatific vision and in affective union with God[24]. Yet it should be noted that Albert's application of this egress-regress scheme in our passage here is overextended in scope. For not only does it include the human rational soul, which he indeed takes to be created *ex nihilo*, but also the human body. This body, however, as we learn from his somewhat later *De homine*, originates naturally and not by creation[25].

Albert's second systematic grounds concern the substantial union of a composite nature, which entails that the soul of any living being be the essential form of the body. Substantial union of the composite is ensured when the soul, by its very essence, is present in the whole of the body and when it is the principle of life in the body[26]. In Albert's eyes, substantial union of the composite does not only seem to apply to humans in this life, but has also deep consequences for the next life. For it is only on the basis of such a substantial union with the incorruptible human soul that the human body possesses its specific human corporeal disposition for the resurrection. Indeed, no other body — be it plant or animal — would receive such a disposition from its nutritive soul or sensitive soul, simply because the rational soul is the only one capable of providing it to the body. In sum, then, Albert's argument for the human body's resurrection here implicitly relies on the Neoplatonic egress-regress scheme and on the presumption of substantial union of the composite human being. Explicitly, however, it turns on his earliest application of the theological model of absolute psychological creationism[27].

The more we progress in Albert's early theological works, the more traction his model of absolute psychological creationism gains for wider systematic contexts. In another early discussion on the origin of the human soul in his *Quaestio de origine animae* (before 1244), Albert states explicitly that *creatio ex nihilo* applies to its lower parts of the *anima sensitiva* and *anima nutritiva* as

[24] Cf. for instance, Albertus Magnus, *Quaestio de visione Dei in patria*, ed. Coloniensis 25/2, pp. 96.8-101.59; *De resurrectione* 4.1.9, 3; 4.1.11, 1 ad 2, ed. Coloniensis 26, p. 331.27-44; p. 333.49-59; *Commentarii in IV Sententiarum* 49.6, ed. Borgnet 30, p. 676B.

[25] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 137.62-70: «Sine praeiudicio aliorum non discedimus a nostra sententia, quam supra posuimus in quaestione de creatione, scilicet quod formae omnes praeter animam rationalem potentia sunt in ipsa materia generabilium et corruptibilim, et educuntur per actionem calidi et frigidi et humidi et sicci commixtionem. De anima autem rationali sola dicimus quod ipsa infundendo creatur et creando infunditur a prima causa, quae est deus gloriosus et sublimis». *Ibid.* pp. 141.71-142.5: «Ad id vero quod obicitur specialiter de anima et probatur quod sit in semine, dicimus quod concedimus duo prima quae probant semen esse causam efficientem generationis. Sed dicimus quod secus est in anima hominis; haec enim secundum principalem partem sui absoluta est a materia et non est alicuius partis corporis actus. Et ideo cum operatio ipsius non dependeat a corpore, principium non potest habere a virtutibus corporalibus, sicut expresse probatur in xvi de animalibus; et ideo anima rationalis dicitur divina, quae sola egrediatur ab extrinseco, scilicet a deo creante. Unde virtus quae est in semine hominis, non est nisi formativa et generativa organorum».

[26] Cf. K. Krause and H. Anzulewicz, *Albert the Great on* totalitas*: Remarks concerning the concept and its hermeneutical significance*, Conference Paper at «Totalitas. Aux origines d'un concept», Université de Caen, 4.–5. February 2015, to be published.

[27] Cf. also Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, pp. 86.41-88.27; pp. 570-572; *Commentarii in II Sententiarum* 1.12, ed. Borgnet 27, p. 34B.

well. At the same time, though, he contrasts this theological model with his take on alternative models of the soul's origin: an alternative theological model of traducianism and the new Aristotelian model of epigenesis. Yet Albert rejects both models as insufficient in their explanatory value for the origin of the human soul, since neither of them can account for the substantial union of all its parts.

> We say that the rational soul does not originate from material transfer [*ex traduce*], but, according to the authority of the Psalm, it alone is individually created by God. For to come to be from material transfer can be said in two ways. Either that it is divided by itself from the generator, be it that its part is in act according to certain thinkers, be it that its entirety is in potency according to Aristotle. And in this way the body originates from material transfer. Or [to come to be] is said from material transfer inasmuch as it is divided by another division. And in this way, the vegetative and the sensitive soul in other beings can be said to be from material transfer. For they are forms whose being and operation are in matter and therefore they are divided for the division of the body as is evident from plants and annular animals. In these the soul is one in act and many in potency and many [of them] are brought in act by the division of the body, since, on account of the distinction of their organs, the part is disposed to be perfected by the soul just like the whole. But the rational soul is not a form impressed in corporeal matter, because it does not rely on corporeal instruments in its operation. And therefore it originates from neither of the two ways of material transfer [as outlined above]. Rather, it is created and similarly the sensitive and the vegetative soul of the human being [are created], which are one in substance with the rational soul[28].

In this passage Albert unambiguously draws a sharp division between two general models of the soul's origin. While the former model relies on the idea of a concomitant transmission of the soul from the parents to the offspring in the act of natural transference, the latter relies on the by now familiar idea of absolute psychological creation. In Albert's eyes, however, natural transference can be construed in different ways: according to the first division, it may be conceived of as actual transmission of the father's soul to his offspring — the traditional traducianist view as, for instance, propounded by Augustine, following Tertullian and other Church Fathers[29]. In contrast, it may also be

[28] Albertus Magnus, *Quaestio de origine animae*, ed. Coloniensis 25/2, pp. 216.45-217.3: «Dicimus, quod anima rationalis non est ex traduce, sed unaquaeque creatur a deo singillatim secundum auctoritatem psalmi. Esse enim ex traduce dicitur duobus modis: aut quod per se dividitur a generante, sive sit actu pars secundum quosdam, sive potentia totum secundum Aristotelem; et hoc modo corpus est ex traduce. Dicitur etiam ex traduce, quod dividitur diviso alio; et hoc modo vegetabilis et sensibilis anima in aliis potest esse ex traduce; sunt enim formae, quarum esse et operatio est in materia, et ideo dividuntur ad divisionem corporis, ut patet in plantis et in animalibus anulosis, in quibus est anima una actu et plures in potentia, et efficiuntur plures actu per divisionem corporis, eo quod propter distinctionem organorum pars est disposita perfici ab anima sicut totum. Anima vero rationalis non est forma impressa in materia corporali, cum in sua operatione non indigeat instrumentis corporalibus; et ideo neutro modo traducitur, sed creatur, et similiter sensitiva et vegetativa hominis, quae sunt una substantia cum ipsa».

[29] Cf. H. Karpp, *Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie*, cit., pp. 59-67. J.M. Da Cruz Pontes, *Le problème de l'origine de l'âme de la patristique à la solution thomiste*, in «Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale», XXXI, 1964, pp. 175-229; here esp. pp. 175-178 and pp. 184-188.

conceived of as potential propagation of the father's essential characteristics to his offspring whence the gradual formation of a new being comes about — the new epigenetic model as presented by Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. In his later works, Albert will frequently refer to this potential propagation by the well-known terms of *incohatio* or *virtus formativa*[30]. According to the second division, material transference of the soul may be conceived of as transference by means of corporeal division, as is done by certain plants and animals. Still, it is important to note that Albert does not endorse either kind of natural transference for the human soul here. In fact, he rejects traducianism as a heretical theological model throughout his theological works[31], he limits the Aristotelian model of epigenesis to animals and plants in his early works[32], and he no longer makes reference to the model of corporeal division for humans elsewhere in his works. Indeed, neither of these three divisions of natural transference is applicable to the human soul, as its intellectual operation is performed immaterially in Albert's eyes. It thus cannot substantially derive from a material cause, as is the case with plants and animals, but it must rather come from God's extrinsic causality. This causality, however, extends to the rational soul's nutritive and sensitive parts, too, and thus explicitly includes those parts of the human soul that are physically instantiated and physically operational. Albert's sharp division of the animal soul's origin from the human soul's creation, then, can be said to follow a sharp

[30] Albertus Magnus, *Liber de natura et origine animae* I.3, ed. Coloniensis 12, pp. 8.98-9.14: «Patet etiam, quod haec vegetabilis anima educitur ab interiori virtute seminis. Propter quod in sexto decimo libro de animalibus probavimus, quod est in semine, sicut artificis forma est in artificiato, quod iam formam artis incipit induere. Propter quod etiam quidam hanc animam ex traduce esse dixerunt, licet hoc omnino sit falsum. Ex traduce enim dicitur, quod sicut pars quaedam traducitur a toto aliquo, virtus autem formativa, quae inducit animam, non venit in semen sicut pars quaedam animae plantae, cuius est semen, sed potius sicut similitudo quaedam suarum virtutum. De his autem perfecte dictum est in nostro libro de animalibus quinto decimo, ubi de seminum natura in animalibus et plantis late disputatum est». *Ibid.* I.4, p. 10.31-34: «[…] anima sensibilis educitur ex materia suae generationis habente virtutem formativam ex assimilatione cum virtutibus membrorum generantium [...]». *Ibid.* I.5, p. 13.82-91: «Oportet autem scire, quod sicut in aliis ita etiam in homine incohatio vegetativi est in materia et in esse primo substantiae animandae et incohatio sensibilis est in vegetativo et incohatio rationalis est in sensitivo, quia aliter homo constitutus, sicut ante probatum est, esset multa et non unum. Sed quia nihil horum fit nisi per virtutem intellectus et non ex materia aliqua efficitur, ideo terminus esse hominis ad similitudinem intellectus primi, qui divinus est, ex nulla materia fieri perhibetur».

[31] Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Quaestio de origine animae*, ed. Coloniensis 25/2, pp. 215–218; *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 130.71-73: «Et hic occurrit illa disputatio, utrum anima sit ex traduce, quemadmodum dixit Apollinaris quidam haeareticus [...]». Albert also rejects this model as against reason and philosophical authority, cf. Albertus Magnus, *Commentarii in II Sententiarum* 18.8, ed. Borgnet 27, pp. 324B-325A, esp. p. 324B: «Dicendum, quod secundum Catholicam fidem, et secundum Philosophos, nulla anima est ex traduce, nec plantae, nec bruti, neque hominis: et per errorem scientiae naturalis inductae sunt opiniones contrariae: dicunt enim quidam, quod materia spiritualis descinditur cum semine, ex qua fiunt anima bruti, et vegetabilis: et hoc numquam aliquis Philosophus sensit, sicut patet in libris eorum, Aristotelis in libris XV et XVI de *Animalibus*, et Avicennae qui exponit Aristotelis verba omnino per alium modum. Et similiter Averroes in libro quodam de *virtute formativa*». For a classic study on this topic, cf. B. Nardi, *La dottrina d'Alberto Magno sull'«inchoatio formae»*, in id., *Studi di filosofia medievale*, Rome 1979, pp. 69-101.

[32] See above note 27.

divide between natural and divine causality. While the origin of plant and animal souls is explicable in terms of natural models of traducianism, epigenesis, or corporeal division, the origin of the human soul as a whole is only explicable in terms of a theological model of absolute psychological creationism. This divide along the lines of natural and divine causality, as is evident from the passage above[33], is corroborated by Albert's reference to the theological authority of the Psalm. Yet the passage, too, suggests another and more proximate motif for Albert's adherence to the theological model of absolute psychological creation: the substantial union of the human soul.

Over the course of his following early theological works, most prominently in his *De homine*[34], it is this substantial union of the human soul (apart from corporeal resurrection as we have seen above) which demands Albert's repeated insistence on the model of absolute psychological creation.

> The rational soul (i.e. the soul of human beings) with all its powers (i.e. the vegetative, sensitive, and rational powers) is neither in the semen like in an efficient cause nor [is it in the semen] by its substance. Rather, it is created by God and infused into the body. For we maintain that in human beings there is one substance, which is the soul, and not three [substances]. And this why we cannot say that this substance is partly created by God with regards to its rational powers and partly educed from the substance of the semen with regard to its vegetative and sensitive powers. But we say that it is created by God in its totality and infused into the body. In contrast, we maintain for the souls of animals and plants that they originate in generation [and that they are] educed from the matter of the semen[35].

Clearly, the reason of the human soul's substantial union motivates Albert's systematic adherence to the theological model of absolute psychological

[33] See above note 30.

[34] Cf. for instance: Albertus Magnus, *De resurrectione* 1.3, ed. Coloniensis 26, p. 245.12-21; *De IV coaequaevis* 1.1.1 s.c. 3, ed. Borgnet 34, p. 309A; 4.24.2 ad 6, ed. Borgnet 34, p. 481A-B; 4.30.2, ed. Borgnet 34, pp. 500A-501B. Albert repeatedly draws on Aristotle's distinction between the human soul's origin *ab extrinseco* and the animal soul's origin *ab intrinseco* and consistently interprets it in terms of its absolute creation. At the same time, he draws of this principle of absolute distinct origin his *De IV coaequaevis* and *De homine* to account for a variety of matters: (1) for the intellectual mode of human knowing, cf. *De IV coaequaevis* 4.24.4 ad 6, ed. Borgnet 34, p. 481A-B; (2) for his justification of the very existence of the human soul, cf. *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 7.68-76; (3) for his defence of the substantial union of the human soul's nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual parts, cf. *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.11–18 as in the following note.

[35] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.6-18: «Ad id quod quaeritur, utrum anima sit in semine, dicimus quod anima rationalis, hoc est anima hominis, cum omnibus potentiis suis, hoc est vegetabilibus et sensibilibus et rationabilibus, non est in semine sicut in effectivo neque per substantiam, sed creatur a deo et infunditur corpori. Nos enim tenemus quod in homine est una substantia, quae est anima, et non tres; et ideo non possumus dicere quod haec substantia in parte creetur a deo quantum ad rationales potentias, et in parte educatur ex substantia seminis quantum ad potentia vegetabiles et sensibiles, sed totam dicimus creari a deo et infundi corpori. Sed animas brutorum et vegetabilium ponimus per generationem educi ex materia seminis». Cf. *Ibid.* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 86.24-29, ad 6; Aristotle, *Gen. An.* II 3, 736b8-29; Aristotle, *De animalibus* XVI 3, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation*, ed. van Oppenraaij, pp. 73-74. For Albert's mature conception, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XVI.1.12, ed. Stadler, pp. 95.25-96.42.

creationism here. Since the specific nature of the rational soul does not allow for its origin from the matter of the semen, it must originate from the altogether different cause of God. Yet it must do so in its totality, including the lower parts of the sensitive and nutritive soul, since otherwise its substantial union cannot be ensured. Indeed, given that the human soul ought to be a substantially unified whole and not divided into three accidentally related and separate souls, it cannot originate in parts from generation and in other parts from creation. Rather, it must originate from creation alone.

To make this argument for the soul's substantial union work Albert yet again relies on an implicit assumption. This time, it is the assumption of numerical proportionality between cause and effect, according to which only a substantially unified cause can ensure the substantial union of its effect. In our passage, then, we see that the substantial union of the divine cause ensures the substantial union of the human soul. This suggests, on the one hand, that Albert here takes numerical proportionality between cause and effect to be the sufficient explanatory principle for the substantial union of the human soul. On the other hand, it shows why all three parts of the human soul, including its *anima nutritiva* and *anima sensitiva*, must be caused by God alone; did these lower parts of the soul originate from the material cause in the semen, the soul's substantial union would be at stake.

In short, Albert applies the theological model of absolute psychological creationism not only to account for the resurrection of the human body, as we have seen above, but also to account for the substantial union of the human soul. In so doing, he extends this model's scope of systematic application dramatically, now including not only the theological discipline of eschatology but also the much wider discipline of theological anthropology. Still, this model's extension in scope comes at a price: it is ultimately unable to draw on some of its most fundamental principles in a consistent way. Indeed, the most pressing inconsistency in this regard becomes apparent in Albert's application of the last principle we just reviewed, the principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect. This principle, again, maintains that the substantial union of an effect is ensured by the substantial union of its cause. In the case of the human soul the substantial union of God ensures the substantial union of the soul. What remains unclear from this one-off application, however, is whether Albert considers this principle to be of universal application to his overall theological anthropology, or alternatively, whether he had good reasons to draw on it selectively only in the context of the substantial union of the human soul.

A context outside this application to the soul's substantial union seems to provide the answer. In this second context, Albert rejects the *dator formarum* model for the origin of the substantial form of any living being by drawing on precisely this principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect. This time, however, he applies it to the substantial union of the composite being and not to the substantial union of the soul. Albert's initial presentation of this *dator formarum* model in an objection to the question of generation suggests

that the substantial form of any living being cannot arise from material causes (alone), but rather requires the immediate causality of the separate substance of the Agent Intellect, the *dator formarum*. The reason for this lies in the fact that «the same specific power does not at once produce something and make use of it. When, therefore, the soul of animals and plants is used by the organic body, it does not also produce [this organic body]»[36]. As is immediately clear, this reason on behalf of the *dator formarum* model rests on the principle of numerical proportionality between a power and its operation: one specific power has one specific operation, but not two. If a natural power like the body thus uses its soul (that is, its substantial form), it cannot at the same time produce this soul. Consequently, the soul's production requires a different cause, which, according to Albert's presentation here, the proponents of the *dator formarum* model take to be the separate Agent Intellect.

In sharp contrast to these proponents, however, Albert himself rejects the *dator formarum* model on the basis of his own principle, namely that of numerical proportionality between cause and effect.

> [A]s it is maintained in book VII of the *Metaphysics*, the same being in number cannot originate from two immediate agents, such that one brings about its form and the other its matter. […] Nor can this [double agency] be maintained to bring about union. For if active and passive qualities were to produce the matter of composites in nature, and if the separate substances were to produce their substantial form, it would be impossible to attain one composite being from matter and form. And therefore we do not take the things to be true that were said about the giver of forms [*dator formarum*][37].

In contrast to the guiding principle of the *dator formarum* model, according to which there must be numerical proportionality between a power and its operation, Albert's reply here is guided by the familiar principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect. Albert's juxtaposition of principles is certainly no direct rebuttal of the *dator formarum* model, yet it clearly suggests a relative superiority of Albert's principle over that of the *dator formarum* model. Over and above numerical proportionality in power and operation, the substantial union of the composite living beings requires that there be no two immediate causes in their coming to be. The immediate causality of the transcendent Agent

[36] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 134.41-48: «[…] non est eiusdem virtutis in specie facere aliquid et uti eo. Cum igitur animae animalis et plantae sit uti corpore organico, non erit eiusdem facere ipsum; ergo anima non est in semine existens, ut faciat corpus organicum vel animam. Et istae rationes omnes sunt ad hoc quod necesse sit ponere datorem formarum, ut posuerunt Plato, Avicenna, Theodorus et sequaces eorum».

[37] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.58-70: «Ad omnia illa quae obiciuntur pro Aristotele contra datorem formarum, in genere concedimus de plano. Sicut enim habetur in VII Primae Philosophiae, idem numero non potest esse a duobus agentibus immediatis, ita quod unum agat formam, alterum materiam ipsius, quia agentium separatorum per substantiam et actum separati sunt effectus per substantiam et actum. Non enim posset poni uniens; et ita si qualitates agentes et patientes facerent materiam compositorum in natura, et substantiae separatae facerent formam substantialem, non posset esse unum compositum ex materia et forma. Et ideo non credimus verum esse, quod dicitur de datore formarum».

Intellect in conjunction with the equally immediate causality of the active and passive qualities in matter would, in fact, inhibit the substantial union of any living being. The *dator formarum* model which proposes such immediate double causality ought thus to be rejected in Albert's eyes. As a consequence of this rejection, however, Albert's application of the principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect can be identified to be extended in scope: this time, it does not only apply to the context of substantial union of the human soul, as we have seen above, but also to the context of substantial union of composite living beings.

Yet it is precisely this extended scope in application that represents a serious dilemma for Albert's theological model of absolute psychological creationism, which arises from his insistence on the human soul's *creatio ex nihilo* by God on the one hand, and the human body's origin from the male semen on the other[38]. This insistence, as we can easily see, presents us with exactly the same double causality as the *dator formarum* model does: the immediate causality of God causing the human soul clearly works in conjunction with the equally immediate causality of the human semen causing the human body. Yet following Albert's extended application of the principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect to composite living beings, such a two-fold immediate causality of God and the male semen cannot possibly result in substantial union of the composite human being.

As a consequence, so it seems, Albert's principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect would thus either be inapplicable as an explanation for the substantial composition of human beings — in which case he would have to give reasons why they are the exception to the rule — or it would have to be abandoned to account for the substantial composition of all living beings altogether. Given that Albert has no such reasons to supply, it seems that the extended scope of this principle would equally affect his application to the union of the human soul, since the principle's application appears to be arbitrary. While the substantial union of the human soul cannot be accounted for without this principle, the substantial union of the composite human being cannot be accounted for on its grounds and yet this substantial union is fundamental for Albert's resurrection argument, as we have seen above. Consequently, it is here that we have arrived at the insoluble internal inconsistency of his theological model. The only choice for Albert to safeguard this model at this point seems simple. He has to somehow replace the principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect as a basic explanatory principle for the origin of the human soul with a more sophisticated principle — a move that Albert was seemingly unable to make in his early theological works.

In sum, then, the theological model of absolute psychological creationism is clearly unable to draw on one of its most fundamental principles in a consistent way. Abandoning this principle clearly did not suit Albert in his early works— at least there seems to be no evidence for it. But it is quite probable that he

[38] Cf. note 27 and note 42.

developed an increasing awareness of the theological model's inconsistencies, giving him a strong systematic reason to eventually replace this model with the philosophically mixed model of epigenetic creation, as I call it. Albert's initial motivation in separating the sheep from the goats, that is, in accounting for the origin of the human soul from *creatio ex nihilo* by means of the model of absolute psychological creationism as opposed to drawing on the Aristotelian model of epigenesis, ended in stalemate. Further systematic inconsistencies across both models may have added momentum to Albert's eventual abandonment of the original theological model: the epigenesis of the animal *anima sensitiva* and *anima nutritiva* on the one hand and the creation *ex nihilo* of the human *anima sensitiva* and *anima nutritiva* on the other sit equally uneasy with systematic consistency, this time across the disciplines[39]. The law of parsimony and Albert's neglect of it here can arguably be identified to have increased the systematic difficulties: why posit two different causes for a similar enough effect[40]? Ultimately, though, the decisive impetus to overcome these systematic weaknesses came from the animals. More precisely, it came from Albert's early and decided espousal of Aristotle's model of epigenesis for explaining the origin of animal souls. For it is here that Albert found the key to systematic consistency in answering all the questions of substantial union of the soul and of the composite, to uniform and reasoned application of one's principles, and to their wide-ranging application across the disciplines. All these systematic criteria were desirable not only philosophically, but also theologically, since for Albert faith and reason never were opposite poles; they rather complemented, informed, and matched one another. Let us

[39] Cf. for instance Albert's remarks on the development of the lower parts of the soul in the following passage: Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 86.10-22: «Ad aliud dicendum, quod Philosophus non intendit dicere quod anima vegetabilis et sensibilis sint in semine sicut actus in potentia, sed sunt in ipso, ut ibidem dicit, ut artificium in artifice; nec intendit dicere quod anima vegetabilis sit ante sensibilem in homine tempore, sed quod prius manifestantur operationes eius. Et hoc nihil prohibet quod anima rationalis sit substantia una cum sensibili et vegetabili, et tamen prius tempore sint opera vegetabilis quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam rationalis. Utrum autem anima vegetabilis et sensibilis sint in semine vel ex semine, et quomodo sint et quomodo non, quaeretur infra, cum disputabitur de potentia generativa».

[40] Similarly, according to the Aristotelian principle of teleology, it is imperative that a living being, even if it is potentially alive as is the semen, be oriented to its formal cause. This principle is often expressed in the phrase that «nature does nothing in vain». In the case of the animal semen, Albert seems to adhere to this principle: the formative power of the animal semen potentially contains not only the entire animal body, but also the entire animal soul with all its parts and faculties. The animal semen, then, can clearly be said to be oriented to its formal cause: in conjunction with the causality of the heavens, it is naturally capable of producing the animal soul as the first actuality of the living being. Yet in the case of the human semen, Albert repeatedly violates this principle, insisting that it is the human body alone which is contained in the formative power of the semen. Cf. Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, pp. 141.71-142.5, ad 33-34. The human soul, in contrast, is not potentially contained in the human semen, since, as we have seen, it is created by God *ex nihilo* in its entirety. Consequently, the human semen cannot be said to be oriented to its formal cause, at least not univocally, since it is not naturally capable of producing the human soul as the first actuality of the living being. There is, then, no teleology in the human semen that is naturally capable of the full production of the human being.

turn, therefore, to the model of epigenesis in Albert's early theological works and investigate it as it emerges.

3. A Dark Horse? The Animal Soul's Origin *ab intrinseco*

Albert entertained no doubts as to the consistency of the Aristotelian model of epigenesis for the origin of animals. Derived from Aristotle's *De generatione animalium* (a part of Michael Scot's Latin translation from the Arabic compilation of the *De animalibus*) and accompanied by insights from Avicenna and Averroes, Albert initially appropriated this model in lose knit fashion in his *De homine*[41]. Trusting its ability to consistently and truthfully explain the origin of animals as a gradual process, their substantial union as composites, and the substantial union of their souls, Albert first incorporated many of its insights into his theological anthropology.

A systematic reconstruction of Albert's early adoptions of the model of epigenesis exposes, almost on the spot, a striking peculiarity about its causal principles at work. In contrast to Albert's model of absolute psychological creationism for the human soul, which relied on (but ultimately failed to consistently adhere to) the principle of numerical proportionality between cause and effect, his model of animal epigenesis relies on a principle of an ordered combination of causes. At its heart stands the ordered combination of three different kinds of causes: (1) the generative power in the male semen and the generative matter of the menstrual blood, (2) the elemental qualities of heat and moisture as active causes, (3) and the transcendental power of the heavens[42]. These three ordered and combined causes that we can reconstruct from Albert's

[41] On Averroes' account of the epigenesis of animate beings, cf. G. Freudenthal, *The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle's Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings*, in «Arabic Sciences and Philosophy», XII, 2002, pp. 111-137; R. Fontaine, *Averroes' Commentary on Aristotle's* De Generatione Animalium *and its Use in Two Thirteenth-Century Hebrew Encyclopedias*, in *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages. Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation: in Honour of Hans Daiber*, ed. by A. Akasoy and W. Raven, Leiden-Boston 2008, pp. 489-502.

[42] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 139.26-43: «Ad aliud dicendum quod in veritate causae agentes et patientes in natura non sunt nisi qualitates primae in se vel in mixto, sed moventes causae sunt plures; motus enim caeli non est a talibus causis. Sed quia hoc non est ad propositum, dicimus quod formae substantiales sunt a qualitatibus primis agentibus et patientibus; licet enim calidum tantum sit agens, non tamen agit tantum in virtute calidi ignei, quia hoc est consumptivum, ut dicitur in libro de substantia orbis. Agit enim etiam cum virtute calidi caeli et cum virtute calidi animae, ut supra habitum est et expresse scribitur in libro *de animalibus* et in libro de substantia orbis, et virtute illius est inductivum formarum substantialium, et diversificatur in agendo secundum quod diversimode respicitur a lumine descendente a stellis. Diversitas autem descensus illius luminis causatur ex diversitate situs stellarum ex appropinquatione et elongatione earum ad invicem». *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 137.62-67: «Sine praeiudicio aliorum non discedimus a nostra sententia, quam supra posuimus in quaestione de creatione, scilicet quod formae omnes praeter animam rationalem potentia sunt in ipsa materia generabilium et corruptibilium, et educuntur per actionem calidi et frigidi et humidi et sicci commixtionem». *De IV coaequaevis* 1.1.6, ed. Borgnet 34, pp. 315B-316A.

epigenesis model ensure not only the substantial union of the composite animal, but also that of the animal soul. How exactly, though, do they achieve this?

In a nutshell, these combined causes achieve substantial union of the animal composite and the animal soul by suggesting a gradual process of their formative stages. Beginning in the generative power of the semen, which has its origin in the vegetative soul of the father, the epigenesis of the animal and its soul is shaped by the interplay of efficient and material principles. These principles, as Albert holds, are found in the male and the female. Both of them are required for the epigenesis of most animals, due to the highly differentiated composition of their bodies; exceptions are merely found in some species of fish[43]. The male parent embodies the efficient principle of epigenesis, giving the generative power through its semen[44]. The female parent embodies the material principle of epigenesis, providing what is required for the male semen to develop into an embryo and finally an animal[45]. For Albert, then, the role of masculinity is to generate its own species from its own semen, whereas the role of femininity is to generate its own species in itself from the semen of another[46]. This does not imply that the male semen encloses the father's soul or any of its parts. On the contrary, according to Albert's epigenetic view, the male semen contains the so-called «generative power». This is caused by the act of the father's soul and channelled through the testicles into the semen[47].

As Avicenna says in the last book of his *Book on the Soul*, the generative power emanates into the organ of generation from the soul that is in the whole body. From this [organ of generation], the power flows into the power of generation in the semen, «which generates its members according to each and every power congruent with it in act, such that each and every member be disposed to receiving its proper power, which

[43] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, pp. 128.72-129.12: «Sicut autem dicit Philosophus in X Metaphysicae, masculinum et femininum accidunt omnibus animalibus. Sed in libro De animalibus excipit quoddam genus piscis, in quo non est umquam visus masculus; et hoc necesse est contingere propter similitudinem partium illius piscis. Quando enim corpus animatum omnino est simile in partibus vel minimam habet diversitatem, tunc superfluum cibi ab ultima digestione accipit virtutem ad proferendum tale corpus; et non est necesse, ut a virtute organi specialis recipiat aliquem influxum ultra hoc. Et ideo cum organa generationis influentia virtutem specialem superfluo quartae digestionis faciant distinctionem maris et feminae, non erit in tali animali distinctio sexus. Et ideo dicunt quidam philosophi et experimentatores quod illud genus piscis est anguilla, in qua numquam apparuit masculus vel femina».
[44] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 137.21-23.32-33: «Dicit enim Aristoteles in XVI : 'Debet femina dare materiam et mas dare id quod creat. [...] Item, ibidem: 'Manifestum est quod materia est ex femina et principium motus est ex masculo'».
[45] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 126.51-57: «Secundaria vero supponitur cum dicitur 'per attractionem aliorum corporum quae illi assimilat'; illa enim est materia sanguinis menstrui et seminis mulieris, quae attrahitur a semine et commiscetur illi, ut sufficiat ad corporis quantitatem. Alia vero pars sanguinis menstrui derivatur ad mamillas ad nutrimentum quod praeparari debet generato».
[46] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 127.26-31: «Praeterea, hoc patet ex diffinitione masculi et feminae, quae colliguntur ex Libro animalibus et ex principio Libri vegetabilium, hae scilicet, quod 'masculus est, qui generat in alio' suae speciei ex semine proprio, 'femina vero quae geneat in se' ex semine alterius suae speciei». *Ibid.* p. 129.13-15: «Ad aliud dicendum quod femina generat in se ex semine alio, quod est effectivum, sed tamen ex semine proprio, quod est materiale».
[47] Cf. also *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 126.39-47.

appears in it». Now, in accordance with this we say that the first generative power, which is a part of the vegetative soul, is in the generator. In animals it certainly has its location in a determinate organ for generation. […] Yet in the semen, there is the generative power, caused by those things that are neither in the soul nor a part of the soul, even if it is brought about by the act of the soul[48].

Contrary, then, to preformationism—a competing philosophical model of generation according to which the father's soul or a part of the father's soul would be in the semen[49]—Albert here adopts Avicenna's epigenetic principle of the generative power. Later he will come to call it *virtus formativa*[50]. Yet already here he conceives of it as a power that is in the semen and that contains the efficient and operating potency (rather than as an act) by which it develops into a complete animal[51]. Oftentimes, Albert explains this generative power in the semen as derived from the father's soul with analogy of art: just as the artisan's art is found in the artefact, so is the father's soul in the male semen[52]. This virtual presence of the father's soul in the semen is what ensures the specific animal identity across the generations. A horse's generative power in the semen cannot bring forth but a horse. The act of generation originates in the father's soul, is then received in his seminal vessels whence it produces the generative power in the semen. The semen thus endowed is capable of operating and producing the generated animal[53], as emerges from Albert's adoption Avicenna's definition of the generative power.

[48] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 128.43-58: «Sicut dicit Avicenna in ultimo libro Sexti de naturalibus, ab anima quae est in toto corpore, virtus generativa emanat in organum generationis; quae virtus influit semini virtutem generationis, 'quae generat membra secundum unamquamque virtutem congruam actioni illius, ita quod unumquodque membrum sit aptum ad recipiendum virtutem propriam, quae apparet in eo'. Et secundum hoc dicimus quod virtus generativa prima, quae est pars vegetabilis animae, est in generante. Et in animalibus quidem situm habet in determinato organo generationis; [...] Sed in semine est vis generativa, causata ab illa, quae nec anima est nec pars animae, licet actione animae operetur».

[49] Cf. L. Demaitre and A.A. Travill, *Human Embryology and Development in the Works of Albertus Magnus*, in *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980*, cit., p. 407 and p. 422, note 69. J.M. Da Cruz Pontes, *Le problème de l'origine de l'âme de la patristique à la solution thomiste*, cit., pp. 220-222.

[50] Cf. for instance Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XVI.1.4, ed. Stadler, p. 1073.17-31; *Liber de natura et origine animae* I.2, ed. Coloniensis p. 12.66-74. For an excellent paper on this matter, cf. also A. Takahashi, *Nature, Formative Power and Intellect in the Natural Philosophy of Albert the Great*, in «Early Science and Medicine», XIII, 2008, pp. 451-481.

[51] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, pp. 137.70-138.3: «Dicimus etiam quod anima plantae et bruti sunt in semine potentia, non actu, et non potentia materiali tantum, sed potentia efficientis et operantis». *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.19-23: «Ad hoc autem quod quaeritur, utrum sint in semine vel non, dicimus quod sunt ibi per aliquem modum et per aliquem non. Sicut enim habetur in XVI De animalibus, non sunt ibi actu, sed sunt in potentia et potentia efficientis et materiae».

[52] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.35-36: «Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod anima est in semine sicut artificiatum in artifice».

[53] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 126.39-47: «Virtutis enim genus supponitur per hoc quod dicit 'vis vegetabilis animae'. Actus autem eius supponitur dupliciter, scilicet per 'accipere' et per 'operari'. In generante enim accipit primo per attractionem ad vasa seminaria, quae attrahunt semen a toto corpore, et ab ipsis vasis descendit in ipsum vis generativa. Vis autem operans est in semine et non in organo aliquo, et illius est operatio eius quod nascitur».

The generative power is a power of the vegetative soul, which takes from the body of which it is part [something] similar to it in potency. And [it] operates in [this part of the body] through the attraction of other bodies which it assimilates to [the body], [and it operates] by generation and mixture, and it converts [the part] into a similitude of [the body] in act[54].

What emerges, too, from Avicenna's definition and Albert's subsequent interpretation thereof is that in the absence of the proper conditions and instrumental causes, the generative power in the male semen cannot begin the formation of the embryo. The proper conditions, we find in Albert elsewhere, comprise principally the woman's menstrual blood, the material principle of epigenesis. Its role is two-fold: on the one hand, it is to lay «a foundation for the quantity of the [embryonic] body» and, on the other hand, it is to feed the generated being through transferred nutrition to the breasts. The first role is particularly crucial for the formation of the embryo, since it is here that the menstrual blood is «attracted by the [male] semen and mixed with it» to form, in conjunction with the semen, the corporeal parts of the embryo[55].

Beside the proper conditions supplied by the woman's menstrual blood, the necessary instrumental causes for the generative power's action are found in the elemental qualities. These, as Albert insists repeatedly, are the proper instruments of the male and female powers, which is why they, too, fall into efficient and material causes. Heat plays the efficient causal role as the male semen's instrument, whereas moisture plays the material causal role as the menstrual blood's instrument[56]. Still, physical heat in the semen can become active only in conjunction with the two other heats of the heavens and of the father's soul's heat[57]. Indeed, when physical heat acts under the power of heavenly heat, Albert explains, «it brings forth the being of the form and the species». When it acts under the power of the soul's heat of the father, however, «it receives the informative and generative power for the organs from the generative power of the father»[58]. Diversity in the activity of heat is primarily caused by the descending

[54] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 126.7-13: «Ad primum ponatur diffinitio Avicennae in VI de Naturalibus, quae est haec: 'Generativa est vis vegetabilis animae accipiens de corpore in quo est partem illi similem in potentia et operatur in ea per attractionem aliorum corporum quae illi assimilat, generari et commisceri, et convertit eam in similitudinem illius in effectu'».
[55] Cf. note 46 and note 47. Cf. also *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 127.31-33: «[…] femina generans non descindit semen proprium ad hoc quod effective operetur conceptum».
[56] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 128.65-72: «[…] dicendum quod semen est duplex, scilicet materiale et effectivum. Quod tamen effectivum pars est materiae secundum subiectum primum in quo salvatur. Et primum, scilicet materiale, descinditur a femina per attractum sanguinis menstrui vel alterius humoris, qui est loco eius; secundum autem, scilicet effectivum, descinditur a viro in omnibus animalibus, in quibus est masculus et femina».
[57] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 139.30-43: «[…] dicimus quod formae substantiales sunt a qualitatibus primis agentibus et patientibus; licet enim calidum tantum sit agens, non tamen agit tantum in virtute calidi ignei, quia hoc est consumptivum, ut dicitur in libro De substantia orbis. Agit enim etiam cum virtute calidi caeli et cum virtute calidi animae, ut supra habitum est et expresse scribitur in libro De animalibus et in libro De substantia orbis, et virtute illius est inductivum formarum substantialium».
[58] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.31-35: «in virtute caeli, secundum quam potest esse principium formae et speciei, et in virtute animae, secundum quod recipit a virtute generativa

light of the stars, varying itself in causality in accordance with the spatial relation among the stars[59]. Albert's reference to this last cause illustrates his indebtedness to the Peripatetic tradition and its insistence on a combined causality of the spheres and intellects on the one hand and the physical powers in the semen and menstrual blood on the other[60]. Apart from this diversity in the activity of the stars' heat, Albert also describes diversity in terms of the receptivity or disposition of matter. Since matter is disposed in many ways due to its difference in mixture and complexion, it is capable of receiving different kinds of forms. This is why the specific matter capable of receiving an animal form must not simply be receptive of a certain kind of mixture (as this would only result in minerals) or of a certain kind of imbalanced mixture and complexion (as this would result in plants). Rather, it must be receptive of a balanced state of complexion and only then can animals be generated[61]. Albert explains in more detail elsewhere that this kind of matter required for animal epigenesis is a kind of «moisture mixed in accordance with the complexion of the semen and with nature»[62]. Here, then, we see the interaction of the elemental qualities as instrumental causes with the male and female active and passive causes. Moisture, which is the instrumental

patris vim informativam et generativam organorum».

[59] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 139.38-43: «et diversificatur in agendo secundum quod diversimode respicitur a lumine descendente a stellis. Diversitas autem descensus illius luminis causatur ex diversitate situs stellarum ex appropinquatione et elongatione earum ad invicem».

[60] Cf. for instance H. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, Oxford 1992; H. Eichner, *Ibn Rushd's Middle Commentary and Alexander's Commentary in their relationship to the Arab commentary tradition on the* De Generatione et corruptione, in *Aristotele e Alessandro di Afrodisia nella tradizione araba. Atti del Colloquio La ricezione arabe ed ebraica della filosofia e della scienza greche, Padova, 14-15 maggio 1999*, ed. by C. D'Ancona and G. Serra, Padua 2002, pp. 281-297; G. Freudenthal, *The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle's Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings*, cit., pp. 111-137; P. Carusi, *Génération, corruption et transmutation. Embryologie et cosmologie dans l'alchimie islamique au Xe siècle*, in *L'Alchimie et ses racines philosophiques. La tradition grecque et la tradition arabe*, ed. by C. Viano, Paris 2005, pp. 171-188; C. Genequand, *Ibn Rushd, Alexandre d'Aphrodise et le problème de la génération*, in *La lumière de l'intellect. La pensée scientifique et philosophique d'Averroès dans son temps*, ed. by A. Hasnawi, Louvain-Paris 2011, pp. 311-318; G. Freudenthal, *Averroes' Changing Mind on the Role of the Active Intellect in the Generation of Animate Beings*, in *La lumière de l'intellect. La pensée scientifique et philosophique d'Averroès dans son temps*, cit., pp. 319-328.

[61] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 139.57-71: «Dico autem proportionem agentis et materiae, quia calidum et humidum moventia in generatione diversas accipiunt proportiones ad formas substantiales inducendas ex diversitate luminis descendentis a sublimi de stellis et ex diversitate materiae, quae quandoque commixtionem tantum nata est suscipere, et tunc generantur mineralia; quandoque autem commixtionem et complexionem, non tamen ad aequale, sed in qua dominatur substantia terrestris dura, et tunc generantur plantae; quandoque autem complexionem accedentem ad aequale, et tunc generantur animalia. Et sic etiam intelligitur, quod dicit Philosophus, quod omnis generatio est ex convenienti. Conveniens enim supponit proportionem agentis et materiae ad formam, quae inducitur».

[62] *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 141.26-28: «[…] materia est humidum commixtum secundum complexionem seminis et naturam». *Ibid.,* ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 126.47-51: «Materia vero etiam duplex supponitur, scilicet principalis quae profundatur in membris radicalibus, et hoc est humidum quod est in substantia seminis, et supponitur per hoc quod dicitur 'partem corporis similem illi in potentia'».

cause from the female passive principle receives the complexion of the semen and in conjunction with all other natural causes brings forth the embryo.

Still, the combined interaction of all these causes in epigenesis does not occur at an instant but rather forms the animal gradually through a number of developmental stages. First, as we have seen, is the formation of the semen and its generative power from the father's soul. This semen, then, carries in its generative power all the nutrition whence it is able to form all corporeal organs of the animal body[63]. The first generated part of this corporeal formation is, as Albert maintains, the heart[64]. From this principal organ all other corporeal organs and parts are successively formed, beginning with the superior members of the body and terminating in its inferior members[65]. Yet simultaneously with the formation of the heart as the first corporeal organ, the nutritive soul, or rather a proto-nutritive soul comes into being (*anima cibativa*). This proto-nutritive soul is not the soul as form of the animal, but rather a simple physiological soul instantiated in the blood[66] and presupposed for all life as its first act[67]. It long precedes the development of the sensitive soul, which ultimately constitutes the substantial form of animals[68]. Any specific sensitive soul, however, requires first the formation of the sensitive organs, and second the ultimate perfective stage of specific determination[69]. All of these are ultimately sustained by the generative

[63] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 103.61-63: «[…] in XVI *De animalibus* dicit Philosophus quod virtus informativa et generativa, quae est in semine, trahit in se nutrimentum, ex quo formet organa».
[64] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 49.37-41: «[…] sicut dicit Aristoteles in XVI *De animalibus*, primo generatur cor et ex corde producuntur omnia membra animalis consequenter, et ideo etiam diriguntur ad ipsum per colligationes nervorum et venarum et arteriarum».
[65] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 142.15-19: «[…] sicut ipse dicit in libro *De animalibus*, primo in generatione formantur membra superiora post cor et postea inferiora, et propter hoc in primis quinque mensibus magnus est fluxus nutrimenti in superiora attracti per virtutem formativam, quae est in semine».
[66] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/1, p. 7.56-61: «Quod autem dicitur in Deuteronomio de brutis quod 'sanguis est eis pro anima', intelligitur quod primi actus animae quoad sua obiecta fundantur in sanguine, secundum quod sanguis est, vel alius humor illi respondens, 'ultimum nutrimentum', ut dicit Philosophus in *Animalibus*». Cf. Aristotle, *Part. An*. II 3, 650a34; *De animalibus* XII 3, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation*, ed. van Oppenraaij, p. 49. For Albert's mature conception, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XII.2.1, ed. Stadler, p. 837.6-27.
[67] Albertus Magnus *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 37.26-29: «Sed nutritiva semper nutrit, et propter hoc animata tamdiu vivunt, quamdiu possunt accipere nutrimentum, ut dicit Philosophus». Cf. also Aristotle, *De anima* II 2, 413a30-31. Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 17.40-43: «Ad aliud dicendum quod nutritiva supponitur in vita, quia nutrire est primus actus, secundum quem dicitur vivere in corpore animato, ut habetur in xvi de animalibus». Cf. Aristotle, *Gen. An.* II 3, 736b8-13; *De animalibus* XVI 3, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation*, ed. van Oppenraaij, p. 73. For Albert's mature conception, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XVI.1.12, ed. Stadler, p. 1095.4-15.
[68] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 43.41-43: «Secunda scribitur in XVI De animalibus, ubi dicitur quod embryonibus inest anima vegetabilis propter acceptionem nutrimenti ante sensum et rationem». Cf. Aristotle, *Gen. An.* II.3, 736a32-b27; *De animalibus* XVI.3, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation*, ed. van Oppenraaij, pp. 72-74. For Albert's mature conception, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XVI.1.10; XVI.1.12, ed. Stadler, pp. 1090.8-1091.33; pp. 1095.4-1096.29.
[69] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 82.57-65: «Ex eo quod diximus in libro De anima, sciet qui voluerit quod necessario erit in concepto prius anima cibativa, et tunc

power of the male in the semen[70]. The final intention present in the generative power of the semen, then, is the educed specific form and with it the completely formed animal[71].

In sum, then, Albert's model of animal epigenesis as incorporated into his early theological anthropology in his *De homine* decidedly follows Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. At its bare bones, this model of epigenesis rests on the principles of a gradual process of formative stages on the one hand and of ordered causal combination on the other. The generative power in the male semen acts for the development of a full animal, relying on the proper conditions and nutrition provided by the female menstrual blood, reinforced by the instrumental causality of the active elemental qualities of heat and moisture, and influenced by the heavenly stars[72].

Most remarkable about Albert's early adoptions of this model of epigenesis is, however, that he nowhere criticises it in its applicability to animals. Nowhere do we find him doubt its systematic applicability, internal consistency, and truth. Before his *De homine*, the model of epigenesis played no important role for Albert. Questions about the human soul and about its absolute creation ruled the scene. The advent of epigenesis threw this traditional theological model into contradictions. Questions like the beginning of human life, the requirement of a proto-nutritive soul for it, the development of the human sensitive soul and its corporeal instantiation all challenged this old model's truth for the human soul. Emerging as a dark horse in Albert's *De homine*, the model of epigenesis stimulated Albert's modification of his model of *creatio ex nihilo* for the human soul. Slowly but surely, the new model's universal explanatory value, its internal consistency, and its comprehensive scope of application contributed to finding a suitably consistent model for the human soul's origin—the model of epigenetic creationism, which Albert confidently presented in his mature works.

erit in eo anima sensibilis, per quam dicitur animal. Et non erit animal et vivum simul neque equus et animal, sed complementum erit in ultimo, quia quodlibet complementum habet proprium suae generationis'. Ex hoc accipitur quod vegetabile et sensibile praecedunt se invicem tempore in bruto».

[70] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 137.27-31: «(44) Item, ibidem: 'Sustentatio embryonis erit ex virtute maris, quae est in semine. (45) Item, ibidem: 'Non tantum sensui, sed etiam rationi manifestum est, quoniam conceptum sustentatur ex semine maris». Aristotle, *Gen. An.* II 4, 739a17; 740a5-6; *De animalibus* XVI 4, *Michael Scot's Arabic-Latin Translation*, ed. van Oppenraaij, p. 82, p. 84. For Albert's mature conception, cf. Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XVI.1.15, ed. Stadler, p. 1106.8-10; *Ibid.* XVI.2.1, p. 1115.6-13.

[71] Albertus Magnus, *De homine*, ed. Coloniensis 27/2, p. 126.57-62: «Similiter duplex finis est: Per hoc enim quod dicitur 'generari', tangitur figuratio corporis secundum lineamenta membrorum; per hoc vero quod dicitur 'in similitudinem illius in effectu', tangitur finis ultimus, qui est finis intentionis, et est inductio formae specificae in eo quod generatur».

[72] Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Commentarii in II Sententiarum* 2.12, ed. Borgnet 27, p. 34A-B; cf. also note 44.

4. Killing Three Birds with One Stone: Animals, Humans, Epigenesis, and creatio ex nihilo

However innovative the application of the Aristotelian model of epigenesis for the origin of humans may appear in Albert's mature *Liber de natura et origine animae* (after 1258)[73], it offered the solution to the deep inconsistencies of the model of absolute creationism. In his early work of the *De homine*, Albert must have realised that animals and humans are profoundly similar in their physical nature on the one hand, and in their nutritive and sensitive souls on the other. And yet, due to the rational human soul, they are almost generically different, even with regard to their psycho-physiological make-up[74]. Integrating the reality of these similarities and differences into one explanatory model of epigenetic creationism, Albert finally answered the questions of substantial union of the human soul and of the human composite consistently.

At the beginning of his *Liber de natura et origine animae*, Albert resorted to a *reductio ad absurdum* argument, according to which no material cause is capable of producing the effect of an intellectual soul, a substantial form that operates independently of the body[75]. Systematically speaking, this argument justified him in subsuming the intellectual soul's origin to a distinctive *formal* causality of the first cause. This distinctive causality, however, is not *contra naturam*, but rather more internal to nature than any other causality. The principle of *opus naturae est opus intelligentiae* explains why[76].

> It should also be known from what was said before that the substance that is the soul of humans derives partly from the inside [*ab intrinseco*] and enters partly from the outside [*ab extrinseco*]. This is the case because although the vegetative and sensitive [parts of the soul] in humans are educed from matter by the formative power, which is in the drop of the mother and father, this formative power would not have educed them in this way (as they are powers of the rational soul and forms and substances

[73] For the illustrious history of the *Liber de natura et origine animae*, first as a part of Albert's *De animalibus*, later as a work in ist own right, cf. H. Anzulewicz, *Einleitung*, in *Albertus Magnus. Über die Natur und den Ursprung der Seele*, ed. and trsl. by id., Freiburg-Basel-Wien 2006, pp. 9-34, esp. pp. 16-23.

[74] Cf. note 21.

[75] Albertus Magnus, *Liber de natura et originae animae* I.5, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 13.25-42: «Ex dictis autem elucescit […] quod intellectus in animae rationalis natura ingreditur in conceptum ab extrinseco non ita, quod intellectus primus causet ipsum extra naturae opus, sed quia educit eum de luce sua et non de aliquo materialium principiorum. Et si esset de aliquo materialium principiorum, oporteret, quod speciale semen haberet praetor semen maris et feminae, eo quod semen feminae habet in se vegetativum et semen maris habet in se sensitivum in potentia, et neutrum horum sufficit ad intellectum et rationem. Nec potest habere semen, in quo sit in potentia; omnis enim virtus, quae est in semine, sive sit animalis sive caelestis sive elementalis aut mixtionis elementorum, virtus est operans in corpore nec educere potest formam, nisi quae est actus corporis, sicut iam dictum est».

[76] *Ibid.*, I.1, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 3.29-34.43-45: «Incipientes igitur a generatione animae accipimus propositionem, quam saepe probavimus, quod omne opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. In omni autem opere quod intelligentia motu corporis exercet, necesse est actum corporis esse rectum et informatum forma intelligentiae corpus illud moventis. […] Igitur omne opus naturae est ad aliquam formam intelligentiae, quae primus et universalis motor est in tota natura».

of the intellect), unless inasmuch as this formative power is moved and informed by the universal intellect, which is the mover in the work of generation. And this is why the ultimate perfection, which is the intellectual form, does not derive through an instrument or from matter, but it rather flows from the pure and unmixed intellect of the first cause by its light. In accordance with this it is also said that God creates the soul [and does] not [educe it] from something that is predisposed. And in this way the intellect is introduced into the embryo from outside matter, but [it is not introduced there] from an extrinsic agent, because the intellect, which is the author of nature, is not extrinsic to nature, except in this way that it is said to be something extrinsic to the things that it is separate from them by its being and not mixed with them. But in this way the universal agent of the separate intellect is not distant from the generated things by position and place, because it is more intimate to the natural things than any principle of nature. For, these principles of nature act only and can only act inasmuch as they are moved and informed by it[77].

With this new model of epigenetic creationism, Albert achieved a remarkable systematic consistency not only between the origin of the human soul and the composite human being, but most importantly between the origin of human and animal souls[78]. On the side of the human soul's origin, all that comes directly «from the outside» is the intellectual part of the soul. Here, we find the culmination of the work of the intelligence—the unmediated formal causality of the first cause in nature accounted for by the light metaphor. The *anima sensitiva* and *anima nutritiva* of humans are both on the same causal level as the complete animal soul. They are derived from the formative power of the male semen and the proper conditions of the menstrual blood—the mediated, efficient-formal causality of the secondary causes in nature: «just like in other [living beings] it is equally the case in humans [that] the beginning [*incohatio*] of the vegetative soul is in matter and in the first being of the substance that is to be animated. Similarly, the beginning of the sensitive soul is in the vegetative soul

[77] *Ibid.*, I.5, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 14.14-40: «Ostensum est etiam per antedicta, quod substantia illa quae est anima hominis, partim est ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco ingrediens, quia licet vegetativum et sensitivum in homine de materia educantur virtute formativa, quae est in gutta matris et patris, tamen haec formativa non educeret eas hoc modo, prout sunt potentiae rationalis et intellectualis formae et substantiae, nisi secundum quod ipsa formativa movetur informata ab intellectu universaliter movente in opere generationis. Et ideo complementum ultimum, quod est intellectualis formae, non per instrumentum neque ex materia, sed per suam lucem influit intellectus primae causae purus et immixtus. Propter quod etiam ex non praeiacenti aliquo creare rationalem deus dicitur animam; et hoc modo intellectus ingreditur in embryonem ab extrinseco materiae, non tamen ab extrinseco agente, quia intellectus, qui est auctor naturae, non est extrinsecus naturae, nisi hoc modo quo extrinsecum rebus dicitur, quod est separatum ab eis per esse et non commixtum cum eis; sed hoc modo a rebus generatis separatus intellectus universaliter agens non distat ab eis per situm et locum, cum potius sit intimior rebus naturalibus quam aliqua naturae principia nec principia naturae aliquid agunt vel agere possunt, nisi mota ab ipso et informata per ipsum».

[78] The focus of my argument here is on modifications and reconsiderations that concern Albert's own system of thought. It is not to say, though, that this systematic consistency was not previously achieved by his Peripatetic sources and that Albert did something totally new here in comparison to them.

and the beginning of the rational soul is in the sensitive»[79]. Just as the complete animal soul, the human *anima nutritiva* and *anima sensitiva* are subject to a gradual process of formation. They develop in consecutive stages in accordance with the physiological development of the embryo. This does not imply that Albert considered these *animae* to be subsistent souls properly speaking[80]. Rather, he took them to be forming powers, soul potentially and not actually, similar to the *virtus formativa* in the male semen[81]. As such, they lead up to the final influx of the intellectual soul, the substantial form of the human being that is derived immediately from the first cause[82]. Similarly, just as in animal epigenesis, the union of the human soul is ensured by its gradual formation through developmental stages toward its substantial *telos*, the rational soul. The combined and ordered causality of the work of the intelligence, the work of formative power in the semen, and the instrumental causes of the female and the elemental qualities brings about this substantial union. On the side of the animal soul's origin, causality and explanatory value of the model of epigenesis remain stable[83].

In short, then, epigenesis, animation, ensoulment, the union of the substantial form, and the union of the composite being are now all covered under one fundamental explanatory model for humans and animals alike. Thanks to Albert's decisive insight into the principle of combined causality and

[79] *Ibid.*, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 13.82-87: «Oportet autem scire, quod sicut in aliis ita etiam in homine incohatio vegetativi est in materia et in esse primo substantiae animandae et incohatio sensibilis est in vegetativo et incohatio rationalis est in sensitivo, quia aliter homo constitutus, sicut ante probatum est, esset multa et non unum». Albert thus changes his view on the point of efficient causality in the human male semen and grants it the same scope of efficient causality as the animal male semen. Cf. also Albertus Magnus, *De animalibus* XVI.1.12 65, ed. Stadler p. 1095; Albertus Magnus, *Liber de natura et originae animae* I.5, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 13.25-42.

[80] Albert's student, Thomas Aquinas, will come to share his fundamental insights on the development of the human soul's lower parts through time, but defend a view of successive replacement of forms. This differs from Albert's model of a gradual development through the *virtus formativa* according to which the development of powers occurs before the human soul as substantial form is infused. Aquinas, in contrast, took the *anima nutritiva* to be the first form of the human embryo and the *anima sensitiva* to replace this lower form once the embryo is sufficiently developed. Last but not least arrives the *anima rationalis*, created *ex nihilo*, to replace the lower soul of the *anima sensitiva*. In Aquinas' eyes, each higher form can perform all operations of the lower form in addition to its own specific operations. Cf. for instance, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I.76.3-5; I.90.3; I.118.2, ed. Leonina 5, pp. 220-228; 387-388; 566-567. Secondary sources, cf., for instance, H. Seidl, *Zur Geistseele im menschlichen Embryo nach Aristoteles, Albert des Großen und Thomas von Aquin. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag*, in «Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie», XXXI, 1986, pp. 37-63; M.A. Taylor, *Human Generation in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas: A Case Study on the Role of Biological Fact in Theological Science*, unpubl. dissertation, Catholic University of America 1982; J.F. Silva, *Potentially Human? Aquinas on Aristotle on Human Generation*, in «British Journal for the History of Philosophy», XXIII, 2015, pp. 3-21.

[81] Cf. Albertus Magnus, *Liber de natura et origine animae* I.6, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 14.57-72.

[82] For a brief overview over these matters in Albert's mature works, including his *De anima*, *De animalibus*, and *Liber de natura et origine animae*, cf. H. Seidl, *Zur Geistseele im menschlichen Embryo nach Aristoteles, Albert des Großen und Thomas von Aquin*, cit., pp. 46-50.

[83] Cf. note 3 for references on Albert's mature model of animal epigenesis.

of the overarching principle of *opus naturae est opus intelligentiae*, the model of epigenesis—originally applied to animal and plant generation only—could be extended. The incorporation of formal causality for the rational soul's origin widens the scope of its explanatory value for the origin of humans. In this way, Albert does not just kill two birds with one stone but three: he preserves the systematic consistency for each model separately—the epigenesis of animals and epigenetic creationism of humans—and equally across these models of origin.

> In sum, then, we say that every form of nature is a form that is induced from the intelligence, which is the prime mover of nature. And there is no difference whether it is introduced by many or few media or by one medium, just as there is no difference in forms of art with regard to the fact that it is a form of the artist, whether it is introduced by one tool or by many, just like a medium. The introduced form differs in accordance with its proximity to matter and in accordance with its affinity to the mover and in accordance with the mediate distance and proximity to both, yet such that every form that is introduced is in the light of the intellect that moves first in nature[84].

This systematic consistency across these models of origin, which emerges so prominently in this passage, does not so much eliminate Albert's theological motivations behind his original account of *creatio ex nihilo* as reinforce them by a more sophisticated account of truth. Scientifically speaking, Albert's search for this truth may rely on systematic criteria, on the superior explanatory value found in consistency and scope of explanation, and on a unified procedure for defining the origins of experientially similar beings, namely humans and animals. Motivationally speaking, however, he remains within the boundaries of theology. Faith and reason never are opposite poles for him. Systematic consistency, uniform and reasoned application of principles, a wide scope of their application all ground Albert's shift in explanatory model, theology informs it.

For Albert, the integration of the Aristotelian model of animal epigenesis into his early theological works proved the *stimulus* for a new and pioneering view of the origin of humans and their souls in the Latin West. Throughout his works, Albert was preoccupied with finding a model of creationism that would suit reason and faith. The model that fulfilled his systematic criteria originated in his theological works as that of animal epigenesis. Yet ultimately, Albert's systematic integration of this model into his eschatology and theological anthropology resulted in nothing but a thorough modification of his Christian conception of the human soul's *creatio ex nihilo* on the systematic level. Compared to the old theological model of absolute creationism, the new model of epigenetic creationism consistently accounted for the human soul's origin from an ordered

[84] Albertus Magnus, *Liber de natura et origine animae* I.1, ed. Coloniensis 12, p. 4.34-46: «Colligendo igitur dicimus, quod omnis forma naturae est forma ab intelligentia, quae primus naturae motor est, inducta. Neque est differentia, utrum per multa aut pauca aut unum medium inducatur, sicut etiam in formis artis non est differentia quoad hoc quod sit forma artificis, utrum per unum instrumentum aut plura sicut per media inducatur, formaque inducta differentias habet secundum propinquitatem ad materiam et secundum affinitatem ad motorem et secundum mediam distantiam et propinquitatem ad utrumque, ita tamen quod omnis forma quae inducitur, in lumine sit intellectus illius qui primo movet in natura».

and combined causality. Animals, then, opened the door to Albert's scientific advancements concerning the origin of the human soul. The appropriation of the precise elements found in his Aristotelian sources facilitated them. How precisely they did so remains to be studied in greater detail in the future[85]. The positivistic lens of a historically selective reading cannot expose this extensive integration and resulting shift in Albert. A non-selective approach that takes into account Albert's own pursuits unveils it and gives us a glimpse at a deeper value of his work for the history of philosophy and science.

[85] The secondary literature listed in note 3 has already investigated the central elements in their indebtedness to Aristotle's *De animalibus*; Albert's indebtedness to the works of Avicenna and Averroes on the topic presented in this study remains to be investigated in greater detail.

Articoli/9

L'angelo e la bestia

Metafisica dell'istinto, tra Pierre Chanet e Marin Cureau de La Chambre

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In this essay we address the debate between Pierre Chanet and Marin Cureau de La Chambre on animal instinct, analyzing it in depth and connecting it to the question of the relationship between God and secondary causes. While Chanet considers instinctive actions as the result of a direct intervention by God, that would conduct his creatures beyond their natural limits, Cureau places them in the cognitive structure that God has given to the animals, doing of instinctive actions natural actions in the strict sense. Starting from that, Cureau can introduce a bizarre analogy between animal's innate capability to act in the environment beyond any previous experience and the innate knowledge of angels. This comparaison is strongly criticized by Chanet and probably persuades Cureau to change his presentation of the soul in his late masterpiece *Le Systéme de l'âme.* My conclusion is that both Chanet's and Cureau's account for animal istinct are functional to an anthropocentric metaphysics that keeps human soul as an intellective, individual and separable substance; but they also provide — especially with Cureau — a good example of a compromise between hylomorphism, dualism and mechanism.

Introduzione

A partire da una celebre affermazione poi resa nota da Pascal[1], l'angelo e la bestia costituiscono i due estremi di un universo al centro del quale è posto, come una giuntura ibrida, l'uomo; articolazione di spirito e materia, coscienza e inconsapevolezza. Già nella maggioranza dei sistemi metafisici di età moderna,

[1] «L'homme n'est ni ange, ni bête, et le malheur veut que qui veut faire l'ange fait la bête», in B. Pascal, *Pensées*, Paris 1977, fr. 572, p. 370, a di cui troviamo in verità le tracce già in molti autori rinascimentali. Ad es. Marsilio Ficino, *Teologia Platonica*, tr. it a cura di E. Vitale, Milano 2011, IX, VI, p. 794. La questione sembra trovare d'altro canto le sue radici nella posizione "liminare", a metà tra forme materiali e pure forme assegnata da Tommaso all'anima umana. Sulla questione, nella vastissima bibliografia, è di eccezionale chiarezza la ricostruzione di M. Lenzi, *Anima, forma, sostanza. Filosofia e teologia nel dibattito antropologico del XIII secolo*, Spoleto 2011.

d'altro canto, angeli, uomini e animali sono disposti lungo una scala gerarchica, che potremmo far risalire perlomeno al platonismo medievale e la cui struttura interna riflette quella di un creato qualitativo, essenzialmente ordinato intorno all'opposizione tra atto e potenza, nonché fortemente incentrato sul primato dell'attività intellettiva. Una struttura, questa, che connette tre creature in un solo significato, e fa sostanzialmente del dibattito antropo-psicologico, angelologico e psico-zoologico un solo discorso organico, sviluppato su tre assi interdipendenti.

Parafrasando Kuhn, potremmo affermare che è sotto l'egida di questa visione, complessiva e paradigmatica, che si consolida per secoli la dottrina ilemorfista, all'interno della quale si dipanano inevitabilmente una serie di rompicapo. Anomalie e casi-limite che proprio per la peculiare collocazione del problema si offrono come costantemente triplicati, nonostante siano di volta in volta risolvibili solo in uno degli aspetti che interconnettono, e generino per questo continui smottamenti teorici.

È cavalcando questo processo, ci pare, che la teoria aristotelica giunge fino alle porte del meccanicismo cartesiano, e da qui sino a convertirsi in quella del materialismo illuminista[2]. Proprio a quest'altezza, in un'epoca di transizione paradigmatica qual è la prima metà del Seicento, assistiamo così a una temporanea sovrapposizione di modelli, nella quale gli estremi della teoria ilemorfica – tradotta in termini disposizionali e deterministici e riconfigurata all'interno di una differente considerazione del ruolo delle cause seconde – divengono mutuabili con alcuni assunti fondamentali della riduzione del mondo a macchina[3].

[2] Mettiamo qui in continuità due filoni storiografici ormai consolidati, che pongono la psicologia meccanica di Descartes come perno, perlomeno storiografico di questa transizione. Da una parte una ricca mole di studi, che dimostrano una convergenza quasi diretta della psicologia aristotelica nel meccanicismo, a partire dal noto caso di Gomez Péreira, sul quale si v. in part. G. Sanhueza, *La pensée biologique de Descartes dans ses rapports avec la philosophie scolastique. Le cas Gomez-Péreira*, Paris 1997, ma anche relativamente all'evoluzione della psicologia gesuita, su cui si v. in part. D. Des Chene, *Physiologia. Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Thought*, Ithaca-London 1996; Id. *L'immatérialité de l'âme: Suárez et Descartes*, in J. Biard, R. Rashed, *Descartes et le moyen âge*, Paris 1997, cit., pp. 319-27; Id. *Life's Form. Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul*, Ithaca-London 2000; Id., *Spirits and Clocks. Machine and Organism in Descartes*, Ithaca-New York 2001 e la raccolta a cura di D. Perler, *Transformations of the Soul: Aristotelian Psychology, 1250-1650*, Leiden 2009. Dall'altra una continuità tra Descartes e l'evoluzione materialista del meccanicismo, ricostruita da moltissimi lavori, e, tra i primi, da A. Vartanian, *Diderot and Descartes. A Study of Scientific Naturalism in the Enlightenment*, Princeton 1953; ma su questo si vedano anche i saggi contenuti in C. Borghero, C. Buccolini (a cura di), *Dal cartesianismo all'illuminismo radicale*, Firenze 2010. Su questo passaggio si veda anche G. Hatfield, *Mechanizing the Sensitive Soul*, in G. Manning, *Matter and Form in Early Modern Science and Philosophy*, Leiden-Boston 2012, pp. 151-186, che menziona anche la posizione di Chanet.

[3] La tesi di una progressiva evoluzione meccanicista dell'aristotelismo è in part. di Des Chene, *Physiologia*, cit.

Si tratta di un fenomeno che il dibattito tra Pierre Chanet[4] e Marin Cureau de La Chambre[5], che trova avvio nelle pagine della *Considerations sur la Sagesse de Charron* di Chanet[6] e che si prolunga per molti anni in un serrato botta e risposta tra i due medici[7], esemplifica chiaramente. In esso, divenuto un caso relativamente noto, i termini ilemorfisti in cui si svolge la disputa appaiono ormai incapaci di liberarsi da un intrico che si è fatto più linguistico che contenutistico, e dare conto di qull'ibrido concettuale che è divenuto, nei secoli, la nozione di "intelligenza animale".

Cosa significa, infatti, parlare di razionalità dei bruti? Essa, nella sua ossimorica semplicità, è il terreno di incontro e di scontro tra due differenti concezioni dell'*intelligere*, una pienamente materiale-sensista, l'altra immateriale-noetica, che fino a questo momento l'ilemorfismo ha saputo mantenere insieme. In questo contesto, la peculiarità della disputa tra Chanet e Cureau emerge dal fatto di situarsi in un frangente di forte tensione della psicologica classica, che essa rivede anche in funzione dei significati che il suo lessico tradizionale prende all'interno di un nuovo vocabolario. E una questione di termini è divenuta, in fin dei conti, quella che lega e oppone i due *sçavants*, il cui dibattito è incentrato

[4] Su Chanet si v. in part.Jean-Baptiste Piobetta, *Pierre Chanet; une psychologie de l'instinct et des functions de l'esprit au temps de Descartes*. Paris 1937; M. Edwards, *Marin Cureau de la Chambre and Pierre Chanet on Time and the Passions of the Soul*, in «History of European Ideas», 8 (2012), pp. 200-217.

[5] Su La Chambre si v. in part. I. Förster, *Marin Cureau de la Chambre 1594–1675. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der psychomoralischen Literatur in Frankreich*, Wrocław 1936; S. Diamond, *Marin Cureau de La Chambre*, in «Journal of History of Behavioural Sciences» 4 (1968), pp. 40-54; G. Legée, *Bio-bibliographie de Marin Cureau de la Chambre (1596–1669)*, in «Histoire et Nature», 8 (1976), pp. 21-32; M.T. Marcialis, *Filosofia e psicologia animale da Rorario a Leroy*. Cagliari 1982, di cui si v. anche Ead., *L'animale e l'immaginario filosofico tra Sei e Settecento*, in *Lo specchio oscuro*, a cura di L. Battaglia, Torino 1993; A. Darmon, *Les corps immatériels. Esprits et images dans l'oeuvre de Marin Cureau de La Chambre*, Paris 1985; D. Sturdy, *Science and Social Status. The Members of the Académie des Sciences 1666–1750*, Woodbridge 1995; T. Gontier, *De l'homme à l'animal: Montaigne et Descartes ou les paradoxes de la philosophie moderne sur la nature des animaux,* Paris, 1998, pp. 194-96 (in riferimento al dibattito con Chanet); O. Le Guern, *Cureau de La Chambre et les sciences du langage à l'âge classique*, «Corpus» 16-17 (1991), pp. 17-25; S. Burgio, *Marin Cureau de La Chambre, o dell'agire ecfrastico*, *Introduzione* a S. Burgio (a cura di) *I Charactéres de l'amour (1640) di Marin Cureau de La Chambr*e, Soveria Mannelli 2005; S. R. Cohen, *Life and Death in the Northern European Game Piece*, in K. A. E. Enenkel - P. J. Smith, *Early Modern Zoology. The Construction of Animals in Science, Literature and the Visual Arts*, Leiden-Boston 2007; M. Wild, *Marin Cureau de la Chambre on the natural cognition of the vegetative soul: an early modern theory of instinct*. Vivarium, 46 (2008), pp. 443-461; E. Scribano, *Introduzione* a M. Cureau de La Chambre, *Quale sia la conoscenza degli animali e fin dove possa estendersi*, Firenze 2010 (d'ora in poi indicato con CdA Scr. seguito dal numero di pagina); M. Edwards, *Marin Cureau de la Chambre and Pierre Chanet on Time and the Passions of the Soul*, cit; A. Guerrini, *The Courtiers' Anatomists Animals and Humans in Louis XIV's Paris*, Chicago 2015.

[6] Leggiamo e citiamo il testo di Chanet da P. Chanet, *Considerations sur la Sagesse de Charron*, Paris, Claude Le Groult, 1643 (d'ora in poi indicato con Ch-Cons., seguito dal numero di pagina).

[7] Il dibattito si dipana, cronologicamente, nelle seguenti opere: Chanet, *Considerations sur la Sagesse de Charron* (1643); Cureau de La Chambre, *Traité du Caractère des Passions* (1645); Chanet, *De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux* (1646); Cureau de La Chambre, *Traité de la connoissance des animaux* (1648); Chanet, *Traité de l'esprit de l'homme et de ses fonctions* (1649); Cureau de La Chambre, *Systéme de l'âme* (1664).

innanzitutto sul contesto metafisico nel quale situare e dare significato a uno dei soggetti più ambivalenti e discussi della storia del pensiero occidentale: l'animale. Esso si oppone all'uomo come un ente dall'esistenza del tutto opaca, talvolta strumento inconsapevole di un superiore disegno divino? Oppure si dà in continuità con l'umano, come un grado inferiore di una razionalità insita in tutte le cose, attiva, nel caso delle azioni istintive, quasi meccanicamente?

L'aspetto più interessante, che nelle righe che seguono tenteremo di sviscerare, è che buona parte dell'acceso scontro tra Chanet e Cureau sull'intelligenza animale riguarda, in ultimo, le modalità di connessione tra intelligenza e vita biologica, le medesime che l'aristotelismo ortodosso deve poter garantire per proseguire l'impostazione immortalista, sostanzialista eantiaverroista della psicologia data in particolare da Tommaso, garantendo al tempo stesso un discrimine tra anima intellettiva umana e anima materiale dei bruti. I due medici si soffermano così a mettere a punto in particolare l'individuazione di un modello che assegni o meno agli animali la responsabilità causale della razionalità delle loro azioni, pur non sganciando la *ratio* dei bruti da un modello di razionalità "primo" e complessivo per l'intero creato. E la domanda conclusiva alla quale Chanet e Cureau tentano, con soluzioni opposte, di rispondere è: la causa della razionalità animale è da individuarsi esclusivamente nella causalità prima del Creatore o, piuttosto, nel dispositivo mondano da lui predeterminato?

1. Pierre Chanet, istinto e finalità

Le *Considerations* di Chanet prendono le mosse, come è noto, dalla *Sagesse* di Charron, per confutarne la tesi, prossima a quella di Montaigne, di un possesso della ragione da parte degli animali. Per Chanet, che ricalca le linee di una metafisica rinascimentale fortemente antropocentrica[8], al contrario di quanto sostenuto da Charron e Montaigne tutte le azioni degli animali possono essere ricondotte all'opera dell'istinto, la cui presenza non nega la razionalità dell'agire animale, ma piuttosto consente di escludere che l'azione razionale sia indizio di una razionalità *dell'*animale. La ragione che sottende una vasta serie di comportamenti dei bruti, infatti, è abbastanza perfetta da superare le peculiarità naturali dell'animale stesso, e richiede un rimando diretto alla causa prima, Dio, che ne ha predisposto l'agire. Con una movenza piuttosto diffusa tra i suoi contemporanei, Chanet ritiene così la natura una mera causa strumentale, predisposta dal Creatore per agire in vista di una finalità che non conosce.

Al fine di argomentare la sua posizione Chanet stabilisce innanzitutto una differenza tra ragione e istinto: tale distinzione è essenziale, per il medico francese, nel complesso di un'argomentazione che impiega lo statuto gnoseologico dell'animale per determinare quello umano. «La pluspart de ceux qui tiennent que les bestes ont de la raison», scrive infatti Chanet,

[8] V. in particolare Ch-Cons., pp. 1-20.

prennent en mauvaise part tout ce que nous disons de l'instinct, comme si c'estoit une desfaite malicieuse, forgée pour obscurcir la verité, & comme si nous appellions instinct aux bestes ce que bous voulons qui soit raison aux hommes, disans une messe chose sous des noms differens[9].

Tutto al contrario, per Chanet, il vero errore che si riverbera anche sul piano antropologico è quello di non individuare la peculiarità psicologica dell'istinto: le azioni istintive vanno infatti separate, per il medico francese, da un'ampia gamma di comportamenti animali che spesso vi sono riferiti, ad esempio quello di un cavallo che ritrova la strada di casa, o che cerca da mangiare[10]; azioni, queste, la cui causa può essere facilmente individuata nell'immaginazione o nella facoltà nutritiva, secondo il classico schema della psicologia aristotelica[11].

Ma la facoltà immaginativa e quella sensitiva, specifica Chanet, sono comuni all'uomo e alle bestie, «lesquelles ne different de nous qu'au regard de la raison, qui est une faculté de prouver une chose par une autre chose differente, & qui procede à l'aquisition de sa fin en faisant preceder une deliberation»[12]. Unico discrimine tra animali e uomini è così la deliberazione razionale, che sembra impossibile applicare ai primi e che spesso, però, non è la causa di tutte le azioni dei secondi; per esempio nel classico caso delle azioni involontarie, che non sono il frutto di una determinazione della volontà, ma di un meccanismo che trova la sua base nell'immaginazione[13].

[9] Ch-Cons., p. 56.
[10] Ch-Cons., p. 57.
[11] *Ibid*.
[12] *Ibid*.
[13] Che l'immaginazione svolgesse la funzione di una *ratio* basata sulla sensibilità e sulle *species* impresse dai sensi, è, come noto, un assunto classico dell'aristotelismo, che trova la sua origine in *De Anima* Γ ed è discusso lungo i secoli come luogo-chiave nel dibattito sull'immortalità dell'anima. Tra gli studi più rilevanti, su questo aspetto, G. Watson, *Phantasia in Aristotle, "De Anima" 3.3*, in «Classical Quarterly», 76, (1982), pp. 100-13; M. V. Wedin, *Mind and Imagination in Aristotle*, New Haven 1988; D. Frede, *The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle*, in M. Naussbam, A. Rorty, *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, Oxford 1992, pp. 279-96; M. Schofield, *Aristotle on Imagination*, in M. Naussbam, A. Rorty, *Essays on Aristotle's* De Anima, cit., pp. 249-77. Riguardo all'evoluzione del concetto di immaginazione e fantasia in epoca medievale rimane d'obbligo la monumentale raccolta AA. VV. *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na Filosofia Medieval. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale. Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002*, Turnhout 2006, da cui si v. in part. M. A. S. de Carvalho, *Intellect et imagination: la «scientia de anima» selon les 'Commentaires du Collège des Jésuites de Coimbra'*; un lavoro di assoluto valore sull'evoluzione dell'immaginazione tra medioevo e prima età moderna è poi F. Piro, *Il retore interno. Immaginazioni e passioni all'alba dell'età moderna*, Napoli 1999; dello stesso Piro si v. inoltre *Tra intelligenza animale e passioni umane: discussioni sull'immaginazione e la "virtù estimativa" nel XVI secolo*, nell'interessante raccolta a cura di L. Formigari, I. Cubeddu, G. Casertano, Imago in phantasia depicta. *Studi sulla teoria dell'immaginazione*, Roma 1999 (pp. 167-87), e *È sufficiente un solo senso interno? La psicologia dell'immaginazione nella prima età moderna e le sue difficoltà*, in «Lo Sguardo. Rivista di filosofia», n. X, pp. 183-197. Si v. poi anche A. Illuminati, *Quasi una fantasia. Funzioni cognitive dell'immaginazione nei commentatori di Aristotele,* ancora in L. Formigari, I. Cubeddu, G. Casertano, Imago in phantasia depicta. *Studi sulla teoria dell'immaginazione*, Roma 1999 (pp. 149-66). Sull'età moderna, oltre agli studi già citati, è ormai un classico M. Fattori - M. L. Bianchi, Phantasia-Imaginatio. *V Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellet-*

Proprio sull'"estimativa"[14] va d'altro canto a incentrarsi la polemica di Chanet, che critica coloro i quali, vedendo che una gamma di comportamenti complessi degli animali «ne venoit point de coustume, & ne povuoit estre rapporté a l'imagination & à la memoire»,

> on inventé exprés une nouvelle faculté, & un quatrièsme sens interne, qu'il nomment l'Estimative, differente de la raison, encore que le mot, dont ils expriment cette faculté soit tres-mal propre pour marquer cette difference, pource que l'estimation que nous faisons des choses, est l'effect d'un raisonnement mesme[15].

La posta in gioco è ancora una volta, per Chanet, la corretta identificazione di un discrimine tra uomo e animale. La dottrina dell'Estimativa non si accorda d'altra parte alle stesse dottrine dei filosofi che la sostengono, «puisqu'ils accordent tous que l'âme de l'homme embrasse toutes le facultez qui sont en l'âme sensitive des bestes»[16]. Ma se coloro che ne affermano l'esistenza, infatti, «prennent la peine d'examiner toutes les actions de leur ame, ils n'en reconnoistront iamais pas une qui se puisse rapporter a cette Estimative»[17]. L'argomento di Chanet prosegue poi sulla stessa linea:

> S'ils la reconnoissent aux hommes, d'où vient que pour la prouver ils ne se servent que des actions des Bestes? au lieu que lors qu'ils parlent de l'imagination & de la memoire, ils les expliquent toutes deux, par ce qu'ils en resentent en eux-memes, ce que nous appliquons puis après aux bestes. Si les hommes avoient cette faculté, toutes les fois qu'ils verroient des animaux venimeux, ils les discerneroient d'avec ceux qui ne le sont pas, sans autre experience, de mesme que les bestes reconnoissent leurs ennemis par le moyen de cette faculté[18].

La condizione animale appare così come un campo di esperienza completamente inaccessibile all'uomo, che vi si approccia prevalentemente a partire dalla propria, seguendo un processo analitico-ipotetico. Esso delinea al suo interno, per differenze e analogie, gnoseologia animale e umana, e alla stessa maniera con cui attribuiamo agli animali immaginazione e memoria interpretando i loro comportamenti sulla base della nostra esperienza, dovremmo rilevare l'insistenza di una facoltà Estimativa come quella ipotizzata dai partigiani dell'intelligenza animale. Ma l'interrogativo diviene, per Chanet, ancora più complesso, laddove ci si interroghi su

tuale Europeo, Roma 1988; si v. inoltre M. Muccillo, *La concezione dell'immaginazione nel Rinascimento tra platonismo e aristotelismo (Marsilio Ficino e Giovan Francesco Pico della Mirandola)*, in AA. VV., *La mente, il corpo e i loro enigmi. Saggi di filosofia. Mente, corpo, realtà*, Roma 2007, pp. 11-35. Interessante anche la ricostruzione del contesto fornita da *Descartes's Imagination. Proportion, Images and the Activity of Thinking*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1996.

[14] Sulla funzione estimativa dell'anima e sulla sua progressiva dismissione rimandiamo a F. Piro, *Il retore interno*, cit., in part. le pp. 146-165.

[15] Ch-Cons., pp. 58-59.

[16] Ch-Cons., p. 59.

[17] Ch-Cons., p. 60.

[18] *Ibid*.

comment c'est que l'Estimative, qui est un sens interne, pouvoit connoistre une antipathie sans en recevoir aucune impression par les sens externes, & comment c'est que la contrarieté que l'on dit entre au Loup, se peut communiquer aux Brebis, sens qu'il sorte de ce Loupe aucune espece de cette contrarieté, et sans qu'il en entre rien par aucun des sens externes de la Brebis[19].

Supporre l'esistenza di una simile facoltà, in grado di "stimare" – al di là delle impressioni sui sensi – antipatie, simpatie e finalità intrinseche della natura porterebbe, di fatto, a ipotizzare «que un'aveugle qui mange du fruit en reconnoistroit la couleur, à cause qu'elle est en mesme sujet que la saveur, e addirittura se ne deriverà la possibilità di «un seul sens externe pour toutes sortes d'objects»[20]. Da una simile assurdità deriva perciò, per Chanet, che «l'instinct doit estre quelqu'autre chose que cette pretendue faculté». Meglio, perciò, «se tenir à l'opinion la plus commune, qui nous enseigne que l'instinct est une direction de tous les Estres naturels vers leur fin, lors que cette fin est trop relevés pour leur connoissance, & qu'il n'ont d'eux mesmes aucune faculté naturelle pour les y conduire»[21].

L'opinione «la plus commune» a cui qui si accenna è – come nota Scribano[22] – principalmente quella di Tommaso, che – rovesciando, per certi versi, il senso logico della teleologia aristotelica – aveva concepito la regolarità delle azioni svolte da enti inconsapevoli come l'indizio di una finalità estrinseca alla natura stessa, che ne predispone l'agire nelle cause seconde, esattamente come una freccia scagliata verso una specifica direzione[23]. Chanet ne riprende il senso, che è alla base, d'altronde, di una complessiva lettura finalistica del creato; ma, al contrario dell'Aquinate, mantiene salda la sua critica alla facoltà estimativa, che per Tommaso aveva invece un ruolo decisivo nel giustificare la distinzione tra uomini e animali sul piano psicologico[24].

Perno dell'argomentazione di Chanet è quindi il fatto che l'istinto costituisca un «fin […] trop relevés pour [la] connoissance». Ciò consente al medico francese di spostare sulla causa prima quel peso eziologico che la tradizione scolastica aveva al contrario imperniato sulle facoltà proprie dell'animale, e in particolare, appunto, sull'estimativa. In tal modo la gnoseologia dei bruti può essere trasformata in un semplice *medium* passivo, che recepisce e attua direttamente

[19] Ch-Cons., p. 61.
[20] Ch-Cons., p. 61.
[21] Ch-Cons., p. 62.
[22] CdA Scr., pp. 23-26 e 29-32.
[23] Si tratta della quinta delle celebri "vie" tomiste per dimostrare l'esistenza di Dio. Cfr. in particolare *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 3: «Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum».
[24] Si v. in part. F. Piro, *Il retore interno*, cit., pp. 89-103 e R. Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a 75–89*, Cambridge 2002, p. 269 e ss.

la volontà della prima Causa del mondo. Per Chanet, infatti, la vera causa delle azioni istintive degli animali è Dio, che completa «par la providence le defait de tous les agents naturels dans les actions, qui sont au dessus de l'activité de leurs formes naturelles, & des causes secondes»[25]. Queste ultime, «dans l'exercise de leurs actions naturelles ne recevoit qu'un simple concours de la cause premiers», nonostante, «dans les actions que nous attribuons à l'instinct, la cause premiere agit toute seule en ce qui est de la conduite & direction des autres causes vers leur fin»[26].

Come sottolinea ancora Scribano[27], la posta in gioco è qui metafisica, dato che si tratta di concepire, per il tramite della condizione animale, un'intera visione della natura. Nel discorso di Chanet appare chiaro, d'altra parte, che il cuore del discorso è quello dell'autonomia delle cause seconde, che la razionalità dei bruti difesa da Montaigne e Charron difende a tal punto da minacciare la gerarchia metafisica uomo-animale. Chanet, al contrario, sembra pensare come un mero strumento cieco, il quale agisce inconsapevolmente e automaticamente.

Nonostante il suo finalismo estremo, la posizione delle *Considerations* può sembrare convergere parzialmente con quella di Descartes – che riassimilando l'animale alla pura meccanica riduceva la sua azione a una complessiva eziologia del mondo, a sua volta dipendente dalle leggi ad esso impresse dalla sua Causa prima – o avvicinarsi all'occasionalismo di Guelincx e Malebranche. Ma le cose non sembrano andare esattamente così. Per Chanet – che sembra qui ragionare in termini di pura filosofia prima – le cause seconde risultano autonome nelle «actions naturelles» prescritte loro dalla loro essenza, attività, queste, in cui il concorso divino è semplicemente ontologico, come ad esempio è per Suárez. A questo livello, quello della semplice fenomenologia naturale, gli animali (e la natura in generale) hanno così un grado sufficiente di realtà per sostenere la causa delle loro azioni; cosa che non accade, invece, quando essi operano per finalità che non sono alla loro portata. Solo in questo secondo caso Dio interviene direttamente come causa efficiente, con un atto che sembra essere a tutti gli effetti sovrannaturale.

Con ciò, quindi, Chanet non sovverte quel classico edificio essenzialista che era appartenuto a Tommaso e al neoplatonismo rinascimentale e che, tra il XVI e il XVII secolo viene rielaborato e rafforzato dalla scolastica gesuita. Esso si delinea infatti nell'idea, avicenniana e poi tomista, di un creato costituito come rete di essenze gerarchicamente ordinate; un *ordo* costruito in base alla differente sostanzialità ontologica e alla nobiltà dell'operazione essenziale delle creature, le quali, nella loro regione d'essere, svolgono autonomamente la funzione prescritta loro dal Creatore tramite l'essenza. È a questa architettura che, pare, Chanet, aggiunge un intervento diretto di Dio a giustificazione delle azioni istintive.

L'autore delle *Considerations* lo ribadisce al termine del capitolo IV, dove si domanda se «le mouvement qui en descend se peut dire violent au regard

[25] Ch-Cons., p. 62.
[26] Ch-Cons., pp. 62-63.
[27] CdA Scr., p. 31.

des causes secondes, ou s'il leur est naturel»[28]. I movimenti causati dall'istinto, e dunque dall'azione *sovrannaturale* di Dio, possono essere considerati anche *innaturali*? La risposta di Chanet è che anche l'istinto «se peut appeller naturel, encore que tout ce qui a coustume de se rencontrer dans un mouvement purement naturel ne se rencontre pas icy», e ciò anche se gli «effects purement naturels, qui ne despendent que des facultez naturelles de l'âme des bestes & de leur corps», «constituent, à proprement parler, toute la nature d'un animal»[29]. Non si tratta, perciò, di un «mouvement qui soit violent, ny qui puisse estre appellé ainsi», e la ragione di ciò è che «premierement cette cause premiere, qui en fait toute la conduite, n'est pas proprement un agent exterieur», oltre al fatto che «les animaux qui sont conduits par l'instinct, contribuent d'eux-mesmes leurs facultez et leurs organes pour l'execution de ces actions, qui son bien actions des animaux»[30].

Ma per Chanet c'è una ragione «plus considerable» del fatto che l'istinto non sia, per gli animali, un movimento violento; essa è nel fatto che «ces actions» vengono «executées par des organes naturels, qui sont meus par une cause premiere, qui est interne, & qui ne fait aucune violence à la cause seconde»[31]. Secondo il medico francese, quindi, la naturalità delle azioni istintive è dovuta al fatto che la causa prima agisce per il tramite delle seconde, pur trasformando queste ultime in una mera causalità strumentale, ma secondo le loro predisposizioni naturali, che vengono, per così dire, "reinterpretate" o, meglio, "sovrainterpretate". Chanet ha dalla sua un esempio piuttosto interessante, quello delle intelligenze che muovo i cieli. Gli animali che operano mossi dall'istinto agiscono

> de mesme que les Cieux, qui sont roullez par les Intelligences, suivant l'opinion commune, ne souffrent en cela aucun mouvement destuit soit leur fin, ne force aucune de leurs inclinations, & ne leur fait point changer le centre, ny le lieu qui leur est naturel[32].

Il riferimento agli angeli diviene ancora più curioso se consideriamo, come diremo a breve, che proprio dall'angelologia Cureau trarrà gli elementi della sua tesi sull'innatismo animale, e su quest'uso le repliche di Chanet saranno non poco taglienti[33]. Ma, tornando all'argomento di Chanet, rileviamo come per quest'ultimo «dans l'instinct il y a encore moins de violence» che nel movimento celeste, «puisque la cause premiere, bien loin de forcer la fin & l'inclination des agens particuliers, les porte vers cette fin, et les conduit vers leur but, où d'eux-mesmes ils n'eussent pû parvenir»[34].

[28] Ch-Cons., p. 70.
[29] *Ibid*.
[30] Ch-Cons., pp. 70-71.
[31] Ch-Cons., p. 71.
[32] *Ibid*. Quella riguardante la naturalità dei moti celesti impressi dalle Intelligenze è d'altra parte una *vexata questio* scolastica, ampiamente discussa, come sottolineato in particolare da E. Grant, *Planet, Stars and Orbs*, *The Medieval Cosmos, 1200–1687*, Cambridge 1996, pp. 526-559, per tutto il medioevo e sino alla prima età moderna.
[33] V. *infra*.
[34] Ch-Cons., pp. 71-72.

Il punto è, insomma, quello dell'eventuale sovrannaturalità del fine, e dell'impiego strumentale di peculiarità del tutto naturali per l'animale: Dio agisce infatti come «un homme qui ietteroit [une] pierre du haut en bas: car tant, s'en faut que l'action par laquelle cette pierre en bas, soit violente, c'est à dire contre la nature de cette pierre: qu'au contraire elle se doit dire naturelle, encore que la forme de la pierre ne contribuë rien à ce qu'on y ajoute & imprime de mouvement»[35]. L'azione qui esemplificata sposta, effettivamente, la pietra dalla sua condizione attuale, ma lo fa proprio riportandola «dans le lieu, & dans l'estat qui luy est les plus naturel (au moins au regard de la Nature universelle)», che la provvidenza «porte à un fin qu'elle n'eust pû acquérir si tost toute seule»[36].

Ma la questione della gnoseologia animale – come rilevavamo in precedenza – non può essere disgiunta da uno sfondo metafisico nella quale si colloca, e che conferma. Per Chanet, infatti, «Dieu a donné dés le commencement du monde à toutes les parties de la matiere, des formes agissantes, doüées d'autant de facultez, qu'il jugea qu'il estoit necessaire qu'elles en eussent»[37]; ma al tempo stesso, nel crearle come tali, si è impegnato a «suppléer par sa providence ce qui pourroit arriver de manquement à leurs actions naturelles», intervenendo là dove fosse necessario. È «cette providence» «ce que nous appellons l'instinct»[38].

Sul fondamento metafisico di questa convinzione nessuno potrà, per Chanet, dubitare, dato che «la Nature est composée de pieces si differentes & et si contraires, qu'elles ne sçauroient se maintenir en l'ordre où nous les voyons, d'autant que l'ordre est un effect de la raison»[39]. Ora,

> de sorte que cette raison n'entant point dans le choses insensibles, il faut qu'elle leur soit fournie d'ailleurs, et qu'elles soient par quelqu'autre principe plus noble, qui connaisse la fin où elles sont portées, & sache disposer des moyen pour y parvenir. Il en est de ces causes comme d'un trait, ou d'un flesche, qui ne manquait iamais le but, mais s'y portant tousiours avec autant de seureté que si elle le voyoit, nous croyons necessairement qu'elle y est conduite, et poussée par quelqu'un qui voit ce but[40].

Come nota Scribano[41], l'immagine della freccia è tratta direttamente da Tommaso, per descrivere azioni finalistiche che mostrano una causa intelligente dietro di esse che le conduce e dirige all'azione. D'altra parte, per Chanet, l'istinto è qualcosa che va al di là del mondo animale, e – come specificava poco sopra - «Il sert à toute sort d'agents, qui sont en la Nature»; basti considerare che anche «les Plantes & les autres corps insensibles ne sçauraient venir à bout de toutes leurs actions sans l'assistance de cet instinct, c'est à dire sans la cause premiere, ou sa direction»[42].

[35] Ch-Cons., p. 72.
[36] Ch-Cons., p. 71.
[37] Ch-Cons., p. 73.
[38] Ch-Cons., p. 74.
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] CdA Scr., p. 29.
[42] Ch-Cons., p. 63.

Trattandosi, in sostanza, di una direzione impressa direttamente da Dio alla Natura, l'istinto degli animali è un fenomeno analogo, spiega Chanet, alla caduta di una pietra. Per il medico francese, curiosamente, «toutes les actions & les facultez des pierres» sono da correlarsi all'istinto, dato che «les pierres n'ont point de faculté par la moyen de laquelle elles puissent sçavoir que les lignes droites sont les plus courtes, ny que leur centre est en bas»[43]. E

> quand elles le sçaroient, peut-être n'y descendroient elles pas sans y este poussées, pource que dans le centre où la providence de Dieu a voulu les choses pesantes s'arrestassent pour le bien general du monde, il n'y a rien qui puisse obliger les choses pesantes d'y descendre[44].

Allo stesso modo, vegetali e animali si comportano, sotto l'influsso dell'istinto, come oggetti mossi da una forza metafisica, che attraversa tutta la Natura e agisce tramite di essi, là dove le loro predisposizioni psicologiche non giungono. Ad esempio, prosegue Chanet, le piante sviluppano in alcuni casi dei gruppi di fiori che compongono precise figure, pur non avendo la loro anima nulla più della pura forma delle cose inanimate, eccetto una serie di funzioni vegetative del tutto prive di intelligenza[45].

Un punto importante – che spiega bene, a parer nostro, la posizione di Chanet – è che tutto ciò trova la sua origine in Dio e che per certi versi ogni predisposizione che non contempla un'azione regolata dalle funzioni dell'anima può essere considerata istinto. Anche la «conformation des animaux vient», infatti, per Chanet, «de l'instinct, & […] c'est un ouvrage immediat de l'auteur de la Nature»[46]. Per il medico francese, insomma, l'intera natura è prodotta, disposta e predisposta dal suo Creatore verso il bene, ma questa disposizione può trovare due strumenti di attuazione: da una parte Egli utilizza, nella maggior parte dei casi, la forma, l'anima, a cui assegna un'operazione essenziale; dall'altra interviene direttamente per tutta una serie di operazioni che vanno al di là di queste ultime, ma sempre restando nel dominio degli eventi naturali.

C'è da capire, quindi, cosa si intenda qui per Natura, un concetto a proposito della quale Chanet segue «la définition de tous les Sages», per i quali essa «n'est que la puissance ordinaire de Dieu, il faut dire que tous les effects, qui son ordinaires en la Nature, & qui ne relevent que de cette puissance ordinaire, ne doivent passer, by pour des miracles, ny pour des monstres»[47]. La Natura si trova quindi all'interno della potenza ordinata di Dio, e

> encore que i'attribue beaucoup d'effects à l'autheur de la Nature, ie ne dis pas pour cela que ces effects soient des miracles, ayant desia dit, que c'estoient des actions naturelles […] auxquelles i'adioute maintenant qu'il faut que ces actions soient naturelles, puis qu'elles sont ordinaires. Elles sont dans l'ordre de la Nature, & dans les

[43] Ch-Cons., p. 75.
[44] Ch-Cons., pp. 75-76.
[45] Ch.-Cons., p. 79.
[46] Ch-Cons., p. 82.
[47] Ch-Cons., p. 86.

règles qui furent establies dés le commencement du monde, lors que Dieu ayant fait les diverse Estres, & leur ayant fourny leurs facultez, il commença deslors à pratiquer les effects de l'instinct, suppléant deslors aux defauts de ces facultez[48].

L'istinto giunge quindi là dove la natura, entro i suoi limiti *ordinari*, non svolge alcune funzioni, ma esso, pur andando contro l'ordine comune, non supera i limiti della natura. Per Chanet sembra così che l'*ordo* della creazione si sdoppi su due livelli: da una parte un ordine comune, quello dell'azione degli enti naturali secondo la loro essenza, e dall'altra l'ordine della natura intesa come effetto della potenza ordinata di Dio. In questo secondo caso, che è anche quello dell'istinto, Dio agisce nella natura oltre i limiti assegnati agli enti naturali, ma non oltre le regole assegnate al mondo. E il perno dell'argomento di Chanet sembra risiedere nel fatto che, coincidendo la natura con la potenza ordinata di Dio, il suo intervento risulta sempre naturale, in quanto è stato previsto fin dal principio nell'ordine complessivo della creazione.

2. Anime, angeli e animali: l'innatismo di Cureau de La Chambre

La tesi sviluppata da Chanet nelle *Considerations* diverrà oggetto di interlocuzione polemica in particolare nell'opuscolo *Quelle est la connoissance des betes et jusqu'où elle peut aller* di Marin Cureau de La Chambre[49]; opera originalmente pubblicata in appendice al secondo volume dei *Charactères*, i cui contenuti saranno ribaditi nel più tardo e complesso *Système de l'ame*[50], che qui utilizzeremo costantemente come testo di riferimento.

La tesi di fondo che Cureau oppone a quella di Chanet è che l'intelligenza animale vada considerata, sì, una predisposizione dei bruti, ma che quest'ultima debba essere collocata nello stesso apparato psicofisiologico dell'animale, che può quindi essere ritenuto intelligente. Riallacciandosi in parte all'innatismo platonico, Cureau presenterà perciò una teoria delle immagini mentali secondo la quale tutte le azioni istintive sono prescritte agli animali fin dalla nascita, mediante figure impresse nell'immaginazione.

Il ruolo di primissimo piano assegnato all'immaginazione emerge d'altra parte fin dal principio dell'opuscolo, dove La Chambre illustra la conoscenza come un'azione (opponendosi a chi la ritiene una mera passione):

la Connoissance est la propre & la seule fonction de l'Ame Sensitive & de la Raisonnable; car sentir, concevoir, iuger, raisonner, tout cela n'est autre chose que Connoistre. Or comme il n'y a pas d'apparence que des natures si nobles soient sans

[48] Ch-Cons., pp. 85-86.
[49] Leggiamo e citiamo quest'opera di Cureau da M. Cureau de La Chambre, *Les charactères des passions*, vol II, Paris, Jacques Dallin, 1663. (d'ora in poi indicato con CdA seguito dal numero di pagina).
[50] Leggiamo e citiamo il *Système de l'âme* dall'edizione moderna Paris 2004 (indicandolo d'ora in poi con SdA seguito dal numero di pagina).

action, puisque toutes les autres qui sont au dessous d'elles ont la vertu d'agir; il faut nécessairement que la Connoissance soit une action[51].

Cureau adotta, in generale, il classico modello aristotelico in cui l'anima agisce su rappresentazioni fantasmatiche, ma non senza delle variazioni importanti. L'argomentazione della prima parte del *Systeme de l'ame* si basa proprio sull'assunto che «la connoissance est une action», fondando l'intera conoscenza sulla relazione tra «Entendement» e «Phantosmes». Questi ultimi, prodotti dal soggetto conoscente stesso, sono gli unici veri interlocutori dell'intelletto, una sorta di "filtro" psichico che permette all'intelligenza immateriale di dialogare con gli oggetti esterni, senza ammettere per questo che l'«Entendement» venga direttamente a contatto con «les images qui sortent [des] Objects […] et qui les representent, lesquelles passant dans les organes des sens s'unissent à l'imagination»[52].

Come rileva ancora Scribano[53], effettivamente, Cureau mantiene il termine "Especes" per indicare le cosiddette "specie espresse", quelle prodotte dalla mente come rappresentazioni immateriali degli oggetti, mentre limita il ruolo delle specie impresse, emanate dagli oggetti e recepite passivamente dai sensi. I fantasmi rappresentativi con cui opera l'intelletto, infatti, non possono essere, per Cureau, il risultato della mera impressione meccanica sui sensi delle «images» che si dipartono dagli oggetti, ma risultano il prodotto diretto di un'azione dell'anima:

> Il faut donc dire que l'Entendement sans l'intervention d'aucune autre vertu, a la puissance de faire les portraits et les Images des objets sur le modele des Phantosmes qui sont dans l'Imagination; et qu'il connoist quand il form ces Images que l'on appelle Idées pour les distinguer de ces Phantosmes[54].

Tra le ragioni per cui non è possibile definire la sensazione come una mera «reception des images» vi è, per Cureau, il fatto che «il n'y a point d'Especes pour le Sens du Toucher, qui connoist immediatement les qualitez tactiles»; se la premessa fosse vera, il tatto «ne pourra recevoir aucune Espece, et par consequent il ne connoistra rien»[55]. Seguendo questo ragionamento è, per Cureau, da rigettare l'idea che anche negli altri sensi la conoscenza possa avvenire attraverso le specie, e in generale che la conoscenza possa essere in alcun modo passiva. Essa è azione, «puisque l'Entendement agit quand il connoist» e «il faut que le Sens agisse aussi, puisque la Connoissance est une fonction commune à l'un et à l'autre»[56].

Per Cureau — che in questo ricalca probabilmente Campanella, divenuto molto noto, come si sa, nella Francia del secondo Seicento — «la connoissance

[51] CdA, pp. 462.
[52] SdA, p. 24.
[53] CdA Scr., pp. 57-58, n.
[54] SdA, p. 27.
[55] SdA, p. 72.
[56] SdA, p. 73.

est une altération» «perfective»[57] dell'intelletto, facoltà in grado di trasformarsi continuamente nell'oggetto del suo conoscere[58] e, «toutes choses en puissance, comme dit Aristote»[59]. Sempre nel *Systeme de l'ame* il medico francese presenterà una versione semplificata del classico schema scolastico dei sensi interni che spiega piuttosto bene quali siano i vari gradi del processo conoscitivo. In un primo momento La Chambre sottolinea le differenze tra tre modelli: 1) quello della psicologia di Avicenna, che individua cinque «Sens interieurs» (il senso comune, l'immaginazione, la fantasia, l'estimativa, la memoria); 2) quello di Tommaso che «n'en veut que quatre, confondant l'imagination avec la phantasie»; 3) infine «les Medicins» che ne individuano solo tre (l'immaginazione, la facoltà cogitativa, la memoria); in base a ciò propone poi la sua soluzione, secondo cui non vi sono che «trois sortes de Connoissance»: il senso comune e i sensi esterni, che permettono la conoscenza *intuitiva*, la fantasia, che consente quella *astrattiva*, e la la conoscenza *pratica* frutto della facoltà estimativa»[60]. Queste tre facoltà «sont differentes reellement», e da ciò consegue che «il y ait trois sortes des Phantosmes, celuy du Sens commun, celuy de la Phantasie, et celuy de l'Estimative»[61].

Appare dunque chiaro come avvenga, per Cureau, il processo conoscitivo:

1) *Fase materiale:* gli oggetti inviano ai sensi delle loro «images», che si raccolgono nel senso comune, divenendo fantasmi dell'immaginazione:

> Il faut croire qu'apres qu'un objet a imprimé son espèce dans l'organe de quelque sens, l'Imagination qui est excitée par elle, forme en soy-mesme une autre Image, & comme une nouvelle copie de l'original qu'elle a devant soy: ou pout mieux dire cette especе luy sert de modelle sur lequel elle bastit une figure qui a bien les mesmes traits, mais qui a encore un estre & une nature plus noble & plus excellente qu il n'a pas, & c'est ce qu'on appelle communement Phantosme[62]

2) *Fase immateriale:* è a questo punto che l'intelletto si unisce ai fantasmi, anche se «cette union n'est pas la Connoissance», ma solo «une disposition pour agir»[63]. È così l'intelletto a produrre a sua volta dei ritratti immateriali dei fantasmi trasfigurando la conoscenza su un piano del tutto spirituale, e in ultimo la «Connoissance consiste dans la production de ces Images, par lesquelles [l'Entendement] se transforme dans les choses qu'il connoist»[64].

[57] SdA, p. 29.
[58] SdA, p. 30.
[59] SdA, p. 31.
[60] SdA, p. 85.
[61] SdA, p. 89. In questo caso Cureau preferisce utilizzare il termine «phantasie» in senso avicenniano, sottolineando il ruolo unificatore e attivo che la facoltà immaginativa ha rispetto ai fantasmi già realizzati dal senso comune; è quest'ultimo, d'altro canto, ad identificarsi – come troviamo ad esempio anche nel primo Descartes – con l'immaginazione nella sua funzione ritenitiva.
[62] CdA, p. 465.
[63] SdA, p. 34.
[64] SdA, p. 34.

Con un simile processo, come diremo, Cureau può così sciogliere anche la funzione svolta dalla coppia intelletto agente-intelletto possibile, che nel *Systeme de l'ame* vengono qualificate come «abstractions metaphysiques»[65] di un solo intelletto, il quale da una parte "guarda" i fantasmi immaginativi e dall'altra produce le sue *species* espresse o idee.

Un punto importante è che in tal modo Cureau riesce a riadattare in senso protodualista l'impianto aristotelico iniziale, rifiutando l'idea di una continuità tra sensi e intelletto, tipico invece dell'aristotelismo domenicano. Da una parte c'è un processo *materiale* che comincia dalle «images» degli oggetti e termina nelle figure dell'immaginazione; dall'altra abbiamo un processo *immateriale* dell'intelletto che agisce su queste figure e le riproduce su un piano spirituale. In tal mondo l'anima, nella sua funzione intellettiva, è del tutto autonoma, e La Chambre può paragonare la sua attività, nello stato di separazione, alle menti angeliche che «connoissent par des Especes infuses»[66], aggirando il classico problema scolastico dell'innaturalità della conoscenza intellettiva pura.

Il segmento corporeo e materiale del processo conoscitivo, che nel caso degli animali costituisce il grado massimo di razionalità, trova così, ancora una volta, il suo polo cognitivo fondamentale nell'immaginazione, che come abbiamo detto è anche la sede dell'attività astrattiva[67]. «Sous ce mot d'Imagination nous comprenons toutes les puissances de l'Ame Sensitive», scrive Cureau, «comme par celuy d'Entendement, toutes les Facultez intellectuelles qui servent à la Connoissance»[68]: la fantasia, con una movenza tipica dell'epoca, diviene perciò una sorta di "ragione sensibile", vertice dell'anima dei bruti, non in grado di maneggiare concetti universali[69] eppure deputata a inanellare rappresentazioni particolari astratte in sequenze *razionali*. L'immaginazione è così paragonata a un «architecte qui assemble non pas les figures, mais les pierres de telle figure», mentre «l'Entendement fait [...] comme le mathématicien qui unit les figures toutes simples & séparées de la matiere»[70].

I termini in cui si muove Cureau sono, di fatto, quelli della scolastica, con un accento avicenniano là dove l'immaginazione è ritenuta la facoltà che presiede la totalità delle azioni animali e, insieme, permette di creare delle proposizioni affermative:

> il faut necessairement donner à l'Imagination la puissance de faire des Propositions Affirmatives tout de messe qu'à l'Entendement: car lors que celuy-cy juge qu'un aliment est bon, il ne fait autre chose qu'unir & assembler l'Idée du *bon* avec celle de l'*Aliment*, d'où vient qu'on appella cette action Composition[71].

[65] SdA, p. 35.
[66] SdA, p. 38.
[67] SdA, p. 85.
[68] CdA, p. 474.
[69] *Ibid*.
[70] CdA, p. 475.
[71] CdA, p. 478.

Un altro elemento molto interessante sul quale il trattatello si sofferma è il fatto che «l'Imagination connoiste une chose par une autre». Secondo Cureau, infatti,

> il faut de necessité que l'Imagination qui peut aller d'un Phantosme à l'autre, fasse un progrez dans ses Connoissances, & qu'elle passe souvent d'une chose plus connuë à celle qui l'est moins, & qu'enfin elle connoisse celle-cy par le moyen de l'autre[72].

L'attività compositiva dell'immaginazione costituisce così, a partire dalle immagini sensibili, un vero e proprio processo euristico, che si svolge secondo un metodo analitico-deduttivo, come mostra l'esempio riportato dallo stesso Cureau:

> un animal pressé de la faim void une chose blanche, il sent qu'elle est molle, & la trouve savoureuse: s'il peut assembler diversement les Phantosmes de ces qualitez, comme nous avons dit, il pourra unir le premier avec le second, le second avec le troisieme & puis rejoindre le premier avec celuy-cy. Car il pourra iuger que cette chose blanche est molle, que ce mol est savoureux, que ce savoureux est bon à manger; & enfin reprenant le premier le rëuner avec le dernier, & iuger que telle chose blanche est bonne à manger.

Secondo La Chambre la certezza tipica di questo tipo di conoscenza dipende dal fatto che «il la fasse aller par ce milieu, qui luy sert comme de degré pour arriver à ce qu'il veut connoistre», e come noto il reperimento del medio è la caratteristica fondamentale della conoscenza analitica. Essa è, in questo caso, graduale, discorsiva e ipotetica – secondo il classico modello platonico della *Repubblica* – e consente agli animali di elaborare strategie di ogni tipo, finalizzate, ad esempio, a procurarsi il nutrimento. Si tratta, quindi, per Cureau, di un vero e proprio ragionamento, che prosegue anche in assenza degli oggetti, attingendo alle immagini racchiuse nella memoria; un ragionamento che conduce gli animali al giudizio: affermativo quando le immagini vengono unite, negativo quando essere vengono separate[73].

Ovviamente Cureau, come già Tommaso mentre adottava lo schema avicenniano, non intende cadere in una tesi in odore di alessandrismo. Tra i ragionamenti "materiali" dell'immaginazione e quelli "immateriali" dell'intelletto vi è «une tres-grande difference», dovuta al fatto che, mentre l'immaginazione «est bornée aux choses corporelles qui son necessaires à la vie», «l'Entendement a la liberté de iuger de toutes choses, d'en former des notions generales & d'en tirer quand il luy plaist des consequences ou particulieres ou universelles»[74]. Insomma, La Chambre si riallinea sulla classica posizione ortodossa che stabilisce tra immaginazione e intelletto una differenza «de nature & d'essence», dovuta principalmente al fatto che l'intelletto opera a livello esclusivamente spirituale.

[72] CdA, p. 480.
[73] CdA, p. 483.
[74] CdA, p. 484.

Stabilendo due differenti tipologie di ragionamento, quello dell'immaginazione e quello dell'intelletto, Cureau può pertanto attribuire agli animali una razionalità "debole", una forma del tutto discorsiva, compositiva e materiale di intelligenza agli animali che, come diremo, non è in alcun modo libera. È proprio a quest'altezza, d'altro canto, che appare chiara la polemica con le *Considerations* di Chanet, e con la teoria dell'istinto di quest'ultimo. Cureau definisce infatti l'istinto «le refuge le plus ordinaire de ceux qui ne veulent point reconnoistre le raisonnement des animaux, & qui leur est comme un mot consacré ou une parole magique, avec laquelle ils croyent fasciner les Esprits»; esso, secondo Cureau, non esclude infatti il ragionamento, ed è al tempo stesso «particulier aux animaux». Polemizzando apertamente con Chanet, egli sottolinea d'altro canto che «on ne dira iamais, si l'on veut parler proprement, que les Pierres soient poussées par l'instinct quand elles tendent vers leur centre, ou quand elles font quelqu'autre action que ce soit qui leur est ordinaire», visto che l'istinto è piuttosto «un certain poids, une inclination ou un mouvement qui supplée au defaut des facultez naturelles, & qui pousse les choses où elles ne pourroient aller d'elles-mesmes»[75].

Pertanto, secondo Cureau, è chiaro che «les Pierres, les Plantes, & tous les autres corps qui sont privez de sentiment n'ont point besoin de ce secours, & ont les vertus qui son necessaires pour fair toutes leur fonctions», mentre l'istinto va supposto negli animali «que nous voyons fair des choses qui semblent surpasser la force des puissances que la Nature leur a données». Azioni come quella della pecora che fugge dal lupo o del pulcino che, appena nato, già teme i predatori, vanno riferiti all'appetito, e dato che questo è «une puissance aveugle qui a besoin d'estre conduite par la Connaissance», è necessario che «ceux-cy qui apparemment ne peuvent connoistre ce qu'ils font, soient poussez par quelque vertu qui n'est point de l'ordre de celles qui leur sont propres & naturelles»[76].

Cureau distingue così due tipologie di azione animale: le azioni accompagnate da una conoscenza sensibile e da un ragionamento (seppur di secondo livello qual è quello dell'immaginazione), e le azioni che, accompagnate da una conoscenza superiore a quella dei sensi, «se puissent rapporter à cette Cause occulte, qui pousse secrettement les Animaux à faire leurs actions les plus naturelles sans estre instruits d'aucune connoissance sensible»[77]. È solo in questo secondo caso che ci troviamo di fronte a una vera azione istintiva.

La Chambre demolisce pertanto la posizione di Chanet, partendo proprio dalle sue premesse metafisiche. Egli individua tre possibili cause dell'istinto: l'anima del mondo dei Platonici, il Cielo degli Aristotelici e Dio, in quanto causa prima del mondo. Nonostante ques'ultima tesi appaia a Cureau, tra tutte, «la plus raissonable», essa è insostenibile per un semplice motivo: «Pur parler sainement», scrive il medico francese,

[75] CdA, pp. 495-96.
[76] CdA, p. 496.
[77] CdA, pp. 497-98.

ie crains que cette opinion qui semble defendre la bonté de Dieu, ne condamne sa Puissance & sa Sagesse. Quoy? il aura laissé toutes les especes des animaux dans une si grande imperfection, qu'elles n'auront pas la moitié des vertus qui leur sont necessaires pour la vie?[78]

È del tutto inverosimile, prosegue Cureau, che avendo Dio fatto ogni cosa secondo peso e misura, come lo stesso Chanet ricordava,

il ait abandoné l'Homme qui est le chef d'oeuvre de ses mains à la foiblesse de son Raisonnement, pour assister les Bestes d'un si noble & si puissant secours, & qu'il ait trouvé des moyens naturels pour former le Raisonnement & l'Intelligence, qui sont les plus nobles actions des choses creées, sans en avoir peur trouver pour celles des Bestes qui sont d'un ordre inferieur[79].

La questione è insomma teologica e antropologica: come è pensabile che Dio abbia abbandonato l'uomo per intervenire in modo così esatto e potente a vantaggio delle bestie? E come è possibile che Egli abbia al contrario inserito nella natura l'intelligenza e la ragione, e non sia riuscito a contemplare una causa naturale per l'istinto, per poi non trovare altro modo che un suo intervento diretto per riparare alla mancanza?

Esclusa, per assurdo, la posizione di Chanet, Cureau delinea la sua, che ricolloca nella natura e nelle sue cause ordinarie l'origine degli atti istintivi, pur mantenendo l'origine in senso primo di degli istinti come esterna all'animale stesso[80]. È così ancora una volta all'immaginazione che Cureau guarda, notando che negli atti istintivi, pur non essendo questi in relazione con specie sensibili, vi è una conoscenza da parte degli animali che li mettono in atto. Essendo la facoltà immaginativa il vertice dell'intelligenza dei bruti, essa va individuata anche come il luogo dove risiedono e sorgono gli istinti, che non sono affatto inconsapevoli, ma piuttosto accompagnati da una conoscenza di ordine superiore che si esprime nell'immaginazione.

Al contrario di quanto crede Chanet, durante l'azione istintiva gli animali non entrano in una fase di totale inconsapevolezza, ma al contrario in essi si attiva una conoscenza indipendente dai sensi, che permette loro giudizi che trascendono le informazioni ottenute empiricamente. «que servirait à l'Abeille quand elle sort la premiere fois de la ruche» – si chiede Cureau – «de voir & de gouster les fleurs, si elle ne iugeoit qu'elle y doit trouver la matière deqouy faire le miel & la cire, & si elle ne sçavoit deja tout l'art qu'elle doit employer en un si merveilleux ouvrage?»[81].

La soluzione di La Chambre, come abbiamo già anticipato, è quella che l'istinto provenga da specie naturali di tipo non sensibile, ovvero da impressioni innate, «imprimées dans l'Ame dés le premier moment de sa naissance», e riattivate mnemonicamente in situazioni in cui esse vengono richiamate da agenti esterni. Per convalidare questa posizione, Cureau utilizza un'analogia

[78] CdA, p. 499.
[79] CdA, p. 500. Cfr. SdA, p. 124.
[80] In SdA una complessiva confutazione della posizione di Chanet è a pp. 112-119.
[81] CdA, p. 504.

molto forte, quella con gli angeli, ai quali «la Philosophie & la Théologie ont esté contraintes de reconnoistre de pareilles Images pour la messe necessité qui se trouve aux Animaux»[82]. Gli angeli, secondo il medico francese,

> n'ayant point d'organes pour recevouir celles de dehors, & les objects mesmes n'estans pas captes d'en produire qui luy soient proportionnées, il faut, si on ne veut confesser que c'est la plus defectueuse de toutes les créatures, & que la puissance de connoistre lu a est donnée inutilement; il faut, dis-ie, qu'elle en ait d'interieures & pour se servir de termes de l'Eschole, de Connaturelles, sur lesquelles au defaut des object, l'Entendement Angelique forme apres ses idées & ses connoissances[83].

Il modello innatista attribuito alle sostanze intelligenti separate diviene così traslabile anche agli animali, la cui conoscenza istintiva è frutto di specie impresse nell'anima prima di ogni altra esperienza. La fonte angelologica sembra qui essere Tommaso, che in *Summa Theologiae* I, 55 aveva approfondito la questione della cognizione angelica specificando che

> Angeli intelligunt, non sunt a rebus acceptae, sed eis connaturales. Sic enim oportet intelligere distinctionem et ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, sicut est distinctio et ordo corporalium. Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter perfectam per formam, in corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiae non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam, nunc aliam formam, ab aliquo agente. Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellectivae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod accipiunt species intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intellectiva in substantiis spiritualibus superioribus, idest in Angelis, naturaliter completa est per species intelligibiles, inquantum habent species intelligibiles connaturales ad omnia intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt[84],

ribadendo poi, in una *quaestio* successiva, che

> si Angelus acciperet cognitionem rerum materialium ab ipsis rebus materialibus, oporteret quod faceret eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo eas. Non autem accipit cognitionem earum a rebus materialibus, sed per species actu intelligibiles rerum sibi connaturales, rerum materialium notitiam habet; sicut intellectus noster secundum species quas intelligibiles facit abstrahendo[85].

Si tratta di una posizione sulla quale si allineeranno, anche in epoca successiva, la maggior parte degli autori di scuola domenicana e gesuita; eppure va detto – cosa che qui La Chambre non fa – che una simile trasposizione non risulta priva di difficoltà, dato che gli angeli rappresentano puri intelletti intuitivi, mentre gli animali sono del tutto privi di una ragione superiore a quella discorsivo-immaginativa. Le specie dei primi sarebbero perciò di natura del tutto

[82] CdA, p. 505.
[83] CdA, p. 506.
[84] ST I, q. 55, a. 2.
[85] ST I, q. 57, a. 1.

spirituale, già astratta e completamente differente da quella dei secondi, nei quali non esiste un intelletto in grado utilizzare l'informazione a un livello superiore.

Il richiamo di Cureau agli angeli sembra quindi mirare, più che a una analogia diretta tra due creature estremamente distanti nell'ordine del creato, ad avvalorare la qualificazione di simili *species* come *connaturali* alla mente animale. È con questa strategia che La Chambre può sostenere che la razionalità animale è del tutto naturale, e al tempo stesso generata da una causa che trascende le facoltà degli animali stessi.

D'altro canto, l'innatismo di Cureau, come l'istinto di Chanet, trova il suo senso in un quadro complessivo del creato, che riguarda tutte le sostanze in grado di conoscere. Ciò secondo uno schema delle sostanze spirituali che Tommaso aveva limitato all'uomo, e che qui, dietro evidenti influssi rinascimentali, investe anche l'animale:

> si l'ordre que Dieu a estably dans l'Univers, demande que les perfections qui se trouvent accomplies dans les choses les plus hautes, soient commencées dans celles qui leur sont inferieures; il est necessaire que ce moyen de connoistre estant tres-parfait dans les Intelligences, soit comme esbauché dans les autres choses qui ont comme elles la faculté de connoistre. Car il est certain que ces Images son fort grossiers, & fort confuses dans les Bestes, & qu'elles ne leur donnent que la connoissance de fort peu de choses qui sont necessaires à leur conservation: Mais que l'homme, outre celles qu'il a communes avec elles, en a de plus eslevées & de plus lumineuses, comme son celles qui e portent naturellement à la connaissance de Dieu, des premiers Principes & autres semblables[86].

A garantire, per i bruti, una conoscenza innata, è il medesimo principio metafisico che pone negli uomini intuizioni noetiche pure, come quelle dell'esistenza di Dio e dei principî logici, e che per Tommaso dipendeva direttamente da una gerarchia delle sostanze intellettive ordinata secondo i diversi gradi di potenza dei processi intellettivi. Una prerogativa delle creature dotate di intellezione, che Cureau qui concede anche agli animali, ritenendo la loro anima degna di conoscenza razionale e perciò parte di un progetto complessivo del creato che passa per l'azione conoscitiva.

Attribuendo agli animali il ragionamento, quindi, Cureau si spingerà fino ad assegnar loro un imperfetto ma autentico uso del linguaggio, nonché la consuetudine di comunicarsi reciprocamente pensieri e indicazioni di tipo pratico. Ciò senza concedere ai bruti alcuna facoltà deliberativa, giacché, per Cureau, non è affatto necessario che per ragionare si debba deliberare, dato che si impiega molto spesso la ragione e il ragionamento anche laddove non vi sia spazio per la deliberazione. Secondo il medico francese, infatti,

> il n'y a aucun lieu pour la deliberation, autant qu'on ne peut deliberer que lors qu'il se trouve plusieurs moyen pour arriver à quelque fin, & qu'on est dans la liberté de choisir celuy que l'on veut. Il n'y a donc point de necessité que les Bestes deliberent, parce qu'on outre qu'elles n'ont le plus souvent qu'une voye pour parvenir à leur but,

[86] CdA, p. 507.

comme est celle que l'Instinct leur enseigne; il est certain que lors qu'elles rencontrent plusieurs moyens, elles se determinent d'abord à celuy qui se presente ou le premier ou le plus efficace, & qu'elles n'ont point la liberté du choix[87].

3. Appendice: le «Bestes» di Chanet contro gli angeli di Cureau

La posizione di La Chambre, fortemente schierata contro Chanet, non poteva che provocare una violenta replica del secondo, affidata al già citato trattatello *De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux: avec l'examen de ce que M. de La Chambre a escrit sur cette matiére*. Ad esso Cureau risponderà, a sua volta, con un *Traité de la Connoissance des Animaux* che, pure, abbiamo avuto modo di menzionare, nel quale ribadisce la sua posizione, rispondendo punto per punto agli attacchi di Chanet.

Un aspetto particolarmente interessante che ci interessa sviluppare in questa appendice è tuttavia quello del ruolo svolto dalle dottrine angelologiche a cui, si è visto, entrambi i protagonisti della disputa fanno riferimento. Il ricorso alla condizione del tutto speciale degli angeli mostra forse al meglio a quale punto di crisi fosse giunta la psicologia di età moderna, non più in grado di teorizzare all'interno dei classici termini ilemorfici la condizione-limite degli animali, senza mettere per questo in discussione alcuni asserti fondamentali sull'uomo. Come ha ben mostrato Scribano[88], d'altro canto, i modelli di conoscenza "superiore" che nel medioevo erano stati esclusiva delle sostanze intelligenti nello stato di separazione dal corpo, angeli e beati, sono progressivamente adottati dalla gnoseologia "normale", specialmente di area dualista e occasionalista, fin dal primo Seicento; un fenomeno che ci sembra dover essere riconnesso proprio alla profonda crisi dell'ilemorfismo, e che nello strascico della disputa tra Chanet e Cureau appare piuttosto chiaro.

L'analogia, fortissima, utilizzata da Cureau, non poteva d'altra parte che attendere una replica incentrata anche su questo punto, come Chanet farà nel 1646. *De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux*[89], presentando l'«opinion de Monsieur de La Chambre touchant l'Instinct», si sofferma ad affrontare la tesi di Cureau, che presenta come fondata sull'idea – non condivisa dalla Scuola, secondo l'autore – che gli angeli abbiano specie infuse innate. Si tratta, secondo Chanet, di un'opinione che «il nous veut faire passer pour une maxime de la Théologie», quando si tratta al massimo di «un sentiment particulier de quelques Theologiens». Tutti coloro che «l'on a appelé Nominaux, & divers d'entre les Modernes», infatti,

> n'admetent d'autre cognoissance dans les Anges que celle que l'Eschole nomme intuitive. Et parmi ceux qui leur donnent des Especes, plusieurs comme les Disciples de

[87] CdA, p. 539.
[88] E. Scribano, *Angeli e beati. Modelli di conoscenza da Tommaso a Spinoza*, Roma-Bari 2006.
[89] Leggiamo e citiamo questo testo da P. Chanet, *De l'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux: avec l'examen de ce que M. de La Chambre a escrit sur cette matiére*, Paris 1646 (d'ora in poi indicato come Ch-CdA).

l'Escot veulent qu'ils les acquierent comme nous faisons; & ne leur en attribuent tout au plus de naturelles que quelques unes qui son fort generales. Ils refutent les Auteurs du parti contraire, qui ont attribué aux Anges une aussi parfaite cognoissance des choses absentes, & qui ne sont pas encore arrivées que de celles qui son présentes, & qui les mettent hors d'estat d'avancer jamais leur science & de profiter de l'experience[90].

Questioni di scuola, dunque, ma di fondamentale importanza per l'uso che qui ne viene fatto. Mentre il riferimento fondamentale di Cureau va a Tommaso, quello polemicamente chiamato in causa da Chanet va a Scoto e, parallelamente, alla scuola nominalista[91], fautrice di una gnoseologia angelica progressiva e connessa all'esperienza. Secondo l'avversario di Cureau, noi sappiamo quindi

> que les Anges n'ont point d'organes corporels: & ne doutons pas que toutes les Especes qui sortent des corps ne soient materielles. Elles ne laissent pas de servir d'object au cognoissances Angeliques & à celles de nos ames lors qu'elles sont despouillees de leurs organes corporels[92].

Il punto, per Chanet, non è insomma quello di opporre conoscenza materiale e immateriale, ma piuttosto di sottolineare l'importanza del processo astrattivo, che rende le specie sensibili fruibili per qualsiasi intelletto, anche quelli angelici:

> nostre entendement qui est inorganique ne laisse pas de iuger des Especes sensibles: pour-quoy veut-on desnier la mesme faculté au Anges & s'opiniastrer à nier sans fondement qu'ils n'ont pas cette vertu agissant qui illumine les Especes & les despouille de toutes les imperfections de la matiere?[93]

La replica di Chanet prosegue poi attaccando proprio il fondamento metafisico della tesi di La Chambre, ovvero l'idea che l'universo sia ordinato per gradi, che l'innatismo sia presente, in proporzioni differenti, in tutte le creature dotate di conoscenza: angeli, uomini e animali. Secondo Chanet, infatti,

> il y a mille facultez très excellentes dans le Metaux & les autres Mineraux; dont il ne parois pas la moindre trace dans les Elements. La nourriture & les autres parties de la végétation sont accomplies dans les Plantes: & ne sont point commencées dans les choses qui leurs son inferieures. La veüe, la memoire et l'imagination ne se trouvent que dans les Animaux[94].

Tra i vari gradi del creato, insomma, c'è una costante soluzione della continuità, che ci costringe ad ammettere che «la raison de l'homme n'a rien qui lui ressemble & qui en approche dans les Bestes». In particolare, poi, Chanet mette in dubbio la stessa esistenza dell'ordine «que l'on nous veut persuader».

[90] Ch-CdA, pp. 39-40.
[91] Una panoramica molto completa e ampia sulla questione, che probabilmente funge qui anche da fonte sulle diverse parti in gioco, è in F. Suárez, *De Angelis*, lib. 2, capp. 5, 6 e 12
[92] Ch-CdA, p. 40.
[93] Ch-CdA, p. 41.
[94] *Ibid*.

Tutto al contrario, Dio «a voulu que les vertus specifiques fussent celles qui sont les plus parfaites, il a voulu aussi qu'elles fussent incommunicables, & qu'il ne s'en rencontrast rien dans les Estres inferieurs». Nel caso, infatti, in cui La Chambre avesse ragione, «ce qui est parfait est les Anges estoit esbauché dans les Bestes», e «le plus & le moins qui s'y rencontreront ne serois pas capable de les en faire differer», annullando, di fatto la distinzione tra angeli e animali.

Dalla sua, Chanet non rifiuta del tutto l'innatismo proposto da Cureau, ma piuttosto nega che esso possa riguardare anche gli animali:

> quelle est la cause des images naturelles des Anges & des Hommes? Ie vous respondroy sans hesiter que c'est Dieu qui les donne à nostre ame en la creant sans l'entremise d'aucune cause seconde, Mais les Ames des Bestes qui se font de la matiere & qui resultent de ses dispositions, n'ont point de cause qui leur puisse communiquer ces images, qui sont en nous des preuves bien expresses que nostre ame est spirituelle, et qu'elle vient de Dieu[95].

Nelle creature realmente dotate di intelletto esistono effettivamente, per Chanet, delle immagini innate, simili a quelle proposte da Cureau, ma ciò risulta impossibile proprio per gli animali, che possiedono solo un'anima materiale, il cui statuto ontologico è insostanziale e nominale, frutto della pura disposizione delle parti.

Insomma, in un edificio teorico che vede le differenti parti sostenersi a vicenda, come è quello a cui prendono parte Chanet e Cureau, la determinazione del modello intellettivo angelico – di fatto il caso-limite che descrive un'intelligenza allo stato puro – diviene il luogo dove si gioca la partita della possibilità di proporre o meno un certo modello di intelligenza animale. Concependo infatti gli angeli come intelletti suscettibili di conoscenza empirica – così come fa Chanet – l'innatismo diviene una prerogativa delle intelligenze puramente immateriali, che, facendo perno sull'attività astrattiva dell'intelletto agente, stabiliscono proprio nella possibilità di astrazione dalla materia il discrimine con quella degli animali; da ciò deriva una struttura che rende impossibile affidare ai bruti, come cause seconde, una loro autonomia, e quindi intendere l'istinto come qualcosa di differente da un'azione diretta della causa prima. Al contrario Cureau, che pensa gli angeli come pure intelligenze intuitive e l'intelletto come un dispositivo noetico *chiuso*, può concepire l'innatismo come una predisposizione operata da Dio nelle e con le cause seconde, tracciando una complessiva metafisica della ragione che contempla anche gli animali e radica l'istinto nella gnoseologia "normale".

Caso curioso, riguardo alle questioni angelologiche, la controreplica di Cureau non giungerà direttamente nel *Traité* col quale vorrà smentire le critiche di Chanet. Essa sarà al contrario contenuta nel *Système de l'ame*, e in forma ellitica, mediata proprio da quella creatura mediana tra l'angelo e la bestia, che è l'uomo; una convergenza che a parer nostro mostra appieno quale influsso abbia avuto il dibattito con Chanet nella costituzione della psicologia finale di

[95] Ch-CdA, pp. 44-45.

Cureau, e dalla quale si evince anche un parziale ripensamento della tesi iniziale del medico francese.

Nel *Système*, come abbiamo accennato Cureau dà infatti conto dei processi gnoseologici fondamentali, incentrando il *Livre I* sulla conoscenza intellettuale. Ricalcando e articolando più nel dettaglio la tesi espressa nei *Charactères*, il medico francese traccia un percorso argomentativo che si sviluppa nei seguenti passaggi:

> Cap. I, Article XI: «Il n'y a point d'Intellect Agent ni Possible»[96], nel quale Cureau, come dicevamo, riduce questa distinzione a una mera astrazione metafisica, affermando l'esistenza di un solo intelletto, il cui ruolo fondamentale è quello di produrre fantasmi a partire dalle specie presenti nell'immaginazione. Con ciò, di fatto, Cureau fa dell'intelletto una facoltà autonoma e univoca, interfacciata con la sola immaginazione, mediatrice tra l'attività noetica e i sensi.
>
> Cap. II, Article I: «La Connoissance de l'Ame separée est semblable à celle des Anges»[97], con cui Cureau ribadisce la completa autonomia dell'intelletto attraverso il caso-limite dell'anima intellettiva nello stato di separazione. Quest'ultima va considerata noeticamente identica agli angeli, facendo di converso di questi ultimi il modello di una conoscenza perfettamente intuitiva e priva di mediazione empirica.
>
> Cap. II, Article II: «Les Anges connoissent par des Especes infuses», nel quale La Chambre conferma, seppur in un differente luogo di trattazione, le premesse della sua tesi sull'intelligenza animale. Proprio qui Cureau dà indirettamente battaglia, ancora una volta, a Chanet, mettendo in fila le tesi di Tommaso, Scoto e Théophile Raynaud, e presentandole tutte come «d'un mesme advis» sulla questione della specie connaturali degli angeli. In particolare, soffermandosi sull'opinione di Scoto, Cureau la conette alla questione, assai rilevante, della conoscenza angelica per infusione dei singolari: «car pour avoir l'Espece universelle de l'Homme, ils ne peuvent pas connoistre quand Pierre et Jean naistront, ni les actions particulieres ques l'un ou l'autre fera»[98]. Per evitare questo inconveniente, Scoto avrebbe sostenuto così che «ces Especes n'estoient point nées avec les Anges; qu'elles ne leur sont données qu'au temps et dans l'occasion qu'ils doivent connoistre actuellement, et que'elles leur font connoistre par ce moyen, la nature et l'existence particuliere de ces choses»[99]. È però la tesi di Raynaud a tenere insieme le differenti posizioni: secondo il teologo gesuita, infatti, gli angeli possiedono due tipi di specie innate, le «Generales» e le «Connaturales»; entrambe, tuttavia, vanno considerate incomplete e non capaci

[96] SdA, p. 35.
[97] SdA, p. 37.
[98] SdA, p. 39.
[99] *Ibid*.

di rappresentare l'esistenza particolare delle cose. Un difetto risolto dal fatto che Dio «y adjouste l'Espece qui la represente et qui consomme ainsi la generale»[100].

Non a caso, da questo percorso argomentativo Cureau trae la conclusione, «fort vraysemblable»,

que les Anges ont receû dés le premier moment de leur creation des Especes generales pour connoistre l'Essence et la Nature des choses. Parce que ce sont des qualitez qui perfectionnent la Faculté connoissante; et qu'il ya des preuves convainquantes ques les Animaux en ont eu de pareilles pour l'instinct dont ils ont esté pourveus.

Ma è proprio nel confermarla che Cureau mette a punto, di fatto, la sua posizione, avvicinandola paradossalmente a quella di Chanet. Le «Especes» innate di angeli, uomini e animali, descrivono infatti la realtà solo in termini generali, richiedendo un ricorso esterno da parte di Dio, di volta in volta che si presentano casi particolari.

Siamo, quindi, di fronte a una implicita resipiscenza di Cureau, e a un suo avvicinamento alla posizione proto-occasionalista di Chanet? Niente affatto. La partita dell'indipendenza dell'istinto si gioca nuovamente sul fronte dei meccanismi attraverso i quali, diversamente dagli angeli, gli animali declinano nel particolare le generalità descritte dalle specie connaturali.

Una questione che La Chambre spiega a fondo nel *Livre III*, tornando proprio sul parallelo tra bruti e angeli, e chiedendosi perché Dio non abbia fornito agli animali conoscenze innate su tutti gli oggetti possibili. La risposta del medico è che

la plus necessaire de toutes les Connoissances est celle de la Presence des objets: dautant que c'est par elle qu'on jouït du bien, et qu'on connoist certainement le mal pour le pouvoir eviter. Or elle ne se peut acquerir par le Sens et par les Images qui vient de dehors. Car celles qui sont naturelles ne le peuvent donner, parce qu'elles son generales et indifferentes à toutes les circonstances de temps, et il faut par necessité que le Sens les deteminent au temps present […]. Quand nous disons que la Connoissance vient de ces Images, nous n'entendons pas qu'elles fassent effectivemente la Connoissance, car c'est l'Imagination qui la fait: Mais elles servent d'objets à l'Imagination pour former ses Phantosmes; ce sont les originaux et les patrons sur lesquels elle fait ses portraits, en quoy consiste da Connoissance[101].

Recuperando il classico schema dell'innatismo platonico del *Menone*, Cureau chiarisce così che le specie connaturali sono soltanto un modello generale, insito nella memoria fin dalla nascita, che consente all'animale di riconoscere, in occasioni particolari, ciò che potenzialmente "conosce" solo in astratto. La presenza del lupo attiva così nell'agnello una vera e propria reminiscenza, che altrimenti rimarrebbe implicita e che gli consente tuttavia di riconoscere come pericoloso qualcosa di cui non ha mai avuto esperienza.

[100] *Ibid.*
[101] SdA, pp. 130-31.

4. Conclusioni

Angeli e bestie sono stati i termini di partenza di un'analisi, quella del dibattito tra Chanet e Cureau, che ci ha costantemente condotti a rilevare in filigrana la presenza di un elemento di giunzione tra questi due entità: l'uomo. È proprio l'antropo-psicologia, e in particolare una psicologia votata a un ilemorfismo antropocentrico, infatti, a svolgere la funzione di perno, che connette e pone in continuità angeli e bestie, intelligenza e vita biologica, spirito e materia.

Si tratta di due poli che in un certo senso, già durante gli anni in cui si svolge la disputa tra i due medici francesi, hanno vissuto nell'affermarsi contemporaneo del paradigma cartesiano una potente scissione. Non è un caso, d'altra parte, che il crollo dell'ilemorfismo aristotelico coincida proprio con il rilevare un'impossibilità – prima di tutto logica – nel connettere, mantenendo una loro specifica identità, intelligenza pura e materia, sostanze intellettive separate e bruti. E ci sembra altrettanto rilevante il movimento con cui questi due estremi, che hanno sinora vissuto agli antipodi della cosmologia classica, finiscano per divenire due opposti e complementari modelli per pensare l'uomo: creatura intellettuale, pensante, da una parte, e pura animalità fisiologica, dall'altra.

La disputa tra Chanet e Cureau sembra così mostrare una volta di più come, nella forma che dà loro il pensiero classico, angeli e bestie abitino concettualmente e dialetticamente l'uomo, come rimandi indiretti a una sua pretesa essenza di cui l'apice e il pedice del creato sono il riflesso. È così che, per secoli, la potenza nuda dell'animale, della sua vita e della sua ossimorica razionalità, può vivere imprigionata negli schemi di una metafisica dell'atto e della potenza, dell'intelligenza e della sostanza, il cui progetto e la cui chiave d'accesso sono prerogativa dell'uomo. Ed è così che il crollo, alcuni secoli più tardi, di quella metafisica, dirà inevitabilmente la liberazione dell'animale dall'uomo, e insieme una liberazione dell'uomo stesso dalla prigione concettuale che lo incastona al centro del creato.

Articoli/10

*Animalité et humanité au XVIIIe siècle: Condillac, Diderot, Rousseau**

Jean-Luc Guichet

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The paper shows how Condillac, Diderot and Rousseau deal, in different ways, with the main aspects of the question of animals in the French XVIIIe century. Condillac, who renews Locke's research, addresses the issue to elucidate the origin of knowledge. Diderot sees in animals a mean to enter material laws of life, matter and finally man. Rousseau focuses on anthropology and also ethics, promoting animal as a key to understand man. Thus, these three authors allow us to catch a synthetic view on the very rich question of animals and its stakes in the Enlightenment.

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Nous allons partir de trois grandes questions philosophiques que l'homme à partir du XVIIe siècle et davantage encore au XVIIIe siècle en vient, de façon plus insistante ou plus privilégiée qu'avant, à poser à l'animal[1]: celle de la connaissance, plus précisément de son origine; celle de la métaphysique avec les questions de l'âme (sous la forme en particulier de la querelle de l'âme des bêtes, qui démarre vraiment à partir des années 1660), de Dieu, et de la nature de la vie; celle en- fin de l'anthropologie, c'est-à-dire de l'homme lui-même, cette dernière question permettant de revisiter entre autres le thème classique des passions, saisi non plus seulement sous l'angle traditionnel d'une perspective de maîtrise morale, mais sous celui de la construction génétique de l'homme conçu à partir de ces éléments passionnels en écartant l'idée d'une définition par une nature rationnelle donnée *a priori*. Le XVIIIe siècle prolonge et développe

* Conférence prononcée (en italien, trad.: Alice Venditti, Uniroma 2) à l'université Uniroma 2 Tor Vergata le 30 octobre 2007, sur invitation du Professeur Paolo Quintili.

[1] Signalons à propos des usages des termes au XVIIIe siècle: «animal», «bête», «brute» que ce siècle est un moment où ce vocabulaire très classique se brouille considérablement chez la plupart des au- teurs (mais pas chez quelques-uns comme Condillac par exemple qui en use toujours très rigoureusement), imposant donc de les saisir à chaque fois en fonction du contexte.

ces questions, non pas de la même manière, mais en renversant l'ordre: le siècle précédent mettait en première place la question métaphysique, puis abordait celles de la connaissance et celle de l'homme; le XVIIIe siècle fait passer ces deux dernières au premier rang, et déplace la question métaphysique au dernier. En outre la question éthique à l'égard des bêtes, très secondarisée au XVIIe siècle, prend de plus en plus d'importance et d'autonomie.

Les auteurs ne vont pas non plus prendre en charge de façon uniforme tous ces aspects, mais vont s'occuper davantage de l'un ou de l'autre. En gros, la distribution est la suivante:

- Condillac reprend la question de la connaissance (à partir de Locke dont il nous faudra donc au préalable parler);
- Diderot prend en charge celle de la nature de la vie et de la matière (en délaissant les deux autres questions de Dieu et de l'âme), en touchant cependant aussi fortement à l'anthropologie;
- Rousseau s'occupe avant tout de celle de l'anthropologie et aussi de l'éthique, même s'il s'intéresse également aux autres questions.

C'est pourquoi nous avons choisi ces trois auteurs: en vertu de leur capacité à grosso modo représenter les trois entrées principales au XVIIIe siècle du traitement de l'animal par les philosophes et afin de déployer la complexité et la richesse du champ. C'est évidemment tout à fait une gageure que de parler de trois auteurs aussi importants dans une même communication et nous allons parcourir très vite – trop bien sûr – des conceptions très vastes et intimidantes. Ce qui don- nera sans doute souvent l'impression d'un aperçu. Tant pis! On espère au moins montrer la richesse et l'importance des enjeux dont au XVIIIe siècle l'animal devient l'hôte privilégié.

Nous n'avons pas oublié cependant les aspects scientifiques. Nos trois comparses – car ils se connaissent très bien et discutent de ces questions - entre autres lisent intensivement Buffon. Condillac sera même accusé de plagier ce dernier, alors que précisément il essaye de s'en démarquer. Rousseau et Diderot s'en inspirent également, et positivement, mais pour le dépasser, tous deux à leur manière: le premier en animalisant l'homme à l'état de nature beaucoup plus que ne le voudrait Buffon; le second en en tirant des conséquences matérialistes qui heurtent la prudence de l'auteur de l'*Histoire naturelle*. Double débordement de Buffon par nos deux très hardis philosophes: du côté anthropologique par Rousseau, du côté matérialiste et métaphysique par Diderot, débordements qui tous deux compromettent et amenuisent l'écart maintenu entre l'homme et l'animal par Buffon qui y tient beaucoup (Rousseau également, mais différemment).

En outre, avant et à côté de Buffon, il faut déjà prendre en compte ce qu'on peut appeler la «révolution microscopique» (ouverte à la fin du XVIIe siècle par le microscope de Leeuwenhoek), et nombre de recherches anatomiques et physiologiques majeures (illustrées par les noms de Stahl, Haller, des savants

de l'école de Montpellier etc.), qui marquent profondément la réflexion philosophique sur la question des animaux. L'impulsion du thème de l'animal au XVIIIe siècle tient donc aussi largement à sa promotion scientifique, longuement préparée par le siècle précédent (recherches de Willis, de Tyson, de Guillaume Lamy, etc.). Mais je laisserai pour l'instant ces perspectives de côté, que je reprendrai dans la prochaine leçon[2], pour ne retenir que les aspects strictement philosophiques.

Reprenons la question: comment le XVIIIe siècle à travers nos trois auteurs, représentatifs des lignes essentielles de questionnement sur ce sujet à ce moment-là, conçoit-il l'animal (ou plutôt les animaux car il faut prendre en compte l'extrême diversité des espèces)?

- Comme un laboratoire (très théorique d'ailleurs car on est encore loin de l'éthologie) pour com- prendre la formation de la connaissance: ainsi procède Condillac;

- Comme un être empiriquement donné, voire expérimentalement manipulable, dont l'approche a pour enjeu la possibilité d'en expliquer la réalité tout entière (fonctionnement corporel, perception et connaissance, comportement) sans l'hypothèse de l'âme, comme être intégralement maté- riel, comme organisme, et par là de spéculer sur l'essence ultime de la matière, de la vie et de la nature: telle est la démarche de Diderot;

- Comme un terme privilégié de comparaison concrète pour comprendre ce qu'est l'homme: c'est là la visée fondamentale de Rousseau.

1. Le traitement de l'animal chez les empiristes: de Locke à Condillac

Chez Locke, le cas animal est curieusement traité. À la fois une pétition générale de principe est régulièrement réaffirmée qui réévalue l'animal comme sujet de connaissance. Et en même temps l'attention n'est guère poussée plus loin et s'introduit peu dans le détail du comportement animal. Il est bien possible que cette retenue tienne à la question de l'instinct qui s'inscrit de façon problématique dans le cadre d'une conception empiriste. En effet, cette notion apparaît en contradiction avec le présupposé fondamental de cette dernière, les traits instinctifs se présentant comme innés et faisant donc, semble-t-il, exception au principe général de déduction de la connaissance à partir de l'expérience sensible. On pourrait s'attendre par conséquent à une critique en règle de cette notion d'instinct par le maître de l'empirisme. Or il n'en est rien, Locke esquive systématiquement le problème. On comprend pourquoi son discours sur l'animal reste étrangement évasif même s'il y revient pourtant assez souvent: parce que

[2] Cette conférence a été publiée: *Cervello, sensi, pensiero e animalità. Elementi anatomici e fisiologici nell'antropologia materialista del secolo XVIII*, dans *Anima, mente e cervello*, dir. par P. Quintili, Rome 2009, pp. 71-94.

s'aventurer plus avant dans le détail de son comportement concret, ce serait prendre le risque de se confronter avec cette notion problématique de l'instinct.

Il est une occasion cependant où Locke semble se trouver comme pris au piège de cette question de l'instinct et la manière dont il y répond, ou plutôt refuse d'y répondre, confirme manifestement la réalité d'un problème. Significativement, il ne s'agit pas d'une réflexion spontanée de Locke lui-même dans la ligne de raisonnement de son discours, mais tout au contraire d'une interruption extérieure due à Coste, son traducteur, et qui, loin de déboucher sur un dialogue, en exprimera fermement le refus. Ce singulier épisode est relaté par le traducteur de l'*Essai sur l'entendement humain* qui — visiblement très intéressé par la question des bêtes et sans doute pour cette raison intrigué par ce silence de Locke sur ce point — prit l'initiative, de façon sans doute intempestive, de lui poser directement la question. Citons l'extrait:

> Il me souvient à ce propos, qu'en conversant un jour avec Mr. Locke, le discours venant à tomber sur *les Idées innées*, je lui fis cette Objection: que penser de certains petits Oiseaux, du *Chardonneret*, par exemple, qui éclot dans un nid que le Père ou la mère lui ont fait, s'envole enfin dans les champs pour y chercher la nourriture sans que le Père ou la mère prenne aucun soin de lui, et qui, l'année suivante, sait fort bien trouver et démêler tous les matériaux dont il a besoin pour se bâtir un nid qui, par son industrie, se trouve fait et agencé avec autant ou plus d'art que celui où il est éclos lui-même.
>
> Et Coste, comme si tout cela n'était pas suffisant, d'en rajouter: «D'où lui sont venues [à ce chardonneret] les idées de ces différents matériaux et de l'art d'en construire ce nid»? La réponse ne se fait alors guère attendre: « Mr. Locke me répondit brusquement, *Je n'ai pas écrit mon Livre pour expliquer les actions des Bêtes*»[3].

Ce geste irrité de fermeture à une question, à laquelle n'a été donné pratiquement le temps que de s'entrouvrir, a de quoi surprendre, confortant le soupçon qu'elle révèle un point particulièrement sensible dans la conception empiriste et pour cela systématiquement écarté. De quel ordre ce point peut-il relever sinon celui d'une lacune que l'argumentation de Locke a beaucoup de difficulté à combler et qui apparaît alors non comme un simple embarras passager, mais bien comme la marque d'une insuffisance théorique, voire d'une aporie? L'animal, partenaire traditionnel des doctrines empiristes ou sceptiques, se montre sous un nouveau jour, celui d'un faux ami potentiel, susceptible de témoigner par l'apparence d'innéité de son instinct contre l'idée d'une réductibilité toujours possible de la connaissance à l'apprentissage sensible. Même un innocent chardonneret peut alors apparaître comme un danger pour les fondements mêmes de la doctrine, suffisamment en tout cas pour refuser d'en écouter l'impertinent ramage, ou l'homme qui malencontreusement s'en fait l'écho. Il semble donc qu'il y ait un problème animal de l'empirisme[4] et Locke à

[3] *Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain* (reprint Vrin de l'éd. de 1755, éd. Emilienne Naert, Paris, 1983), note de la p. 111.

[4] Ce ne sera pas le cas des matérialistes dans la mesure où ils ne sont pas forcément enfermés dans un empirisme rigoureux, comme on le voit bien avec La Mettrie admettant sans difficulté le fait d'un instinct inné.

cet égard transmet un héritage difficile à ses successeurs empiristes, comme une sorte d'héritage en blanc, de dette – à charge pour eux un jour ou l'autre de se résoudre à le solder – à l'égard de l'animal.

C'est Condillac qui relèvera ce défi animal de l'empirisme[5] dans le *Traité des animaux* de 1755 en engageant sa réflexion sur le problème de l'instinct pour s'efforcer de dissoudre purement et simplement cette notion en la ramenant à une formation empirique. Ce mouvement est corrélatif de la radicalisation de l'empirisme chez cet auteur et est même requis par elle: puisque son projet est de ramener intégralement et sans résidu la connaissance à la sensation, alors l'animal et son instinct ne peuvent plus être laissés de côté. Il faut impérativement en rendre compte, ne pas laisser cette exception demeurer comme refoulée au sein de la théorie telle une écharde pouvant ultérieurement donner prise à une possibilité de réfutation, mais au contraire l'intégrer dans une explication génétique globale de la connaissance. Le cas de l'instinct animal devient même une véritable pierre de touche de la réussite de cette radicalisation par la capacité d'universalisation qu'elle permet. Il s'agit de passer d'une théorie de l'esprit finalement seulement humain chez Locke, à une théorie de l'esprit tout court, et parvenir à inclure l'esprit de l'animal dans cette théorie générale serait la preuve de sa réussite. À travers sa réponse à la question animale, le sensualiste – ou plutôt le sensationniste pour employer un terme moins utilisé, mais sans aucun doute plus adéquat – ambitionne ainsi non seulement une confirmation, mais même une réfondation et une universalisation de l'empirisme. C'est en fait une gageure, celle de ramener l'instinct à autre chose, d'en faire l'effet d'une mauvaise interprétation des mécanismes du comportement animal.

Sur quoi fonder alors ce comportement animal? Ce sera sur la réflexion, en se gardant toutefois de comprendre celle-ci comme une faculté séparée à la manière de Locke et en l'admettant au contraire comme une propriété de l'expérience sensible, une capacité d'autoréflexion du sensible. Le *Traité des animaux* pourra dès lors lire la construction de l'expérience comme un véritable processus d'autoéducation de l'animal par et dans le sensible. Cette réflexion animale procède de manière logique, par le raisonnement, voire l'abstraction, étant bien entendu que celle-ci reste élémentaire. L'instinct apparaîtra comme l'effet pétrifié de ce qui aura été initialement un véritable raisonnement. L'illusion très consistante de l'instinct consistera à prendra cet effet pour une cause, à le concevoir comme étant depuis son origine un pur mécanisme irréfléchi, aveugle et inné, alors qu'il n'est pourtant rien d'autre, affirme Condillac, qu'«un

[5] Après bien entendu quelques autres comme par exemple Boullier, mais ce sera Condillac le plus radical et le plus cohérent dans sa démarche qui se veut celle d'un sensationnisme intégral ne présupposant plus rien d'autre que la seule sensation pour construire le système de la connaissance.

commencement de connaissance»[6]. Pourquoi cet effacement paradoxal de la réflexion dans son résultat? Parce que le motif de cette réflexion chez l'animal ne dépasse pas ses besoins bornés, resserrés dans un environnement toujours à peu près identique; les solutions permettant de s'y adapter seront donc en nombre réduit, aisées à trouver et pouvant indéfiniment être reproduites. Par conséquent, l'ingéniosité animale est en quelque sorte victime de sa propre performance: trop bon disciple de l'expérience, sans ambition car sans besoin excessif et sans amour-propre, s'ajustant au registre limité et pratiquement invariant de l'existence dans la nature, l'animal trouvant vite ce qu'il cherche n'a aucun besoin de s'exténuer à chercher encore et toujours contrairement à l'homme inquiété par des besoins toujours renaissants et multipliés par un milieu mouvant et complexe. Dès lors, la modestie animale laisse le champ libre à l'homme qui peut se prendre en quelque sorte pour le premier de la classe...

L'interprétation de l'animal vérifie ainsi l'option anti-mécaniste fondamentale de Condillac, en confirmant la capacité du sensible à produire une expérience se suffisant, semble-t- il, totalement à elle-même. La notion d'instinct perd alors toute consistance et n'est plus — pour reprendre la formule spinoziste sur le hasard — que «l'asile de l'ignorance» de l'homme devant les bêtes. Il s'agit cependant d'un double mouvement. En effet, Condillac, s'affichant comme profondément spiritualiste, ne s'en tient pas à cette réduction génétique de l'instinct qui porte comme conséquence l'intégration de l'homme et de l'animal dans le même processus; il accompagne en même temps en sous-main cette opération de l'affirmation d'une différence d'ordre substantiel entre l'homme et de l'animal, avançant même une racine métaphysique de cette différence comme l'atteste le *Traité des animaux*:

> Concluons que, quoique l'âme des bêtes soit simple comme celle de l'homme, et qu'à cet égard il n'y ait aucune différence entre l'une et l'autre, les facultés que nous avons en partage, et la fin à laquelle Dieu nous destine, démontrent que si nous pouvions pénétrer dans la nature de ces deux substances, nous verrions qu'elles diffèrent infiniment. Notre âme n'est donc pas de la même nature que celle des bêtes[7].

Cependant, cette substantialité métaphysique est si mince, si évasive, si restrictivement principielle, qu'elle n'apparaît guère convaincante, même s'il n'est pas évident qu'il y ait lieu de soupçonner la bonne foi de Condillac. Diderot pour sa part n'a pas les scrupules de Condillac; il ne cantonne pas son radicalisme au plan épistémologique mais l'étend à celui métaphysique et son radicalisme sera donc résolument matérialiste.

[6] «L'instinct n'est rien, ou c'est un commencement de connaissance», *Traité des animaux*, éd. par M. Malherbe, Paris 2004, 2nde partie, début du chap. V.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

2. La spéculation matérialiste (Diderot): animalité de la matière et de l'homme (du faire, de la raison et de la passion)

L'animalité est omniprésente chez Diderot. Elle atteint même une sorte de diffusion qui, on le verra, est à la limite d'une dilution. Elle s'ancre en son œuvre sur le mode, aurait-on presque envie de dire, d'une idiosyncrasie: Diderot lui-même est très animal ainsi que sa pensée fondamentalement vivante, fluente, intuitive, toujours en alerte et en métamorphose. Pour en rester au plan de la théorie, deux idées sur l'animalité apparaissent comme centrales chez Diderot: d'une part, la matière est pour lui fondamentalement animale; et, de l'autre, l'homme est intégralement animal, et s'il possède tout de même une spécificité en dépit de cette réductibilité à l'animalité, ce ne peut être que par une mise en forme particulière de cette matière animale qui le constitue.

La première idée, celle d'une animalité de la matière, rejoint la théorie de la sensibilité universelle chez Diderot. Par quoi en effet l'animalité se définit-elle avant tout? Par la sensibilité. Citons les *Eléments de Physiologie*: «On en viendra quelque jour à démontrer que la sensibilité ou le toucher est un sens commun à tous les êtres [...]. Alors la matière en général aura cinq ou six propriétés essentielles, la force morte ou vive, la longueur, la largeur, la profondeur, l'impénétrabilité et la sensibilité»[8]. On est loin des hésitations initiales de Diderot: la sensibilité n'est pas simplement le résultat de l'organisation, résultat molaire d'une certaine structuration de la matière, mais véritablement une propriété ontologique, moléculaire peut-on dire, de la matière elle-même. Diderot est donc plus qu'épicurien (rappelons que l'atome en effet n'est pas sensible chez Epicure)...

Or, la sensibilité est partout dans la matière, cela sous deux états: «sourde» ou «vive» (d'où la possibilité de la génération spontanée qui s'effectue simplement par le passage de l'un à l'autre). Dès qu'il y a une certaine continuité et unité, une totalisation et prise d'autonomie, il y a animal. Dès lors, qu'est ce qu'un animal, où commence-t-il et où finit-il? Rien n'est plus délicat de le dire! Il est fort difficile, voire impossible, de préciser les limites entre les règnes, la frontière entre végétal et animal étant bien incertaine comme le montre l'article «Animal» de Diderot dans l'*Encyclopédie*, qui s'appuie sur l'autorité de Buffon. Mais ces limites semblent indéfinissables également au sein de l'animal lui-même puisque Diderot ouvre une sorte de mise en abîme de l'animalité au sein de l'organisme: l'animal est composé d'autres animaux tel une grappe d'abeilles (c'est l'image de l'organisme dans le *Rêve de d'Alembert*, image reprise de Bordeu), animaux qui sont les organes car ceux-ci sont aussi des animaux... Ainsi, l'animalité est plus importante que l'animal chez Diderot. L'animal n'est qu'une forme provisoire abritant passagèrement une animalité qui se confond avec la sensibilité et qui circule universellement à travers la matière et ses métamorphoses.

La seconde idée est celle selon laquelle l'homme est animal: pas seulement par certains côtés particuliers comme la sexualité par exemple, mais dans la

[8] *Eléments de Physiologie*, éd.par P. Quintili, Paris 2004, pp. 123-124.

totalité de son être, dans la diversité de ses activités même les plus hautes, jusqu'à sa raison et son génie que Diderot compare à l'instinct, jusqu'à enfin sa vie sociale et politique. L'unité de l'homme et de l'animal chez Diderot est donc davantage qu'un simple prolongement de l'union de l'âme et du corps, même dans la version d'une radicalisation matérialiste sur ce thème: c'est toute une nouvelle conception de la sensibilité qui s'y investit, s'y expérimente et s'y formule, une sensibilité ambitieuse qui prétend former le tout de l'être et l'unifier. Reprenons et développons tous les points que nous venons de mentionner:

> Tout d'abord, l'homme est animal dans son être puisque comme tout organisme – citons les *Eléments de Physiologie* - «L'homme peut donc être regardé comme un assemblage d'animaux où chacun garde sa fonction particulière, et sympathise soit naturellement, soit par habitude, avec les autres»[9].

Comme exemple d'activité humaine, signalons le caractère curieusement animal aux yeux de Diderot de la technique, sensible à travers des sortes de chimères biotechniques comme par exemple cette étrange suggestion des *Eléments de Physiologie*: «Que serait-ce qu'un métier de la manufacture de Lyon si l'ouvrier et la tireuse faisaient un tout sensible avec la trame, la chaîne, et le semple? Ce serait un animal semblable à l'araignée qui pense, qui veut, qui se nourrit, se reproduit et ourdit sa toile»[10]. De même, dans les articles de l'Encyclopédie rédigés par Diderot sur les techniques, les machines sont souvent décrites en des termes très animaux (par exemple la machine à bas à l'article «Bas»).

A l'égard de la raison, citons encore les *Eléments de Physiologie*: «La raison, ou l'instinct de l'homme est déterminé par son organisation et par les dispositions, les goûts, les aptitudes que la mère communique à l'enfant, qui pendant neuf mois n'a fait qu'un avec elle»[11] et aussi la *Réfutation d'Helvétius*: «La raison de l'homme est un instrument qui correspond à toute la variété de l'instinct animal; que la race humaine rassemble les analogues de toutes les sortes d'animaux; et qu'il n'est non plus possible de tirer un homme de sa classe qu'un animal de la sienne [...]»[12]. Cette profonde analogie de l'homme et des espèces animales ouvre également sur un autre plan d'animalité humaine, cette fois d'ordre psychologique: celui - très récurrente chez Diderot - d'une typologie animale des hommes, étroitement déterminés par leur économie physiologique et sensorielle propre, enfermés dans une sorte d'idiosyncrasie indissolublement organique et psychologique. Ce déterminisme explique pourquoi Diderot croit beaucoup moins que Condillac, Helvétius et dans une moindre mesure Rousseau, en la plasticité humaine et en l'idéal de l'éducation des Lumières qui semble chez lui de l'ordre d'un salut plus politique et global que réellement individuel et moral.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 338.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 122.
[11] *Ibid.,* p. 144.
[12] *Réfutation d'Helvétius, Œuvres,* t. I, Paris 1994, p. 805.

Pour l'organisation sociopolitique, c'est-à-dire à l'échelle des vastes ensembles collectifs, non seulement le fonctionnement mais aussi la capacité de régulation et d'organisation doivent se penser sur un mode organique et animal. A la différence de Buffon, cette animalité pour Diderot est sans ordre donné. C'est ce qui fait la différence aussi avec Rousseau — grand lecteur également de Buffon — qui reprend l'idée d'un ordre de la nature (c'est-à-dire avant tout l'ordre des espèces chez Buffon, même s'il connaît des hésitations croissantes au fur et à mesure que progresse l'oeuvre). Chez Diderot en revanche se développe l'idée d'une nature sans ordre et d'une animalité sans maître: ni maître externe (comme l'homme chez Buffon) ni maître interne (ordre voulu par Dieu comme on le trouve cette fois chez Rousseau). Du coup, il n'est pas possible de trouver un modèle pacifique dans la vie animale, où ne règne pas l'harmonie mais un entredévorement perpétuel, la nature étant une véritable arène de la prédation. L'animalité sans cesse circule entre les animaux par cet entredévorement, la force transformant sans cesse les formes par la mort, la sexualité, la génération et la monstruosité. Le langage humain seul, comme le montre l'article «Droit naturel» permet une unité véritable, même si elle est fragile, entre les vivants par la formation d'une volonté générale, en droit extensible à l'espèce animale tout entière, mais resserrée de fait à celle humaine[13].

Précisons cette perspective d'une possibilité de régulation : sur ce plan comme ailleurs, le seul ordre qui vaille pour Diderot est un ordre non pas imposé mais émergent. La philosophie de Diderot est ainsi une pensée non pas seulement de la vie, mais de la capacité spontanée d'auto-organisation du vivant à quelque échelle que ce soit, celle de l'organe, de l'organisme, des ensembles sociopolitiques. Non seulement les sociétés associent des organismes, mais l'organisme est lui-même société (Diderot utilise souvent ce terme pour désigner l'organisme) d'organes, eux-mêmes déjà combinaisons de molécules vivantes. Cette pensée de l'organisation, de la création d'ordre, se fonde de façon cohérente sur la base très vitaliste de la confiance dans l'énergie du vivant, dans sa puissance de conservation de soi qui implique sa capacité à s'organiser à tout niveau que ce soit pour pouvoir précisément survivre (c'est sur la même base que Diderot penche pour la médecine expectative de l'école de Montpellier, fondée sur la

[13] Article «Droit naturel», *Encyclopédie*. Il faut nuancer cependant car Diderot contestera ailleurs l'idée d'une spécificité humaine absolue du langage: «Car vous vous moquez, lorsque vous êtes tenté de croire que l'art de créer des signes, surtout en prenant le mot signe dans une acception aussi étendue que vous l'avez fait, est essentiellement propre à l'homme. Les animaux ont cet art tout comme nous. Ils s'entendent, ils se parlent comme nous. Les périls nouveaux auxquels nous les exposons étendent leur idiome. Les chasseurs le comprennent en bonne partie» (*Observations sur Hemsterhui*s, *ibid.* p. 731). Cela dit, outre que ce passage écarte soigneusement les termes de langage ou de langue et prend l'expression «art des signes» dans un sens très «étendu», il serait difficile d'admettre qu'un tel «langage» aille jusqu'à une capacité de délibération d'ordre politique et permette une unité autre que biologique entre les animaux d'une même espèce. En outre, l'article «Droit naturel» ne refusait pas aux bêtes toute communication, mais simplement la déclarait trop équivoque et incertaine, sans commune mesure donc avec le langage humain.

confiance en la capacité réparatrice de la nature). Mais cet ordre naturellement est toujours précaire, sans garantie aucune, toujours défait et toujours à refaire.

Reste tout de même la question de la spécificité humaine que l'on a déjà effleurée. Pour y répondre, il faut relever l'importance du langage, de la transmission par l'éducation et l'écriture, du cerveau (le reproche est fait à Helvétius de ne pas en comprendre l'importance), mais aussi de l'organisation sensorielle. Cette organisation chez l'homme se révèle en effet tout à fait particulière: elle permet un équilibre. Cet équilibre sensoriel est particulièrement thématisé par la *Réfutation d'Helvétius*[14]: l'espèce humaine à la différence des autres se caractérise par l'égalité de ses organes sensibles. En dépit des possibilités communes avec l'homme, l'esprit animal est entravé par des sens non seulement trop puissants, mais surtout déséquilibrés, ce qui l'asservit quasi exclusivement à celui dominant. L'esprit humain en revanche est dans un rapport aux sens tout à fait autre : informé par de nombreux organes dont la puissance est à peu près équivalente, il est à leur égard dans une situation comparable à celle sereine et impartiale d'un juge recevant les dépositions des témoins sans se laisser influencer par l'un plus que l'autre:

> Pourquoi l'homme est-il perfectible et pourquoi l'animal ne l'est-il pas ? L'animal ne l'est pas parce que sa raison, s'il en a une, est dominée par un sens despote qui la subjugue. Toute l'âme du chien est au bout de son nez, et il va toujours flairant. Toute l'âme de l'aigle est dans son œil, et l'aigle va toujours regardant. Toute l'âme de la taupe est dans son oreille, et elle va toujours écoutant. Mais il n'en est pas ainsi de l'homme. Il est entre ses sens une telle harmonie, qu'aucun ne prédomine assez sur les autres pour donner la loi à son entendement; c'est son entendement au contraire, ou l'organe de sa raison qui est le plus fort. C'est un juge qui n'est ni corrompu ni subjugué par aucun des témoins. Il conserve toute son autorité, et il en use pour se perfectionner. Il combine toutes sortes d'idées ou de sensations, parce qu'il ne sent rien fortement[15].

Ainsi, la source première de la différence humaine est d'ordre biologique et ce n'est qu'ensuite qu'elle peut se déployer dans le monde des signes, du langage et de la culture. Cette source est en fait double: interne par le cerveau particulièrement développé chez l'homme, externe par cet équilibre sensoriel (il faudrait compter aussi le diaphragme, siège de l'émotion) également propre à lui ; ces deux aspects multipliant leur énergie en entretenant un rapport dynamique particulièrement efficace. Du coup, par ce jeu entre les sens et le cerveau, entre l'extérieur et l'intérieur, qui neutralise toute pression excessive d'un côté ou d'un autre en compensant les forces les unes par les autres, l'esprit humain interpose entre lui et la richesse (particulièrement forte chez lui) de l'information sensible une distance nouvelle, source d'une liberté inédite jusque là dans la nature. L'homme ainsi se trouve expliqué dans sa différence et dans ses possibilités propres sans d'aucune manière devenir une exception par rapport au

[14] Dans cet ouvrage, Diderot développe davantage cette idée que l'on retrouve dans d'autres de ses livres.
[15] *Réfutation d'Helvétius*, cit., p. 814-815.

monde animal. Paradoxalement, Diderot rend compte de la spécificité humaine de façon totalement animale, par les seules lois communes de la vie et de la sensibilité, et sans recours à une quelconque essence absolue ou nature humaine: par conséquent, la différence humaine à la fois est bien réelle et pourtant purement et seulement de nature animale.

L'animal ou plutôt les autres animaux évoquent de leur côté - pour reprendre un modèle célèbre, celui de Condillac – l'image d'une «statue» qui se serait figée dans son mouvement sur le stade d'un sens, arrêtant là l'aventure en droit ouverte du sensible. Le philosophe sensualiste et notre matérialiste ne différant qu'en ce que cet arrêt est dû à la limitation des besoins pour le premier tandis que le second l'attribue à la disposition des organes sensibles. Pour Diderot, l'ani- mal est un spécialiste biologique borné, aveugle à tout ce qui sort de la sphère étroite de son métier de nature, tout entier moulé par son mode particulier d'adaptation et d'adhésion sensible au monde. L'homme, lui, présente la figure d'un généraliste éclectique qui fait de la diversité et de l'égalité de ses rapports sensibles au réel le principe d'une capacité de synthèse et d'une certaine liberté. Il s'ouvre alors un monde différent qui n'est pas un autre monde, ni non plus l'accès à un plan transcendant, mais l'effet heureux et contingent d'une combinaison différente des déterminations universellement à l'œuvre dans le sensible et le vivant. Mais la prise en considération du génie trouble ce beau tableau. Qu'est-ce en effet que le génie? Ecoutons Diderot qui le tient paradoxalement dans une singulière proximité avec la bête: «D'où il s'ensuit que l'homme de génie et la bête se touchent, parce qu'il y a dans l'un et l'autre un organe prédominant qui les entraîne invinciblement à une seule sorte d'occupation, qu'ils exécutent parfaitement»[16]. Ce qui fait le génie chez un homme est donc en définitive d'être - s'il est possible - plus animal encore que l'ho- mme moyen, et donc aussi moins rationnel, plus fou. Et le génie, parce qu'il tient d'abord à l'organisation physiologique, est pour Diderot d'abord inné.

On voit que, dans tous les cas, la différence de l'homme et de l'animal pour Diderot non seulement n'a rien de substantiel, mais se révèle tout à fait conjecturale et relative, et d'ordre d'abord physiologique. En quelque sorte, le matérialisme de Diderot est moins empiriste que celui de Condillac – ce qui se marque sur ces exemples de l'instinct et du génie – mais c'est à cette condition que son matérialisme est à ces yeux plus fondé et qu'il peut donc défaire le spiritualisme — affiché s'il n'est sincère — de Condillac. C'est la différence avec le matérialisme d'Helvétius qui, lui, se voudra intégralement empiriste et même sensationniste, donc plus proche de Condillac et, en remontant plus haut, de Locke. Mais, pour Diderot, cette option du matérialisme soutenue par Helvétius précisément n'est pas crédible, voire est intenable au regard justement de l'expérience qu'il invoque sans cesse en témoin contre l'auteur de *De l'homme*, soupçonnable même d'une pointe peut-être d'idéalisme.

[16] *Ibid.,* p. 185.

3. La réflexion anthropologique et l'animal chez Rousseau

Les questions auxquelles s'alimente la réflexion de Rousseau sur l'animal sont essentielles à sa pensée. Ce sont celles qui tiennent à son intérêt pour la nature, à sa réflexion sur l'âme et sur la sensibilité, à son inquiétude à l'égard de l'origine, à son souci de la thématique éthique de la pitié, du droit et des valeurs. A ces quatre motifs — la nature, l'âme et sa vie sensible, l'origine, en- fin tout ce qui concerne l'éthique, le droit et les valeurs — il faut ajouter en outre ce qui apparaît comme le centre même dont partent et auquel reviennent sans cesse toutes ses interrogations : la question de l'homme. Très logiquement, la réflexion de Rousseau s'oriente donc selon trois axes : celui métaphysique et ceux majeurs de l'anthropologie et de l'éthique.

De Condillac, enfermé dans la problématique de la connaissance, à Diderot, soucieux de vérifier avant tout sa métaphysique matérialiste et aussi, il est vrai, son anthropologie, puis à Rousseau qui même s'il traite à peu près de tous ces aspects de façon diffuse resserre la réflexion sur l'homme et les valeurs, nous assistons à un élargissement progressif de la question de l'animal au XVIIIe siècle. Mais c'est de la question anthropologique chez Rousseau dont on parlera essentiellement car c'est son horizon fondamental de réflexion.

Comme chez Diderot, l'anthropologie de Rousseau associe étroitement animal et homme, ce qui est très important puisque cette convergence consacre la nouvelle importance anthropologique de l'animal, mais la différence avec Diderot est triple:

a) ce couplage homme/animal repose non fondamentalement sur l'expérience sensorielle mais avant tout sur celle émotionnelle et affective, ou, comme on l'appelle au XVIIIe siècle, morale: ce seront les tendances animales fondamentales de l'amour de soi, la pitié etc. dont on va reparler;

b) la base métaphysique de leurs anthropologies est fondamentalement différente: matérialiste et physiologiste pour Diderot, fondée chez Rousseau sur la notion d'une âme spirituelle, même chez l'animal, et même si la reconnaissance du corps est fondamentale chez Rousseau;

c) Rousseau enfin ne dissoudra pas la différence de l'homme et de l'animal en les rapprochant aussi étroitement que Diderot, mais au contraire restituera cette différence comme résultat inattendu de cette unification, cela grâce à la perfectibilité qu'il réserve à l'homme, à la différence des deux autres auteurs. C'est en effet cette réservation de la perfectibilité à l'homme qui permet de fonder l'anthropologie sur une base animale, de descendre très très bas l'homme jusqu'à l'état de nature tout en lui assurant en même temps par la perfectibilité de pouvoir remonter à la hauteur véritable de ce qu'il est devenu en s'appuyant précisément sur ces données animales dans les- quelles les animaux en revanche, parce qu'ils ne disposent pas de la perfectibilité, resteront en- fermés.

Précisons un peu plus: le mouvement fondamental de l'anthropologie de Rousseau est donc de coupler étroitement l'animal à l'homme pour en faire non

pas seulement un contre-modèle, mais bien aussi un modèle pour pleinement comprendre cet homme. Dans sa perspective, l'homme concret ne se constitue pas fondamentalement par opposition avec la bête, mais en re- prenant sur le mode de la réflexion ce qui est constitutif de la nature animale en général. La nature de l'homme n'est pas exclusive de la nature en l'homme mais tout au contraire doit passer par le détour de cette nature en l'homme pour se constituer comme humaine également sur le plan moral. L'homme est dessiné par tout un jeu d'aller-retour avec l'animalité, jeu qui le distingue de la nature animale en même temps qu'il l'y attache. Ainsi, non seulement la pitié mais aussi la capacité d'imitation, l'amour de soi, la sexualité, la pudeur s'enracinent chez l'homme dans l'animalité et en même temps sont les éléments constitutifs de l'humain. Prenons l'exemple de la pitié qui permettra de parler aussi de l'aspect éthique de la question de l'animal chez Rousseau: d'un côté la pitié est la base naturelle de la morale et en même temps il n'y a moralité que quand cette base naturelle est choisie et ressaisie par la conscience et la raison qui vont la confirmer et la dépasser en même temps car il n'y a pas de moralité sans liberté et capacité de choix. Donnons comme exemple l'accession d'Emile à la moralité. Comme vous le savez, cette accession se fait très tard, vers l'âge de 16 ans. Comment? Par l'expérience de la pitié, expérience où précisément entre en jeu l'animal lui-même. La pitié étant elle-même une donnée animale pour Rousseau (quoiqu'il soit à cet égard plus nuancé qu'on le croit généralement), l'animalité est donc double- ment présente dans cette expérience inaugurale voyant Emile naître à la vie morale: elle est pré- sente intérieurement et extérieurement. Donnons le passage:

> Émile ayant peu réfléchi sur les êtres sensibles saura tard ce que c'est que souffrir et mourir. Les plaintes et les cris commenceront d'agiter ses entrailles, l'aspect du sang qui coule lui fera détourner les yeux, *les convulsions d'un animal expirant* lui donneront je ne sais quelle angoisse, avant qu'il sache d'où lui viennent ces nouveaux mouvements [...] Ainsi nait la pitié, premier sentiment relatif qui touche le cœur humain selon l'ordre de la nature. Pour devenir sensible et pitoyable, il faut que l'enfant sache qu'il y a des êtres semblables à lui, qui souffrent ce qu'il a souffert, qui sentent les douleurs qu'il a senties, et *d'autres dont il doit avoir l'idée comme pouvant les sentir aussi*. En effet, comment nous laissons- nous émouvoir à la pitié, si ce n'est en nous transportant hors de *nous et nous identifiant avec l'animal souffrant ? en quittant pour ainsi dire nôtre être pour prendre le sien*[17]?

Ainsi, de façon synthétique, peuvent se repérer trois niveaux de l'anthropologie de Rousseau:

- des tendances animales lourdes et primitives, et la liste est assez longue: non seulement l'amour de soi et la pitié, mais aussi l'imitation, la paresse, la sexualité et la pudeur;

[17] *Émile*, livre IV, *Œuvres Complètes*, t. IV, Paris 1969, p. 505, mis en italiques par nous.

- la perfectibilité comme actualisateur historique qui allège cette pesanteur naturelle en l'affectant de virtualité chez l'homme, et cela de façon croissante dans la série: l'amour de soi est absolument primitif, la pitié un peu moins etc.;

- enfin la liberté métaphysique qui constitue comme la condition de possibilité de toute cette anthropologie.

De là les différences entre les anthropologies de Condillac, Diderot et Rousseau: le premier - Condillac - continue à affirmer la différence métaphysique de l'homme et de l'animal mais tout dans sa théorie permet de s'en passer, ce qui fait que c'est une philosophie qui maintient la différence humaine au plan métaphysique en semblant avoir «peur» de la perdre tout en voulant en faire totalement l'économie dans l'efficacité explicative du discours; le second - Diderot - assume pleinement l'identité fondamentale de l'homme et de l'animal (ce qui n'exclut pas bien sûr de penser une certaine spécificité humaine, mais qui n'a plus rien de substantiel); le troisième en- fin - Rousseau - affirme résolument la différence métaphysique de l'homme même s'il ne fait agir que des facteurs empiriques et même s'il montre l'homme comme le résultat d'un processus historique d'humanisation par l'exercice de sa perfectibilité sur la base de son animalité fondamentale. Grâce à la perfectibilité et à la réservation de celle-ci à l'homme, il peut effectuer cette synthèse entre humanité et animalité sans risquer de perdre la spécificité humaine puisque seul l'homme précisément peut faire cette synthèse grâce au fait que seul il est perfectible. Ainsi l'homme peut devenir lui-même sur la base de sa relation étroite mais réflexive avec l'altérité animale. C'est en quelque sorte en se desserrant de lui-même qu'il devient lui-même. Rousseau montre par là que l'homme en quelque sorte n'est humain que s'il n'est pas qu'humain, que s'il n'est pas enfermé dans une spécificité absolue faisant sécession.

Que conclure au terme de ce tour d'horizon? Constatons simplement, ce qui est déjà beaucoup, l'extrême richesse du thème animal dans le questionnement des Lumières et son intérêt philosophique majeur puisqu'il touche au plus profond non seulement de toutes les ramifications de ce questionnement, mais même de ce qui, à nos yeux, constitue son centre, à savoir l'anthropologie moderne décisivement ouverte par ce siècle.

¶ Sezione 2/b

Animali che parlano

La comunicazione dall'animale
all'uomo e dell'uomo
attraverso l'animale

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N. 18, 2015 (II) - Confini animali dell'anima umana. Prospettive e problematiche

Articoli/11

Das fleischverschmähende Tier als Weg zur Gerechtigkeit

Zohra Makadmini

Articolo sottoposto a *peer-review*. Ricevuto il 06/03/2015. Accettato il 02/04/2015.

This paper focusses on two fables of the famous arabic book *Kalila wa Dimna*, which is based on the indian *Pancatantra*, dedicated to the relationship between ruler and his philosophical adviser. To impart morals without endangering oneself too much, symbols and metaphors are used and the reader has to discover the masked meaning of these fables himself. I will give an interpretation of the allegory of the lion becoming a vegetarian showing the use of metaphors in this arabic bestseller.

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Das Buch *Kalila wa Dimna*[1] wurde im achten Jahrhundert von dem Autor Ibn al-Muqaffa'[2] im heutigen Irak aus dem Persischen ins Arabische übersetzet. Der persische Text stellt eine Übersetzung aus dem primären indischen Werk, *Pancatantra*, dar. Es handelt sich um ursprünglich indische Fabeln, die sich weltweit verbreitet haben. Ibn al-Muqaffa' hat sowohl die Geschichten übersetzt als auch bearbeitet[3], so fügte er Kapitel ein, die nicht im originalen Text zu finden sind und ließ auch einige Passagen weg. Es finden sich in seiner Übersetzung zum

[1] Ich werde nicht auf die schier unzählbaren Beiträge zu *Kalila wa Dimna* eingehen, sondern nur auf die für unser Unterfangen nützlichen Artikel verweisen, grundsätzlich zur Einleitung vgl. R. Irwin, *The Arabic Beast Fable*, in «Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes», LV, 1992, S. 36-50.

[2] Ibn al Nadim bezeichnet Ibn al-Muqaffa' als Schreiber für den zweiten Kalifen der Abbassiden, al Mansur (754-775). Neben den politischen Aufgaben als Schreiber, erwähnt Ibn al Nadim, dass Ibn al-Muqaffa' ein qualifizierter Übersetzer war, der das Persische sowie das Arabische beherrschte und mehrere Werke ins Arabische übersetzt habe, eins davon ist *Kalila wa Dimna: Kitab Al-Fihrist* mit Anmerkungen, hrsg. v. G. Flugel, Leipzig 1872, I, 1, S. 118. Vgl auch das Buch *Tabaqat al-Umam* des andalusischen Historikers Said al Andalusi, باتك ةعبطملا .قرشلا ةلجم .يعوسيلا وخيش سيول بألا هرشن .يسلسدنألا دعاص ممألا تاقبط الكلوثالا ةيلا باء نيعوسيلا 1912 Said al Andalusi, *Kitab Tabaqut al Umam*, hrgs. v. Pf. Cheikho al Jasu`i, in «Zeitschrift des Orient», VIII, Beirut 1912 und P. Kraus, *Zu Ibn al-Muqaffa'*, in «Rivista degli studi orientali», XIV,1, 1933, S. 1-20.

[3] Ibn al-Muqaffa' gilt als der ersten Gründer der arabischen Prosa. Vgl. A. Miquel, *L'Islam et sa civilisation* (VIIe-XXe siècle), Paris 1990, S. 161.

Beispiel auch Verse aus dem Koran und Sprüche des Propheten Mohammed[4], wodurch sie zu einer arabisch-islamischen Interpretation des indischen Textes wird. Ibn al-Muqaffa' übersetzte das Werk in einer blutigen Epoche des islamischen Reichs, ich meine hier den Verfall der umajjadischen Dynastie und die Entstehung des abbasidischen Reichs[5]. Die Übersetzung des Buchs bzw. die Bearbeitung musste zu der islamischen Denkart passen. Vor allem sollte sie keine direkte Kritik am Herrscher darstellen[6], das heißt, dass der primäre Text sich aufgrund der politischen Komponente in unterschiedliche Kulturen geändert hat. Die Hauptgeschichte des Buches *Der Löwe und der Stier* befindet sich sowohl im primären indischen Text als auch bei dessen Übersetzungen[7]. In dieser Fabel geht es um die Freundschaft zwischen einem Löwe und einem Stier: Der neidische Schakal Dimna schafft mit vielen Listen, den Löwen zu überzeugen, einen Stier aus Misstrauen zu töten, was der Löwe, danach bereut. Die Freundschaft ist in den Fabeln des *Kalila wa Dimna* ein Thema, das häufig vorkommt; neben der Freundschaft aber auch Geduld, Mut, Großzügigkeit, Rache und vieles andere[8]. Es geht in *Kalila wa Dimna* jedoch vor allem um die Gerechtigkeit des Königs, bzw. um dessen Ungerechtigkeit. Der Philosoph Beidaba erzählt dem König Debchleim, die zwei Hauptfiguren des Buchs, „fabelhafte" Geschichten, die ihm zeigen sollen, wie ein König gerecht regieren könnte[9].

In diesem Beitrag wird es um die Gerechtigkeit in *Kalila wa Dimna* gehen. Es handelt sich dabei um die Allegorie der fleischfressenden Tiere, die zu fleischverschmähenden geworden sind. Gerechtigkeit wird hier mit dem Verzicht auf Fleisch verbildlicht. Das fleischverschmähende Tier stellt den gerechten König dar, es ist das Symbol für eine friedliche Herrschaft. Fleischfressen steht

[4] *Kalila wa Dimna*, hrsg. v. Habib Youssef Maghine, Beirut 2003, S. 137. Ich zitiere im Weiteren diese Ausgabe unter dem Kurztitel *Kalila wa Dimna*.
[5] Vgl. hierzu S. A. Arjomand, *Ibn al-Muqaffa' and the 'Abbasid Revolution*, in «Iranian Studies», XXVII,1, 1994, S. 9-36.
[6] *Kalila wa Dimna*, cit. S. 7
[7] Die persische Übersetzung aus dem Indischen ist verloren gegangen, dafür haben wir davon eine syrische Übersetzung. Vgl. E. Wagner, *Asiatische Studien*, in «Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft», L, 1996, p. 482. Die Übersetzung von Ibn al-Muqaffa' wurde in mehreren anderen Sprachen wieder übersetzt, wir erwähnen hier die kastilische Übersetzung, die auf den Auftrag von Alfonso X. verfasst wurde und die von Johannes von Capua, der den hebräischen Text von Rabbi Joel ins Mittellateinische mit dem Titel *Directorium vitae humanae alias Parabolae antiquorum sapientum* (mlat. «Ratschläge zum menschlichen Leben oder Beispiele der alten Weisen») überträgt; Vgl. A. Takeda, *Blumenreiche Handelswege, Ost-westliche Streifzüge auf den Spuren der Fabel, Der Skorpion und der Frosch*, in «Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte», LXXXV,1, 2011, S. 133.
[8] *Kalila wa Dimna* gehört in den arabischen Länder, zu den Bucher, die die Schüler in der Grundschule lesen müssen, ich war selbst in meiner Kindheit von den Geschichten dieses Buches fasziniert.
[9] Zum *Fürstenspiegel* in der arabischen Literatur vgl. F. Bauden u. A. Ghersetti, *L'art de servir son monarque. Le Kitāb Waṣāyā Aflaṭūn al-ḥakīm fī ḫidmat al-mulūk*, in «Arabica», LIV,3, 2007, S. 295-316 und G. Richter, *Studien zur Geschichte der Älteren Arabischen Fürstenspiegel*, Leipzig 1932.

für den despotischen Herrscher. Das asketische Leben eines Tiers steht für die Rolle des Religiösen in der Gesellschaft[10].

Bevor ich diese Symbole erkläre, möchte ich für die Leser, die das Werk nicht kennen, seine Geschichte darlegen.

Die Figur des Philosophen Beidaba[11] (Pilpay) wurde als der ursprüngliche Autor des Werks dargestellt[12]. Er ist der Berater eines indischen König gewesen, welcher nach der Eroberung Indiens durch Alexander den Großen herrschte. Ibn al-Muqaffa' erzählt am Anfang, wie Alexander der Große dank seiner Erfahrung und List Indien eroberte[13], wie nach der Abreise von Alexander die Inder den König, den Alexander bei ihnen herrschen ließ, vertrieben[14] und einen indischen König namens Debchelim aussuchten. Ibn al-Muqaffa' betont, dass dieser von Alexander eingesetzte König ein ungerechter Herrscher gewesen war, der die Gefügigkeit des Volkes ausnutzte, um ihm zu schaden und der versuchte hatte, andere Königreiche zu unterjochen[15].

Ibn al-Muqaffa' versucht von Anfang an zu erklären, was ein guter Herrscher von einem schlechten unterscheidet. Zunächst wird nicht klar, warum er die Geschichte der Eroberung Indiens durch Alexander erwähnt, bis er von dem neuen König von Indien erzählt. Der erste stellt sich in seiner Eroberungsstrategie als vernünftiger König heraus, der zweite möchte von Beginn an mit Gewalt herrschen, weil er nur an Macht glaubt. Hier ist vielleicht implizit zu verstehen: Wenn Alexander der Große etwas langsam, geduldig und schrittweise angeht, dann sollte ein weniger erfolgreicher Herrscher davon lernen. Dies ist eine der ersten Lektionen, die der König lernen sollte[16].

Der Philosoph Beidaba wollte dem neuen König von Indien den richtigen Weg zeigen. Anhand der List und der Weisheit wollte er dem König den Weg der Gerechtigkeit zeigen. Dabei lädt Beidaba seine Schüler ein, mit ihnen darüber zu diskutieren, wie man dem König helfen könnte[17]und versucht ihnen zu erklären, dass jemand, wenn er auch schwach und nur ein "Denker" ist, trotzdem einen König bzw. einen Tyrannen besiegen oder immerhin ändern könnte.

Das Beispiel erzählt von einer Lerche,

> die einen Platz gefunden hatte, um ihre Eier zu legen; dieser Platz lag aber auf dem Pfad eines Elefanten, auf dem dieser stets zur Wasserstelle ging. Als der Elefant einmal zur der Quelle gehen wollte, trat er auf das Nest der Lerche und tötete ihre Küken. Als die Lerche dies entdeckte, wusste sie gleich, dass es nur der Elefant gewesen sein konnte,

[10] Cfr. C. Audebert, *La violence dan Kalila wa-Dimna d'Ibn al-Muqaffa'*, in «Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics», XIII, 1993, S. 24-45.
[11] Wie Ibn al-Muqaffa' die Figur Beidaba dargestellt hat, handelt es sich um eine historische Figur, dank ihr hat das Land, eine Blütezeit erlebt.
[12] *Kalila wa Dimna,* cit., S. 31.
[13] *Ibid.,* S. 33- 34.
[14] *Ibid.,* S. 35.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] M. Mahassine, *Deux genres d'autorité vus a travers les œuvres d'ibn al-Muqaffa': l'autorité fondée sur la religion et l'autorité fondée sur la fermeté*, in «Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae», XLIV,1, 1991, S. 89-120.
[17] *Kalila wa Dimna*, cit., S. 36.

der ihr dies angetan hatte. Sie flog heulend zu ihm und fragte: „Oh König, warum hast du meine Eier zerstört und meine Küken getötet, obwohl ich deine Nachbarin bin? Weil du vor mir keinen Respekt hast? weil ich klein und schwach bin?" Der Elefant bejahte die Frage. Die Lerche verließ ihn und flog zu den Raben und beschwerte sich. Die Raben meinten, dass sie gegen den Elefanten nicht viel tun könnten. Daraufhin bat die Lerche sie darum, den Elefanten zu blenden. Die Raben flogen zum Elefanten und pickten seine Augen aus. Erblindet konnte er nur noch fressen und trinken, was er direkt vor sich fand. Dann flog die Lerche zu den Fröschen und bat sie um Hilfe. Die Frösche meinten wie die Raben, dass sie zu klein und schwach seien; um dem Elefanten schaden zu können. Die Lerche sagte: „Ich möchte, dass ihr zu einem Loch mit mir geht und da laute Geräusche macht, wenn der Elefant euch hört, wird er sicher denken, dass da Wasser ist. Die Frösche taten, was die Lerche wollte. Als der Elefant den Lärm der Frösche hörte, folgte er ihm durstig, stürzte in das Loch und lag im Sterben. Da kam die Lerche zu ihm und sagte: „Du Tyrann, der so sehr an seine Macht glaubte und mich so verachtet hat. Siehst du nun wie listig ich bin? Obwohl ich so klein bin und du so groß bist, bist du trotzdem der Dumme"[18].

Nachdem Beidaba mit seiner Schülern diskutiert hat, und ihnen durch diese Geschichte gezeigt hat, dass List über Gewalt triumphieren kann, begibt er sich tatsächlich zum König und versuchte ihm von seiner Ungerechtigkeit zu überzeugen:

So wie die Lerche den Elefanten überlistet hat, so gelang es Beidaba, dem Philosophen, dem König seine Ungerechtigkeit vor Augen zu führen. Wie die Lerche, behilft auch er sich mit viel Arbeit, Geduld und List. Beidaba spricht zwar sanft zum König, aber er wagt es dabei, den König zu kritisieren. Diese Kritik kostet den Philosophen anfangs seine Freiheit, als der König jedoch über die Worte des Philosophen nachdenkt, versteht er ihre Wahrheit und holt Beidaba aus dem Gefängnis, um ihn zu seinem Berater zu machen. Der König wird der gerechteste Wasir aller Königreiche der Welt[19].

Dank der Gerechtigkeit des Wasirs und seines Königs herrschte Frieden im Land, und der Wasir hatte Zeit, um Bücher über die Kunst des Herrschens zu schreiben, wie Ibn al-Muqaffa' schreibt[20]. Auch der König machte sich Gedanken darüber und studierte, was seine Vorfahren für Bücher hinterließen, so dass er sich entschied, auch so ein Buch zu haben, in dem seine Zeit verewigt wird. Er beauftragt Beidaba ein Buch zu schreiben, das explizit den einfachen Leuten zeigen sollte, wie man den Königen gehorcht. Implizit hingegen sollte das Buch den Königen zeigen, wie sie gerecht herrschen[21]. Dieses Buch ist *Kalila wa Dimna*[22].

[18] *Ibid.,* S. 37.
[19] *Ibid.,* S. 49-50. Als die Schüler von Beidaba dies hörten, kamen aus dem ganzen Land und feierten den Erfolg ihres Lehrers. Ibn al-Muqaffa' erzählt, dass dieses Fest landesweit gefeiert wurde.
[20] *Ibid.,* S. 54.
[21] *Ibid.,* S. 56.
[22] Ob diese Geschichte der Wahrheit entspricht oder fiktiv ist wissen wir nicht.

Nachdem Ibn al-Muqaffa' uns die Geschichte des Buches erzählt hat, erklärt er anhand vieler Beispiele wie man das Buch lesen und verstehen sollte[23]. Er betont, dass der Leser langsam und nachdenklich das Buch studieren soll, er solle nicht denken, dass es in dem Buch um eine List zwischen zwei Tieren gehe oder um eine Diskussion zwischen einem Löwen und einem Stier, sondern er müsse nach dem versteckten Sinn der Geschichten suchen, um das Ziel des Buches zu begreifen[24]. Das Tierische dient als Vergleichsobjekt zum Menschlichem. Man sollte die Moral der Geschichten begreifen. Das Buch ist an drei Arten von Leuten adressiert: zunächst an die Jugend, die das Lustige in die Fabeln suchen; zweitens an die Könige, die durch die vielseitig beschriebenen Bilder von den Tieren, Spaß an diesem Buch finden würden, die dritte Kategorie, die wichtigste, stellt die Philosophen dar[25]. Der Leser in *Kalila wa Dimna* sieht sich aufgefordert, über die Geschichten nachzudenken. Der Autor verlangt vom Leser, seine Vernunft zu gebrauchen. Das Buch ist nur einem intelligenten Leser zugänglich, der Leser muss auf seine Imagination zurückgreifen können.

Die Kunst des Vergleichens/ der Allegorie hat im Arabisch ebenso Tradition wie in anderen Sprachen. Das Verb «mathala» heißt, «etwas mit etwas anderem vergleichen». Von diesem Verb kommen Worte wie Beispiel, 'mithal' und das Sprichwort, «mathal». Es gibt mehrere Arten und vor allem unterschiedliche Mittel des Vergleichens. Das einfachste und übliche Mittel ist der Buchstabe Kef, der mit 'wie' auf Deutsch zu übersetzen ist. In der Dichtung jedoch, die den Arabern ganz besonders am Herzen lag, wurde das Kef oft weggelassen, um die Schönheit des Textes nicht zu mindern. So sind für Tiere wie Löwen hunderte Neologismen zu finden. Metapher und Tropen ersetzen den traditionellen Vergleich. Der Wegfall hat nicht nur das Mittel «wie» getroffen, sondern trifft auch das Verglichene, das wegelassen werden kann, um die Imagenation des Lesers anzuregen und um dem Text Schönheit zu verleihen. Viele arabische Sprachgelehrte wie al Jorjani oder al Askarri haben über die Kunst des Vergleichs geschrieben. Für al Jorjani gibt es zuerst zwei Arten, einen direkten Vergleich, der die Objekte explizit vergleicht und keine Interpretation bedarf. Der zweite ist ohne Interpretation nicht zu verstehen. Für al Jorjani ist die Metapher die Bedeutung der Bedeutung[26].

In dem Buch *Métaphore vive* betont Paul Ricoeur, dass der intime und letzte «Ort» der Metapher sich nicht in den Wörtern oder den Sätzen befinde, auch nicht im Diskurs, sondern in der Kopula des Verbs sein. Das Wie/Comme wurde nicht mehr zu dem Verb sein zugefügt, sondern es wird «im Verb» wieder zum Existieren gebracht. Die Metapher ersetzt ein Wort, sie ersetzt dessen Verhältnis zu anderen Worten, sie beschreibt das Wort wieder[27]. Der Ort der Metapher ist aber nicht stabil, es ändert sich mit den Bedeutungen der Symbole,

[23] *Ibid.,* S. 127-130. Vgl. F. de Blois, *Burzoy's Voyage to India and the Origin of the Book of Kalilah wa Dimna*, London 1990.
[24] *Kalila wa Dimna*, cit., S. 131.
[25] *Ibid.,* S. 133.
[26] Asrar el Balacha, *Abd Al Kaher Jorjani,* Dar el Madani 1991, S. 90.
[27] P. Ricœur, *Metaphore vive*, Paris 1975, S. 11.

diese bestehen aus mehrdeutigen Ausdrücken. Durch die Mehrdeutungen der Symbole entsteht ein Konflikt unter den Interpretationen. Die Metapher lebt durch diese Interpretation und dessen Konflikt[28]. In dem Spiel zwischen den mehrdeutigen Symbolen und ihrer Interpretation wird die Metapher geboren. Die Metapher ist, für Ricoeur, lebendig. Sie lebt durch dieses Spiel, das endlos ist:

> C'est pourquoi il n'y a pas de symbole sans un début de interprétation: là où un homme rêve, prophétise ou poétise, un autre se lève pour interpréter; l'interprétation appartient organiquement à la pensée symbolique et à son double sens[29].

Für Ibn al-Muqaffa' wird das Erzählte durch Vergleiche, Beispiele und Metaphern leichter zu begreifen, klarer für den Verstand, schöner für das Ohr. Dies hilft auch, dem Schreiber, den Sinn seiner Geschichte besser zu übermitteln[30]. Wie wir oben gesehen haben ist *Kalila wa Dimna* an ein breites Publikum adressiert, an die Jugend wie an die Philosophen, doch nur die Philosophen könnten den versteckten Vergleich entdecken, sie sollten die Codierung entziffern. Das Imaginäre in *Kallila wa Dimna* bedient mehrere Zwecke. Neben der Schönheit des Textes verleiht das Imaginäre dem Text Codes, die nicht jeder zu entziffern vermag, wie das Beispiel der Löwin und des Schakals verdeutlichen mag.

Eine Löwin lebte in einem Wald. Sie hatte zwei Junge. Eines Tages ging sie auf die Jagd und ließ ihre Jungen in der Höhle. Ein Jäger, hatte die Jungen da gefunden, er zielte mit seinem Bogen auf sie, tötete und häutete sie und brachte ihren Pelz nach Hause. Als die Löwin zurück kam und verstanden hatte, was ihren Jungen passiert war, legte sie sich auf dem Rücken und schrie nach Leibeskräften. Neben ihr wohnte ein Schakal, der ihren Schrei gehört hat und sie fragte was ihr geschehen war. Nachdem der Schakal alles erfahren hatte, beruhigte er die Löwin und sagte ihr, dass man in dieser Welt immer zurück bekäme, was man getan hat. Die Löwin verstand nicht, was der Schakal ihr damit sagen wollte. Darauf erklärt er ihr, dass jede Tat ihren Preis habe, sei er Belohnung oder Strafe: beide fallen auf einen genau so viel oder wenig zurück, wie der Ackermann Frucht bekommt, je nachdem wie viel er gesät hat. Der Jäger habe ihr das angetan, was sie anderen oft angetan habe, indem sie vielen die Kinder geraubt hat, weil sie sich von dem Fleisch anderer Tiere genährt hat. Auch diese Tiere hatten sicher Mütter und Väter. Der Schakal fragte die Löwin, warum sie nicht an diese Kinder gedacht habe und ob ihr dies nur passiert sei, weil sie nicht an die Folgen ihren Taten gedacht habe. Als die Löwin dies von dem Schakal gehört hatte, verstand sie, dass das, was ihr passiert war, die verdiente Strafe für ihre ungerechten Taten war. Sie entschied sich gleich, Fleisch nicht mehr zu fressen und sich nur noch von Früchten zu ernähren. Sie betete auch die ganze Zeit und führte ein asketisches Leben. Eine Taube, die sich von den Früchten des gleichen Feldes ernährte wie die Löwin, beschwerte sich, dass ihr das Essen weggenommen würde. Als die Löwin dies gehört hatte, aß sie kein Obst mehr, sondern nur noch Grass, und betete und führte weiter ihr asketisches Leben[31].

[28] P. Ricœur, *Parole et symbole,* in «Revue des sciences religieuses», IL, 1975, S. 146.
[29] P. Ricœur, *De l'interprétation. Essai sur Freud*, Paris 1965, S. 27.
[30] Abi al Fa`tel al Midati, *Sammlung der Sprüche*, komm. von Kusai al Husein, Dar und Mattabet al Hilal 2003, Teil 1, S. 20. ج نيحسلا ىصق د ت يداميتلا لضفلا بيأ لاثمألا عمج
2003 لالهلا بتكم و راد 20 ص 1
[31] *Kallila wa Dimna,* cit., S. 388.

Allerdings ist sie überhaupt erst durch den Rat des Schakals auf den Weg der Askese gebracht worden.

Auch diese Geschichte beginnt wie alle anderen: König Debchelim bittet Beidaba um ein Beispiel für jemanden, der durch eigenes Unglück lernt, anderen nicht mehr zu schaden. Der Philosoph betont bei der Geschichte, dass nur die Ignoranten den anderen ohne nachzudenken schaden würden:

> Man soll für andere wünschen, was man für sich selbst wünscht und es für die anderen hassen, was man für sich nicht haben will. Man soll nichts tun, was den anderen schaden könnte, man sollte nicht seine Interessen auf Kosten der anderen verteidigen, denn jeder Betrüger bekommt die Rechnung für seine Taten[32].

Die Löwin stellt hier die Macht dar. Sie folgte lediglich ihren Interessen, tötete Tiere, die schwächer sind. Sie denkt aber dabei nicht daran, dass es Stärkere als sie gibt, und dass das was sie anderen angetan hat, eines Tages auf sie zurückfallen würde.

Dem buchstäblichen Sinn nach handelt es sich um eine Löwin, die ihren Nachwuchs verloren hat, sie akzeptiert ihre Strafe und wird fleischverschmähend. Der Löwe ist für Ibn al-Muqaffa' in *Kalila wa Dimna* das Symbol des Herrschers. Das Weib ist oft die Mutter des Königs, die ihm Rat gibt, um ihm den Weg der Gerechtigkeit zu zeigen[33]. Der Leser dieser Fabel soll begreifen, dass die Macht niemandem verbleibt. Wenn der Herrscher Blut zu vergießen anfängt, hört er damit erst auf, wenn sein eigenes Blut fließt. Diese Blutgier schadet dem Herrscher ebenso wie der Löwin, dem Staat ebenso wie ihrer Familie. Die Macht ist wie jede Gier eine Sucht, die keine Grenze kennt, bis sie den Süchtigen zerstört hat. Die Lösung ist fleischverschmähend zu sein. Mit fleischverschmähend ist hier Fasten und Vermeidung von Blutvergießen gemeint. Das heißt, wenn der Herrscher nicht mit der Macht umgehen kann, sollte er umgehend von ihr lassen, bevor es noch mehr Opfer geben wird. Es geht aber nicht darum, Macht zu verlieren. Es geht vielmehr um Strategien, wie wir oben bei Alexander der Große gesehen haben, die Macht keine Sucht werden zu lassen. Ein Herrscher darf seine Kraft nicht missbrauchen. Ibn al-Muqaffa', als Schreiber bei den Mächtigen, versucht sie vor den verderblichen Konsequenzen ihres Handelns zu warnen. Der Adib, der Gebildete, ist der einzige, der den Staat retten könnte. Der König braucht die Beratung guter Leute, um gerecht herrschen zu können. Die Funktion der Berater ist aber gefährlich und braucht Garantien, die der König gewähren muss, das zeigt das Beispiel des asketischen Schakals und des Löwen.

> Man erzählt von einem asketischen Schakal[34], der mit anderen Schakalen und Füchsen und Wölfen lebte. Er war anders als sie und tat nicht das, was sie taten,

[32] *Ibid.,* S. 387.
[33] *Ibid.,* S. 380.
[34] Bei der syrischen Übersetzung geht um einen König, der ungerecht in seinem Leben gehandelt hat und wieder als ein Schakal geboren ist. Vgl. F. Schulthess, *Kalila und Dimna. Syrisch und deutsch*, Berlin 1911, 1.2., S. 125.

so griff er die anderen nicht an, er vergoss kein Blut, er fraß kein Fleisch und war niemals ungerecht zu den anderen. Die anderen Tiere warfen ihm dies vor und fragten ihn, warum er das Töten und das Fleischfressen verweigere. Der Schakal erklärt sein Benehmen mit dem Argument: Wenn er unter ihnen wohne, hieße dies nicht, dass er wie sie ein Sünder sei müsse; er habe sich für ein sündenloses Leben entschieden. Der Schakal lebte weiter so gleichgültig und asketisch bis ein Löwe von ihm hörte, der über alle Tiere herrschte. Er war begeistert von dem Ruf des Schakals, von seiner Keuschheit, seiner Ehrlichkeit, seiner Treue. Der König rief den Schakal zu sich. Als der Löwe sich mit dem Schakal unterhielt, wusste er, dass der Schakal die Person war, die er brauchte und beauftragt ihn, für ihn zu arbeiten. Der Schakal lehnt den Auftrag des Königs ab. Er wolle nicht für den Herrscher arbeiten, er habe keine Erfahrung damit, wie man mit ihm umgehen solle. Der König solle ihn nicht dazu zwingen. Der Schakal erklärt dem König weiter, warum er nicht für ihn arbeiten wolle: er habe Angst, wenn er diese Arbeit mit Ehrlichkeit leistete, würden viele auf ihn neidisch werden und versuchen ihm zu schaden. Der Löwe beharrt darauf, den Schakal zu seinem engsten Vertrauten zu machen. Dies akzeptiert der Schakal schließlich unter der Bedingung, dass der König ihn nicht hastig und vor allem nicht ohne Beweise verurteilen möge, wenn neidische Tiere ihn anzeigten. Der Löwe versprach dies dem Schakal. Die anderen Tiere waren unzufrieden mit der Erhöhung des Schakals und wollten ihm schaden. Als der Löwe einmal besonders schmackhaftes Fleisch gegessen hatte, gab er einen Teil davon dem Schakal, es für ihn zu bewahren. Die neidischen Tiere nahmen das Fleisch und versteckten es im Hause des Schakals. Als der Löwe am nächsten Tag nach dem Fleisch fragte, behaupteten einige, dass der Schakal das Fleisch nach Hause genommen hatte, um es selbst zu fressen. Die anderen sagten, dass man dieser Verdacht prüfen müsse. [...] Als man das Fleisch bei dem Schakal fand und alle gegen ihn zeugten, war der Löwe sicher, dass er schuldig war und befahl ihn zu töten. Die Mutter des Löwen hörte das Urteil und fragte ihren Sohn, warum er sich so entschieden habe, er erzählte ihr die Geschichte, worauf sie antwortete, dass man niemals so schnell eine solche Entscheidung treffen dürfe. Besonders der König müsse allen voran Geduld haben. [...]. Sie warf ihrem Sohn weiter vor, dass er den Schakal verurteilt habe, obwohl er unschuldig war. Sie fragte ihn: «Wie kannst du ihn so verurteilen? Er hat dich niemals betrogen und wegen des Fleisches würde er dich nicht betrügen, und Du, König, solltest dir über den Fall des Schakals nochmals Gedanken machen; er hat selbst nie Fleisch gefressen, wie würde er das Fleisch, das du ihm anvertraut hast, fressen können? Die anderen Tiere haben sicher das Fleisch bei ihm zu Hause versteckt [...]. Während des Gesprächs zwischen Mutter und Sohn, kam ein Vertrauter zum Löwen und erzählte von der Unschuld des Schakals. Die Mutter empfiehl ihrem Sohn, seine Leute zu bestrafen und zum Schakal gut zu sein, [...] was der König auch tat. Der Schakal sagte dem Löwen: «War das nicht genau, warum ich nicht bei dir arbeiten wollte? Genau dies habe ich gefürchtet, würde passieren, wenn ich in deiner Nähe bin, [...] vielleicht denkst du jetzt, dass ich Rache nehmen werde, was nicht stimmt, ich habe nur Angst, davor, dass sie mir dies noch einmal antun der Gerechtigkeit [...] Der Löwe achtete nicht darauf, was der Schakal sagte. Er versprach ihm aber, dass er Vertrauen zu ihm haben würde, und dass der Schakal auch ihm vertrauen solle. Sie wurden mit der Zeit enge Freunde[35].

Es bleibt letztendlich offen, ob der Löwe sich wirklich geändert hat. Ibn al-Muqaffa' stilisiert sich vielleicht selbst zum Schakal, der unter bösen Fleischfressern lebt, ohne selbst einer zu werden. Die Moral der Geschichte ist, dass ein guter Berater ehrlich sein muss, um seinem Herrn und dem Land

[35] *Kalila wa Dimna*, cit., S. 373-383.

gut zu dienen. Diese Ehrlichkeit kann den Berater das Leben kosten. Ohne die bedingungslose Unterstützung des Herrschers für den Berater, schafft dieser seine Aufgabe nicht. Ein guter Berater ist «fleischverschmähend»; das heißt, er strebt nicht nach Macht; er vergießt kein Blut, um seine Ziele zu erreichen. Sein Ziel ist die ewige Belohnung im Jenseits, und nicht der kurzfristigen Erfolg im Leben. Der Schakal in dieser Geschichte hat sich von Anfang an für ein asketisches Leben entschieden. In *Kalila wa Dimna* ist es eine Entscheidung, fleischverschmähend zu sein. Tiere, Löwe oder Schakal, die von Natur aus Fleischfresser sind[36], entscheiden sich, fleischverschmähend zu werden. Der Löwe, wie erwähnt, soll das Beispiel für den despotischen Herrscher geben, der Schakal hingegen steht für den Philosophen, der sich ohne dramatische Konversion für das Dasein als Nicht-Fleischfresser entschieden hat. Das Fleisch stellt das Blut, das Böse, die Macht dar. Ein guter Herrscher sollte seinen Blutdurst unterdrücken und seine Gier nach Macht bezähmen. Nur der despotische Herrscher braucht das Fleisch, das Blut. Ein gerechter Herrscher, der über die Folgen seiner Tat nachdenkt, verzichtet darauf, wenn er einen soliden Staat gründen möchte.

Das Ziel des Buches war, wie oben erwähnt, dem König von Indien den Weg der Gerechtigkeit zu zeigen. Dieser König wurde vom Volk ausgesucht, um den fremden Herrscher zu vertreiben. Da der König Dabchelim ein despotischer Herrscher war, musste der Philosoph Beidaba intervenieren. Ein Land, das mit Gewalt beherrscht würde, würde irgendwann von anderen Ländern unterjocht werden. Die Gerechtigkeit ist von Anfang an die Garantie für die Unabhängigkeit. Die Gerechtigkeit schafft erst die Voraussetzung für die Souveränität des Landes. Sie ist die Gewähr, dass das Land weiter im Wohlstand lebt. Die Kontinuität der Existenz eines Lands ist nur durch die Gerechtigkeit zu bewahren. Lahcen Boukhali erklärt in seinem Buch *Le discours politique dans Kalila et Dimna d' Ibn al-Muqaffa*, dass es sich in dem Werk um eine Fundierung einer Macht handelt, die stark genug ist, um den Untertanen ein respektables Leben zu gewährleisten[37]. Nur eine starke Macht kann die inneren und äußeren Konflikte überleben. Hier verbindet Boukhali die Gerechtigkeit mit der Macht. Ein schwacher Herrscher kann nicht gerecht sein. Gerechtigkeit ist eine Entscheidung. Nur wer stark ist, kann sich für die Gerechtigkeit entscheiden, es sind die starken Herrscher, die sich Gerechtigkeit leisten können. Bei der Fabel *Die Löwin und der Schakal* hat sich die Löwin gegen ihre Natur entschieden. Ihre Reue hat sie auf den richtigen Weg gebracht. Ihre Tat vollzog sie aus Überzeugung. Obwohl sie ihr

[36] Ibn al-Muqaffa' nimmt mit Absicht Tiere, die von Natur aus Fleischfresser sind, um zu betonen, dass es um eine Entscheidung geht. Genau so muss der Mensch gegen seine wilde Natur handeln.

[37] L. Boukhali, *Le discours politique dans Kalila et Dimna d' Ibn al-Muqaffa*, Doktorarbeit in *Literature arabe, Ecole normale supérieure de Lyon,* 2012, S. 322: https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00682596/document: «Pour Ibn al-Muqaffa, seul un pouvoir fort peut pratiquer la justice et peut satisfaire les besoins de ses sujets sans les enfoncer, un pouvoir fort sur tous les plans: politique, économique ainsi que sur le plan idéologique nécessaire pour diriger les esprits. Ainsi, il peut stabiliser l'ordre au sein du territoire sur lequel il exerce son autorité. Cette stabilisation signifie la protection du territoire contre les troubles internes ainsi que contre les attaques externes.»

altes Leben weiter führen konnte, wollte sie sich ihrer Sünden entsagen. In der islamischen Lehre kann ein Sündig seine Sünde mit guten Taten wegwischen. Wenn man seine Sünden von Herzen bereut hat, wird einem alles verziehen. Ein starker, gerechter Herrscher soll religiös sein[38]. Das ist was Boukhali mit ideologischer Stärke bezeichnet. Die Religion ist die ideologische Quelle für die Gerechtigkeit. Einer der neunundneunzig Namen Allahs ist er Gerechte. Viele Verse des Korans verlangen vom Menschen, gerecht zu sein[39]. Ebenso wie eine ideologische Referenz, braucht der Herrscher eine gute Beratung. Dieser Berater soll ihm das Politische sowie das Religiöse erklären. Ein guter Berater führt ein asketisches Leben. Er interessiert sich nicht für den Schein des Lebens. Er sucht keine Vergnügung sowie keine Macht und keinen Ruhm. Er hat eine bestimmte Aufgabe, nämlich das Wohl des Landes zu bewahren. Das ist die Arbeit des 'Adib', der sich mit 'Adab' beschäftigt, was im modernen Arabisch 'Literatur' bedeutet, ursprünglich aber 'Benehmen'. Nur der Adib ist fähig, dem Herrscher Adab beizubringen und er sollte auch die Untertanen Benehmen lehren[40]. Ein Adib bringt Regeln und Gebote, die zeitlos sind, bei. Es geht nicht um einen bestimmten Herrscher oder um gewisse Untertanen, die Regeln des Benehmens/ Adab gelten für jeden. Die Rolle des Beraters endet nicht bei der Beratung und der Klärung der Regeln. Der Berater, Adib, Weise, Philosoph, muss drauf achten, dass die Normen für einen «gesunden» Staat weiter respektiert werden, wie Makram Abbès betont[41]. Es geht um einen sicheren Staat, in dem die Bewohner auf das Leben der Wildnis verzichten, um ein stabiles Leben zu erreichen. Es wird betont, dass der Mensch gegen seine eigene Natur kämpfen soll, um eine optimale Gesellschaft schaffen zu können, was einen Verzicht der eigenen Interessen zugunsten des Zusammenlebens bedeutet. Um diesen 'tugendhaften' Staat zu gründen wird der Adib/ Berater bzw. der Philosoph 'geopfert'. Er zahlt den Preis, dass er die mangelhaften Bedingungen zum vollkommenen

[38] Cfr. I. T. Kristó-Nagy, *Reason, Religion and Power in Ibn al-Muqaffa'*, in «Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae», LXII,3, 2009, S. 285-301.
[39] *Surat an Nisa*, v. 58, *Surat al Hadid,* v. 25.
[40] Ibn al Muqaffa' ist auch Verfassers des Buches *Al Adab al Kabir*, das Buch über Benehmen, in dem die Rolle des Beraters in der kulterellen Weitergabe und 'Zivilisierung' eines Staates hervorgehoben wird. Cfr. Y. de Crussol, *L'épreuve du pouvor dans* al-adab al-kabir *d'ibn al-Muqaffa et quelques thèmes entrecroisés de l'adab et de la littérature soufie à l'époque abbassie,* in «Bulletin d'études orientales», LVI, 2004/5, S. 205-223.
[41] M. Abbès, *L'ami et l'ennemi dans* Kalila et Dimna*,* in «Bulletin d'études orientales», LVII, 2006/7, S. 11-41: S. 35: «Dès lors, le souci du sage est tout à fait autre: c'est la stabilisation du pouvoir, la pacification de la société, et la victoire sur les ennemis de l'intérieur qui représentent à ses yeux le bien politique à atteindre. La stabilisation du régime signifie la réduction des conflits internes, la victoire sur les séditieux, les brigands, les bandits et les malfaiteurs. Comme le signifient métaphoriquement les fables, c'est la sécurité qui est le bien auquel souhaitent accéder les sujets. C'est une vie paisible et sûre, sans crainte et sans épouvante que les habitants de la jungle cherchent à atteindre. Seul un pouvoir fort, protecteur et juste peut réaliser ce besoin. Interprétée dans ce sens, la question de la conservation du pouvoir devient synonyme de la victoire de la politique sur l'état de nature qui existe de manière latente dans la société. Plus encore, dans l'optique d'Ibn al-Muqaffa' et conformément au contexte politique de l'époque, la stabilisation de la domination est le signe de l'humanisation accrue des rapports sociaux et de l'apaisement des conflits; c'est un progrès social considérable qui se réalise contre l'animosité de l'homme et contre son agressivité.»

Zusammenleben gezeigt hat. Sobald das Ziel erreicht ist, wird seine Intervention nicht mehr als gut erachtet. Dieses Schicksal erlebte auch Ibn al-Muqaffa', der Schreiber bzw. Sekretär des abbasidischen Reiches war und als der Begründer der arabischen Prosa gilt. Ibn al-Muqaffa' wurde mit 36 Jahre getötet. Ibn al Nadim erzählt, dass Ibn al-Muqaffa' lebendig verbrannt wurde[42], ohne den genauen Grund zu nennen. Vielleicht, weil Ibn Nadim selbst zur der Zeit der Abbasiden lebte. Habib Youssef Moghnie jedoch ist der Meinung, dass die Übersetzung des *Kalila wa Dimna* Ibn al-Muqaffa' das Leben gekostet habe[43]. Moghnie ist auch der Ansicht, dass Ibn al-Muqaffa' dieses Buch wegen seines indirekten Inhalts aussuchte, weil er mit den erzählten Fabeln die Gewalt des abbasidischen Reiches denunzieren konnte[44]. Sicherlich wollte Ibn al-Muqaffa' die Abbasiden warnen und ihnen zeigen, dass sie ihre Macht nur dann erhalten könnten, wenn sie ihr Reich auf solide Basis stellten, nämlich auf Gerechtigkeit und nicht nur bloße Gewalt[45]. Der Preis für seine Warnung war sein Leben, dies ist das Schicksal eines asketischen «Tieres», wenn es sich für das Wohl seiner Gesellschaft gegen sein eigenes Interesse entscheidet.

In den Fabeln *Die Löwin und der Schakal* und *Der Löwe und asketischen Schakal* haben wir gesehen, wie das Verhältnis von König und Berater funktionieren sollte. Der Herrscher braucht eine gute Beratung von seinem Wasir bzw. dem Philosophen, um den Staat gerecht dirigieren zu können. Die Macht blendet den Herrscher, sodass er nicht mehr weiß, wie er handeln soll. Die Moral der Fabeln besagt: ein guter Berater kann den Staat retten und ein durch die Sucht nach Macht verblendeter Herrscher kann sich und seine Macht dadurch retten, dass er andere Meinungen einholt. Tierische Figuren stehen für das Menschliche. Sie symbolisieren das Politische oder das Soziale. Dies ist nach der Zeit, Ort, oder der Zusammenhang einer Geschichte zu interpretieren. Die Symbole bedienen bei jeder Lektüre verschiedener Bedeutungen.

Auch, wenn wir in einem «geschlossenen» Apparat leben, fliehen Metaphern jedes System, weil Metaphern «von Geburt an» frei sind. Dies ist das Spiel von Kunst und Realität. Die Regeln der Gesellschaft könnten unsere Imagination nicht fesseln. Vieles könnte die Imagination manipulieren, wie zum Beispiel Werbung oder Medien. Das Bild, das Symbol, schreitet trotzdem immer fort. Es bildet lebendige Metaphern, die durch unterschiedliche Interpretationen leben. Es gibt keine definitive Interpretation für irgendeine Metapher. Sie alle werden in jedem Moment durch unterschiedliche Lektüren wieder geboren. Die Interpretation ist die Mutter der Metaphern, diese wurden aber niemals anerkannt; sie sind Bastarde, die die Gesellschaft nicht akzeptiert, weil sie sich

[42] *Kitab Al-Fihrist,* cit., s.118.
[43] *Kalila wa Dimna,* cit., S. 20.
[44] *Ibid.* S. 13.
[45] *Ibid.*, S. 19. Ibn al-Muqaffa' schrieb und übersetzte auch andere Bücher. Zu erwähnen sind hier al Adab al Kabir und al Adab Sachir. In beiden Büchern geht es darum, wie Politiker und das einfache Volk sich zu verhalten habe. Diese Bücher hatten keinen Erfolg wie *Kalila wa Dimna*, wohl auch weil die damaligen Leser die Schönheit der Fabeln direkten moralischen Anweisungen vorzogen.

beständig ändern. Sie wohnen nur in ihrem jeweiligen Kontext. Symbole stehen im Gegenteil für etwas Bestimmtes. Sie sind Mittel um etwas auszudrücken. Metaphern entstehen in dem Moment der Rezeption des Texts. Sie existieren weder davor noch danach.

Ein 'fabelhaftes' Werk ist offen für mehrere Interpretationen. Der Leser mischt sich in den Text ein. Er ist frei, den Text nach seiner Zeit, seiner Art zu denken, zu interpretieren. Jede Interpretation könnte in ihrem Kontext stimmen. Fabeln sind wie Gedichte, sie rufen nach Interpretationen. Sie leben dadurch weiter.

Tiere stellen in unseren «Kollektivbewusstsein» menschliche Charakters dar. So steht der Hund für Treue, der Fuchs für Schlauheit, der Esel für Fleiß und so weiter. Die Instrumentalisierung des Tiers ist weltweit bekannt. Der Mensch versucht seine Schwäche durch das Tier zu überwinden oder seine Hoffnung zu verwirklichen. Die Fabeln sind der optimale Bereich, wo das Tier zugunsten des menschlichen Willens ausgenutzt wird. Wollte der Mensch das Tier ausnutzen, weil es schwächer ist oder weil der Mensch einsam war und keine andereren Lebewesen, mit denen er sich vergleichen vermag, gefunden hat? Durch diesen Vergleich hat das Tier eine Seele bekommen. Die Tiere haben durch die Metaphern ihr eignes Leben gewonnen. Sie sind als literarischen Figuren lebendig.

Testi/2

*Bestie: sull'anatomia del terrore di fronte all'animale**

Thiemo Breyer

This essay describes various forms of bestial figures (from wild animals to human sadists and spree killers to zombies and vampires) and figurations (institutional systems such as the ancient Roman criminal law with its practices of execution), in which some figures are embedded. The evoked monstrosities exhibit a chiasmatic interconnection of two orders that touches on the well-known dualities of immanence and transcendence as well as life and death. The specific intentionality of the living-as-dead and the animalic-as-human is identified and used to illustrate this double-structure, which can also be expressed in paradoxical predications. Eventually, as will be argued, it is only in human form that the animalic can turn into the bestial.

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Questo saggio si basa sull'intuizione che il termine 'bestiale' sebbene si riferisca a tutto ciò che noi attribuiamo all'animale, è in realtà genuinamente antropologico e perciò possibile solo all'uomo. Seguendo questa intuizione, denomino con 'bestiale' figure e azioni oppure figurazioni e strutture nelle quali è avvertibile un conflitto che rimanda all'intreccio di due ordini diversi e che quindi sovraccarica (e mette in crisi) l'immaginazione e l'empatia. Letteralmente, una bestia è un animale selvaggio e terrificante. È selvaggio rispetto a una disposizione, un'indomita naturalità, oppure rispetto a un comportamento concreto che è furioso, imprevedibile o smisurato. L'uomo spesso riconduce l'esaurimento che consiste nella sfrenata concessione animalesca a un particolare genere di stimolazione alla limitatezza dell'animale alla natura dei sensi – o, per altro verso, alla sua mancanza di ragione.

L'aspetto del 'provare terrore di fronte all'animalesco' è già immanente al termine 'bestia' nel suo significato appena indicato. Più interessante è forse il termine spesso utilizzato come sinonimo, cioè 'mostro', dal latino *monstrum*, che significa segno di monito (da *monere* = avvertire e *monstrare*). In una menzione etimologica che Isidoro di Sevilla raccolse nel sesto secolo nelle *Etymologiae,* i mostri vengono trattati nei capitoli sui miracoli. Isidoro si riferisce a un episodio

* Il contributo si basa su una relazione tenutasi a Friburgo nel 2014 nel Convegno in onore di Bernhard Waldenfels. Traduzione a cura di Myrtha de Meo-Ehlert e Emanuele Caminada.

dell'antichità, nel quale un dio presagì ad Alessandro Magno la sua morte improvvisa, facendo nascere da una donna un essere ibrido, con un busto da uomo e un corpo d'animale. Gli organi umani di questo essere malaugurato (*Unwesen*) sarebbero nati morti, mentre quegli animali sarebbero vivi. Umano e animale, vita e morte appaiono qui in una relazione doppiamente incrociata[1].

Accanto al significato di monito si intende con *monstrum* però anche ciò che è contro natura, come mostri immani e giganti (*Ungeheuer*), orchi e stregoni (*Unholde*), zombie e dannati (*Scheusale*): esseri che sono caratterizzati da una specifica deformità oppure dall'eccesso di una particolare caratteristica rispetto ad una presupposta normalità. Nell'ambito di ciò che è dato appartiene a questa categoria sia il malformato – che non necessita di esser insolito nell'osservazione empirica – sia il fantastico, che nessuno ha veramente visto. Nell'ambito di ciò che è realizzato, rientrano sia delle azioni concrete, come atti funesti o contro natura, sia delle narrazioni su cose incredibili, improbabili e mostruose. Nel linguaggio odierno e nella rappresentazione mediatica si indica con il termine 'bestiale' qualsiasi tipo di azione o struttura, dal modo di procedere di un regime contro i suoi critici (si pensi alle notizie sui Gulag in Corea del Nord), al comportamento di killer o pedofili contro le loro vittime fino all'atteggiamento dei cacciatori di balene giapponesi nei confronti dei delfini etc. Dal punto di vista fenomenologico ed ermeneutico a partire da questa costellazione semantica bisogna quindi chiedersi con quali esperienze di terrore e con quali categorie di estraneità siano in correlazione le diverse forme di ciò che viene chiamato bestiale. Le seguenti osservazioni cercano di avvicinarsi a una risposta a questa domanda.

Il motivo dell'intreccio (*Verschränkung*), che in fenomenologia si trova così spesso e in modo così diversificato – in Edmund Husserl come relazione fra soggetti nel contesto di un'intersoggettività trascendentale aperta[2], in Maurice Merleau-Ponty come intercorporalità e interanimalità[3], in Bernhard Waldenfels come doppio gioco di esigenza e risposta o intreccio tra mondo famigliare, domestico e mondo straniero (*Heim- und Fremdwelt*)[4] – rinvia a un movimento, che non si può intendere né come ibridazione né come agglomerato di elementi apparentemente inconciliabili. Per quanto riguarda le bestie, sono d'avviso che si tratta di esseri chiastici. Ciò significa, che il bestiale rappresenta un intreccio di due ordini, che hanno a che fare sia con la relazione uomo-animale, sia con la relazione di immanenza e trascendenza e di vita e di morte. È pertanto interessante indagare quelle figure che si presentano in figurazioni determinate, cioè in contesti che nel complesso appaiono estranei o che, nel nostro caso

[1] Cfr. M. Schneider, *Gottmonster. De Sades politische Theologie*, in «Monströse Ordnungen. Zur Typologie und Ästhetik des Anomalen», a cura di A. Geisenhanslüke e G. Mein, Bielefeld 2009, p. 554.
[2] P. es. E. Husserl, Hua VI, 346; VIII, 52; IX, 344; XV, 33.
[3] Cfr. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le philosophe et son ombre*, in «Signes», Paris 1960, p. 213; *La nature: Notes, cours du Collège de France*, Paris 1995, p. 247.
[4] Cfr. B. Waldenfels, *Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Fremdwelt,* in «Philosophische Grundlagen der Interkulturalität», a cura di R. Mall e D. Lohmar, Amsterdam 2007, pp. 53–66.

specifico, possono essere definiti bestiali, all'interno dei quali le singole figure svolgono funzioni determinate.

Tra le *figure* vorrei portare all'attenzione, da un lato, animali che svolgono una funzione tipicamente umana in performance e inscenamenti ritualizzati, sia come colpevoli che come vittime; d'altro lato saranno considerati uomini e azioni in cui apparentemente si nasconde un che di animalesco. Intendo *figurazioni* in duplice senso: cioè sia come configurazioni fisiche, quasi di ordine architettonico, nelle quali alcune figure incorporano un determinato ruolo (ad es. l'arena romana nella quale le fiere vengono aizzate contro i condannati), sia come processi immaginativi di prefigurazione, attraverso i quali solamente può nascere una figura (ad es. la rappresentazione riduzionista dell'animale come pura macchina).

Come primo esempio storico portiamo alla memoria le *venationes*, che nell'antica Roma, accanto ai combattimenti dei gladiatori, erano certamente l'attrazione più impressionante della cultura del divertimento imperiale. Nel Circo Massimo così come al Colosseo dal secondo secolo prima di Cristo vennero esibiti e uccisi nei modi più diversi animali selvaggi. Inoltre, più terribile a vedersi e ancora più spettacolare, vi era una particolare condanna a morte per gli uomini: la *damnatio ad bestias*[5]. I condannati venivano uccisi da animali selvaggi come elefanti o felini, che spesso li sbranavano lacerandone la carne viva. Lo spettacolo era particolarmente dispendioso, visto che gli animali dovevano essere trasportati dagli angoli più lontani dell'Impero a Roma: più esotica la bestia, più grande l'effetto. La legittimazione giuridica di tale metodo crudele consisteva nell'argomento che delinquenti che nelle loro azioni malvage si erano comportati come animali selvaggi e terrificanti, meritassero di essere giustiziati da loro pari.

Cosa possiamo chiamare 'bestiale' di questo spettacolo barbaro? Certamente non gli attacchi degli animali selvaggi, perché essi sono determinati dalla pulsione e dalla fame. Spesso gli animali venivano infatti affamati estremamente prima di aizzarli contro i prigionieri. I loro attacchi sono perciò animali, ma non bestiali nel nostro senso. Ciò che però chiameremmo bestiale è la perfida logica di incolpamento e il metodo di giustizia combinato con l'esecuzione animale, cioè la doppia figura di razionalità istituzionalizzata (motivazione del tipo di esecuzione, compreso il calcolo del divertimento delle masse a vantaggio del prestigio dei governanti) da un lato, e di crudeltà animale e incondizionatezza del destino di morte dall'altro. John Locke considera una tale incondizionatezza come attributo caratterizzante degli «animali feroci», "those dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy man whenever he falls into their power."[6] Il gruppo degli animali feroci, che vengono impiegati con la funzione carnefice di boia, forma un sottosistema animale all'interno della politica e del diritto romano, che come sistema contiene tratti bestiali. Si potrebbe anche

[5] Cfr. A Futrell, *Blood in the Arena: The Spectacle of Roman Power*, Austin 1997, Capitolo V.
[6] J. Locke, *Second Treatise of Government*, a cura di C. B. Macpherson, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1980, p. 14.

parlare di 'tipi di ordine' e di 'stili d'ordine'[7]: 'bestiale' sarebbe allora uno stile d'ordine che permette esecuzioni animali (nel doppio senso di performance ed esecuzione penale) all'interno di un ordine che è genuinamente umano, perché politico. Il sistema complessivo si potrebbe allora definire 'bestiale' se, seppur fondato razionalmente e metodicamente, vi può infuriare all'interno l'irrazionale-animalesco. Precisamente, nel caso della *damnatio ad bestias* la traiettoria balistica dell'attacco dell'animale non è il contrario di strategia e razionalità, ma strumento essenziale della sua teleologia; perché si sa benissimo che cosa succede se un leone affamato viene scatenato nell'arena contro un uomo disarmato.

L'idea dell'assoluta fissità (*Festgestelltheit*) e delle sue conseguenze fa tremare l'uomo. L'immaginazione della totale determinatezza viene però creata proprio dall'uomo, nella *damnatio*, per esempio, lasciando affamare leoni e tigri, prima di portarli nell'arena. L'idea del cieco automatismo – che per esempio sta alla base della figura dello zombie, che ha come unico obbiettivo divorare carne umana – è correlata alla paura di poter perdere ciò che è genuinamente umano, cioè il controllo cognitivo del comportamento e la flessibilità di adattarsi a ruoli e perspettive diverse. L'uomo trepida di fronte a queste creature per la sua 'non fissità' (*Nicht-Festgestelltheit*) nietzscheana e se ne accerta proprio grazie al contrasto con l'animale, anche se qui l'animale deve essere messo in scena, il che non corrisponde necessariamente al suo essere – dato che certamente anche gli animali superiori hanno stati cognitivi e la capacità di modulare il proprio comportamento in modo flessibile. Detto in altre parole, l'animale diventa superficie di proiezione della paura genuinamente umana di perdita della personalità, della riflessione e della razionalità.

Nella logica della *damnatio* il delinquente, comportandosi in modo atroce come un animale, si priva della possibilità di vivere una morte onorevole per mano di un boia umano. Cade al livello degli animali, per essere poi afferrato dai suoi pari. La logica opposta si trova nei processi agli animali nel medioevo, e con ciò consideriamo un altro esempio storico[8]. L'idea principale è che l'animale agisce come l'uomo e deve perciò essere giudicato dall'uomo. Tra il Trecento e il Seicento cittadini o burocrati mossero accuse sia contro animali domestici sia contro animali selvaggi, dai maiali agli insetti, e intentarono così un procedimento legale, che veniva eseguito secondo le regole della giurisdizione. Così persino dei parassiti potettero avere aiuto legale da intercessori umani. Se un animale veniva dichiarato colpevole, poteva aspettarsi delle torture o la pena di morte come un delinquente umano. Comunque si voglia interpretare le fonti che danno notizia dei suddetti processi, questi dimostrano certamente uno spazio dell'immaginazione in cui ha luogo un'inversione o trasposizione dell'intenzionalità. Questa è legata al presupposto che gli animali siano responsabili per le loro azioni, o perché sono dotati di una volontà propria,

[7] Cfr. B. Waldenfels, *Ordnung im Zwielicht*, Frankfurt a.M. 1987, p. 18.
[8] Cfr. P. Dinzelbacher, *Das fremde Mittelalter. Gottesurteil und Tierprozess*, Essen 2006, pp. 103–113.

oppure perché sono posseduti dal diavolo o indirettamente dalla volontà di una strega. L'animale è o *agens* maligno e responsabile per sé stesso, o *patens* di una volontà demoniaca e quindi non responsabile – una povera creatura, che può essere guarita con una pena giusta, quindi capace di scacciare il diavolo[9].

In entrambi casi, nell'esecuzione capitale dell'uomo attraverso l'animale da un lato e nell'esecuzione capitale dell'animale attraverso l'uomo dall'altro, la messa in scena serve all'affermazione dell'antropologico e all'emarginazione dell'animalesco. Dal punto di vista odierno entrambe le forme sembrano *inumane*: all'uomo viene inflitto qualcosa che non corrisponde alla sua dignità e all'animale: qualcosa che espande la sua animalità in qualcosa che egli non è. Riprenderemo questo punto più avanti in modo più dettagliato concentrandoci sulla grammatica della predicazione negativa nel caso dell'*inumano*. Per il momento spostiamo la nostra attenzione da sistemi nei quali animali vengono funzionalizzati a soggetti umani le cui strutture e capacità d'esperienza possono essere paragonate a tali sistemi. Se individui o collettività formano il sistema complessivo o l'esecutivo, l'elemento caratteristico dell'inevitabile (che nell'arena romana è implementato dalle fiere, nei processi medievali dal procedimento dell'ordinamento giuridico) può essere definito con un nome: *amok*.

Questo termine viene dal malese (*meng-âmok* = compiere atti di vandalismo, infuriare; *amoak* = uccidere) e indica nel contesto culturale indonesiano in primo luogo non un atto individuale privato, ma un'azione bellica che veniva eseguita da un piccolo gruppo. La strategia di questi guerrieri audaci era di determinare una battaglia attaccando ciecamente il nemico, come in stato di esaltazione e senza considerare le proprie perdite. In Europa il fascino di questa estasi autodistruttiva divenne parte dell'immaginazione collettiva associata all'Indonesia grazie ai racconti di viaggio redatti tra il Cinquecento e il Settecento[10]. Tuttavia il termine 'amok' si estese semanticamente fino all'uso odierno (comune soprattutto in tedesco e inglese), che può indicare quasi tutte le forme di cieca aggressione. Parallelamente a questo allargamento semantico si può constatare anche una sua delimitazione, in quanto utilizzato in connotazione sempre più individualistica. La persona che compie un *amok* non è più inserita in un gruppo di sodali che perseguono uno scopo integrante e vogliono servire un sistema complessivo, ma si presenta in modo del tutto sottratto a qualsivoglia relazione sociale o politica. La sua motivazione è idiosincratica e lo fa sembrare come l'ultimativo solitario o il ribelle disperato, se non come lo psicopatico. Nel sistema classificatorio nosologico della associazione psichiatrica americana (DSM-IV) l'*amok* è incluso sotto le rubriche «disturbi dissociativi» e «disturbi del controllo degli impulsi»[11].

[9] Cfr. Luc. 8, 29–34.

[10] Le descrizioni di Duarte Barbosa del 1516 o di James Cook del 1772 sono impressionanti. Cfr. M. Longworth Dames, *The Book of Duarte Barbosa: An Account of the Countries Bordering on the Indian Ocean and Their Inhabitants* (2 vol.), London 1918–1921; C. Cash, *The Life and Voyages of Captain James Cook*, London 1905.

[11] L'*Encyclopedia of Multicultural Psychology* conta l''amok' sotto i sindromi culturali (cfr. Y. Jackson (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Multicultural Psychology*, London 2006, p. 132). Giustamente Manuel Saint Martin contro questa riduzione dell'*amok*, probabilmente ancora influenzata di un certo esotismo dei racconti del primo colonialismo, obietta che le malattie psicologiche

La psicodinamica dell'*amok* è spesso caratterizzata da un'iniziale dissociazione o fase di dissociazione, marcata da forte inclinazione al rimuginìo, seguita da un'esplosione di violenza contro persone o cose.

Nella psicologia e nella criminalistica si distingue ulteriormente tra aggressione 'calda' e 'fredda'[12]. Bisogna però tener presente che la figurazione dell'*amok freddo* è una denominazione moderna occidentale che non ha tanto a che fare con il significato originale. Anche l''amok caldo' è un'invenzione nuova, che riduce chi vi è soggetto al momento di furia non pianificata e di sfogo cieco della rabbia accumulata. Questo concetto misconosce l'originaria valenza strategica dell'*amok* nella meccanica bellica e quindi la precisa pianificazione del suo impiego. Senza rispettare l'orizzonte semantico originario, il momento della furia domina il concetto moderno di *amok caldo*, mentre il momento della pianificazione strategica e dell'esecuzione del piano d'azione viene posto solamente al centro dell'*amok freddo*.

Il pluriomicida norvegese Anders Breivik rappresenta sicuramente il paradigma dell'*amok* freddo. Secondo tutte le ricostruzioni, Breivik uccise 77 uomini senza nessuna furia, senza nessun moto emotivo visibile. Anche nel processo legale che seguì al suo arresto non mostrò alcun segno di pentimento[13]. Il rimuginìo che precedette l'*amok* si mosse all'interno della sua rielaborazione di un pensiero ideologico di destra radicale, che formò l'impianto di convinzioni alla base della pianificazione strategica e dell'esecuzione a sangue freddo del suo crimine. Per l'*amok* freddo del terrorista isolato Breivik, l'autocostruzione dell'ideologia di destra nazionalista forma lo sfondo cognitivo dell'azione. Egli non agì primariamente per arrecarsi soddisfazione personale o stati di piacere, ma per dare il suo contributo con un'azione esemplare degna di emulazione affinché il mondo – nei termini della sua ideologia – diventasse migliore.

Un caso ben diverso è invece quello del *sadico*, che rappresenta un'altra figura del nostro gabinetto degli orrori. Il suo fine è la propria individuale soddisfazione di piacere, indipendentemente da quanto le sue intenzioni possano venir presentate in modo eccessivo e sublimate a un livello generico. Mentre nel nostro esempio dell'*amok* freddo è perseguito il compimento di un qualsivoglia scopo superiore che viene inserito in una narrazione quasi razionale, l'eccesso di violenza sadistico ruota intorno al piacere immediata e sensibile che non può essere espresso in alcun termine linguistico. Con ciò non si vuole certamente dire che la razionalità di sistemi politici, militari e ideologici non possa creare

che stanno alla basa dell'*amok*, come la schizofrenia, la depressione o il bipolarismo, sono oggi giorno certamente diffuse in tutto il mondo – e forse soprattutto nel mondo occidentale – e che perciò l'*amok* non può essere ridotto a un fenomeno di una specifica cultura. (M. Saint Martin, *Running Amok: A modern perspective on a culture-bound syndrome*, in «Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, I,2, 1999, pp. 66–70).

[12] Cfr. R. Carlstedt, *Handbook of Integrative Clinical Psychology, Psychiatry, and Behavioral Medicine*, New York 2009, pp. 541ff.

[13] Cfr. A. Borchgrevink, *En norsk tragedie – Anders Behring Breivik og veiene til Utøya*, Oslo 2012.

spazi all'interno dei quali le attitudini sadiche dei singoli non possano essere espresse e vissute con particolare intensità[14].

L'intreccio di due ordini, come l'abbiamo potuto osservare finora nelle diverse figure e figurazioni, si può articolare grazie a una *predicazione paradossale* che forma in un certo senso l'equivalente linguistico di ciò che in seguito vorrei abbozzare come 'struttura chiasmatica dell'inquietante'.

In tedesco la parola '*Ungeheuer*' è spesso usata come sinonimo di '*Monster*'[15]. Rispetto al nostro tema, per *Ungeheuer* si potrebbe intendere una bestia sotto l'aspetto dell' inquietante (*Unheimlichkeit*). Un '*Ungeheuer*' è '*ungeheuerlich*', perché è anormale, immane, e provoca sia meraviglia che terrore. Chi lo guarda non si sente più a suo agio ('*geheuer*'), cioè si sente turbato nella sua esistenza, è inquietato, ha paura e ansia[16]. L'omologia di nomi e aggettivi mostra un'evidenza fenomenale, dato che la '*Ungeheuerlichkeit*' dell''*Ungeheuer*' si manifesta proprio nello stato d'animo dell'osservatore. Nel '*Un-*' dell' '*Ungeheuer*' si trova un modo paradossale della predicazione che si basa sul fatto che la negazione di un predicato non è la stessa cosa di un'affermazione di un predicato negativo.

Innanzitutto vorrei illustrare un paio di semplici esempi linguistici. Quando diciamo «Pietro non è umano» ciò significa: Pietro non è un uomo, ma piuttosto è un animale o un dio, a ogni modo è qualche cosa fuori dall'umano. Abbiamo negato il predicato 'umano'. Se affermiamo invece il predicato negativo, la frase risulta in modo seguente: «Pietro è inumano», che significa che Pietro è un uomo, ma in modo non-umano, cioè è come uomo un «inuomo», un non-uomo (*Unmensch*). Questa determinazione negativa si può affermare soltanto per quanto riguarda l'uomo. Si può benissimo dire di un animale che sia non-umano – dire che sia inumano sarebbe però un controsenso. Caratterizzante per ciò che viene affermato con la forma di una predicazione paradossale, è un eccesso di umanità, un eccesso negativo, che non può essere collocato in nessun'altra sfera se non in quella umana (e non nell'animale o nel divino), ma che è proprio radicato nell'umano stesso.

[14] Se questo intreccio è un attributo caratterizzante di un completo sistema, è plausibile parlare, come ha fatto Jean Améry per il nazionalsocialismo, di un sistema 'sadico' o 'bestiale'. Cfr. J. Améry, *Die Tortur*, in «Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne. Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten», Stuttgart 1977, pp. 51–81.

[15] Un interessante legame delle figure dei mostri e dei folli omicidi si intravede grazie all'etimologia della parola '*ungeheuer*', come viene spiegata nel *Grimmsches Wörterbuch*. Mentre 'der ungeheuer' indicava secondo l'uso seicentesco il diavolo o un pazzo furioso, nel Settecento dominava la forma neutrale '*das ungeheuer*' – «forse con l'influsso latino di *monstrum*, *prodigium* e dei suoi equivalenti nelle lingue moderne» (*Deutsches Wörterbuch*, a cura di Jakob e Wilhelm Grimm, tomo 24, colonna 701).

[16] Il termine *ungeheuer* ricorda il significato e l'etimologia dell'italiano 'immane', così riportato dall'Enciclopedia Treccani: «immane (ant. inmane) agg. [dal lat. *immanis* «crudele», poi «gigantesco», comp. di in e manus «buono»]. – Smisurato, di enorme grandezza: corpo, statura i.; l'i. gigante; più spesso di fatto, azione, comportamento, e, nell'uso letter. e ant., di animale (e per estens. di persona), che, oltre che grandi, siano anche orribili, spaventosi, o crudeli, spietati, inumani: un'i. sciagura; i. misfatto; urla immani; Inferocita terra, i. mare Mi separa dal luogo della tomba (Ungaretti); una belva, un mostro i.; crudelissimi e inmanissimi inimici (L.B. Alberti).»

Si mostra una struttura analoga nella figura del *non-morto* (come il vampiro o lo zombie). La frase «Pietro non è morto» significa semplicemente, che Pietro è vivo. La frase «Pietro è non-morto (*untot*)» significa invece, che Pietro è vivo, ma in modo 'morto' cioè che Pietro *in quanto morto è vivente*. Anche qui la negazione non è da intendersi nel senso logico, ma in modo che venga stabilita una specifica intenzionalità, una struttura del *qualcosa-in-quanto-qualcosa*, cioè del *vivente in-quanto-morto*. Nella trasposizione il bestiale può essere inteso come struttura dell'*animale(sco)-in quanto-uomo*. Soltanto nell'uomo l'animale può diventare bestiale – il bestiale è l'inumano, che nessun animale può essere.

È importante osservare, che l''in quanto' dell' 'in' di 'in-umano' e del 'non' di 'non-morto' non rappresenta né una negazione logica, né una combinazione sommativa di elementi contrari in un insieme ibrido. Lo zombie non è morto e vivente contemporaneamente, ma essendo un morto è vivente. Il termine 'non-morto' esprime questa struttura paradossale (non formalmente ma semanticamente)[17]. Formalmente paradossale sarebbe l'essere dello zombie, se fosse contemporaneamente *a* e *non-a*. Ma non lo è affatto! Piuttosto è *a in quanto non-a*. Detto in modo generale, le due entità comprese nelle parentesi mentali della bestialità si escludono dal punto di vista logico, ma non dal punto di vista figurale e metaforico. Il terrore che sorge alla loro vista le fa emergere come mostri nel senso vero e proprio: come figure dell'eccesso di pensare insieme cose contrarie – questo eccesso cognitivo è una capacità umana che provoca quindi paure genuinamente umane. Il bestiale è un 'tra' (*zwischen*), composta da distanza umana e impulso animale, ragione e piacere, etc. – i dualismi classici trovano i propri limiti nella figura chiasmatica della bestia.

In conclusione, per superare la dimensione unilaterale del sottotitolo, accenno qui brevemente che il terrore di fronte all'animale assume un grado esistenziale dove funge come parte dell'umano – sia come comportamento individuale che collettivo, sia come caratteristica strutturale di un sistema costruito. Perché, quando si presenta come pura animalità, già ci aspettiamo soltanto il peggiore, cioè l'inevitabile. Con l'uomo invece l'*inevitabile* diventa l'*inquietante* (*unheimlich*)[18]. Abbiamo paura (*Furcht*) dell'automa cartesiano impazzito e dell'inevitabilità implicata in esso. Proviamo però angoscia (*Angst*) di fronte all'inquietante (*Unheimlichkeit*), sebbene non si sia coscienti dell'inevitabilità *dal punto di vista del suo contenuto* (inhaltlich *bewusst*) – coscienti ad esempio che si venga sbranati (come nella *damnatio*) – ma solo

[17] Cfr. S. Žižek, *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*, Durham 1993, capitolo III.

[18] Sigmund Freud considerava il momento della ripetizione del similare come la fonte del sentimento di inquietudine (311). La ripetizione presenta in tal caso una dimensione compulsiva di inevitabilità che Freud mette in relazione con la coazione a ripetere. Questo motivo è degno di nota se si tiene conto che ogni ripetizione porta con sè anche una rottura interiore. Una figura della ripetizione rotta che appare a molti uomini in un grado supremo inquietante è – come lo stesso Freud indica (315) – il *revenant*, ovvero il non-morto a cui si è già accennato. Questi si mostra come ripetizione dell'umano sotto inversione di segno. Cfr. S. Freud, *Das Unheimliche*, in «Imago. Zeitschrift für Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf die Geisteswissenschaften», V, 1919, pp. 297-324.

formalmente coscienti che succederà o può succedere qualche cosa di immane (*etwas Ungeheuerliches*). La possibilità è ancora più terrificante della realtà inevitabile, perché provoca ulteriore sofferenza nella fantasia. Nel 'terrore di fronte all'animale' proviamo paura per la fissità e la determinatezza (*Festgestelltheit*), cioè l'inevitabilità dell'essere lacerato e sbranato. Nel 'terrore di fronte al bestiale' proviamo angoscia per la non determinatezza e non fissità (*Nicht-Festgestelltheit*), cioè per le impensabili possibilità che il chiasmo uomo-animale ancora ci riserba. L'inquietante (das *Unheimliche*) è più angosciante se emerge nel quotidiano, nella quiete del normale mondo famigliare e domestico (*Heimwelt*). Similmente l'immane (das *Ungeheuerliche*) nel senso del mostro (*Ungeheuer*) o della bestia è più terribile dove si presenta nell'essere che apparentemente conosciamo meglio, cioè nell'uomo.

Articolo/12

«Come un che di animale»: Wittgenstein etologo

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In his mature works (*Philosophical Investigations*, *On Certainty*) Wittgenstein develops the idea that the linguistic accord between men is not the result of a conventional agreement but the consequence of a common way of feeling. In this perspective, the certainty that characterises the linguistic behavior, typical of human form of life, has to be intended not as a cultural item but as "something animal" that lies over our capacity of giving justifications about our beliefs.

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1. Contro il pregiudizio culturalista

Il luogo comune in merito al "secondo Wittgenstein" vuole che la riduzione del significato all'uso comporti un'assolutizzazione del carattere sociale e comunitario della pratica linguistica. Se «per una *grande* classe di casi […] il significato di una parola è il suo uso nel linguaggio»[1], la comprensione dell'attività dei parlanti richiederà necessariamente un'attenta analisi dei contesti in cui si verificano i concreti scambi verbali. Di qui l'idea che la pluralità dei "giochi linguistici" non debba essere riportata a un modello unico, che non si debba cercare un tratto «comune a tutti questi processi»[2], ma che si debba privilegiare piuttosto una considerazione contestuale degli usi e delle pratiche. Intendere l'insieme dei giochi linguistici come una rete aperta a nuovi sviluppi permette di specificare la dimensione processuale del gioco stesso: «E non si dà il caso in cui giochiamo e – 'make up the rules as we go along'? E anche il caso in cui le modifichiamo – as we go along»[3].

Dalla constatazione che l'uso è retto da regole, che «'seguire una regola' è una prassi […] e [che] perciò non si può seguire una regola 'privatim'»[4] si è

[1] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Oxford 1953 (trad. it. *Ricerche filosofiche*, Torino 1995, § 43, p. 33).
[2] Ivi, § 65, p. 46.
[3] Ivi, § 83, p. 56.
[4] Ivi, § 202, p. 109.

fatta discendere un'interpretazione relativista e convenzionalista della filosofia di Wittgenstein. In questa linea si situa, per esempio, la celebre disamina dell'argomento contro il linguaggio privato proposta da Saul Kripke[5]: se il significato è l'uso e l'uso è retto da regole che non possono essere seguite privatamente, il linguaggio rivela il suo profilo di accordo convenzionale tra i parlanti, di concordanza all'interno di una comunità. Così il risultato di un calcolo matematico non è il riflesso di un dato di realtà ma il frutto di una negoziazione tra i membri di un gruppo umano, i quali letteralmente *decidono* della verità o della falsità di alcune asserzioni. L'insistenza di Wittgenstein sull'importanza dell'addestramento, sul linguaggio come abitudine e istituzione[6], sulla necessità di considerare «il modo di comportarsi comune agli uomini»[7] ha dunque decretato un'interpretazione culturalista dell'idea di "gioco linguistico", diventato una delle parole-chiave del post-modernismo[8] e del pensiero debole[9].

Wittgenstein teorico della fine delle grandi narrazioni e filosofo post-metafisico: così l'autore delle *Ricerche filosofiche* è stato arruolato tra i pensatori funzionali a una lettura relativista della realtà, in cui non vi sono fatti ma solo interpretazioni (nella misura in cui, però, queste interpretazioni sono sempre oggetto di una convenzione tra i parlanti). Lo stesso Wittgenstein, tuttavia, non era ignaro delle possibili derive "deboliste" del suo pensiero e anzi si poneva la questione nei seguenti termini:

> "Così, dunque, tu dici che è la concordanza [*Übereinstimmung*] fra gli uomini a decidere che cosa è vero e che cosa è falso!" – Vero e falso è ciò che gli uomini *dicono*; e nel linguaggio gli uomini concordano [*und in der* Sprache *stimmen die Menschen überein*]. E questa non è una concordanza [*Übereinstimmung*] delle opinioni, ma della forma di vita[10].

Il paragrafo delle *Ricerche* che abbiamo riportato illustra chiaramente il problema posto dall'idea di concordanza nell'uso linguistico e, allo stesso tempo, inizia a suggerire una risposta. L'idea di gioco linguistico e di linguaggio come *praxis* comunitaria pare demandare i criteri di verificazione e falsificazione all'accordo tra i parlanti: a decidere della correttezza di un uso linguistico sarebbe la concordanza (*Übereinstimmung*) tra gli uomini, il loro convenire su determinate proposizioni, ritenute verità accettate. Ma, sottolinea Wittgenstein, l'accordo in questione non è una concordanza delle opinioni, né una convenzione nominalistica su formulazioni da accettare o rifiutare: l'accordo cui accenna il filosofo è una *consonanza sentita*[11], una convergenza effettiva sulla forma di

[5] S. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Oxford 1982 (trad. it. *Wittgenstein su regole e linguaggio privato*, Torino 1984).
[6] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, cit., § 199, p. 107.
[7] Ivi, § 206, p. 109.
[8] Cfr. J.F. Lyotard, *La Condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir*, Paris 1979 (trad. It. *La condizione postmoderna. Rapporto sul sapere*, Milano 1981).
[9] Cfr. D. Marconi, *Wittgenstein e le ruote che girano a vuoto*, in P.A. Rovatti, G. Vattimo (a cura di), *Il pensiero debole*, Miano 1983, pp. 164-180.
[10] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, cit., § 241, p. 117.
[11] Cfr. S. Oliva, *Il sentimento è un'atmosfera? Il paradigma musicale del "terzo" Wittgenstein*, da pubblicarsi in «De Musica».

vita. Non si tratta qui di un contratto stipulato tra i parlanti ma di una sintonizzazione tra gli uomini, che si verifica in ciò che essi dicono. L'enfasi – indicata nel paragrafo delle *Ricerche* dal corsivo – va posta sull'attività di dire, sul fatto che gli uomini parlano, più che sul contenuto di ciò che si dice. L'*Übereinstimmung* avviene nel discorso, in un agire linguistico logicamente precedente a ogni singolo contenuto vero o falso.

Nell'idea di *Übereinstimmung* della forma di vita si profila un esempio di consenso che non è frutto di convenzione: un accordo sentito, un «consentire»[12] profondamente radicato nella natura dell'animale che ha linguaggio. Contro le letture culturaliste che vedono nel Wittgenstein "antropologo" un apologeta dell'incommensurabilità delle forme di vita e un convinto assertore dell'inapplicabilità di predicati universali alle faccende umane, «si deve piuttosto riconoscere che nel linguaggio gli uomini (originariamente) convergono e si accordano»[13]. A partire da questo fatto, un comportamento costante e naturale caratteristico di una specie vivente tra le altre, è dunque possibile ripercorrere la riflessione wittgensteiniana in un direzione che metta in luce il lavoro non solo "etnologico" ma anche "etologico"[14] del filosofo, attento osservatore della vita umana *qua* animale.

2. *Della Certezza*: un'indagine etologica

Come si è detto, caratteristica dell'accordo linguistico è quella di essere una concordanza non (o almeno non primariamente) sulle opinioni ma sulla forma di vita. Ciò significa che i contenuti, ritenuti stabilmente veri da una comunità di parlanti, si presentano come il precipitato di una pratica dell'accordo e vengono a costituirsi come proposizioni "rigide", "proposizioni-perno", sulle quali si incardinano le altre asserzioni, considerate empiriche, di volta in volta soggette a verifica. Alla relazione dinamica che intercorre tra proposizioni "grammaticali" (ritenute indubitabili e paradigmatiche all'interno di una data visione del mondo) e proposizioni "temporali" (asserzioni fattualmente verificabili) sono dedicate le annotazioni che compongono la raccolta intitolata *Della Certezza*, testimonianza della fase finale del percorso filosofico di Wittgenstein[15].

Tra i due tipi di proposizione sussiste una differenza di tipo grammaticale, ben espressa dalle diverse formule con cui vengono introdotti gli enunciati: in un caso possiamo dire di "essere certi" (ad esempio dell'esistenza del mondo esterno), nell'altro affermiamo di "sapere" (per esempio, come è un oggetto,

[12] S. Borutti, *Dubbio, scetticismo e senso comune in Wittgenstein*, in «Nuova civiltà delle macchine», XXIII, 2005, p. 98.
[13] L. Perissinotto, *Forme di vita, accordi e regole in Wittgenstein*, in *Wittgenstein politico*, a cura di D. Sparti, Milano 2000, p. 122.
[14] Per un'analisi della dimensione antropologica dell'indagine wittgensteiniana, cfr. P.M.S. Hacker, *Wittgenstein's Anthropological and Ethnological Method*, in *Wittgensein: Comparisons and Context*, Oxford 2013.
[15] Per una presentazione dei temi trattati da Wittgenstein in *Della Certezza*, cfr. A. Coliva, *Moore e Wittgenstein: scetticismo, certezza e senso comune*, Padova 2003; D. Moyal-Sharrock, *Understanding Wittgenstein's* On Certainty, New York 2004.

quali sono le sue qualità osservabili e misurabili). Sebbene si possa essere inclini a cercare la differenza tra la certezza e il sapere in un sentimento di sicurezza che accompagnerebbe le proposizioni del primo tipo, in realtà non è necessario rivolgersi all'interiorità del singolo, poiché le "proposizioni-perno" hanno un chiaro profilo comunitario. Proposizioni come "Sono certo che il mondo esistesse prima della mia nascita" o "Sono certo di avere due mani" non sono espressione di un convincimento personale, ma manifestano l'adesione a una visione del mondo già da sempre condivisa. A riprova della connotazione comunitaria della certezza di cui parla Wittgenstein sta il fatto che sulle proposizioni "grammaticali" vi è una convergenza, un accordo, che nulla ha a che fare con la verificabilità; piuttosto, sono proprio queste proposizioni a fungere da metro per stabilire l'appartenenza di un individuo alla comunità in cui tali asserzioni sono tenute per indubitabili: «Ma certo non sono soltanto io a credere, in questa maniera di avere due mani: lo credono tutte le persone ragionevoli»[16].

Consensuale ma non convenzionale, l'accordo tra i parlanti rivela che il linguaggio, «lungi dall'essere l'espressione di un pensiero etereo, è il prolungamento e l'elaborazione di modi d'espressione istintivi, prelinguistici, che ci avvicinano agli animali»[17]. E in effetti Wittgenstein intende descrivere il comportamento umano non tanto e non solo ponendosi nel punto d'osservazione di un visitatore straniero che voglia studiare gli usi costumi di una tribù sconosciuta, ma calandosi nei panni di un etologo, analizzando cioè la forma di vita umana come una possibilità tra le diverse forme di vita animale. Per comprendere a pieno la natura dell'accordo linguistico bisogna dunque considerare il ruolo e il peso che esso ha nella vita umana:

> Ora, io vorrei considerare questa sicurezza, con come qualcosa di affine all'avventatezza o alla superficialità, ma come una forma di vita. (Questo è espresso molto malamente, e, di sicuro, anche pensato malamente).
>
> Questo, però, vuol dire che io voglio concepirla come qualcosa che giace al di là del giustificato e dell'ingiustificato; dunque, per così dire, come un che di animale[18].

La difficoltà di pensare questa sicurezza sta nel fatto che essa non è un l'accompagnamento mentale di un contenuto linguistico qualsiasi: la certezza di cui parla Wittgenstein non deriva dalla molteplice possibilità di modalizzazione dei nostri enunciati, per cui ciò che è necessario ci pare sicuro mentre ciò che è possibile appare, da un punto di vista soggettivo, dubitabile. La certezza che qui è in questione rappresenta un dato antropologico o, per attenerci al punto di vista etologico, essa costituisce un tratto saliente del comportamento di una specie animale.

Lo sforzo di riflessione in cui si applica Wittgenstein – con esiti che egli stesso considera perfettibili – consiste in un tentativo di mettere a fuoco un

[16] L. Wittgenstein, *Über Gewissheit*, Oxford 1969 (trad. it. *Della certezza*, Torino 1978, § 252, p. 41).
[17] C. Chauviré, *Le moment Anthropologique de Wittgenstein*, Paris, 2004, p. 140 (trad. mia).
[18] L. Wittgenstein, *Über Gewissheit*, cit., § 359, p. 57.

fenomeno, inappariscente e allo stesso tempo pervasivo, che non è sullo stesso piano degli altri fenomeni, dal momento che la certezza relativa alle proposizioni grammaticali va a formare lo sfondo contro cui si stagliano le proposizioni temporali: «il dubbio viene dopo la credenza»[19] e dunque la certezza di alcune asserzioni fornisce l'attrito necessario perché si metta in moto la macchina della verificazione, riservata ai contenuti empirici delle proposizioni di cui è possibile dubitare.

La certezza delle proposizioni "rigide" giace dunque al di là del giustificato e dell'ingiustificato: né vere né false, esse rappresentano il paradigma di ciò che può essere ritenuto indubitabile e costituiscono il limite oltre il quale non ha senso chiedere prove e giustificazioni. In questo senso esse sfuggono a un controllo: non ci si può chiedere se sia giusto o meno (fondato o meno) basare su di esse la propria condotta. Al contrario, proprio le proposizioni indubitabili costituiscono il metro su cui misurare la distanza dal vero delle altre proposizioni: ciò che diciamo esser vero, in sostanza, è più o meno prossimo al grado limite di indubitabilità costituito da proposizioni quali "Sono certo che il mondo esisteva prima che io nascessi". A chi giudicasse questa posizione una concessione all'irrazionalismo, Wittgenstein risponderebbe:

> Qui voglio considerare l'uomo come un animale; come un essere primitivo a cui si fa credito bensì dell'istinto, ma non della facoltà del ragionamento. Come un essere in uno stato primitivo. Di una logica che sia sufficiente per un mezzo di comunicazione primitivo non dobbiamo vergognarci. Il linguaggio non è venuto fuori da un ragionamento[20].

Un'analisi etologica del comportamento umano è possibile solamente se si accantona l'idea che l'uomo sia per natura diverso dagli altri animali a causa della sua «facoltà di ragionamento». La proposta di Wittgenstein – e in ciò sta il suo naturalismo – fa segno verso una continuità tra diverse forme di vita animale: in modo non diverso da altre specie, i presupposti vitali dell'animale linguistico non sono frutto di un'attività intellettuale, ma rappresentano un dato non ulteriormente giustificabile.

Se è vero che l'uomo, in quanto dotato di linguaggio, può accedere a pratiche – come ad esempio l'argomentare o il dubitare – precluse ad altre specie animali, ciò non significa che la sua condizione sia meno "naturale". Semplicemente, per la specie umana, il comportamento linguistico è un tratto tipico ed esclusivo, a partire dal quale è possibile costruire una rete di pratiche e, di conseguenza, un'immagine del mondo. Non è però vero il contrario: la forma di vita condivisa dall'umanità non si basa su assunti razionali, vale a dire coerenti e sperimentati. In questo senso, con un'inversione paradossale che spesso ritroviamo nel pensiero di Wittgenstein, è il nostro fare – etologicamente inteso come comportamento tipico della specie – a tracciare di fatto i limiti tra ciò che riteniamo valido e indubitabile e ciò che invece è sottoposto al controllo sperimentale.

[19] Ivi, § 160, p. 29.
[20] Ivi, § 475, pp. 76-77.

«Il linguaggio non è venuto fuori da un ragionamento» poiché, in caso contrario, dovremmo presupporre ciò che invece è una conseguenza: il pensiero razionale non è miracolosamente infuso in una classe di animali e non precede il linguaggio, ma è proprio il linguaggio, in quanto tratto caratteristico di una specie, a consentire sviluppi imprevedibili che possono portare l'animale umano anche molto lontano dal suo dato biologico di partenza. La razionalità è il frutto tardo, e per certi versi auto-contraddittorio, dello sviluppo naturale di una certa specie animale.

La certezza che trova espressione nelle proposizioni "grammaticali", con cui tracciamo l'immagine del nostro mondo – del mondo che condividiamo con gli altri –, è dunque un presupposto animale, tipico della nostra specie. A tale certezza non possono essere applicati i criteri con cui giudichiamo "localmente" i dati empirici, poiché essa rappresenta lo sfondo pre-razionale contro cui si stagliano i singoli giochi linguistici. Ma pre-razionale, per l'appunto, non significa irrazionale:

> Non devi dimenticare che il giuoco linguistico è, per così dire, qualcosa di imprevedibile. Voglio dire: non è fondato, non è ragionevole (o irragionevole).
> Sta lì – come la nostra vita[21].

Il fondamento del gioco linguistico, sebbene espresso da un insieme di proposizioni apparentemente non dissimili dalle proposizioni empiriche, rimane eterogeneo rispetto a ciò che sorregge. Perché si dia un'attività linguistica ragionevole è necessario che vi sia un presupposto non ragionevole né – e questo è il punto più interessante – irragionevole. Le proposizioni come "Sono sicuro che il mondo esistesse prima della mia nascita" si attestano, per così dire, su un grado zero di ragionevolezza, che solo a costo di un grave fraintendimento potremmo ricondurre a una sicurezza irrazionale. Ponendosi al di là della stessa distinzione tra ragionevole e irragionevole, la certezza delle "proposizioni-perno" restituisce la nostra pratica linguistica alla sua originaria dimensione vitale e animale. È per questo che il fondamento del gioco linguistico, cui le proposizioni indubitabili danno voce, «sta lì – come la nostra vita».

3. Giochi linguistici e storia naturale

Riannodare i fili (che le interpretazioni "culturaliste" di Wittgenstein avevano reciso) tra linguaggio e vita significa articolare in modo nuovo la distinzione tra natura e cultura, partendo dal dato linguistico come tratto caratteristico di una specie animale. La forma di vita umana è dunque distinta da quella degli altri esseri viventi ma non per questo deve essere valutata secondo criteri speciali: il richiamo di Wittgenstein alla dimensione pubblica e osservabile delle pratiche linguistiche agisce qui come altrove, invitando a considerare ciò che è aperto alla vista senza far derivare da ciò conclusioni metafisiche. Nel caso

[21] Ivi, § 559, p. 91.

dell'animale umano messo a confronto con gli altri animali, ad esempio, non bisognerà legare alla competenza linguistica un'attribuzione di presunte facoltà spirituali. In modo rigorosamente etologico, basterà osservare il dato empirico che differenzia gli umani dai non-umani: il fatto che i primi parlano.

> Talvolta si dice: gli animali non parlano perché mancano loro le facoltà spirituali. E questo vuol dire: "non pensano, e pertanto non parlano". Ma appunto: non parlano. O meglio: non impiegano il linguaggio – se si eccettuano le forme linguistiche più primitive. – Il comandare, l'interrogare, il raccontare, il chiacchierare, fanno parte della nostra storia naturale come il camminare, il mangiare, il bere, il giocare[22].

Nell'endiadi costituita dall'espressione "storia naturale" si condensa il pensiero – problematico ma fecondo – del Wittgenstein maturo intorno al particolare statuto dell'indagine sul linguaggio, la quale non è altro che un indagine sulla vita umana, intesa come un insieme di pratiche, al contempo riconoscibili e passibili di imprevedibili sviluppi. Come in altri passi delle *Ricerche*[23], il filosofo invita a non teorizzare ma a guardare[24], a osservare l'unica cosa che è costantemente aperta al nostro sguardo, il comportamento umano, senza compiere indebite duplicazioni e senza proiettare presunte entità mentali in una sfera interiore e inaccessibile.

L'uomo è dunque un animale che interroga, racconta, chiacchiera. Se all'interno di questa pratiche può essere istituita la distinzione tra vero e falso, tra ragionevole e irragionevole, bisogno riconoscere però che le pratiche stesse non si fondano a loro volta su qualcosa di giustificato, non più di quanto sia lecito supporre che il camminare, il mangiare, il bere, il giocare siano pratiche "razionali". Semplicemente, come scrive Wittgenstein a proposito delle ragioni che possono giustificare il modo in cui si segue una, a un certo punto della spiegazione si arriva a dire «Ecco, agisco proprio così»[25].

Se dunque Wittgenstein rifiuta ogni forma di discontinuità essenzialista tra uomo e animale, non per questo riconosce le ragioni di chi vuole a tutti i costi negare le differenze a vantaggio di un totale continuismo tra le forme di vita. Spiegare un fenomeno, infatti, non vuol dire uniformarlo a un altro già noto, ma significa valorizzare gli elementi di novità e i tratti distintivi, cogliendone la specificità. Così, il carattere linguistico della forma di vita umana segna necessariamente una frattura rispetto al mondo degli altri animali: come è stato recentemente affermato, il linguaggio costituisce una «macchina antropologica»[26] o «antropogenica»[27] che distingue nettamente tra ciò che è umano e ciò che è non-umano. E anche Wittgenstein sottolinea che «gli animali non parlano».

[22] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen* , cit., §25, p. 23.
[23] Ivi, § 66, p. 46.
[24] Sull'importanza dello sguardo nella filosofia di Wittgenstein e sulla rilevanza del regime visivo, cfr. A. Boncompagni, *Wittgenstein. Lo sguardo e il limite*, Milano-Udine 2011.
[25] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, § 217, p. 113
[26] G. Agamben, *L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale*, Torino 2002, cap. 9.
[27] F. Cimatti, *Filosofia dell'animalità*, Roma-Bari 2013, cap. 2.

Bisogna considerare però che l'indagine sul linguaggio, coincidendo con un'indagine (seppur etologica) sull'umano, mette il filosofo nella difficile condizione di essere al contempo soggetto e oggetto della ricerca: il movimento di riflessione imposto da un simile presupposto porta necessariamente a riappropriarsi del proprio punto di vista, del punto di vista dell'animale umano, l'unico che sia effettivamente a disposizione di chi si interroga. Indicare nel linguaggio la differenza tra umano e non-umano non vuol dire dunque escludere dall'indagine tutti gli altri animali, in maniera semplicistica e superficialmente antropocentrica, ma significa tracciare un limite dal di dentro alla propria brama di conoscere, accettando di aderire alle possibilità offerte dalla propria forma di vita, così come essa si presenta.

La dimensione animale, tuttavia, non è distinta ed esclusa a partire dall'umano poiché, come si è visto, esso permane nella forma di vita caratterizzata dal linguaggio come ciò oltre cui non è lecito porre la domanda "perché?". Riportando in primo piano ciò che abitualmente fa da sfondo alle nostre pratiche linguistiche, sia esso la certezza con cui pronunciamo verità ritenute indubitabili o il fatto che, per *natura*, la nostra vita è fatta anche di comandi, interrogativi, racconti e chiacchiere, Wittgenstein ci invita a sostare, a interrompere la catena delle giustificazioni e delle razionalizzazioni, per riconoscere ciò che, anche nello nostre pratiche linguistiche più raffinate, sta lì – «come qualcosa di animale».

¶ Sezione Terza

Questioni di etica

Fondamenti di una relazione oltre l'analisi noetica

Articoli/13

L'ontologie de l'âme noétique dans le débat sur l'immortalité de l'âme en Italie (1516-1518)

Quomodo de anima intellectiva considerat naturalis

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The present study aims to demonstrate how the question of the ontological status of the intellectual soul – *anima* or *intellectus* – as exposed and discussed in the controversy over the immortality of the soul which opposed Pietro Pomponazzi and Agostino Nifo in 1516-1518, aroused a heated debate between the Alexandrist and the Averroïst. This question was also part and parcel of a political-theological issue, revived by the bull *Apostolici regiminis* of 1513, wich related to the respective fields of philosophy and theology, the latter defending a l*ocus sacer* forbidden to the philosophical speculations.

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La controverse sur l'immortalité de l'âme des années 1516-1518, opposant principalement deux philosophes péripatéticiens, Pietro Pomponazzi, qui se réclamait de l'école alexandriste, et Agostino Nifo, figure illustre de l'averroïsme, plonge en réalité ses racines dans les disputes et débats qui animèrent l'Université de Padoue dès la deuxième moitié du XV^e^ siècle: c'est, en effet, un long combat que livra l'Église aux philosophes des universités du nord de l'Italie, et la controverse de 1516-1518 en est le dernier épisode, le plus subtil, sans doute, puisque sont désormais aux prises, dans une lutte fratricide en dehors même des murs de l'Université, les deux représentants des deux écoles combattues[1].

[1] Sur les controverses sur l'immortalité de l'âme à la Renaissance, voir l'étude de synthèse de G. Di Napoli, *L'Immortalità dell'anima nel Rinascimento*, Torino 1963. Sur les antécédents plus précis de la controverse de 1516-1518, voir notre étude en introduction de l'édition d'A. Nifo, *De pulchro et amore. I.De pulchro liber*, éd., trad., notes et intr. L. Boulègue, Paris 2003, p. XXXV-XLVIII.

Quomodo de anima intellectiua considerat naturalis: la question est posée en 1516 par Pietro Pomponazzi dans le *Tractatus de immortalitate animae*[2]. Alors professeur à l'Université de Bologne, Pomponazzi, dans le *De immortalitate animae*, soutient ouvertement, en se plaçant dans la lignée d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, le célèbre commentateur aristotélicien du II^e^ siècle, l'existence d'une âme ontologiquement une et indivisible, unie au corps et vouée à périr en même temps que lui. Il s'opposait alors non seulement à l'orthodoxie religieuse, mais aussi, au sein même de l'école péripatéticienne, à la thèse des averroïstes, ayant eu eux-mêmes des démêlés avec les autorités religieuses[3]. En soutenant cette définition, Pomponazzi défendait en même temps la thèse que l'immortalité de l'âme est impossible à prouver philosophiquement, même si elle est une vérité révélée.

Si l'ouvrage suscita les critiques modérées des savants, des réactions beaucoup plus violentes eurent lieu de la part d'ordres religieux: ces derniers obtinrent du Doge de Venise que le livre fut publiquement brûlé, et certains entreprirent un voyage à Rome pour demander au pape de mettre le livre au ban et de contraindre l'auteur à une confession publique. Mais Pomponazzi bénéficia aussi d'un certain nombre de protections, notamment de celle de l'humaniste et cardinal Pietro Bembo[4]. Le philosophe alexandriste s'abritait derrière la profession de la double vérité, philosophique, d'une part, qui relève de la raison, et théologique, d'autre part, qui relève de la foi, profession envers laquelle l'Église, dans son ensemble, s'était jusqu'alors montrée conciliante. Il est donc assez étonnant de voir la façon dont Pomponazzi revient, au cœur de son ouvrage, sur la délimitation de cet espace de liberté dont il a revendiqué pour lui-même l'usage. Il le fait dans un passage éminemment polémique avec les philosophes averroïstes. En effet, avant d'aborder l'interprétation d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur le *De anima* et de soutenir la thèse de la mortalité de l'âme, Pomponazzi expose et critique les thèses de ses prédécesseurs sur la question de l'âme, de son statut ontologique et de son immortalité: il traite notamment des philosophies d'Averroès, de Platon et de

[2] P. Pomponazzi, *Tractatus de immortalitate animae magistri Petri Pomponatii Mantuani*, impressum Bononiae per magistrum Iustinianum Leonardi Ruberiensem, 1516. Nous nous référerons dans la suite de cet article à l'édition de B. Mojsisch : *Abhandlung über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele*, Hamburg 1990. Pour ce qui est des traductions publiées du traité de Pomponazzi en langues vernaculaires, outre la traduction anglaise de W-H. Hay (*Tractatus de immortalitate animae*, Haverford college, 1938), nous signalons deux parutions récentes: la traduction italienne de V. Perrone Compagni, *Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima*, Firenze 1999, et la traduction française de T. Gontier, dans P. Pomponazzi, *Traité de l'immortalité de l'âme*, Paris 2012.

[3] Sur les professeurs averroïstes de l'Université de Padoue au XV^e^ siècle et leurs débats, voir les études de E. P. Mahoney, *Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: an unnoticed dispute*, in «Rivista critica di storia della filosofia», XXIII, 1968, p. 268-296; *Agostino Nifo's early views on immortality*, «Journal of the history of philosophy», VIII, 4, 1970, p. 451-460; *Antonio Trombetta and Agostino Nifo on Averroes and intelligible species: a philosophical dispute at the University of Padua*, dans «Storia e cultura al Santo di Padova», Vicenza 1976, p. 289-301. Sur Pietro Pomponazzi, nous renvoyons notamment à l'ouvrage de M. L. Pine, *Pietro Pomponazzi: radical philosopher of the Renaissance*, Padova 1986.

[4] Sur les réactions à l'ouvrage de Pomponazzi, voir E. Renan, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, Paris 1861 (1^ère^ éd. 1852), p. 356-363; G. Di Napoli, *L'immortalità dell'anima*, cit., p. 203-318; V. Perrone Compagni, «Introduzione», dans P. Pomponazzi, cit., p. XCVIII.

Thomas d'Aquin. C'est au chapitre IV qu'il examine et critique précisément la thèse averroïste en se fondant sur l'interprétation du *De anima* d'Aristote, et il pose lors d'une digression la question des domaines respectifs du philosophe (*naturalis*) et du théologien. La question ici posée se trouve donc étroitement liée à la question du statut ontologique de l'âme intellective, statut qui va déterminer la façon dont le philosophe est supposé pouvoir en traiter. Et le philosophe en question est averroïste à ce moment du traité.

Or, en 1516, au moment où Pomponazzi édite son traité visant à démontrer philosophiquement la mortalité de l'âme humaine, la question est d'actualité, et le *Tractatus de immortalitate animae* s'inscrit dans un contexte précis. Spéculer sur l'âme intellective, la plus haute faculté humaine, susceptible d'immortalité, est une chose sérieuse que l'on veut, dans cette deuxième décennie du XVI^e^ siècle, considérer comme trop sérieuse pour la laisser aux spéculations des philosophes. En effet, les théologiens s'interrogent sur la compétence et les objets respectifs de la philosophie et de la métaphysique, cette dernière constituant, selon eux, une *doctrina sacra*. Le problème soulevé ici n'est pas nouveau et s'inscrit dans une problématique ancienne dont l'Université de Paris au XIII^e^ siècle fut le théâtre, opposant les philosophes de la faculté des arts aux métaphysiciens de la faculté de théologie[5]. Dans les universités du nord de l'Italie n'existait pas de chaire de théologie[6], néanmoins les tensions entre les représentants, universitaires et ecclésiastiques, des deux disciplines sont bien présentes. Les années 1510 sont une période de grande intranquillité pour les philosophes, notamment pour ceux qui, dans les universités de Bologne ou de Padoue, fortement inscrites dans la tradition péripatéticienne, se consacrent à l'étude des commentateurs aristotéliciens, tels Alexandre d'Aphrodise et Averroès, et à leurs thèses qui, pour être différentes, remettaient en cause le dogme de l'immortalité de l'âme humaine. Le Concile du Latran V, en 1513, a non seulement condamné fermement la théorie averroïste de l'intellect unique et toute autre thèse contraire à celle de l'immortalité de l'âme comme celle soutenue par les alexandristes, mais encore a voulu contraindre l'enseignement universitaire de façon extrêmement rigoureuse: la *Bulla Apostolici Regiminis* du 19 décembre 1513 ordonne aux philosophes dans les universités d'établir la vérité de la religion chrétienne et de réfuter les arguments contraires à la foi, en renonçant s'il le faut à la lumière naturelle pour la seule lumière divine, – contrainte tout à fait nouvelle et opposée à la tolérance

[5] De nombreuses études sont consacrées à ces débats, on ne saurait ici être exhaustif. Voir notamment: M. R. Hayoun et A. de Libera, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, Paris 1991; R. Imbach et F.-X. Putallaz, *Profession: philosophe. Siger de Brabant*, Paris 1997.

[6] Sur la continuité, à la Renaissance, entre les universités italiennes du nord et la scolastique médiévale, voir Ch. B. Schmitt, *Aristote et la Renaissance*, Paris 1992, p. 9-15 (1^ère^ éd. *Aristotle and the Renaissance*, Cambridge Massachusetts – London 1983). Sur l'université de Padoue plus précisément, où Pomponazzi et Nifo furent tous deux professeurs, voir B. Nardi, *Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo XIV al XVI*, Firenze 1958; A. Poppi, *Introduzione all'aristotelismo padovano*, Padova 1970, p. 22-28.

jusqu'ici respectée envers les spéculations philosophiques, contrainte à laquelle même certains thomistes, comme Cajetan, se sont opposés[7].

C'est pourquoi il est important de s'arrêter sur la question que pose Pomponazzi – *Quomodo de anima intellectiua considerat naturalis* – et d'en comprendre les enjeux: non seulement une telle question détermine l'espace de la philosophie, mais, dans ce contexte, on voit qu'elle le fait précisément en relation avec la question de la définition de l'âme noétique, *anima intellectiua*, au cœur d'un des débats les plus importants du XVI[e] siècle italien.

1. L'âme intellective et les limites de la philosophie naturelle selon Pietro Pomponazzi (*Tractatus de immortalitate animae*, 1516)

Selon Pomponazzi, qui se réclame d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise, l'âme intellective est matérielle et vouée à périr en même temps que le corps. Une telle définition s'oppose donc à celle des averroïstes, que Pomponazzi expose aux chapitres III et IV du *De immortalitate animae*: selon eux, l'âme intellective serait bien une réalité séparée, immortelle mais, après la mort, elle cesserait d'être une âme individuelle pour être une intelligence, unique pour tous les hommes[8]. La définition d'Averroès, telle qu'il la formule, est donnée au chapitre III[9]:

> Averroes itaque et, ut existimo, ante eum Themistius concordes posuere animam intellectiuam realiter distingui ab anima corruptibili, uerum ipsam esse unam numero in omnibus hominibus, mortalem uero multiplicatam.

Averroès et Thémistius sont donc associés[10], et, selon eux, l'âme humaine serait composée, d'une part, de l'âme noétique - intellect ou encore âme intellective - et, d'autre part, de l'âme dianoétique – âme cogitative qui comprend l'âme végétative et l'âme sensitive. La première, l'âme noétique, absolument immanente et immatérielle, est éternelle et, spécificité de la thèse averroïste, unique pour tous les hommes; la seconde, l'âme dianoétique, matérielle et multiple, est mortelle. Ainsi, selon le principe de non-contradiction, il faut donc que l'âme noétique soit autre que l'âme dianoétique. Il est donc très important pour Pomponazzi de

[7] Sur le concile du Latran V, voir N. H. Minnich, *The fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517). Studies on its Membership, Diplomacy and Proposals for Reform*, I, Aldershot-Brookfield 1993 et O. de La Brosse *et al.*, *Latran V et Trente, 1512-1517 et 1545-1548. Histoire des conciles oecuméniques*, tome X, Paris 2007, p. 90-91.

[8] Pour une analyse de l'ensemble des chapitres III et IV *du De immortalitate animae*, voir l'introduction de V. Perrone-Compagni, dans P. Pomponazzi, cit., 1999, p. XVIII-XXX.

[9] P. Pomponazzi, *De immortalitate animae*, III (éd. Mojsisch, p. 12).

[10] Ici, Pomponazzi reprend l'association qu'avait faite A. Nifo en 1503 dans son *De anima*, alors que Thomas d'Aquin avait disjoint les deux commentateurs (voir le *De unitate intellectus*, II, pp. 49-52). Sur ce point chez Thomas, voir B. Nardi, dans Thomas d'Aquin, *Trattatto sull'unità dell'intelletto contro gli Averroisti*, Firenze 1998, p. 139, note 5. Voir aussi V. Perrone Compagni, «Introduzione», dans P. Pomponazzi, *Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima*, cit., 1999, p. XXIII. Sur ce point chez Nifo, voir L. Boulègue, *Pomponazzi* versus *Nifo: à propos de la thèse d'Averroès*, in «Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie» (*Pietro Pomponazzi entre traditions et innovations*, dir. J. Biard et T. Gontier), 48 (2009), p. 83-98.

rappeler la définition de l'âme intellective selon les averroïstes, car réfuter cette définition reviendra à ruiner la thèse de son immortalité, cette thèse étant elle-même fort divergente de celle de l'orthodoxie chrétienne puisque les averroïstes soutiennent qu'elle est unique pour tous les hommes et donc ruinent eux aussi, en un autre point (celui de l'individualité), le dogme de l'immortalité de l'âme.

Pour Pomponazzi, un premier point d'opposition avec les averroïstes est que, selon lui, l'âme humaine est une; et sur ce point, il rejoint la position de Thomas pour qui l'âme humaine est une *realiter* (mais elle est séparable du corps et immortelle). Pour réfuter Averroès, tout l'effort de Pomponazzi va porter sur l'analyse philologique et il se placera uniquement du point de vue de l'interprétation du texte d'Aristote par Averroès[11], et, plus précisément, de la compréhension du rôle des images dans la pensée. Il montrera quant à lui que, selon Aristote, il ne peut exister une pensée sans image; or, si l'âme intellective ne peut posséder une opération indépendante du corps, c'est-à-dire si elle ne peut penser sans recourir à l'imagination, alors elle ne sera pas immatérielle, donc elle ne sera pas immortelle. C'est lors de cette étape de la réfutation, qui consiste à montrer qu'il ne peut y avoir de pensée sans recours à l'imagination, que Pomponazzi pose la question des domaines respectifs de philosophe et du théologien:

> Et secundum istum modum solui potest usitata dubitatio, scilicet quomodo de anima intellectiua considerat naturalis, cum tamen primo De partibus capite 1 dicat non spectare ad naturalem de intellectiua, cum sit mouens non mota et reliqua quae ibi dicuntur. Soluitur, inquam, quoniam, qua anima est, naturalis est ; immo secundum hanc considerationem considerantur intelligentiae a naturali ; qua uero anima humana intellectus est, metaphysici negotii est sicut et caeteri intellectus superiores. Sed re uera haec responsio multipliciter uidetur deficere: in primis quidem, quoniam, si idem iudicium esset de anima humana, quod et de ceteris intelligentiis, quando in duodecimo Metaphysicae[12] Aristoteles tractationem facit de intelligentiis et de humana anima pertractare debuisset; quod tamen minime fecit. Preaterea si idem est iudicium de humano intellectu, quod et de intelligentiis, cur igitur Aristoteles textu commenti 26 secundi Physicorum[13] ponit terminum considerationis naturalis animam humanam ? Quoniam si intelligat Aristoteles quantum ad quia est, falsum est. Etenim quia est Dei et intelligentiarum naturalis demonstrat, et per ipsum Commentatorem primi De anima commento 2[14] et commento 36 duodecimi Metaphysicae[15] diuinus haec accipit a naturali. Si uero loquatur quantum ad quid est, satis patet secundum responsionem datam non pertinere ad naturalem, cum ut sic sit mouens, non motum, immo, ut dicit responsio, hoc uoluit Aristoteles in primo De partibus capitulo citato[16].

[11] P. Pomponazzi, *De immortalitate animae*, IV (éd. Mojsisch, p. 16): «Sed quoad secundum haec paucula, quae mihi plenam fidem faciunt, adducere statui, uidelicet hoc alienum esse ab Aristotele, uerum hoc esse figmentum et monstrum ab eo Auerroe fictum».
[12] Aristote, *Métaphysique*, XII 8, 1073a14-1074a38.
[13] Aristote, *Physique*, II 2, 194b10-15 et Averroès, *In Physicam* XII, comm. 36.
[14] Averroès, *In De anima*, I, comm. 2.
[15] Averroès, *In Metaphysicam*, XII, comm. 36.
[16] P. Pomponazzi, *De immortalitate animae*, chap. IV (éd. Mojsisch, p. 20-22).

Pomponazzi rappelle ici, en s'appuyant d'abord sur le livre I des *Parties des animaux*, que ce n'est pas au philosophe de la nature d'étudier l'âme intellective, car elle meut sans être mue. Ensuite, il opère, en suivant dans un premier temps Averroès, la distinction suivante: en tant qu'âme, elle relève bien du domaine du philosophe de la nature; mais, en tant qu'elle est un intellect, elle est du ressort du domaine du métaphysicien, au même titre que les autres intelligences. Suit la réfutation de cette réponse en prenant appui principalement sur le deuxième livre de la *Physique* où l'âme humaine est posée comme une borne à l'étude du physicien (*naturalis*). Pomponazzi critique alors l'interprétation d'Averroès lui-même en retournant contre lui ses arguments: «Car s'il entend par-là 'relativement à l'existence', il a tort; en effet, le philosophe de la nature démontre l'existence de Dieu et des autres intelligences, et le théologien s'est emparé du domaine du philosophe comme le dit le Commentateur lui-même dans son commentaire 2 du livre I du traité *De l'âme* et son commentaire 36 du livre XII de la *Métaphysique*. Si en revanche, il veut dire 'relativement à son essence', il ressort clairement de la réponse apportée qu'elle ne relève pas du domaine du philosophe de la nature, parce qu'elle meut sans être mue». La question est donc posée au philosophe averroïste, précisément, de savoir comment il peut se prononcer sur l'âme intellective, le présupposé étant que, si l'âme intellective est immatérielle, elle échappe au raisonnement humain puisque celui-ci ne peut penser qu'à partir des données de la sensation. Ainsi Pomponazzi fait-il comprendre que les averroïstes ne devraient pas se prononcer sur l'essence de l'âme intellective après la mort puisqu'ils affirment qu'une fois séparée du corps, celle-ci continue d'exister non plus en tant qu'âme mais en tant qu'intelligence. Ce que Pomponazzi réfute ici, c'est la possibilité pour le philosophe de la nature de connaître l'essence des intelligences pures, et il place les averroïstes face à leur propre aporie : soit l'âme est une âme, et alors elle relève bien du domaine du philosophe qui peut la connaître, soit elle est une intelligence et le philosophe ne peut connaître son essence. Ce faisant, Pomponazzi, en impliquant Averroès, souligne aussi que les théologiens, à leur tour, en se prononçant sur l'existence, outrepasseraient également les limites de leur champ d'investigation en empiétant sur le domaine du physicien.

Plus habile encore se révèle Pomponazzi ici quand on sait que la distinction qu'il oppose aux averroïstes est celle qu'a établie Thomas d'Aquin en s'appuyant sur les *Analytiques postérieurs* d'Aristote, distinction selon laquelle la connaissance du fait diffère de la connaissance de la cause[17]. On peut atteindre la première grâce à une démonstration *quia*, qui part des effets pour remonter à la cause, et atteindre la seconde grâce à une démonstration *propter quid*, qui part de la cause. La démonstration *quia* permet d'affirmer l'existence de quelque chose, notamment de Dieu, mais ne permet pas de connaître son essence. Or le philosophe de la nature, selon Thomas, dont la conception était communément

[17] Aristote, *Analytiques postérieurs* I, 3 et Thomas d'Aquin, *Somme Théologique* I, 2,2. Sur ce point, voir R. Imbach et I. Fouche, dans Thomas d'Aquin, Boèce de Dacie, *Sur le bonheur*, Paris 2005, p. 28-30.

admise au XVI[e] siècle, ne peut que raisonner selon la démonstration *quia*. Il peut donc affirmer l'existence d'une chose, non pas se prononcer sur son essence. Ainsi Pomponazzi montre-t-il que, selon lui, Averroès et ses disciples, quand ils traitent de l'âme intellective comme d'une intelligence, outrepassent les limites de compétence de la philosophie.

Que Pomponazzi démonte la démonstration averroïste, notamment en dénonçant un raisonnement circulaire, est, dans le cadre d'un débat philosophique, parfaitement normal. Il est plus frappant de le voir, en tant qu'alexandriste, recourir à un argument thomiste, en général utilisé par les contemporains pour contraindre l'ensemble des philosophes naturalistes, et pas seulement les averroïstes. Il est vrai que la thèse de Pomponazzi, en soutenant la mortalité de l'âme, qui est une et matérielle, de fait, ne s'aventure pas au-delà de la borne fixée au philosophe de la nature dans la *Physique*, et cette borne ne restreint pas, en effet, sa propre démonstration étant donné que, lui, soutient la mort de l'âme avec le corps et n'a donc rien à spéculer sur l'essence de l'âme après la mort. Pomponazzi livre donc une digression étonnante sur le domaine d'investigation du philosophe qui n'était pas nécessaire à la réfutation qu'il voulait faire de la thèse d'Averroès. Car non seulement il réfute l'interprétation averroïste du texte d'Aristote, mais il dénonce aussi à l'attention d'éventuels censeurs les audaces averroïstes en fournissant un argument en adéquation avec les dispositions coercitives de la *Bulla* de 1513.

2. L'âme intellective et le raisonnement spéculatif: la liberté du philosophe selon Agostino Nifo *(De immortalitate animae libellus aduersus Petrum Pomponatium*, 1518)

Derrière le nom d'Averroès, Pomponazzi vise assurément des contemporains, et cela est sensible au chapitre IV où il déplore l'écho que rencontre la thèse averroïste à son époque[18]. Or l'un des noms marquants de l'averroïsme padouan de la fin du XV[e] siècle et du début du XVI[e] siècle est celui d'Agostino Nifo, que Pomponazzi connaît fort bien. En effet, ils étaient, dès les années 1490, rivaux à l'Université de Padoue où Nifo occupa, en 1495, la chaire ordinaire de philosophie et, en 1496, il succéda à Pomponazzi en devenant professeur ordinaire *primo loco*[19]. Nifo avait soutenu en 1492 la thèse averroïste de l'intellect unique dans un *De intellectu* aujourd'hui disparu: diffusé sous forme manuscrite,

[18] *Ibid.*, IV (éd. Mojsisch, p. 14): «Quamuis haec opinio tempestate nostra sit multum celebrata et fere ab omnibus pro constanti habeatur eam esse Aristotelis, mihi tamen uidetur quod nedum in se sit falsissima, uerum inintelligibilis et monstruosa et ab Aristotele prorsus aliena. Immo existimo quod tanta fatuitas numquam fuerit ab Aristotele nedum credita, uerum excogitata».

[19] Sur Nifo et l'Université de Padoue, voir C. H. Lohr, *Renaissance latin Aristotle Commentaries: authors N-Ph.*, dans «Renaissance Quaterly», XXXII, n° 3-4, 1979, p. 532. Voir aussi Pasquale Tuozzi, auteur d'une chronique sur Nifo pour les annales de l'université de Padoue au début du XX[e] siècle : selon lui, en se rapportant à Jacobo Facciolati, Nifo obtint la chaire extraordinaire de philosophie en 1495, et la chaire ordinaire en 1498. Voir Pasquale Tuozzi, *Agostino Nifo e le sue opere*, in *Atti memorie della R. Accademia de scienze, lettere ed arti in Padova*, Padova, XX (1903-1904), f. 65 et Jacobo Facciolati, *Fasti gymnasii Patavini*, Patavii, Typis Seminarii apud

l'ouvrage avait fait scandale et l'auteur avait été contraint de se dédire dans un nouveau *De intellectu* – qui est celui dont nous disposons actuellement – édité en 1503[20]. Cependant, la même année, parut également un *De anima*[21], où il revient aux thèses averroïstes[22]. Et c'est à Nifo que fut confié le soin d'apporter la contradiction à Pomponazzi. Contacté en 1516, il semble avoir répondu à la commande sans enthousiasme et ce n'est qu'en 1518 que parut le *De immortalitate animae libellus adversus Petrum Pomponatium*[23].

Sur les quatre-vingt cinq chapitres qui composent le *De immortalitate animae libellus aduersus Petrum Pomponatium*, Nifo consacre les chapitres IV à XXXIII à l'examen de la thèse d'Averroès et à sa réfutation par Pomponazzi. Il sait que ce sont ses thèses et certains de ses ouvrages passés que Pomponazzi pointe ainsi et il est contraint, sous la pression des commanditaires, de se défendre lui-même tout en feignant ne pas être particulièrement visé. L'exercice est périlleux, particulièrement quand arrive la digression sur les domaines respectifs du philosophe et du théologien:

> Obiter igitur refutare enititur excerptum et principalem responsionem: excerptum quidem, quasi de intellectiua anima idem iudicium est sicuti de intelligentiis: quando Aristoteles in diuinae scientiae libro egisset de intelligentiis, de intellectiua anima agere debuerat, alioquin mancus fuisset. Solutio. Vniuersae considerationis physicae intellectiuam animam terminum constituit Aristoteles libro physicae auscultationis secundo; non enim in cognitione rerum physicarum intellictiuam animam fecit terminum quo ad quia est: cum physica cognitio quia res est usque ad deum ipsum diffundatur, erit ergo terminus in cognitione quid est: quare quidquid est intellectiuae animae in naturali philosophia agenda erit. Haec aduersus excerptum[24].

Le passage est bref. On peut tout d'abord y voir une stratégie d'évitement: Nifo ne souhaite visiblement pas s'attarder sur ce point délicat. Sa réponse reprend les arguments utilisés par Pomponazzi, qui reprenait et appliquait la distinction de Thomas sur les types de démonstrations et les limites de l'investigation du philosophe de la nature, parallèles aux limites de la raison en s'appuyant sur la *Physique* d'Aristote. Mais, dans une formule très brève, par une sorte de saut logique masqué par le *quare*, il arrive à la conclusion contraire à

Ioannem Manfrè, 1757, vol. III, p. 109-111. Pomponazzi eut probablement à souffrir du jeune rival qu'était alors institutionnellement Nifo et il quitta Padoue pour Ferrare.

[20] A. Nifo, *Augustini Nyphi liber de intellectu*, impressum Venetiis per Petrum de Querengis, Bergomensem, 1503.

[21] A. Nifo, *Augustini Niphi super tres libris de anima*, impressum Venetiis per Petrum de Quarengiis, 1503.

[22] Sur ces ouvrages et les positions de Nifo, voir l'article d'E. P. Mahoney, *Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo on Alexander of Aphrodisias: an un- noticed dispute*, cit., Voir aussi l'article de L. Boulègue, *Pomponazzi versus Nifo: à propos de la thèse d'Averroès*, cit.,(surtout p. 97-98).

[23] *Augustini Niphi philosophi suessani de immortalitate animae humanae libellus adversus Petrum Pomponacium Mantuanum ad Leonem Xm pontificem maximum*, Venetiis, impensa heredum quodam Domini Scoti modoetiensis ac sociorum, 1518. Nous recourons à cette édition *princeps* dans la suite de l'article.

[24] *Ibid.*, caput XI, fol. 2 v. col. 2 (Nous explicitons les abréviations et modernisons la ponctuation).

celle de Pomponazzi (et de Thomas): le philosophe de la nature devra traiter de l'âme intellective, quelle que soit l'essence de celle-ci, qu'il ne peut effectivement pas préciser. Donc, Nifo maintient la légitimité du philosophe à traiter aussi de l'âme intellective. Mais ce qu'il n'explique pas, c'est la façon dont celui-ci peut traiter d'une chose dont il ignore et ne peut donner les caractéristiques essentielles. Comment le philosophe peut-il traiter de l'âme quelle qu'elle soit (*quidquid est*), puisqu'il reconnaît, à la suite de Pomponazzi, que la borne posée par Aristote l'empêche de se prononcer sur l'essence de l'âme intellective ? Là où Pomponazzi, épousant la position de Thomas, voudrait que le raisonnement cesse, Nifo, quant à lui, laisse entendre que le raisonnement peut se poursuivre, mais il n'en donne pas explicitement la raison.

En fait, Nifo se réfère implicitement à un usage. Il faut se reporter à la pratique philosophique universitaire qui prévalait depuis le XIV^e^ siècle pour comprendre ce que sous entend sa réponse. Selon Pomponazzi, le domaine de la philosophie et le champ d'exercice du philosophe doivent s'arrêter où commence celui du métaphysicien, car c'est à partir de l'expérience sensible, que le philosophe peut déduire qu'il est besoin, par exemple, d'un premier moteur, et qu'il peut affirmer son existence, mais non son essence. Pomponazzi expose ici la conception que la philosophie est un savoir démontré, conception dominante depuis le XIV^e^ siècle, après avoir été la cause de nombreux déboires pour les averroïstes du siècle précédent. Sur ce point averroïstes et alexandristes sont d'accord. Mais, Pomponazzi en donne ici une interprétation *stricto sensu*, fixe des limites à ce savoir qui restreignent considérablement le champ de la philosophie. Car les philosophes, dans la tradition universitaire, en s'attachant à distinguer les domaines des disciplines philosophique et théologique, n'avaient pas pour autant renoncé à développer des démonstrations fondées sur le probable, et non plus sur la certitude, dans la mesure où ces démonstrations étaient menées avec cohérence en poussant jusqu'au bout les conséquences de prémisses préalablement posées. Cela constituait certes une transgression, mais elle était répandue et communément admise. Ainsi la philosophie pouvait-elle dépasser les limites de l'expérience sensible même si elle renonçait à présenter comme définitives ses raisons quand celles-ci contredisaient la foi[25]. Cette distinction entre raisons définitives et raisons probables, tout en limitant la portée de leurs démonstrations, laissait finalement aux philosophes une certaine liberté de spéculation dans le domaine du probable dont ils ont su tirer profit. C'est précisément cette liberté que visait la *Bulla Apostolici Regiminis* du 19 décembre 1513 en imposant aux philosophes de réfuter les arguments contraires à la foi et de renoncer alors à poursuivre leurs raisonnements. C'est cette démarche que suggère Nifo de façon très rapide dans sa réponse: ne pouvant se prononcer sur l'essence de l'âme intellective, le philosophe est tout de même invité à en traiter *quidquid est*, c'est-à-dire à partir d'hypothèses posées en prémisses dont

[25] Sur cette question, voir l'étude de L. Bianchi et E. Randi, *Vérités dissonantes. Aristote à la fin du Moyen Âge*, traduit de l'italien par C. Pottier, Fribourg-Paris, 1993 (1^ère^ éd. : *La verità dissonanti. Aristotele alla fine del medioevo*, Roma-Bari, 1990), p. 60 et sv. Voir aussi L. Bianchi, *Pour une histoire de la «double vérité»*, Paris 2008.

il tire ensuite les conséquences. La thèse averroïste de l'âme intellective, qui est intelligence et non plus âme quand le corps meurt, est un raisonnement fondé sur le probable.

Pomponazzi adopte donc ici une conception étroite non seulement qui ne l'entrave pas puisque, lui, établissant – philosophiquement – la mortalité de l'âme humaine, n'a pas à l'examiner davantage après la mort, mais dont, en outre, il montre la légitimité en usant d'un argument repris aux plus coercitifs des adversaires de la liberté philosophique. Il place ainsi Nifo dans une position difficile à un moment où les dispositions du Concile du Latran cherchent à s'imposer.

Ainsi la question du statut ontologique de l'âme intellective, âme ou intelligence, a-t-elle eu des répercussions non seulement dans le domaine de la spéculation philosophique, en distinguant nettement les positions alexandriste et averroïste, trop souvent assimilées en raison de leur incompatibilité avec le dogme chrétien de l'immortalité de l'âme pour les uns et, plus précisément, de l'immortalité de l'âme individuelle pour les autres, mais cette question comporte en elle-même les ferments d'un rude débat, ravivé par la *Bulla* de 1513, sur les domaines respectifs de la philosophie et de la théologie, tendant à établir des frontières strictes et un domaine interdit aux investigations philosophiques. Pomponazzi et Nifo, les deux philosophes les plus audacieux de leur temps sur la définition de l'âme intellective et de son immortalité, se sont livrés à une joute à haut risque, probablement facilitée par de vieilles rancunes et manipulée par un pouvoir religieux habile. Dans le premier quart du XVI[e] siècle, il s'agit bien de rétablir un espace sacré qui contraint les philosophes à s'exprimer avec la plus grande prudence et à pratiquer une autocensure qui sera sensible dans les années 1520 aussi bien dans les traités de Nifo que dans la diffusion restreinte des œuvres de Pomponazzi[26].

[26] Nifo, dans les années 1530, en quittant Rome et Pise pour la cour du prince Salerne, reviendra, dans ses traités de type humaniste et non plus scolastiques, à ses positions averroïstes par le biais d'opuscules moraux aux références variées mais centrés autour de la philosophie éthique d'Aristote. Voir notre article «Philologie humaniste et commentaires universitaires. La question de la contemplation dans les *Opuscula moralia* d'Agostino Nifo», dans L. Boulègue (dir.), *Commenter et philosopher à la Renaissance*, Lille 2014, p. 89-103. Quant à Pomponazzi, après le débat avec Nifo, il ne revint plus sur la question de l'immortalité; il poursuivit sa carrière, mais ne chercha plus, semble-t-il, à publier: voir. V. Perrone Compagni, «Introduzione», dans P. Pomponazzi, *Trattato sull'immortalità dell'anima*, cit., p. xcviii.

Contributi/4

«Animula, vagula, blandula», o sobre el alma perdida de los animales

Mónica B. Cragnolini

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This paper analyses a frame of the history of Western Thought in which the issue of animals soul and feeling arises. This paper shows how in *Antoniana Margarita*, a Gómez Pereira's work, the animal is considered from the point of view of human needs (*too human* needs, as Nietzsche would say). The question is how it became necessary to deprive animals of soul, in order to use them for production, experimentation and performance (in zoos, circuses, etc).

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A Vladmir, animula vagula blandula, *in memoriam*

¿Por qué los animales, que al inicio de la historia de la filosofía occidental, tenían alma, la fueron perdiendo? En este artículo sostendré la tesis de que el alma, en un principio vinculada con la vida, fue perdiendo «espesor·« vital hasta que, al convertirse en atributo específicamente humano, permitió la expresión del señorío del hombre sobre todo lo viviente, como modo de hacer patente la «espiritualidad»propiamente humana. Era necesario que el animal «perdiera»su alma para que se tornara factible y justificable la utilización indiscriminada de los animales para necesidades humanas, demasiado humanas diría Nietzsche.

Si pensamos en el uso del término «alma»en el vocabulario filosófico actual, pareciera que la «mente»ha tomado su lugar, y si se habla de alma la referencia en general es al cerebro, la mente y sus procesos. Recientemente el físico Michio Kaku ha planteado la idea de las «bibliotecas de almas«[1] para referirse a la posibilidad de reunir en un «conectoma»todas las conexiones cerebrales de una persona[2]. Es decir, el «alma»de esta biblioteca sería el conjunto de recuerdos, emociones, sentimientos y pensamientos de alguien que se pueden conservar.

[1] Michio Kaku, *The future of the Mind. The Scientific Quest to Understand, Enhance, and Empower the Mind,* New York 2014.
[2] El término «conectoma» (paralelo a «genoma«), propuesto por O. Sporns y P. Hagmann, alude al mapa de las conexiones neuronales de un cerebro. Sobre el «Human Connectome Project« véase http://www.humanconnectomeproject.org/

Frente a esta conservación de lo «personal»(y por ende, identitario), el «alma de los animales»se ha convertido, en determinados momentos de la cultura, en ánima errante, mariposa, habitante de lugares diversos, alma despersonalizada y des-identificada. Es decir, cuando el alma deja de ser solamente «*vis*»o principio vital, y empieza a remodelarse (y a cargarse) con las marcas de lo personal, de la identidad, y de todo aquello que constituye a la «persona humana«, el otrora alma del animal se volatiliza y des-identifica, hasta desaparecer de su «lugar «(el animal), y emigrar a otras entidades, a las que «anima»(«da alma«). Los versos del emperador Adriano antes de morir «Animula, vagula, blandula»[3] podrían caracterizar el alma de los animales, alma que una vez expulsada de su cuerpo (en la concepción de la *bête-machine*) empezó a errar –pequeña y tierna- de manera nómade por el mundo, yendo a animar, como diría Benjamin, los juguetes, o las marionetas[4], como indicaría von Kleist. Tal vez el alma de los animales habite hoy día en el cine, en esa condición espectral que hace que el cine «anime»(dé alma) a lo muerto[5].

En este artículo me referiré a un pasaje de la historia del pensamiento occidental en torno a la cuestión animal, en el que, junto al planteamiento de la «falta de sentir« en los animales, en un preanuncio de la idea de la *bête-machine*, se produce la reacción que cuestiona esta idea y ubica al animal en otro lugar. Desde la obra de Gómez Pereira de 1554 (*Antoniana Margarita*) se intentará mostrar que los hombres «necesitaron»que el animal perdiera su alma, para justificar el sacrificio y maltrato animal. Sacrificio y maltrato animal que en nuestra época de super-productividad debe ser constantemente señalado y denunciado.

1. De Aristóteles y el alma de los animales a la bête-machine

Más allá del alma atribuida a los animales por parte de los pitagóricos y algunos otros filósofos presocráticos, es sin duda Aristóteles quien fundamenta desde un punto de vista metafísico la «necesidad»del alma animal (como alma sensitiva). Cuando se habla de «alma»en Aristóteles hay que tener en cuenta tres conceptos: el alma como principio de vida, como forma del cuerpo organizado, y como acto de los entes que tienen vida en potencia. El alma, en este sentido, recoge aquel elemento presente en muchas lenguas, que remite al hálito, a la

[3] «Animula, vagula, blandula/ Hospes comesque corporis/Quae nunc abibis in loca/Pallidula, rigida, nudula,/Nec, ut soles, dabis iocos….».

[4] Sobre el alma de las muñecas y de los juguetes véase el bellísimo capítulo 2 (*Alma. Por qué las muñecas tienen alma*) del inspirador libro de Guy Hocquenhem y René Scherer, *El alma atómica*, trad. D. Zadunaisky, Barcelona 1987.

[5] Jacques Derrida ha señalado esta condición del cine, que pone en escena fantasmas, en J. Derrida, *Le cinéma et ses fantômes. Entretien avec A. de Baecque et T. Jousse*, en *Penser à ne pas voir. Ecrits sur les arts du visible 1979-2004*, textes reunís et édités par G. Michaud, J. Masó et J. Bassas, Ljublana 2014, pp. 315-335. Akira Mizutta Lippit ha trabajado este tema en relación al animal en *Electric animal: toward a rhetoric of wildlife*, Minneapolis 2000, y en (entre otros lugares) *La muerte de un animal*, trad. G. Di Iorio y A. Sorin, en *Instantes y azares. Escrituras nietzscheanas,* Nro 13, 2013, disponible en http://www.instantesyazares.com.ar/#! numero-actual/vstc1=animales-y-cine:-el-animal...

respiración, a ese instante en que se insufla, por el aire, vida a un ente. La palabra latina «*anima*» (vinculada con el término griego «*anemos*», viento) remite a la *psyché* griega, que se deriva del verbo *psycho*, (soplar). El sustantivo *psyché* aludía a ese aliento que el muerto exhala. En muchas religiones y mitos la divinidad «sopla»sobre la materia para darle vida, y como ese «aliento« permanece en lo viviente hasta la muerte, *psyché* pasó a designar el «alma«. El «animal» es el que tiene «ánima», entonces, animal es el que tiene vida. En latín, *anima* designaba el aspecto más pasional y sensible del alma (identificado con lo femenino), mientras que *animus* se utilizó para referirse al carácter del valor, del coraje, que se vinculaba con lo masculino. Esta raíz de las lenguas indoeuropeas (*an*) está presente en esta idea de hálito en las lenguas latina, española, francesa, e inglesa, lenguas en las que la palabra «animal»se emparenta con el término «alma»[6].

Para Aristóteles, el alma sensitiva, que comparten hombres y animales, implica percepción, movimiento y deseos vinculados con el cuerpo, mientras que el alma racional supone conocimiento superior y voluntad (aquello a lo que los animales no podrían acceder). Es importante tener en cuenta el lugar que tiene el deseo en esta idea de alma, ya que «En efecto, el apetito, los impulsos y la voluntad son tres clases de deseo (*órexis*)«.[7] Con lo cual, hombres y animales comparten un deseo, una *órexis*, que se manifiesta en diversos ámbitos, y esos ámbitos son los que permiten establecer las diferencias entre humanos y animales. Creo que en esa *órexis* se halla el aspecto más interesante del alma como principio vital, ya que la *órexis* es tensión hacia el *télos*. El alma es, entonces, aquello que permite el movimiento en lo vital, y ese movimiento tiende a la forma propia de cada tipo de alma. Lo que caracteriza al alma no es entonces una cierta atribución, sino más bien la posibilidad de la tensión, el movimiento al que alude el soplo. En *Movimiento de los animales*, Aristóteles señala:

> Es evidente que todos los animales tienen un soplo innato y que son fuertes por él. Cómo se preserva el soplo innato, se ha expuesto en otro lugar; por lo que respecta a la relación de este soplo con el principio del alma, parece ser semejante a la del punto en las articulaciones, que mueve y es movido, con lo inmóvil[8].

En los entes vivientes, el alma vegetativa es la que tiene el deseo de nutrición y crecimiento, y el alma sensitiva siente placer y dolor, y es propia de los entes que pueden moverse. Y el alma racional es la que puede pensar y deliberar (el animal no puede responder, sino que reacciona, mientras que el hombre puede elegir). En la medida en que todo ente tiende a su perfección[9], lo propio del

[6] Véase «ani-ane» en R. Grandsaignes d´Hauterive, *Dictionnaire des racines des languess européennes*, Paris 1948, p. 7.
[7] Aristóteles*, Acerca del alma,* introducción, traducción y notas de T. Calvo Martínez*,* Madrid 1978, *414 b,* p. 175.
[8] No hay acuerdo acerca del posible carácter apócrifo de la obra, pero la cito porque (sea o no sea de Aristóteles) se evidencia ese vínculo entre el soplo y el alma antes indicado. Aristóteles, *Movimiento de los animales*, introducción, traducción y notas de E. Jiménez Sánchez-Escariche y A. Alonso Miguel, Madrid 2000, 703 a 9-14, pp. 324-315.
[9] En *Metafísica,* Aristóteles indica que: «El fin es el bien de cada una [de cada cosa], y el bien supremo en la naturaleza toda», véase *Metafísica* 982 b., edición trilingüe de V. García Yebra,

hombre consistirá en aquello que lo diferencia de vegetales y animales, es decir, la función intelectual (que constituye su diferencia específica con los animales), y en la adecuación de su vida vegetativa y sensitiva a ésta. En este punto se patentiza por qué es posible el dominio del animal, en el mismo hombre o fuera del hombre: es por alcanzar lo «propiamente humano« que la animalidad debe ser puesta al servicio de esta causa. Es importante tener en cuenta que Aristóteles atribuye al animal capacidad estimativa, lo que le permite establecer distinciones, pero la diferencia específica con el humano se encuentra en que el animal no puede alcanzar lo universal (siglos más tarde, Heidegger dirá que el animal no capta el «en tanto tal«[10]).

Sin embargo, más allá de las cuestiones que atañen a lo propiamente humano, me interesa destacar que en la concepción aristotélica el alma está pensada como tensión, como movimiento, que comparten, de algún modo, los entes vivientes. Hay «algo» que los acomuna, y que es ese soplo vital que es el alma, al que remite también Aristóteles cuando indica que los poemas órficos reconocen que el alma nace de los vientos: «los poemas conocidos como órficos dicen que el alma nace de los vientos, entra con el aire en los animales cuando respiran»[11].

Cuando el alma se «platoniza» con el cristianismo[12], se transforma, de movimiento y tensión que era, en propiedad y atributo de lo específicamente humano. Con esto no estoy señalando que el alma se haya desvinculado de lo vital, pero sí se puede indicar que, al privilegiarse un «tipo de vida» (la espiritual humana) frente a otra (la del resto de los vivientes) el alma «propiamente humana»se caracteriza por sus «propiedades»o atribuciones que, con el tiempo, tendrán el sello de lo «personal» o identitario. Derrida ha señalado de qué manera casi todas las religiones, que parecieran defender la vida «en general», en rigor preservan «algún tipo de vida» frente a otra. Ese tipo de vida que preservan es la que se considera indemne o «propia»[13]: en este sentido, la vida del alma espiritual pasó a ser, con el cristianismo, lo «más propio» del hombre. Lo más propio se transformó en elemento de diferenciación con el resto de lo vivo, sobre todo con el animal. Un ejemplo paradigmático de esta desvinculación del alma con respecto a lo viviente se encuentra en la figura de Branca Doria en *La divina*

Madrid 1998, p. 13.

[10] M. Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik- Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit, Gesamtausgabe 29/30,* V., Frankfurt a. M., 1992, § 60 (el animal, dirá Heidegger, no puede conocer ni dejar ser al ente en cuanto tal).

[11] Aristóteles, *Acerca del alma* 401 26-30, ed.cit., p. 162. Allí señala también que los órficos no tuvieron en cuenta que algunos animales no respiran.

[12] Me refiero, claro está, a la expresión de Nietzsche «El cristianismo es platonismo para el pueblo« en *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, «Vorrede«, *KSA 5*, p.12 (las obras de F. Nietzsche se citan como *KSA* a partir de las *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, Hrsg. von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Berlín-New York, 1980).

[13] J. Derrida, *Fe y saber. Las dos fuentes de la religión en los límites de la mera razón*, en J. Derrida y G. Vattimo, *La religión (Seminario de Capri)*, trad. C. de Peretti y P. Vidarte, Buenos Aires 1997, pp. 7-106, la referencia a lo indemne está en los parágrafos 13 y 18, y desarrollada en el parágrafo 27, pp. 37 ss.

comedia, ya que Dante encuentra el alma de Branca que es castigada en el noveno círculo del infierno, mientras su cuerpo sigue vivo en la tierra[14].

2. Animales que no sienten (animales sin alma): Gómez Pereira

¿Qué consecuencias supone la pérdida del alma por parte de los animales? Indicamos rápidamente que el cristianismo le quita espesor «vital» al alma al espiritualizarla, y además la reserva para el ámbito de lo «propiamente»humano. En la filosofía moderna, la noción del animal como autómata significa un paso más en la consideración del alma como característica específicamente humana, que no atañe al mundo animal.

Se suele considerar que la concepción de la *bête-machine* se inicia con Descartes, quien, en la Quinta parte del *Discurso del método*, se refiere a la teoría del animal como autómata. Sin embargo, en el siglo anterior, un médico español, Gómez Pereira, había sostenido una postura más radical (sin referirse a los animales como mecanismos). En su texto *Antoniana Margarita*, *obra no menos útil que necesaria, que trata sobre temas físicos, médicos y teológicos*, que se editó en 1554 en Medina del Campo[15], Gómez Pereira había planteado como locura, impiedad y absurdo el afirmar que los animales sienten. Porque todo sentir se halla relacionado con la reflexión: entonces, aquello que parece sentir no es en el animal más que «reacción«. Las «reacciones animales»se explican por hábitos, memoria e instintos naturales, porque si se les atribuyera sentir ocurre que «concedida la sensibilidad a los brutos, hay que concederles la conciencia»[16]. La conciencia supone el conocimiento de que se ve, se oye, y eso implicaría conceder que los animales tienen alma. Y éste es el punto nodal de toda la argumentación de Pereira: sostener y defender la inmortalidad del alma humana, lo que implica que los animales no pueden tenerla.

Todos los argumentos de *Antoniana Margarita* giran en torno a la metáfora del imán: el animal es movido de manera automática, como las partículas atraídas por los imanes: no hay aquí decisión, deliberación o elección alguna. Ese movimiento automático implica ciertos mediadores: especies y fantasmas, que operan como elementos de un engranaje que impide considerar que el animal tenga representaciones.

Cuando Benito Jerónimo Feijoo quiere diferenciar el pensamiento de Descartes del de Gómez Pereira, señala que

> Entrambos negaron alma sensitiva a los brutos; pero Descartes redujo todos sus movimientos a puro mecanismo: Pereira los atribuyó a simpatías, y antipatías, con los

[14] Dante Alighieri, *Divina Commedia*, *Inferno*, Canto XXXIII, 155-157, «per sua opra in anima in Cocito già si bagna, e in corpo par vivo ancor di sopra».
[15] Descartes rechaza conocer la obra de Gómez Pereira en su Carta a Mersenne del 23 de junio de 1641; *A. T.*, (Adam, Ch.-Tannery, P.*, Oeuvres de Descartes, vols. I-XII*, Paris 1988, t. III, p. 386.
[16] Gómez Pereira, *Antoniana Margarita,* reproducción facsimilar de la ed. de 1749, estudio preliminar y versión al español de J. L. Barreiro Barreiro, Compostela-Oviedo 2000.

objetos ocurrentes; de modo que, según este Filósofo, no por otro principio el Perro (pongo por ejemplo) viene al llamamiento del amo, que aquel mismo por el cual, según la vulgar Filosofía, el hierro se acerca al imán, y el azogue al oro[17].

Esto significa que si bien Pereira no pensó en términos de máquinas, sí lo hizo en términos de «reacciones» que suponen siempre un cierto automatismo. Para explicar estas reacciones es que recurrió a las «especies»que generan movimientos en el animal, y los «fantasmas«, especies guardadas en la memoria. Lo interesante del trabajo de Gómez Pereira es que toda la disquisición en torno a los animales y su carencia de sentir se vincula con «necesidades humanas«: es siempre desde la «propia naturaleza del hombre»y sus necesidades que se desarrollan las argumentaciones que niegan el alma animal. El argumento extremo de estas necesidades se encuentra en la afirmación de que hay que negarles el sentir a los animales, porque si no deberíamos admitir que los hombres que los utilizan como fuerza de trabajo (por ejemplo, cargando inhumanamente a las mulas que transportan pesadas cargas en los bordes de los precipicios) y los someten a torturas al hacerlos objeto de espectáculos (como en la tauromaquia), carecen de bondad:

> el tormento de los toros perseguidos alcanza la cima de lo cruel cuando son heridos por pértigas, espadas y piedras -ya que no hay otra práctica humana con la que la vista del hombre se deleite tanto como con estas acciones tan vergonzosas, incluso pareciendo que la bestia pide la libertad con mugidos suplicantes[18].

Este párrafo se encuentra bajo el título «Si los brutos sintieran desaparecería toda la bondad de la naturaleza», e intenta justificar que los animales, que han sido puestos al servicio del hombre (y en la medida en que este servicio siempre implica sufrimiento para ellos) no pueden sentir el sufrimiento, porque si no la creación, y los hombres, no serían bondadosos. Otro ejemplo de este modo de argumentar se patentiza cuando se considera que dado que sólo el hombre puede poseer libre albedrío («Bruta enim electionem non habent»), los movimientos vitales de los animales no obedecen a ninguna elección, sino a la ejecución de sus actos de un «modo natural«: esa es la razón por la cual «naturalmente»(y no por sentido ni entendimiento) las aves emigran en el otoño, o construyen sus nidos en determinados lugares. Pereira sabe que sus argumentos parecen contrarios a la evidencia (los animales «parecen»sentir), pero hay una razón de peso que obliga a negar esta evidencia, y es la primacía del hombre y su alma inmortal frente al animal. Como señala Teófilo González Vila[19], el supuesto fundamental de toda la antropología pereirana es la superioridad del hombre con respecto a los animales, y por ello es que, como hemos indicado, todo gira en torno al hombre

[17] Benito J. Feijoo, *Teatro crítico universal*, Madrid, Real Compañía de Impresores y Libreros, 1777, Real tomo III, Discurso noveno, «Racionalidad de los brutos«, § II, 11, pp. 187-223.
[18] G. Pereira, *Antoniana Margarita*, cit., p. 8.
[19] Teófilo González Vila*, La Antropología de Gómez Pereira*, Madrid 1974, disponible en http://www.filosofia.org/cla/per/1974tgv0.htm. Acceso 02/03/2015.

y sus necesidades. Era necesario, entonces, que el animal no sintiera, para no avergonzar al humano que se deleita con el sufrimiento animal.

Uno de los adversarios de Pereira en esta cruzada negadora del sentir animal es un teólogo salmantino, Miguel de Palacios, que había recibido la obra de Gómez Pereira, quien se la había enviado para solicitarle su opinión, y contesta con una serie de objeciones, e insta al autor a corregir una serie de errores (amenazando con una denuncia por herejía). Por su parte, Gómez Pereira responde a esas objeciones en una segunda edición de la *Antoniana Margarita*, y allí afirma:

> Es una locura pensar que el común de los hombres cree que es verdad que el perro mueve la cola al ver a su señor...Hablar de la sensibilidad de los brutos es una decisión más propia de locos que de imprudentes, porque es tan inútil la ficción de los que afirman que los brutos sienten, como vana la de los que dijeran que la licuación de la cera o el endurecimiento del lodo no se deben a la acción del sol[20].

Pero, además de estas objeciones del teólogo, en 1556 otro médico, Francisco de Sosa, publicó el *Endecálogo contra Antoniana Margarita, en el cual se tratan muchas y muy delicadas razones, y autoridades con que se prueba, que los brutos sienten y por sí se mueven*[21].

He trabajado en otro lugar la contraposición Gómez Pereira-Francisco de Sosa como una expresión de la «ciencia jovial»nietzscheana[22], ya que de Sosa responde a las argumentaciones pereiranas de manera jocosa y «performativizando» aquello que Pereira niega: el sentir (y razonar) animal. Quisiera indicar ahora por qué esta obra representa un momento importante de la historia del pensamiento en cuanto al tema del alma de los animales y a la denuncia de las «necesidades humanas, demasiado humanas» de negación de dicha alma.

El *Endecálogo* se constituye como un diálogo entre diversos animales («Jimio« [*sic*], «Murciégalo» [*sic*], Cocodrilo, León, Águila, Ballena, Elefante, el lobo), Mercurio, Momo y Júpiter. Los animales (esos mismos que para Pereira

[20] Josep Lluís Barona Vilar, en *Sobre medicina y filosofía natural en el Renacimiento*, Seminari D´Estudis sobre la Ciencia, Universitat de València 1993, hace referencia a que fueron dos las respuestas más cercanas temporalmente a la obra de Gómez Pereira, además de la de Sosa, que aquí comentaremos, se refiere a la respuesta del mismo Palacios, véase p. 123. La obra de Palacios es *Objetiones Michaelis de Palacios adversus nonnulla e multiplicibus paradoxis Antonianae Margaritae et apologia earundem,* Medina del Campo: Guillermo de Milis, 1555. 18 fols. Están recogidas en una segunda edición de la *Antoniana Margarita*, en la ed.cit. véanse en pp. 304-318, seguidas de la Defensa de Gómez Pereira.

[21] La obra se encuentra en Ana Vian Herrero *(ed.), Diálogos españoles del renacimiento*, Edición general, estudio preliminar y cronología de A. Vian Herrero, Almuzara, Toledo 2010, y el *Endecálogo* (pp. 523-582) tiene introducción, edición y notas de P. Cátedra García.

[22] Véase M. B. Cragnolini, *Amamos la vida, no por hábito de vivir sino por hábito de amar. Hacia una ciencia «jovial»del animal*, en Esther Diaz (ed.), *Nietzsche y la ciencia. Modulaciones epistemológicas III,* Editorial Biblos Filosofía Coedición UNLa, 2015 (e.p.). Sobre la idea de la ciencia jovial nietzscheana en relación al tema de los animales, remito a M. B. Cragnolini, *La ciencia jovial: un ejercicio del derroche frente a la «guerra santa» contra el animal*, en «*Nómadas, Revista de la Universidad Central*», 37 (octubre 2012), pp. 146-155, ISSN 0121-7550, http://www.ucentral.edu.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2779&Itemid=5159

están movidos «naturalmente») se reúnen en asamblea para denunciar al hombre que ha osado, con argumentos presuntamente filosóficos, señalar que ellos no se mueven por sí mismos[23]. Frente a esto, los animales afirman categóricamente que tienen «ánima viviente» y piden a Júpiter la condena de Gómez Pereira, porque, como señala el Murciélago, es «no menos perjudicial que falso cuanto dice»[24]. El Cocodrilo es quien se encarga de llevar la petición a Júpiter, y en su indignación indica que podría comerse al tal presunto filósofo que les ha provocado tanto daño, y que se movería, para hacerlo, sin necesidad de que las especies muevan sus miembros[25]. Cuando presenta su acusación contra Pereira, señala que «todos los brutos fueron criados con ánima viviente«, «que todo animal es substancia animada y sensitiva, claro está, pues los brutos son animales, que son sensitivos»[26], entre otras afirmaciones. La petición de los animales apunta a que Pereira rectifique lo que ha postulado en su obra, para no producir de ese modo más perjuicio a los animales. Mercurio es el encargado por Júpiter de averiguar si existe semejante hombre que se haya atrevido a afirmar que los animales no sienten, y lo auxilia en sus tarea Momo, convertido en zorro para probar si eran ciertas las afirmaciones de la *Antoniana Margarita*. Siendo animal, Momo advierte que los animales sienten y que se mueven por sí mismos, y se burla ante Mercurio de las «especies»de Pereira, que parecen más inteligentes que el alma racional[27], ya que cada una debe saber en qué nervio colocarse para producir movimiento en el animal. A Momo, transformado en zorro, lo mueven a risa todos los argumentos de Pereira para mostrar que los animales no sienten: las especies, los fantasmas, los instintos naturales, los hábitos, conceptos todos que nunca se aclaran en la obra (y que, más bien., se exponen de modo confuso).

Con estos datos de la experiencia animal de Momo, Mercurio retorna a Júpiter, quien sentencia que «restituyendo a los brutos en su honra, pronunciamos que tienen ánima viviente y que son más que plantas y árboles, y que apetecen y conocen lo que los es dañoso o provechoso, y que sienten y que se mueven por sí»[28].

Mercurio declara también que los animales tienen alma sensitiva, y que muchas veces parecen entender mejor que los hombres y que pueden aprender. Y se afirma asimismo que el argumento que dice que los brutos no sienten no es adecuado para demostrar la inmortalidad del alma, sería mejor, dice la sentencia, que un cristiano crea eso por fe, sin necesidad de buscar otros argumentos. La sentencia condena entonces a silencio a Pereira, y considera que el papel que

[23] F. de Sosa, *Endecálogo...,* en Ana Vian Herrero *(ed.), Diálogos españoles del renacimiento*, cit., p. 544.
[24] p. 538.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 540. Se refiere a la teoría de Gómez Pereira del movimiento de los animales a partir de las especies y fantasmas.
[26] *Ibid.,* p. 545.
[27] *Ibid.,* p. 570.
[28] *Ibid.,* p. 575.

usó para imprimir sus libros debe ser usado por los especieros para colocar las «especias«, ya que tan interesado se hallaba en las «especies»[29].

Pero cuando Mercurio debe ir a la tierra a anoticiarlo de la sentencia, se hace evidente que más allá de los argumentos, el interés en negar el sentir a los animales es otro. Mercurio señala que tiene conocimiento de que Pereira ha tenido «ásperas palabras» contra quienes defienden a los animales[30]. El argumento antes indicado con respecto a la tauromaquia y al uso de los animales como fuerza de trabajo evidencia que lo que está en juego en la argumentación es, más allá de cualquier posición metafísica, una cuestión política. O bien, podríamos decir, la argumentación metafísica muestra lo que se pretende desde el punto de vista político: la justificación de lo injustificable, es decir, del sufrimiento animal mediante negación del mismo. Por esas épocas en que Gómez Pereira escribía esto, otros españoles se encontraban en América sojuzgando a los pueblos originarios en virtud de la consideración de éstos como «animales». Era conveniente, entonces, que los animales no sintieran, para evitar la vergüenza de aquellos que los explotaban. Es por eso, también, que el animal ha sido puesto siempre en la situación de «ser mirado« y no de aquel «que mira»[31].

A veces se presenta el *Endecálogo* como perteneciente al género de la fábula[32], y, más allá de los recursos utilizados, se podría decir que no es una fábula, justamente porque aquí no se trata de «usar» a los animales como ejemplo para los humanos y el fomento de sus virtudes, sino que los animales tienen entidad por sí mismos y, si bien con los modos humanos, quieren mostrar aspectos del mundo animal, y no servir de metáfora para cuestiones humanas. El *Endecálogo* es una defensa del «sentir» de los animales, defensa que si bien no desarrolla las consecuencias a nivel ético y político de la negación de ese sentir, sin embargo señala repetidas veces que ese tipo de argumentos resulta «perjudicial» para los animales.

3. Alma y sufrimiento

Este breve pasaje de la «pérdida del alma animal» que hemos señalado apunta a señalar, como se indicaba al inicio, que era conveniente y necesario,

[29] Ya lo indiqué antes, pero vuelvo a recordar que toda la obra de Francisco de Sosa performativiza de manera irónica todo aquello que Pereira niega en su obra.
[30] F. de Sosa, *Endecálogo*, cit., p. 581.
[31] El trabajo de J. Derrida en *L'animal que donc je suis,* Paris 2006, parte precisamente de la mirada del animal (la gata) que lo mira desnudo, y de la negación de la mirada del animal, que en el *Séminaire La bête et le souverain*. *Volume I (2001-2002*), Paris 2008, p. 376 ss., se desarrolla en torno a la mirada de la *curiositas* de la ciencia en la autopsia del elefante en la *menagerie* de Luis XIV. Para un trabajo en relación a este punto de la imagen de la autopsia del elefante y lo que ella implica, véase M. B. Cragnolini, *Hospitalidad (con el) animal*, en «Escritura e imagen», *Vol. extra: Herencias de Derrida*, Universidad Complutense de Madrid (2011): 313-324, ISSN 1885-5687, disponible en http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_ESIM.2011.37741
[32] En su introducción a la edición citada del *Endecálogo*, Pedro Cátedra García señala, en pp. 532 ss., los dos motivos de la asamblea de animales y de la *eris*, la disputa entre cocodrilo y murciélago, como uso de las formas de la fabulística.

para que el hombre se constituyera como *autos,* sujeto soberano y dueño de todo lo viviente[33], que el animal no tuviera alma. Hoy en día ya no se habla de alma, y su lugar lo ocupa la mente. Pero aquello que estaba presente en la negación del sentir como algo propio de los animales, negación que ejercitó con múltiples argumentos Gómez Pereira a lo largo de su *Antoniana Margarita*, sigue presente en el olvido del sufrimiento animal.

Es cierto que nadie negaría hoy en día que los animales sienten y sufren, sin embargo la maquinaria productiva obliga a no mirar y a no reconocer ese sufrimiento. Existe una forclusión del sufrimiento animal, porque este sufrimiento es continuamente «presupuesto« pero negado (en la industria alimenticia y cosmética, en la experimentación científica, en los zoológicos, circos y espectáculos con animales). De los sufrimientos de los animales en los tambos, granjas, *feed-lots*, mataderos, etc., no se habla o se los presupone como «sacrificios necesarios»para las «necesidades humanas alimenticias«. La presencia de animales en circos y zoológicos se aprueba por «necesidades de esparcimiento o educativas«. El uso de animales en experimentación científica se considera «necesario« para salvar vidas humanas[34].

Stefano Cagno ha propuesto referirse siempre a la experimentación animal como «vivisección»[35], para hacer evidente esa crueldad de todo «tratamiento» del animal en la experimentación. Frente al uso reservado del término «vivisección» para el seccionamiento «en vivo» del animal (por ejemplo, con fines didácticos), Cagno aboga por el uso de dicho término para toda experimentación con animales, como un modo de patentizar ese sufrimiento (que señalé como forcluido) que implica siempre, de algún modo, como diría Nietzsche, «sajar» la vida[36]. La vida, el tiempo, las energías del animal[37] sometido a experimentación son sajadas durante todo el proceso de la experiencia, antes de sacrificio final. Continuo sacrificio de una vida que se considera producida «para salvar otras vidas», las vidas de los humanos que, presuntamente, se «beneficiarán» con los resultados de las experiencias. Más allá de la discusión acerca del valor de los resultados de dichas experiencias en relación a lo humano[38], la pregunta a realizarse es por

[33] Para el desarrollo de esta idea, remito a M. B. Cragnolini, *Virilidad carnívora: el ejercicio de la autoridad sojuzgante frente a lo viviente*, «Revista Científica de UCES, Universidad de Ciencias empresariales y sociales» 16 (2012), pp. 45-51, (también en http://dspace.uces.edu.ar:8180/dspace/handle/123456789/1460)

[34] No discutiré aquí la obviedad de lo fementido de tales necesidades, existen múltiples textos que muestran que la carne no es necesaria para la alimentación humana y es sustituible, otros tantos textos que cuestionan el carácter educativo de los zoológicos, y ni qué decir del cuestionamiento al uso de animales en espectáculos. Asimismo, montones de trabajos muestran lo innecesario del uso de animales en pruebas de laboratorio y los métodos alternativos para la investigación científica.

[35] S. Cagno, *Gli animali e la ricerca, Viaggio nel mondo della vivisezione,* Roma 1997.

[36] F. Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, «Vor den Wissenschaft», *KSA 4*, pp. 375-378.

[37] La captación de la vida, el tiempo y las energías del animal responden a la idea de «tratamiento«, tal como la desarrolla J. Derrida en el *Séminaire La bête et le souverain*. *Volume I (2001-2002*), cit., especialmente *Onzième seánce*, pp. 371 ss.

[38] Se puede afirmar que los resultados de las experiencias con animales prácticamente no tienen posibilidad de ser trasladados al ámbito de lo humano: medicamentos probados en animales fueron desastrosos en humanos (por ejemplo, la talidomida, que no había resultado teratógena

qué, independientemente de los resultados, la ciencia no cuestiona el sacrificio constante de vidas que ella exige.

Nietzsche había caracterizado esta tendencia de la ciencia como exacerbación del ideal ascético: esa necesidad de la vida a negarse a sí misma (para poder seguir siendo vida) es la que el científico utiliza para poner «vida contra vida» en el ejercicio diario de sus investigaciones[39]. Se entiende que esta contraposición es la que se produce entre las vidas que se consideran únicas y valiosas por sí mismas frente a las vidas «producidas» y generales de montones de animales, que nacen en laboratorios, viven y sufren en laboratorios (o empresas) y mueren en laboratorios. A esos animales, para colocarlos en tales condiciones, fue necesario quitarles el alma.

Mencioné al inicio los versos que -se dice- compuso el emperador Adriano antes de morir[40], y que Marguerite Yourcenar recoge en la redacción de sus *Memorias de Adriano*. Julio Cortázar, al traducir al español la obra de Yourcenar, escribe los versos de esta manera «Mínima alma mía, tierna y flotante/ huésped y compañera de mi cuerpo…»[41].

El alma de los animales es alma mínima, tierna y flotante, errando forcluida en la conciencia de los hombres. A veces reaparece, como «alma» de los animales de compañía (o también llamadas «mascotas»). A estos animales se les concede «alma» personalizándolos y acercándolos al mundo de las «personas«, es decir, identificándolos. Mientras tanto, a miles de millones de animales se les niega alma porque, a pesar de que se sabe que sufren, se niega ese sufrimiento.

En nuestra sociedad, los animales de compañía cumplen una función cuasi-denegatoria del sufrimiento animal: por un lado, «reconcilian» al hombre con el mundo animal, permitiéndole vivir una parte de ese mundo en su propia casa, pero, por otro lado, evidencian ese tipo de especismo que tan bien supo retratar Pawel Kuczynski en la imagen del granjero que acaricia a su gato -dispuesto a esperar su comida- con una mano, mientras que en la otra sostiene una cuchilla

en animales), medicamentos útiles en humanos son dañinos en animales (por ejemplo, el ácido acetilsalicílico), con lo cual no se puede acordar un valor «objetivo« a estas experiencias. Si es así, ¿por qué se siguen haciendo, más allá de que lo indiquen los protocolos de probación y uso de los medicamentos?

[39] He trabajado este tema en M. Cragnolini, *An 'Other Way of Being'. The Nietzschean Animal: Contributions to the Question of Biopolitics*, en V. Lemm (ed.), *Nietzsche and the Becoming of Life*, New York 2014, pp. 214-230.

[40] «Animula, vagula, blandula / Hospes comesque corporis / Quae nunc abibis in loca / Pallidula, rigida, nudula, / Nec, ut soles, dabis iocos…», *Historiae Augustae*, Loeb Classical Library, MCMXXI, Hadrianus, Pars II, 25.9, accesible en http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Historia_Augusta/Hadrian/2*.html (acceso 22/3/2015). Uso la imagen en relación al alma de los animales más allá de la explícita referencia de Adriano a su propia alma, y a su relación con los animales. En su historia se cuenta que amaba a perros y caballos, a los que les levantaba altares en sus tumbas, pero que también era un gran aficionado a la caza.

[41] M. Yourcenar, *Memorias de Adriano,* trad. J. Cortázar, Barcelona 1994, p. 163. Cortázar también recoge el inicio del poema «Animula, vagula, blandula» en el capítulo 3 de *Rayuela*, para plantearse la pregunta «¿qué hacer?«, en el contexto de un párrafo sobre Oblomov, Hamlet, y otros indecisos (Julio Cortázar, *Rayuela*, Buenos Aires 1963.)

ante los animales que lo miran desde el establo: caballo, vaca, mula, oveja, cerdo, gallinas, pavo y patos[42].

Mondher Kilani ha evidenciado esta «doble moral» con respecto a los animales de compañía y el resto de los animales[43]. La crisis de la «vaca loca» patentizó el carácter que se adjudica a las vacas, de meros engranajes de una cadena productiva, frente a otro tipo de animales (como perros y gatos) que forman parte del mundo humano. Las vacas que fueron sacrificadas durante la epidemia no pesan en la conciencia de nadie (salvo en la conciencia económica) en la medida en que son «anónimas», sin alma, diríamos, en el sentido personal del alma que hoy en día se atribuye a los animales de compañía[44].

Pero el *animula vagula blandula* de los animales no es personal, es un alma errante y desidentificada, porque la personalidad y la identificación son lo «propio» del humano, que a través de ese «ser persona» puede enseñorearse sobre todo lo viviente. En el marco de los debates biopolíticos, se ha insistido en los últimos años en la «tercera persona»[45] o en el concepto de impersonal, en parte para plantear la pregunta en torno a la vida y al modo de «cuidarla» cuando el modo de ser «personal» parece generar siempre mecanismos inmunitarios que devienen tanatológicos[46]. Ser «persona», ser identidad, supone «separarse» del modo de ser-que-somos con el resto de lo viviente para, en nombre propio, poder ser diferente y superior al resto de lo vivo. Esto es lo que permite la existencia de mecanismos de apropiación de la realidad, modos de la soberanía que en la filosofía moderna implican apropiarse del viviente animal como objeto disponible.

Podríamos pensar la comunidad de lo viviente en términos de «tercera persona» o de lo neutro, aquello que Derrida ha caracterizado en términos del «tránsito del quién al qué»[47]. Tal vez ese sea el desafío para el pensar contemporáneo en relación al animal: deconstruir la historia de la «persona«, del tránsito por el cual el hombre se enseñorea sobre todo lo viviente para poder dominarlo y utilizarlo, y pensar un pasaje al «qué» que permita considerar que el modo de ser que somos supone al animal (en nosotros y «fuera»de nosotros) como un modo

[42] Véase la imagen aquí: http://www.pictorem.com/2099/Pawel%20Kuczynski17.html (no se encuentra en la selección de obras que figura en la página personal del artista).
[43] M. Kilani, en *Crise de la «vache folle»et déclin de la raison sacrificielle*, «Terrain» 38 (mars 2002), pp. 113-126, traducción de M. B. Cragnolini, *·La crisis de la vaca loca y la decadencia de la razón sacrificial*, en «Instantes y azares. Escrituras nietzscheanas» 13 (2013), disponible en http://www.instantesyazares.com.ar/#!__numero-actual/vstc2=mondher-kilani/vstc1=del-animal,-de-la-carne...
[44] J.-P. Digard, en *L 'homme et les animaux domestiques. Anthropologie d´une passion*, Paris 1990, señala en pp. 2231 ss. cómo a la hiperdomesticación y sobreprotección que se da a los animales de compañía se opone el maltrato que reciben los animales de producción, y cómo estas dos actitudes implican que los animales familiares cada vez son más pequeños, mientras que los animales que sirven de alimentación son cada vez más grandes.
[45] R. Esposito, *Terza persona. Politica della vita e filosofia dell'impersonale*, Torino 2007.
[46] Véase R. Esposito, *Immunitas. Protezione e negazione della vita*, Torino 2002.
[47] Derrida se refiere a la relevancia del «tránsito del quién al qué« como temática de sus obras en torno a la hospitalidad, el don, el perdón, en J. Derrida, *Como si fuese posible. Within such limits. Within such limits*, en *Papel Máquina*, trad. C. de Peretti y P. Vidarte, Madrid 2003, pp. 27-258.

del *ser-con* (el *Mit-sein* heideggeriano). Somos-con ese otro que es el animal, y que es, tal vez, más «otro« que cualquier otro humano.[48]

La disputa en torno al sentir de los animales, y la concepción de la *bête-machine* se halla vinculada con una cuestión de «privilegio« de lo humano. En efecto, buena parte de todas las discusiones en torno al animal como autómata se vinculan con la idea dela inmortalidad del alma humana, y esto también se hace visible en el texto de Gómez Pereira. Luego de la *Antoniana Margarita*, en 1595 Jean de Champaignac señala en su *Traité de l'immortalité de l'âme* que no es adecuado atribuir razón a los animales, porque de ellos se derivaría la incorruptibilidad de su alma[49]. También Jean de Silhon escribe en 1634 *De l'immortalité de l'âme* y ofrece un modelo mecanicista para explicar la vida animal. Se trata siempre de preservar el modo de ser humano y los caracteres incorruptibles del alma humana frente al modo de ser animal.

Frente a la «vida que pasa y desaparece» del animal pareciera que el modo de ser-hombre siempre debe instaurarse por un carácter de lo que perdura: la cultura, la escritura, es decir, todo aquello que no se pierde en el olvido. El modo de ser-animal, por el contrario, no perdura, y es por eso que se puede atentar contra el animal utilizándolo para alimentación y vestimenta, experimentando con él, convirtiéndolo en objeto de espectáculos. Pero el *animula vagula blandula* del animal, alma frágil, tierna y pasajera, merece cuidado y respeto.

En esta época en la que ya no estamos empeñados en diferenciar el alma humana del alma animal, porque ya no se habla de almas, tal vez sea un buen ejercicio para el pensar el considerar una comunidad de lo viviente en la que humanos y animales nos amparamos en nuestra fragilidad, en lo que pasa y acontece, en la huella que compartimos, más que en poner el acento en la cultura perdurable, la historia y el monumento que dejamos (cultura, historia y monumento que nos hacen creer que somos superiores, y por lo tanto, «dueños» del resto de lo viviente).

[48] Me refiero al animal en este sentido en M. B. Cragnolini, *Los más extraños de los extranjeros: los animales*, en «Actuel Marx/Intervenciones» 12 (2012), pp. 139-145.
[49] Véase T. Gontier, *De l'homme à l'animal. Paradoxes sur la nature des abinaux: Montaigne et Descartes,* Paris 1998, pp. 105 ss.

Contributi/5

Dall'anima degli animali ai diritti animali

Alma Massaro

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The debate on animal souls has been a feature of European thought since the seventeenth century. It originated primarily in human concerns over the metaphysical structure of reality, rather than from an impartiality towards animals. However, it was in the wake of this discussion that reflection on the status of animals, untethered from human considerations and interests, was born in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England. In particular, attention shifted from the human to the animal realm, and this interest was not limited to the issue of the animal afterlife but, moving from a scriptural basis, was focused on the elaboration of ethical perspectives wich were inclusive of non-human animals. The present work will focus on four books published by Anglican pastors (John Hildrop's *Free Thought upon the Brute Creation*, Richard Dean's *An Essay on the Future Life of Brute Creatures*, Humphrey Primatt's *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals* and William H. *Drummond's The Rights of Animals and Man's Obligation to Treat Them With Humanity*) between 1742 and 1838 that trace the rise of Christian animal ethics.

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1. Introduzione: dalla *querelle* intorno all'anima degli animali all'etica animale

Il dibattito relativo all'*anima delle bestie* aveva infuocato gli animi dei pensatori europei già a partire dal diciassettesimo secolo. I problemi di teodicea connessi con la sofferenza animale potevano rappresentare un ottimo appoggio per quelle correnti filosofiche, sorte sulla scia delle ultime scoperte scientifiche, che miravano a sostenere l'irragionevolezza del cristianesimo: come può Dio, ci si domandava, essere buono e onnipotente e permettere, al contempo, che animali innocenti soffrano tutto il male a cui quotidianamente sono sottoposti?[1] Una soluzione per arginare simili derive anti-cristiane consisteva nel negare, in un sol colpo, sentimenti e ragione agli animali, rendendo così illegittima la

[1] K. Thomas, *Man and the Natural World. Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800*, Londra 1984, pp. 34 e 122-124. Cfr. E.S. Turner, *All Heaven in a Rage*, Fontwell, West Sussex 1992, pp. 44-45.

domanda stessa. Tale è la soluzione cartesiana[2], che consisteva, appunto, nel fare degli animali dei semplici automi, incapaci di provare piacere e dolore: in tal modo erano preservate tanto la bontà quanto l'onnipotenza divine.

Posta in questi termini è evidente come tale *querelle* si originasse più che da un vero e proprio interesse nei confronti della vita animale, dall'esigenza di «ridefinizione dell'uomo, egli stesso non più centro dell'universo ma prodotto dell'incontro casuale degli atomi, non più dominatore della realtà ma gradino dell'essere accanto ad altri gradini»[3].

Ed è proprio alla luce di tale discussione, unita a una rinnovata attenzione nei confronti degli animali, che prese vita, nell'Inghilterra del diciottesimo e del diciannovesimo secolo, una profonda riflessione circa il loro *status* che portò, a sua volta, ad importanti riforme sociali e legali, e pose così le basi per i numerosi dibattiti che sarebbero sorti successivamente[4]. Un dato importante che si registrò nell'Inghilterra anglicana di questo periodo fu lo slittamento dell'attenzione dal piano umano a quello animale, che condusse all'elaborazione di prospettive etiche in grado di includere al loro interno anche gli animali non umani, fino a quel momento esclusi dall'universo morale[5]. Nel presente lavoro si ripercorreranno le singolari considerazioni, appunto, di alcuni pastori anglicani relative all'anima degli animali, contenute in quattro opere pubblicate tra il 1742 e il 1838, che sono in grado di restituire il percorso ricco e articolato in cui si snoda la riflessione cristiana intorno all'etica animale.

Tuttavia, prima di passare ad analizzare tali elaborati, è opportuno tenere presente il clima culturale in cui germogliarono e si svilupparono. Le nuove scoperte scientifiche relative all'anatomia comparata[6], la nuova enfasi sulla sensibilità[7], la nuova attenzione umanitaria[8], il nuovo approccio al dolore visto non più come qualcosa da sopportare ma come un fatto da evitare[9], la nascita del medio ceto urbano e la nuova attenzione verso gli animali nella poesia e nella

[2] Ivi, pp. 33-35. È nota la teoria dell'"animale-macchina" elaborata da René Descartes il quale inferisce, dal fatto che gli animali non sono in grado di parlare, che essi non sono neppure in grado di pensare e, quindi, non hanno un'anima e sono *automi*. Cfr. R. Descartes, *Discorso sul metodo*, in *Opere*, vol. I, Bari 1969, pp. 116-118.
[3] M.T. Marcialis, *L'animale e l'immaginario filosofico tra Sei e Settecento*, in *Lo specchio oscuro*, a cura di L. Battaglia, Torino 1993, p. 93. Come osserva Paul Hazard le discussioni relative agli animali erano spesso pretesto per ribadire posizioni filosofiche relative all'uomo, tanto che Hazard, a proposito di tali dibattiti, commenta: «La discussione sull'anima dei bruti, che durava dal tempo del Descartes e che era ancora lontana dalla conclusione, impegnando in un torneo sempre aperto campioni di ogni sorta, non era, in fondo, che una protesta, spesso oscura, in favore dell'istinto» in Paul Hazard, *La crisi della coscienza europea*, trad. it. P. Serini, Torino 1946.
[4] R. Preece-D. Fraser (a cura di), *Dix Harwood's Love for Animals and How it Developed in Great Britain (1928)*, Lewiston, NY 2002, pp. 135-182.
[5] Come afferma Keith Thomas, fino al diciottesimo secolo «For most persons, the beasts were outside the terms of moral reference», Thomas, *cit.*, p. 148. Cfr., inoltre, Preece-Fraser, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
[6] K. Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*, cit., pp. 129-136.
[7] A tale proposito cfr. ivi, p. 177.
[8] J. Turner, *Reckoning with the Beast*, Baltimore 1980, p. 6.
[9] Per quanto riguarda il nuovo approccio al dolore a partire dal diciottesimo secolo, cfr. ivi, pp. 80-82.

letteratura[10] sono tutti fattori che, messi assieme, favorirono un ripensamento della rapporto uomo-animale[11]. Eppure, tutti questi importanti cambiamenti non avrebbero potuto avere una simile efficacia se non fossero stati a loro volta radicati all'interno della tradizione ebraico-cristiana della *stewardship*[12] – secondo cui il rispetto degli animali è un obbligo religioso[13] – che si stava allora diffondendo all'interno degli ambienti mondani[14], attraverso la nascente sensibilità borghese.

2. John Hildrop

Nel 1742 viene pubblicata a Londra un'opera intitolata *Free Thought upon the Brute Creation*[15], la quale rappresenta «il primo esempio in Inghilterra di un libro dedicato quasi esclusivamente alla relazione degli esseri umani con gli animali»[16]. Il suo autore, John Hildrop[17], si dedica a confutare il gesuita francese padre Guillaume Hyacinthe Bougeant, il quale, nel tentativo di risolvere i problemi di teodicea insiti nel dibattito relativo all'anima degli animali, aveva raccolto nel suo *Amusement Philosophique sur les Langages des Bêtes*[18] le proprie

[10] A partire dalle prime decadi del diciottesimo secolo, invero, numerosi saggi filosofici, libri per bambini e opere poetiche furono volte a dimostrare le conseguenze etiche della rinnovata concezione dell'animalità. Per quanto riguarda la poetica di questo periodo, in particolare di Christopher Smart, William Cowper, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, si vedano R. Preece, *Awe for the Tiger, Love for the Lamb: A Chronicle of Sensibility to Animals*, New York 2002, pp. 127-189, K. Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*, cit., p. 149 e Prece-Fraser, *Dix Harwood's Love for Animals*, cit., pp. 361-410. A proposito della letteratura per bambini, cfr. Harwood, cit., pp. 266-275 e E.S. Turner, *All Heaven in a Rage*, cit., pp. 76-83.
[11] Ivi, pp. 137 e 141.
[12] Cfr. ivi, pp. 156 e 173.
[13] Come afferma K. Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*, cit., p. 156: «Considerate treatment of animals [...] became a religious obligation ... Cruelty [...] was an insult to God, a kind of blasphemy against his creation». Si tratta, egli osserva, di una attitudine nei confronti degli animali che è costante tra il XV e il XIX secolo in Europa secondo cui è possibile sì uccidere gli animali per necessità ma non per divertimento. Come egli afferma, «The paradox, therefore, was that it was out of the very contradictions of the old anthropocentric tradition that a new attitude would emerge». La teoria del rispetto per le altre creature nasce, in definitiva, dalla dottrina del peccato originale: se gli animali sono vittime innocenti del peccato dell'uomo, egli deve allora mostrarsi misericordioso con loro. E ancora: «From the later seventeenth century onwards it has thus become an acceptable Christian doctrine that all members of God's creation were entitled to civil usage. Moreover, the area of moral concern had been widened to include many living beings which had been traditionally regarded as hateful or noxious [...] Of course, spontaneous tender-heartedness, as such, was not new» ivi, p. 173.
[14] E.S. Turner, *All Heaven in a Rage*, cit., pp. 5-9: «benevolence [...] moved from pulpit and novel into more mundane settings».
[15] J. Hildrop, *Free Thoughts upon the Brute Creation; or, an Examination of Father Bougeant's Philosophical Amusement &c. In Two Letters to a Lady*, Londra 1742, p. 62.
[16] R.D. Ryder, *Animal Revolution. Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism*, Oxford 2000 (ed. or. 1989), p. 60, traduzione mia.
[17] J. Hildrop (1682-1756), pastore anglicano formatosi al St John's College di Oxford, direttore della Royal Free Grammar School di Marlborough, autore di numerose opere a sfondo polemico contro deisti e liberi pensatori, oltre che di altri notevoli saggi.
[18] G. H. Bougeant, *Amusement Philosophique sur les Langages des Bêtes*, Gissey, Paris 1739.

critiche alla teoria cartesiana dell'animale-macchina, alla quale aveva opposto una singolare dottrina. I corpi degli animali, secondo il gesuita francese, sarebbero vivificati dalle anime degli spiriti ribelli, destinati alla dannazione eterna, a cui Dio, nella sua infinita misericordia, avrebbe concesso di vivere un'esistenza migliore su questa terra, in attesa della condanna definitiva[19]. In questa prospettiva, le sofferenze del mondo presente non sarebbero paragonabili ai dolori che li attendono nella vita futura. Proprio contro tale assurdità, ma anche contro la dottrina cartesiana, si solleva la polemica di Hildrop. A partire dai dati reperibili attraverso l'esperienza comune e le Sacre Scritture, l'autore dimostra che gli animali sono creature innocenti, destinante a una esistenza migliore, e che la crudeltà nei loro confronti è un peccato.

L'esperienza, spiega Hildrop, è sufficiente a smentire il pregiudizio filosofico che fa capo a Descartes, secondo cui gli animali sarebbero delle macchine insensibili. Tutti noi, sostiene l'autore, distinguiamo negli animali un certo grado di comprensione ed è proprio su questa base che ci relazioniamo con loro, educandoli. La nozione di istinto, invece, a cui spesso fa ricorso la filosofia a lui contemporanea per descrive l'agire animale, non è che un'artificiosa creazione, inventata per timore di dover riconoscere in loro l'anima immateriale e, quindi, immortale[20]. Invero, se le bestie sono fornite di pensiero e ragione, è necessario ammettere in esse un principio immateriale a cui ineriscono queste facoltà e dal quale sono dirette, dal momento che «La comprensione senza un'anima e un'anima che non è uno spirito appaiono piuttosto un'assurdità come la luce senza la fiamma e la fiamma senza il fuoco»[21]. È, quindi, opportuno riconoscere la presenza nelle bestie di una sostanza spirituale, spiega Hildrop, attiva, immateriale, distinta dal corpo, che corrisponde a ciò che gli esseri umani chiamano anima vivente[22], ovvero a quel principio immateriale e spirituale che vivifica i nostri corpi.

Similmente, le Sacre Scritture ci informano circa la vita futura degli animali. Se – e qua entra in gioco la catena dell'essere leibniziana[23] – l'intera creazione,

[19] Come commenta Umberto Eco «Bougeant dà come sottinteso che le bestie manifestino un comportamento intelligente, che si parlino tra loro, e che comunichino con noi. Ma se sono come noi, saranno riservati anche a loro un paradiso e un inferno? La risposta di Bougeant è abbastanza provocatoria: le bestie sono demoni, introdotti nei corpi animali così da recar seco il loro proprio inferno. I demoni, per poter soffrire in eterno del loro inferno terrestre, migrano continuamente da animale ad animale ogni volta che muore il corpo che li ospitava. Questo spiega anche perché gli animali siano cattivi (i gatti sono inaffidabili, i leoni crudeli, gli insetti si divorano a vicenda) e perché siano condannati a soffrire della crudeltà umana» in AA.VV., *Animalia*, a cura di I. Dionigi, Milano 2012, p. 96.

[20] Cfr. J. Hildrop, *Free Thoughts upon the Brute Creation*, cit., p. 16.

[21] Ivi, p. 14. Da questo momento in avanti le traduzioni dei testi originali degli autori anglicani sono mie.

[22] *Soul* nel testo originale, ivi, p. 21.

[23] Come afferma lo stesso Hildrop, «The wonderful Gradation in the Scale of Beings (so far as our Senses can discover it) is not only the Object of our daily Experience and Admiration, but is also a noble Key to open to us the more remote and invisible Scenes of Nature and Providence [...]. As we observe in all Partes of the Creation, that there is a gradual Connection of one with another, without any great or discernable Gaps between, that in all that great Variety of Things we see in the World, they are all so closely linked together, that it is not easy to discover

anche nelle sue parti più piccole, contribuisce all'infinita saggezza, bontà, bellezza, armonia e ordine del tutto (Sal 104, 24; Ec 3,14) e tutto ciò che Dio ha creato è chiamato a essere felice, come conciliare queste realtà con la minaccia del nulla a cui la filosofia contemporanea a Hildrop espone ogni vivente diverso dall'uomo? Non si accusa Dio di incostanza e mutabilità, affermando che Egli stesso che ha creato esseri bellissimi, utili e buoni finisce per annientarli?[24] L'idea di annichilazione è, dichiara Hildrop, assurda e contraria alla Rivelazione. Il progetto originario di Dio è immutabile – Dio è lo stesso ieri, oggi e sempre (Eb 13,8); di conseguenza ciò che a noi appare soggetto al cambiamento in realtà, al tempo opportuno, apparirà nuovamente al proprio posto per rispondere ai fini per cui era stato originariamente creato[25].

Inoltre, prosegue l'autore, se gli animali provano in questa vita felicità e miseria, che cosa impedisce loro di essere capaci di un più alto livello di felicità nel mondo futuro, come del resto lo furono nel Paradiso terrestre, prima che la sofferenza e la morte facessero il loro ingresso sulla terra?[26] Se Ragione e Rivelazione insegnano che sia uomini sia animali al primo momento della creazione erano molto buoni, creati in modo perfetto per contribuire all'armonia universale, come osiamo sostituirci a Dio che li ha fatti buoni, li ha benedetti e ha ordinato loro di essere fecondi?[27] In definitiva la stessa infinita saggezza che li ha creati «non mancherà di disporre di loro nell'aldilà nella maniera più appropriata per rispondere agli obiettivi originari della loro creazione»[28].

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the Bounds between them; we have all the Reason imaginable to believe that by such gentle Steps, and imperceptible Degrees, Beings ascended in the universal System from the lowest to the highest Point of Perfection. Where is he that can settle the Boundaries of the material and spiritual World? Who can tell where the sensible and rational begin, and where the insensible and irrational end? Who can precisely determine the lowest Species of Animals, and the first and highest Degree of inanimate Beings? The whole System of natural Beings, so far as we can observe, lessen and augment in the same Proportion, as the Quantity does in a regular Cone, where though there be a manifest Difference betwixt the Bigness of the Diameter at remote Distances, yet the difference betwixt the upper and the under, where they touch each other, is hardly discernable; the Difference betwixt Man and Man in inconceivably great» ivi, p. 127-128.

[24] Hildrop è piuttosto esplicito su questo punto, ivi, p. 110: «Does it not seem to imply Inconstancy and Mutability in God, that the same infinite Wisdom that made every Creature beautiful, useful, and good for certain Ends and Purposes, should destroy, or annihilate any thing that he has made, and thereby defeat the Wisdom of his own Counsel, and the Ends of his Providence?»

[25] Cfr. *ibid*.

[26] Del resto, ivi, p. 122: «If they [gli animali] are capable of Happiness or Misery here, if they are the Objects of divine as well as human Compassion in their present State [...] what should hinder their being capable of higher degrees of Happiness in their separate State in the invisible World, as well as they were in their first Situation in Paradise, before Sin and Death entered into the World, and they funk with us under the *Bondage of Corruption*?».

[27] Cfr. ivi, p. 125.

[28] *Ibid*. Hildrop osserva inoltre che, se Dio ha munito gli animali di vita e movimento, di senso e percezione, conferendo loro la sua bontà, destinandoli non solo a completare gli ordini in cui sono posizionati ma a prendere parte alle benedizioni e alla felicità, sarebbe una punizione privarli del loro essere per sempre, ivi, pp. 116-117: «If they were created by infinite Wisdom, the same infinite Wisdom will also preserve them [...] I will therefore venture to conclude, that whatsoever Creatures infinite Wisdom saw fit to produce in the first Creation, will be preserved by the same infinite Wisdom so long as the System itself shall continue, which is as certain

Il male che tutti noi soffriamo al momento presente, aggiunge Hildrop, non coincide con la condizione di vita iniziale ma discende dal peccato originale. Da una simile constatazione egli desume che questa vita risulta essere una situazione preternaturale, non destinata a durare per sempre, perché Dio è misericordioso, buono verso tutte le sue creature e onnipotente[29]. Al tempo opportuno verranno, quindi, restituiti agli animali lo splendore e la dignità che erano stati conferiti loro quando furono creati; allora «avrà luogo un *Restituzione Universale* di tutto ciò che cadde per la trasgressione di *Adamo* [...] ci saranno *nuovi cieli e nuova terra* che saranno la dimora della giustizia», come annunciato in numerosi passaggi dell'Antico e del Nuovo Testamento[30]. Infatti, conclude Hildrop, se gli animali sono stati creati per condividere la felicità e la gioia della prima creazione con l'uomo, che cosa ci impedisce di pensare che condivideranno anche la gioia finale – come affermano ripetutamente i profeti dell'Antico Testamento (Is 11,6-9 e 65,25; Os 2,18; Sal 103,31) – ovvero quella condizione di pace, amore e armonia che durerà per sempre?

3. Richard Dean

A distanza di venticinque anni dalla pubblicazione del *Free Thought* hildropiano, nel 1767 viene data per la prima volta alle stampe a Manchester l'opera di Richard Dean[31], intitolata *An Essay on the Future Life of Brute Creatures*[32]. Alla stregua del lavoro di Hildrop, lo scopo dell'*Essay* è cercare di rispondere ai problemi di teodicea che, come abbiamo osservato, insorgono dall'affermazione della vita immortale degli animali. Dean, proprio come già il pastore di Wax-justa-Ripon, sostiene l'esistenza di una vita futura degli animali, opponendosi a coloro che li considerano meri strumenti atti al raggiungimento del piacere umano[33]. Tuttavia con l'*Essay* si assiste ad un'ulteriore svolta all'interno dell'etica animale cristiana, ovvero allo spostamento dell'attenzione dalla vita ultraterrena alla sensibilità animale, per cui la senzienza diviene la ragione principale su cui fondare il nostro dovere di trattare con gentilezza gli animali[34].

a Conclusion, as that the Parts shall continue as long as the whole, [...] and this not only with regard to the Species, but to all the Individuals of the several Species».

[29] Si vedano le parole dello stesso autore: «All the inferior Creation, that fell with and in our first Parents, and suffer for our Transgression, shall at last be restored to their primitive Happiness, and *be delivered from their present Bondage of Corruption into the glorious Liberty of the Sons of God*» ivi, p. 140.

[30] Ivi, p. 141. Cfr. Isaia 65,17 e 66,22; Atti 3,19-21; 2 Pietro 313 1 Cor 15,21-22 e Apocalisse 21,1.

[31] Richard Dean (1726/7-1778), curato delle parrocchie vicine a Manchester e insegnante presso la Middleton Grammar School.

[32] Richard Dean, *An Essay on the Future Life of Brutes, Introduced with Observations upon EVIL, its Nature, and Origin*, J. Harrop, Manchester 1767, voll. I-II.

[33] Obiettivo polemico di Dean sono i cartesiani, in particolare Malebranche, e la loro teoria dell'animale-macchina.

[34] Cfr. Ryder, *Animal Revolution*, cit., p. 62. Similmente Preece, *Awe for the Tiger, Love for the Lamb: A Chronicle of Sensibility to Animal*, cit «While many before had commented on animal pain and suffering, Dean was perhaps the first to make it the focal point of his thesis», in Preece, cit., p. 156.

L'opera si compone di due saggi distinti: al testo propriamente dedicato alla vita futura degli animali è anteposto un saggio relativo alla natura e all'origine del male naturale, in cui l'autore si occupa di mostrare come dolore e morte non siano qualità consustanziali alla materia ma accidenti che seguono al peccato umano. Qui, attraverso l'esame di quattro distinte teodicee – quella manichea impersonata da Pierre Bayle, quella di Leibniz, quella incarnata dal materialismo filosofico illuminista e la sua propria teoria – Dean dimostra, da un lato, come il male fisico e la sofferenza degli animali siano conseguenza del peccato umano e, dall'altro, come attraverso la redenzione dell'uomo l'intera natura venga coinvolta nel processo di salvezza[35].

La seconda parte, più propriamente dedicata alla vita futura degli animali, è scandita in sette distinte proposizioni, in cui l'autore affianca ai dati scritturistici le citazioni di autori antichi e moderni e alcune osservazioni circa la varietà dei comportamenti animali. Gli animali, osserva Dean, sono qualcosa di più rispetto alle semplici macchine cartesiane, possiedono un principio intelligente, da cui hanno origine le loro azioni, e sono dotati degli organi preposti alla percezione del dolore: non possono essere pertanto trattati come strumenti insensibili[36]. Inoltre ci sono evidenze scritturistiche riguardo alla loro immortalità[37]. Certamente l'essere umano sarà investito da una beatitudine tanto maggiore quanto più la sua ragione supera le facoltà animali, nondimeno anche ad essi è concessa un'esistenza futura. E proprio come la sensibilità conferisce loro il diritto a un trattamento più delicato, allo stesso modo le sofferenze a cui sono soggetti li autorizzano a una qualche forma di ricompensa in un'altra vita da parte di un Essere superiore[38].

La questione relativa alla vita immortale degli animali – nel testo la «Post-Existence of Brutal Souls» –, puntualizza il pastore anglicano, non è un tema nuovo, già autori antichi e moderni si sono occupati di questo problema; nuove, però, sono le argomentazioni da lui addotte per sostenere questa opinione. Dopo aver ripercorso le motivazioni suggerite dalle Sacre Scritture e dalla ragione in favore della vita futura degli animali, Dean procede ad indicare al

[35] Cfr. A. Garrett, introduzione a *Animal Rights and Souls in the Eighteenth Century*, Sterling 2000, pp. xviii-xix.
[36] Come osserva Garrett, nel suo lavoro Dean sostiene che gli animali sono agenti morali: «In defending his position Dean claimed, like Hutcheson, that animals were capable of morality: "there are Brutes which would sooner be hanged than pilfer and steal under the greatest Temptations [...] that take up Attachments, and profess Friendships"» in A. Garrett, *Animals and Ethics in the History of Modern Philosophy*, in *The Oxford handbook of animal ethics*, a cura di T. L. Beauchamp - R. G. Frey, New York 2011, pp. 30-32.
[37] Come afferma Dean, *An Essay on the Future Life of Brutes*, cit., p. 110:, «as Brute Animals have attended Man, in all Fear, and capital Calamities, they will also attend him in his final Deliverance, be restored when he is restored, and have a Place in those happy Regions, where Nature shall re-assume the Splendor, and Elegance of her pristine Forms, the eternal God appear as he is, and every Thing be Representative of him».
[38] Ivi, pp. 108-109: «Surely this principle of Sensibility in Brutes, entitles them to a milder Treatment, than they usually meet with from hard, and unthinking Wretches, as the Miseries it makes them liable to, give them a Claim to some Returns from a just and Benevolent Being, in another State».

lettore le conseguenze morali che discendono da una tale presa di coscienza: se gli animali sono qualcosa di più rispetto alle semplici macchine cartesiane e possiedono un principio intelligente, che dirige le loro azioni, allora l'essere umano dovrebbe trattarli come *esseri* dotati di comprensione e non come strumenti, facendo ricorso alla sola forza e alla violenza. Inoltre, riflettendo sullo stesso temperamento umano, è possibile comprendere che anche gli animali, a volte, possono essere restii a fare ciò che viene loro comandato, a causa delle loro inclinazioni individuali.

In conclusione del suo lavoro, Dean trae alcuni insegnamenti pratici in linea con le riflessioni teoriche presentate e in contrapposizione agli atteggiamenti scettici e crudeli giustificati dalla teoria dell'animale-macchina: il fatto che gli animali si trovino sotto il governo umano non autorizza a tormentarli; al contrario, proprio in virtù della sua superiorità, l'essere umano è chiamato a prendersi cura di loro; nel giorno del giudizio, infatti, dovranno rispondere di ogni atto crudele compiuto nei loro confronti[39].

In definitiva, e questa è la tesi sottesa all'intera trattazione, *peccato* e *salvezza* sono due realtà che coinvolgono, indiscriminatamente, tutte le creature viventi[40].

4. Humphrey Primatt

Il 1776 è l'anno di pubblicazione di *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals*[41], opera destinata a segnare profondamente il percorso del movimento animalista del primo Ottocento inglese[42]. In essa l'autore, Humphrey Primatt[43], alla luce di un'attenta analisi delle fonti bibliche, si occupa di dimostrare come la misericordia nei confronti degli animali sia un dovere proprio del giusto, mentre la crudeltà verso di essi costituisca l'atteggiamento specifico dell'uomo empio[44].

A partire da un'analisi relativa al concetto di *giustizia*, Primatt elabora «una visione di emancipazione globale»[45]. Come osserva nella prefazione al suo

[39] Cfr. ivi, p. 111.
[40] Cfr. http://www.oxforddnb.com/templates/article.jsp?articleid=7383&back=.
[41] Humphrey Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals*, R. Hett, Londra 1776.
[42] Cfr. http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100345547?rskey=5l3DPM&result=0&q=primatt. Come osserva Garrett, *Animals and Ethics*, cit., p. 79: «The work was a founding work of the animal advocacy movement of the early nineteenth-century pioneered by Lewis Gompertz (founding member of the SPCA and the Animals' Friend Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals), Richard Martin (animal activist and namesake of one of the first pieces of British animal welfare legislation), the great abolitionist William Wilberforce and others».
[43] Humphrey Primatt (1735-1776/7), pastore anglicano della comunità di Brampton (Suffolk), si ritirò a vita privata nel 1774. L'unica opera conosciuta di Primatt è, appunto, la *Dissertation*.
[44] Come afferma Primatt, *A Disserttion on the Duty*, cit., p. 74, «It has been my endeavour to plead the cause of the Dumb Creatures on the Principles of Natural Religion, Justice, Honour, and Humanity» Primatt, cit., p. 74.
[45] V. Murti, *They Shall Not Hurt or Destroy. Animal Rights and Vegetarianism in the Western Religious Traditions*, Cleveland 2003, p. 101.

trattato, nonostante gli uomini professino differenti credo religiosi, le Sacre Scritture insegnano che la *giustizia* è un'unica legge universale, valida per tutti, che ha origine in Dio stesso[46]; Dio, inoltre, ha manifestato la sua sapienza nel creare l'intero universo e i suoi abitanti, con tutte le loro differenze. Sulla base di queste premesse l'autore traccia una eloquente analogia tra il razzismo e lo sfruttamento degli animali[47]. Allo stesso modo per cui le differenze tra esseri umani non fondano il diritto alla sopraffazione di un uomo sull'altro, così quelle interspecifiche non giustificano la crudeltà di una specie sull'altra: l'uomo bianco non ha alcun diritto a tiranneggiare gli altri individui in ragione del colore della loro pelle né, tantomeno, l'essere umano può arrogarsi il diritto di tormentare un animale o di abusare di lui semplicemente perché privo delle stesse sue capacità mentali[48]. Inoltre, non si deve dimenticare che le differenze nella forma fisica sono mitigate da una comunanza di origine: plasmati da una medesima terra e vivificati dal medesimo alito divino, hanno tutti in Dio un unico Padre (Mal 2,10)[49]. L'Antico e il Nuovo Testamento rammentano a più riprese che, sebbene *figli di Dio* attraverso la grazia, per natura gli umani, proprio come gli altri animali, sono *polvere della terra*, «polvere che respira»[50].

In accordo con quanto prospettato da Dean nel suo *Essay* e anticipando di qualche anno la riflessione benthamiana relativa al valore della sofferenza animale[51], Primatt sostiene che, sul piano morale, le differenze esistenti tra gli

[46] Nel testo di Primatt, *A Disseration on the Duty*, cit., pp. 1-iv: «However men may differ as to speculative points of Religion, JUSTICE is a rule of universal extent and invariable obligation. We acknowledge this important truth in all matters in which MAN is concerned, but then we limit it to our own species only [...]. To rectify this mistaken notion is the design of this treatise, in which I have endeavored to prove, that as the Love and Mercy of God are over all of his works, from the highest rational to the lowest sensitive, our Love and Mercy are not to be confined within the circle of our own friends, acquaintance, and neighbours; nor limited to the more enlarged sphere of human nature, to creatures of our own rank, shape, and capacity; but are to be extended to every object of the Love and Mercy of GOD the universal Parent; who, as he is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works, will undoubtedly require of Man, superior Man, a strict account of his conduct to every creature entrusted to his care, or coming in his way; and who will avenge every instance of wanton cruelty and oppression, in the day in which he will judge the world in RIGHTEOUSNESS».

[47] Ryder, *Animal Revolution*, cit., p. 62: «Primatt [...] frequently drew the analogy between racism and the exploitation of nonhumans».

[48] Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty*, cit., p. 18: «Whether walk upon two legs or four; whether our heads are prone or erect; whether we are naked or covered with hair; whether we have tails or no tails, horns or no horns, long ears or round ears; or, whether we bray like an ass, speak like a man, whistle like a bird, or are mute as a fish; Nature never intended these distinctions as foundations for right of tyranny and oppression».

[49] Ivi, p. 18: «Whether we walk upon two legs or four; whether our heads are prone or erect; whether we are naked or covered with hair; whether we have tails or no tails, horns or no horns, long ears or round ears; or, whether we bray like an ass, speak like a man, whistle like a bird, or are mute as a fish; Nature never intended these distinctions as foundations for right of tyranny and oppression».

[50] Come afferma Primatt, ivi, p. 110: «we are all of the Dust of the Ground, that we are all of One Breath, that we have all One Father, and that One GOD created us».

[51] Cfr. J. Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, a cura di J. H. Burns e H. L. A. Hart, Oxford 1982, cap. XVII, §1, n. 4 (traduzione italiana, *Introduzione ai principi della morale e della legislazione)*.

esseri umani e gli animali vengono annullate dalla comune capacità di provare *dolore*[52]. I primi, pur trovandosi al di sopra di tutte le creature, condividono con esse una caratteristica essenziale, la sofferenza. In quest'ottica l'agire morale dell'essere umano nei confronti delle altre creature viene proporzionato sulla base della loro capacità di provare dolore, delineando un nuovo tipo di interazione fra uomo e animale[53].

La giustizia divina, prosegue l'autore, insegna che anche nel rapporto con gli animali vale la regola aurea «non fare agli altri ciò che non vorresti fosse fatto a te stesso». Allo stesso modo in cui l'amore e la misericordia di Dio si estendono su tutte le sue creature – lo stesso patto noachico conferma tale sua disposizione (Gen 9,8-17) – così l'amore e la misericordia umane non devono essere ristretti alla cerchia di amici, conoscenti e vicini o limitate alla più ampia sfera della natura umana ma, al contrario, devono comprendere tutto ciò che è oggetto dell'amore e della misericordia divini. È, invece, l'orgoglio, avverte Primatt, a limitare la portata universalistica di tale amore, spingendo l'essere umano a ritenersi l'unico "animale terrestre" meritevole delle attenzioni di Dio e a considerare gli animali[54] mere "escrescenze della natura", strumenti da utilizzare e verso cui egli non ha alcun dovere. Le Scritture, infatti, attestano che nel giorno del giudizio Dio stesso richiederà all'uomo, l'essere superiore, un resoconto puntuale della sua condotta verso le altre creature e farà giustizia di ogni crudeltà e oppressione[55]. Infatti, se gli esseri umani hanno ricevuto una maggiore benedizione e uno *status* migliore rispetto agli animali, la loro responsabilità è, allora, maggiorata e non diminuita[56].

[52] Cfr. Andrew Linzey, *Animal Theology*, Londra 1994, p. 16.

[53] Come afferma Aaron Garrett, *An Handbook*, cit., pp. 36-37: «Primatt argued in no equivocal terms that animals' capacity to feel pain and their desire for happiness delimited our conduct towards them». Come osserva Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty*, cit., p. 7-8: «we are all susceptible and sensible of the misery of *Pain*; an evil, which though necessary in itself, and wisely intended as the spur to incite us to self-preservation, and to the avoidance of destruction, we nevertheless are naturally averse to, and shrink back at the apprehension of it. Superiority of rank or station exempts no creature from the sensibility of pain, nor does inferiority render the feelings thereof the less exquisite. Pain is pain, whether it be inflicted on man or on beast; and the creature that suffers it, whether man or beast, being sensible of the misery of it whilst it lasts, suffers Evil».

[54] A questo punto l'autore specifica che utilizzerà il termine *brutes* per indicare ogni creatura inferiore all'uomo, ovvero le bestie, gli uccelli, i pesci, gli insetti, i vermi.

[55] Come osserva Garrett, *Animal and Ethics*, cit., p. 79-80: «Primatt also, though, provided a novel twist on the logic of the great chain of being that pulled him away from utilitarian justifications. As men were superior to animals, to treat them cruelly was worse "than the cruelty of Men unto Men" and was the functional equivalent to "fury and barbarity on a helpless and innocent Babe." In other words, a moral act was reprehensible in proportion to the power, capacity, and reason of the agent and the distance between the agent's power, capacity, and reason and the power, capacity, and reason of the sentient object of the agent's action. This justification drew on a basic moral intuition (as well as on scripture) that there is something deeply wrong with harming the weak, which the Christian duty of mercy disallowed in a novel and compelling way».

[56] Nel testo di Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty*, cit., p. 47: «Again what dignity or distinction have we, that we did not receive from the great Giver of all good? It is true that man is superior to a brute. But then, 'Who made thee, O man, thus to differ? And what hast thou that thou didst not receive? Now, if thou hast not received it, why doest thou glory, as if thou hadst not

Un'importante novità della *Dissertation* è l'opinione di Primatt a proposito dell'anima degli animali. Anziché seguire il terreno già battuto dai suoi predecessori e cercare argomenti a favore della vita futura degli animali, egli analizza le conseguenze dell'ipotesi contraria, secondo cui la loro esistenza si giocherebbe tutta su questa terra[57]. In questo caso particolare non esiste una riparazione agli abusi da essi subiti: pertanto, ne deduce Primatt, «la crudeltà nei confronti degli animali è un torto irreparabile»[58]. Sviluppando ulteriormente la sua argomentazione, egli osserva che gli animali, ancora più degli umani, hanno diritto alla felicità, dal momento che questa è la loro unica condizione di esistenza ed, in ogni caso, non è possibile restituirgli ciò che hanno perduto[59]. Da questa ipotesi, anziché seguire una giustificazione degli abusi, emerge come la crudeltà nei confronti degli animali (*brutal cruelty*) sia peggiore di quella esercitata sugli altri umani (*human cruelty*). La credenza nella vita futura degli animali è, secondo l'autore, una questione di fede che non può condizionare i nostri doveri nei loro riguardi – la nostra condotta morale deve declinarsi sulla loro senzienza.

Primatt si inserisce, dunque, a pieno titolo nella discussione relativa all'etica animale sorta in ambito cristiano, alla quale apporta due importanti novità. Da un lato, l'utilizzo coerente dell'argomento relativo al dolore che, come osserva Garrett, non necessita di una giustificazione provvidenzialistica: «Il dolore è sempre dolore, indipendentemente da chi ne fa esperienza ed esso solo è sufficiente per richiedere l'obbligazione morale e la legislazione»[60]; dall'altro,

received it?' 'Have we not all one Father, and hath not one God created us?' He that made thee a man could have made thee a brute. Now if thou art a man, be thankful, and shew thy superiority by mercy and compassion else thou debasest they reason, and art as low, if not lower, than the brute whom you oppress».

[57] La negazione della vita futura degli animali nella *Dissertation* costituisce un'ipotesi di lavoro e non la posizione di Primatt. Come egli stesso afferma, Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty*, pp. 42-43, «However, as we have no authority to declare, and no testimony from heaven to assure us, that there is a state of recompense for suffering Brutality, we will suppose there is none; and from this very supposition, we rationally infer that cruelty to a brute is an injury irreparable». Per un elenco di studiosi che hanno invece interpretato questa ipotesi come la vera opinione di Primatt si veda Harwood in Preece-Fraser, *Dix Harword's Love for Animals*, cit., pp. 176-177.

[58] «Cruelty to a brute is an injury irreparable», Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty*, p. 43. Per quanto riguarda l'ipotesi seguita da Primatt cfr. ivi, pp. 43-44.

[59] Come afferma Primatt, *A Dissertation on the Duty*, p. 40: «Thou hast marred his little temporary happiness, which was his All to him. Thou hast maimed, or blinded him for ever; and hast done him an irreparable injury». E ancora: «present pain is the only Evil; and present happiness the only Good; therefore whilst he lives he has a right to happiness» ivi, p. 53. «His present life (for anything we know) is the Whole if his existence; and if he is unhappy here, his lot is truly pitiable; and the more pitiable his lot, the more base, barbarous, and unjust in man, must be every instance of cruelty towards him», *ibid*.

[60] «Many of Primatt's arguments» osserva Garrett, *Animal and Ethics*, cit., p. 79, «were found in his predecessors. Like Dean, Primatt pointed out that the unjustifiable belief that animals were made for man, together with bad religion, were heavily to blame. Like Reid and Hutcheson, he argued that animals had a right to wages (that is, resources including food, rest, ease and comfort) and we had a reciprocal duty not to deny them their due in the sense of not interfering with the satisfying of their natural enjoyments and need. All of these arguments were ably backed by scriptural quotations and Primatt did assume a general providentialism with a benevolent deity. But Primatt's novelty was due to the fact that his core arguments, as above,

l'ipotesi di lavoro secondo cui l'esistenza animale sarebbe un fattore meramente terrestre.

Nella parte finale della *Dissertation* emerge come compito dell'uomo giusto, biblicamente contrapposto all'empio, è prendersi cura del benessere del proprio animale e trattarlo con premura. Dio, invero, non si interessa solo dell'*essere* delle sue creature ma anche del loro *ben-essere*, quindi non solo di ciò di cui hanno necessariamente bisogno per natura ma anche della loro prosperità e comodità, come espresso nel noto versetto: «Il giusto ha cura del suo bestiame, ma i sentimenti degli empi sono spietati» (Prov 12,10-11)[61]. In questo senso Primatt conclude il suo lavoro affermando:

> Possiamo appellarci alla RELIGIONE che vogliamo, ma la Crudeltà è ATEISMO. Possiamo vantarci di essere CRISTIANI, ma la Crudeltà è INFEDELTÀ. Possiamo accreditarci come ORTODOSSI, ma la Crudeltà è la peggiore delle ERESIE. La Religione di Gesù Cristo ebbe origine dalla Misericordia di DIO e lo stesso progetto divino fu di promuovere la *Pace* per ogni creatura SULLA *Terra* e di creare uno spirito di universale Benevolenza o di *Buona volontà* NEGLI *Uomini*[62].

5. William H. Drummond

Il percorso tracciato da questi tre autori sembra condurre direttamente all'opera del reverendo William H. Drummond[63], *The Rights of Animals and Man's Obligation to Treat Them With Humanity* pubblicato a Londra nel 1838[64]. Gli anni che intercorrono tra questo lavoro e quello di Primatt sono particolarmente proficui per quanto riguarda lo sviluppo dell'etica animale, almeno in Inghilterra. Nel 1822 viene promulgata la prima legge a protezione degli animali[65]; nel 1824 viene formata la prima organizzazione a protezione

needed no providentialist justification. Pain is pain whoever experiences it, and that alone is sufficient for moral obligation and legislation. [...] Pain is pain whoever experiences it, and that alone is sufficient for moral obligation and legislation».

[61] A questo proposito Primatt suddivide l'umanità in tre categorie. I *giusti*, osserva Primatt, sono coloro che hanno cura del proprio bestiame, si prendono cura della sua vita e del suo benessere e, in ultima analisi, sono misericordiosi verso tutti gli esseri viventi; gli *empi* sono, invece, coloro i quali usano crudeltà nei confronti, almeno, delle creature non umane. Ma, aggiunge il pastore anglicano, esiste una terza categoria di persone, gli *ingiusti*, ovvero la maggior parte delle persone. Essi sono coloro che non si mostrano misericordiosi verso gli animali, senza con questo essere crudeli nei loro confronti.

[62] Ivi, pp. 321-322.

[63] William Hamilton Drummond (1778-1856), ministro della "non subscribing Presbyterian church" e poeta, fu uno dei membri fondatori della Belfast Literary Society (1801).

[64] William H. Drummond, *The Rights of Animals, and Man's Obligation to Treat them with Humanity*, John Mardon, Londra 1838.

[65] Cfr. Ryder, *Animal Revolution*, cit., p. 82.

degli animali, *Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals* (SPCA)[66]; e nel 1835 i combattimenti tra animali vengono dichiarati illegali[67].

Il dovere di praticare la compassione nei confronti delle "creature inferiori", spiega Drummond, è fondato, come tutte le altre obbligazioni morali, sul volere di Dio. È, invero, per volere divino che esistono i sentimenti di simpatia che spingono, ancor prima che sorga il ragionamento, ad assistere coloro che hanno fame, sete, freddo; sentimenti, egli osserva, non limitati alla sola specie umana ma rivolti verso i più deboli in generale. A ben guardare, restringere la benevolenza ai soli esseri umani costituirebbe una privazione del più alto piacere possibile e una frustrazione dei progetti della Provvidenza[68].

La religione, spiega l'autore, e non la natura umana, è la base più solida su cui si fonda la misericordia nei confronti di uomini e animali[69]. L'esempio dato dal «Grande Maestro», il quale affermò «Beati i misericordiosi perché troveranno misericordia», dovrebbe essere sufficiente affinché l'essere umano imparasse il dovere di essere misericordioso. «La benevolenza, la pietà, la misericordia, la compassione», spiega Drummond, «sono tutte virtù morali certamente insegnate dalla *ragione* ma instillate nell'uomo dalla *religione*; e nessuno mai affermerebbe che non dovrebbero estendersi a ogni essere suscettibile di beneficiare della loro influenza. Gli animali inferiori hanno passioni, sentimenti, sensibilità, proprio come l'essere umano superiore»[70].

Se nessuno oserebbe mai negare la crudeltà praticata nei confronti di un essere umano, lo stesso non vale per quella commessa nei confronti degli animali, che spesso non viene neppure riconosciuta e, ancora più raramente,

[66] Società nata a Londra nel 1824 per volontà di un gruppo di umanitari evangelici, costituisce l'organizzazione per il benessere animale più antica e più grande del mondo. Per uno studio approfondito cfr. H. Ritvo, *The Animal Estate. The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age*, Cambridge 1987, pp. 127-135.

[67] A tale proposito cfr. Ryder, *Animal Revolution*, cit., p. 84.

[68] Come osserva l'autore, «Nature asserts her rights in the bosom even of the selfish, and where philanthropy is wanting, perhaps you may find a passionate fondness for horses, lap-dogs, parrots, canary-birds, or other creatures in some degree capable of reciprocating the kindness of their benefactors. The being in whom there is no sweet sympathy either with man or beast can scarcely be placed within the pale of human nature» Drummond, *The Rights of Animals*, cit., p. 4.

[69] Drummond, ivi, p. 5, sostiene che Francis Bacon, nella sua opera *de Augmentis Scientiarium*, individui l'origine della compassione nella natura stessa dell'uomo: «There is a noble and excellent affection of mercy implanted in the mind of man by nature herself, which extends to the brute animals subjected by divine command to his dominion. This affection is analogous to the mercy of a prince to those whom he has subdued. And this is most certain, the more noble the soul the more does it compassionate. But narrow and degenerate minds think that affairs of this nature pertain to to them; but that which is the nobler portion of the universe is affected by community of feeling. Whereof we see that under the old law (the law of Moses) there were precepts not a few, and not merely ceremonial, but the institutes of mercy, as that forbidding to eat flesh with the blood, and the like. Also in the sects of Essaenas and Pythagoreans, they abstained altogether from eating animals; as do some subjects of the Mogul empire at this day. The Turks, too, though cruel and sanguinary by origin and disciple, raise charitable contributions for the support of brutes; and cannot endure that animals should be subject to vexation and torture».

[70] Ivi, p. 5, corsivo mio.

punita. Eppure, denuncia Drummond, alla base di entrambi i tipi di crudeltà vi è la stessa, identica passione negativa[71]. Inoltre, gli animali – e qui si riconosce l'eco delle argomentazioni di Primatt – non possono esprimere i loro lamenti in suoni articolati e spesso la legge, anziché essere dalla loro parte, sancisce la loro distruzione. Oggi, prosegue Drummond, i legislatori paiono aver capito il loro dovere di comportarsi come Dio, ovvero di estendere la loro misericordia a ogni ordine di esistenza, usando il potere loro attribuito per prevenire, e non aumentare, la crudeltà. Il cambiamento di sensibilità avvenuto a livello legislativo non è, tuttavia, in grado di controllare i molteplici abusi perpetrati su di loro. Per questa ragione, osserva l'autore, è necessario che l'umanità faccia «appello a un tribunale più alto per porvi un rimedio: deve invocare la Religione per alzare la sua voce, per parlare alla coscienza»[72].

Sebbene una parte dei cristiani restringa le gioie della vita futura alla cerchia limitata del proprio gruppo religioso, un'altra le estende non solo a tutti i membri della propria specie ma anche a tutti gli esseri animati – una dottrina, osserva l'autore, ben più in accordo con lo spirito benevolente del cristianesimo. Contro coloro che sono a tal punto convinti di essere superiori agli animali e che trovano in tale presunta superiorità la giustificazione ai loro abusi, Drummond osserva che, ammesso che tale primato esista, esso costituisce un invito alla protezione piuttosto che una giustificazione degli abusi[73].

Infatti, se già le loro vite sono brevi, le si vogliono renderle ancora più brevi trattandoli male? Un argomento, aggiunge l'autore, a favore di un loro benevolo trattamento è stato rinvenuto proprio nella limitatezza della loro esistenza: se questa vita è tutto per loro, allora deve essere resa il più confortevole possibile[74]. Altri, invece, considerando tutti i mali che gli animali sono costretti a sopportare in questa vita, suppongono che un futuro migliore sia loro riservato – proprio come accade agli uomini che verranno ricompensati in una vita futura delle pene sofferte in questa[75].

Tuttavia, dopo aver ripercorso le varie teorie relative all'anima degli animali, da padre Bougeant a Wesley, da Hildrop a Descartes e da Malebranche al cavalier Ramsay, Drummond non compie una vera e propria scelta tra tale ventaglio di posizioni ma, ancora una volta riprendendo le argomentazioni di Primatt, sostiene: «qualsiasi sia la nostra conclusione non vi è dubbio che se, come insegna la religione, ogni uomo dovrà nell'aldilà rendere conto delle azioni compiute su questa terra, la crudeltà verso gli animali sarà un crimine che non sfuggirà al castigo dovuto; e sia che la ragione venga riconosciuta sia che venga disconosciuta agli animali, non può essere negato che possono *sentire*, poiché

[71] Ivi, p. 6: «That cruelty to a fellow-creature is a crime no one will dare to dispute», osserva Drummond, «that cruelty to the inferior animals is also a crime is equally true, though it may not be so readily admitted, because it is allowed to pass without due cognizance, and seldom has any penalty been exacted for its atrocities. But the passion is the same whether indulged on a man or an insect».
[72] Ivi, p. 9.
[73] Cfr. ivi, p. 198.
[74] Anche in questo caso il riferimento a Primatt è piuttosto lampante.
[75] Tra i sostenitori di questa posizione, Drummond annovera John Hildrop.

la sensazione non dipende dall'intelletto». Anche in questo testo la crudeltà nei confronti degli animali viene considerata peggiore rispetto a quella perpetrata a danno degli umani. Se un martire può, infatti, affrontare la tortura e la morte rafforzato dalla consapevolezza dei suoi alti ideali e dal giusto Giudice che lo giudicherà, «che giovamento può avere un animale sotto l'accetta del macellaio o sotto il coltello affilato dell'epicureo? Quale risarcimento può sperare per le sue ingiustizie? Di quali risorse potrà godere in futuro?»[76].

L'ipotesi sottesa all'intera trattazione è proprio l'esistenza di alcuni diritti assegnati agli animali dal loro Creatore che non possono, in quanto tali, venire violati impunemente. Proprio il fatto che essi non hanno la possibilità di appellarsi ad alcuna corte induce gli uomini di buona volontà ad assumerne la difesa. Inoltre, aggiunge l'autore, «il dovere di offrire assistenza aumenta con l'urgenza della necessità. Quanto più un animale dipende dalle nostre cure, tanto più forte si fa la nostra obbligazione a offrirgli protezione»[77].

Niente, osserva Drummond, giustifica la crudeltà: essa è contraria alla legge di Dio e all'interesse dell'uomo. In quanto tale deve, essere bandita da tutte le persone che si dicono cristiane o civili. La crudeltà ha, invero, mietuto molte vittime in passato sia tra gli umani sia tra gli animali; a tutt'oggi, essa continua il suo funesto operato nelle classi dei vivisettori, nelle arene per i combattimenti animali, nei club della caccia e nelle navi dei negrieri. Infatti, prosegue l'autore, chi è crudele con gli animali non è meno colpevole che se lo fosse con gli esseri umani: «EGLI, la cui misericordia è il divino attributo, terrà in debito conto quelle azioni crudeli che, non disturbando la pace della società, non sono soggette alle sue leggi ma che agli occhi di COLUI che giudica non secondo le apparenze ma secondo il cuore non saranno meno meritevoli di punizione. Perché se non vi è meno malizia nell'assassinare un animale di quanto ve ne sia nell'uccidere un uomo, anche se non è possibile comprenderlo in un tribunale umano, di certo non sfuggirà al giusto castigo celeste»[78]. In definitiva, conclude Drummond, se la crudeltà è il vizio più terribile, la misericordia è, per parte sua, la virtù più bella.

6. Conclusioni

Come si è visto, il passaggio dalla *querelle* incentrata sulla struttura metafisica della realtà all'etica animale avviene a cavallo tra il diciassettesimo e il diciottesimo secolo e ha una connotazione, oltre che temporale, anche geografica, nel senso che se la prima pare essere circoscritta ai territori di lingua francofona, la seconda sembra collocarsi Oltremanica. A quest'ultimo insieme appartengono, appunto, i testi appena analizzati i quali, sebbene singolarmente costituiscano delle realtà autonome e ben definite, nell'insieme rappresentano un importante tassello dell'etica animale cristiana. Ed è proprio da una rilettura

[76] Ivi, p. 205.
[77] Ivi, p. 208.
[78] Ivi, p. 210.

congiunta di questi elaborati che è possibile comprendere il cammino che conduce da Hildrop a Drummond. Si tratta, si è visto, di un passaggio lineare e saldamente legato alle realtà socio-culturali in cui tali lavori sono inseriti e delle quali promuovono importanti cambiamenti.

Se per Hildrop la discussione rimane ancorata alla necessità di fondare il rispetto degli animali sulla base della loro vita futura, con Dean si assiste a un progressivo e graduale slittamento. Egli per primo fonda il rispetto per gli animali sul riconoscimento della loro sensibilità, sebbene, in definitiva, il suo lavoro rimanga ancora legato all'esigenza di dimostrare l'immortalità degli animali per giustificare il rispetto ad essi dovuto. È, invece, Primatt a comprendere fino in fondo la portata rivoluzionaria dell'argomento relativo alla sensibilità animale, che nel suo lavoro finisce per dar forma a un modo nuovo di intendere l'interazione umano-animale. Come si è visto, nella *Dissertation* il riconoscimento del dolore degli animali è sufficiente a fondare l'obbligazione morale nei loro confronti e non necessita di alcuna spiegazione provvidenzialistica[79]. Per questa ragione egli può trasformare il tradizionale argomento usato per affermare il diritto umano a sfruttare gli altri animali, ovvero la supposta mancanza di una vita immortale, in una valida giustificazione del dovere di trattarli con cura. E dai *doveri* umani ai *diritti* animali il passo è breve, come mostra il lavoro del reverendo Drummond.

In definitiva le opere di questi quattro autori disegnano un percorso che parte dall'affermazione della immortalità degli animali e arriva fino al riconoscimento di veri e propri diritti animali, indipendenti dall'esistenza o meno di una comune vita futura. A partire dall'Età dei Lumi si avvia in Inghilterra la storia della codificazione dell'etica animale cristiana, fino a quel momento rimasta implicita sia negli insegnamenti contenuti nelle Sacre Scritture sia nelle esemplari vite dei santi che, per tutta la durata della storia cristiana, avevano rappresentato un modello ideale di convivenza pacifica tra gli esseri umani e gli animali.

[79] Cfr. Garrett, *Animal and Ethics*, cit., p. 79.

Articoli/14

Der gutherzige Tiger

Tiervernunft und Skepsis in Michel de Montaignes *Apologie für Raymond Sebond*

Nikolaus Egel

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The paper introduces Michel de Montaigne's discussion of the mind of animals in his Essay *Apology for Raimond Sebond* (II, 12) and focuses on its role as a sceptical strategy in Montaigne's thought for doubting human knowledge claims in general. The thesis of this article is thus, that Montaigne is not only defending the possible rationality and the rights of animals *per se*, but that he also uses animals in one of his most famous Essays to question our anthropozentric understanding of reason and to doubt the fundamental possibility of gaining certitude. By establishing a sceptical philosophical discourse with the animals as main actors, Montaigne does not only declare the traditional demarcation line between animals and human beings as null and void, but he also shows that every dogmatic and anthropocentric argument is open for question. The aim of the discussion in the *Apology* is less epistemological than rather ethical and political: By comparing our reason to the minds of animals, we can learn something quite important, namely that we hurt animals, each other and also ourselves by overexcessive knowledge claims which may result in terrible practical consequences for every living creature and especially for human society. Montaigne's sceptical arguments for the defense of animals are meant as a sceptical cure not only for our wrong-headed opinions about the minds of animals, but also for every ill-founded dogmatic view which may lead to epistemic arrogance and – in succession – ethical intolerance.

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Einleitung

"Sie haben mir nämlich gezeigt, daß es möglich ist, zu Erkenntnissen zu gelangen, […], die uns die Kraft und die Wirkungen des Feuers, des Wassers, der Luft, der Gestirne, des Himmelsgewölbes und aller übrigen Körper, […] genau kennen lehrt, […] so daß wir sie […] verwenden und uns auf diese Weise gleichsam zu Meistern und Besitzern der Natur machen können"

René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*

"Das verstehe ich nicht"

Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, II, 12

Montaigne stellt im Jahre 1580 in aller Unschuld eine radikale Frage über den Geist der Tiere und über die Perspektivität unserer Erkenntnis: «Wenn ich mit meiner Katze spiele – wer weiß, ob ich nicht mehr ihr zum

Zeitvertreib diene als sie mir?»[1] Diese Frage findet sich im längsten und zugleich rätselhaftesten *Essai* Montaignes, der *Apologie für Raymond Sebond*, die nicht nur den Theologen Raimundus Sabundus, sondern vor allem – und hierin liegt die Wahl meines Themas für den Beitrag dieser Zeitschrift begründet – auch die Vernunft der Tiere zu verteidigen wünscht. Wie wir sehen werden, erreicht Montaigne dies, indem er (und hier ausdrücklich gegen Raimundus Sabundus und dessen dogmatische Annahmen) unser menschliches Erkenntnisvermögen mit dem der Tiere vergleicht, um vor dieser Folie auf die Fraglichkeit unserer Wissens-ansprüche aufmerksam zu machen und so die Grenze zwischen Mensch und Tier in Frage zu stellen.

Diesem Artikel liegt die These zugrunde, dass Montaigne nicht in erster Linie ein Tierfreund war, sondern dass er seine Betrachtungen über den Geist der Tiere als heuristisches Mittel benutzt, um einen *skeptischen Gegendiskurs*[2] gegenüber einer rationalistischen Position zu führen (die gerade durch ebenjenes Buch vertreten wird, das Montaigne angeblich verteidigt), welche das unbedingte Primat der Vernunft und damit zugleich des Menschen gegenüber allen anderen Lebewesen postuliert. Die *Apologie* handelt also m. E. weniger von der Vernunft der Tiere, als vielmehr von der Unvernunft des Menschen, genauer gesagt von der Unvernunft des Dogmatikers, der mit seinen überzogenen Wissensansprüchen die Tatsache aus den Augen verliert, dass der Mensch ebenso wie die Tiere ein bedingtes und endliches Lebwesen ist, das immer nur aus seiner subjektiven Perspektive urteilen und beurteilt werden kann.

Zugleich – und sehr eng damit verbunden – hat die *Apologie* ebenso wie der Skeptizismus generell ein *therapeutisches Anliegen*: Es geht Montaigne als Skeptiker[3] anhand des Vergleichs mit der Tierwelt darum, den Menschen von seiner Voreingenommenheit und Anmaßung zu befreien[4], damit ein aufrichtiges

[1] Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, hg. u. übers. v. Hans Stilett, 3 Bde., Frankfurt a.M. 2000, II, 12, S. 187.

[2] So die Formulierung von Markus Wild, der in seiner sehr guten Arbeit die philosophische Betrachtung des Geistes der Tiere in der Frühen Neuzeit diskutiert und dort auch sehr ausführlich auf Montaigne eingeht. M. Wild, *Die anthropologische Differenz. Der Geist der Tiere in der Frühen Neuzeit bei Montaigne, Descartes und Hume*, Berlin 2007.

[3] Ich sehe Montaigne dezidiert als einen skeptischen Philosophen. Seit Pierre Villeys Einschätzung, dass Montaigne sich von einem Stoiker über den Skeptizismus zum entspannten Epikuräer entwickelt habe, wird diese Frage immer wieder diskutiert. Allerdings lässt sich diese evolutionistische Deutung der Essais m. E. nicht aufrecht erhalten. Wenn Montaigne überhaupt irgendwie eingeordnet werden kann, dann sicherlich als Skeptiker, da schon die von Montaigne erschaffene Form des Essays als genuin skeptische Literaturform gesehen werden kann, die prinzipiell undogmatisch ist und verschiedene Möglichkeiten der Betrachtung eröffnet. – Vgl. P. Villey, L*es sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne*, Paris 1932. – Siehe dazu auch St. Greenblatt, *Die Wende*, München 2012, S. 254 ff.

[4] Es besteht eine gewisse Verbindung zwischen dem Skeptizismus und der Idee des Heilens. Nicht nur Hippokrates und Galen – die zwei einflussreichsten und wirkungsmächtigsten Ärzte des Altertums – sahen sich als Ärzte und Philosophen, sondern auch die skeptischen Philosophen im Besonderen waren häufig beides: Das gilt für Sextus Empiricus ebenso wie für Agrippa von Nettesheim und Franciscus Sanchez. – Vgl. Agrippa von Nettesheim, *Über die Fragwürdigkeit, ja Nichtigkeit der Wissenschaften, Künste und Gewerbe*, hg. v. Siegfried Wollgast, Berlin 1993; Franciscus Sanchez, *Daß nichts gewußt wird – Quod nihil scitur*, lat.-dt., hg. v. Kaspar Howald, Hamburg 2007.

und harmonisches Verhältnis mit sich selbst, den anderen Menschen und den Tieren möglich wird. Es ist sicher kein Zufall, dass sich in der *Apologie*, die sich weiträumig mit der Vernunft der Tiere beschäftigt, auch Montaignes berühmte Bemerkungen über die Skepsis finden. Denn die *Apologie* ist nicht nur der bekannteste und umfangreichste «Tieressay» der Renaissance, sondern Charles B. Schmitt folgend auch einer der «most compelling expressions of the sceptical philosophy»[5] überhaupt. Daher verwundert es, dass in der Sekundärliteratur die Parallelen zwischen der Montaigne'schen Tierethik[6] und seiner Skepsis bisher so selten gezogen worden sind[7].

1. Die *Apologie für Raymond Sebond*

In der *Apologie* gibt Montaigne vor, die von ihm 1569 aus dem Lateinischen ins Französische übersetzte *Theologia naturalis* (entstanden 1434/36) des katalanischen Theologen Raimundus Sabundus[8] verteidigen zu wollen, in der es Rabundus – folgen wir Montaigne – so «unzweifelhaft, mit solcher Sattelfestigkeit und solch glücklicher Hand» unternehme «gegen die Atheisten kraft natürlicher, reiner menschlicher Vernunftgründe den Wahrheitsbeweis für alle Glaubenssätze der christlichen Religion zu erbringen […]»[9], dass man sich auf den ersten Blick fragen muss, wie Charles B. Schmitt zu dem eben zitierten Urteil über die *Apologie* gelangen konnte. Schließlich scheint Montaigne mit der *Theologia naturalis* doch ein Buch eines spätscholastischen Theologen

[5] Ch. B. Schmitt, *The Rediscovery of Ancient Scepticism in Modern Times*, in *The Sceptical Tradition*, hrsg. v. Myles F. Burnyeat, Berkely/ Los Angeles/ London 1983, S. 225-251, S. 238.

[6] Trotz der sehr lebhafen Montaignerezeption sind bisher nur wenig Artikel zu Montaigne und den Tieren erschienen. So weit ich weiß, behandeln die folgenden Artikel die Tiere bei Montaigne: M. Maupoint, *Le Bestiaire de Montaigne*, in «Bulletin de la société des Amis de Montaigne», XXV/XXVI, 1963, S. 10–24; Y. Bellenger, *L'intelligence des animaux: Montaigne et du Bartas lecteurs de Plutarque*, in «Revue d'Histoire littéraire de la France», LXXX, 1980, S. 523–539; E. Méron, *L'animal est-il une personne?*, in «Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne», IXL/XL, 1995, S. 43–53; C. Couturas, *Les exemples animaliers dans l'Apologie de Raymond Sebond*, in «Bulletin de la Société des Amis de Montaigne», IXL/XL, 1995 S. 54–57; H. Melehy, *Montaigne and Ethics: The Case of Animals*, in «L'esprit createur», XLVI, 2006, S. 96–107; Th. Gontier, *Montaigne and Descartes: Precursors to the Modern Animal Question*, in «Montaigne Studies», XXV, 2013, S. 93–104; N. Panichi, *Montaigne and Animal Ethics*, in *Ethical Perspectives on Animals in the Renaissance and Early Modern Period*, hrsg. v. Cecilia Muratori u. Burkhard Dohm, Florenz 2013, S. 91–110.

[7] Die einzige mir bekannte Ausnahme bildet die Arbeit von Markus Wild, die zahlreiche Aspekte zwischen Montaignes Überlegungen bezüglich der Tiere vertieft, die ich in diesem Artikel nur andeuten kann. – Vgl. M. Wild, *Die anthropologische Differenz. Der Geist der Tiere in der Frühen Neuzeit bei Montaigne, Descartes und Hume*, cit.

[8] Die Lyoner Erstausgabe erschien unter dem Titel *Liber creaturarum sive de homine compositus a reverendo Raymundo Sebeydem.* Die Ausgabe Venedig 1581 war dann mit *Theologia naturalis* betitelt; ein moderner Nachdruck mit kritischer Edition des Prologs liegt vor *Raimundus Sabundus, Theologia naturalis seu Liber creaturarum*, hrsg. v. F. Stegmüller, Stuttgart/ Bad Cannstatt 1966. – Vgl. zu Raimundus Sabundus auch W.A. Euler, *Art. Raimund von Sabunde*, in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, hrsg. v. G. Müller et alii, Bd. 28, Berlin/ New York 1997, S. 122–125.

[9] Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*,cit., II, 12, S. 167.

verteidigen zu wollen, dem es keinesfalls um Skepsis, sondern vielmehr um den klaren Beweis und die eindeutige Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis Gottes und der Glaubenslehren aus der Naturerkenntnis heraus gegangen ist[10]. Und dies muss Sabundus so hervorragend gelungen sein, dass Montaigne eigentlich nur zu sagen bleibt, dass er «eine überzeugendere Vertretung der Sache für unmöglich halte» und dass ihm (Sabundus) «niemand hierin je gleichgekommen»[11] sei.

Doch Montaigne geht im Lobpreis dieses Werkes auf scheinbar ganz unskeptische Manier sogar noch weiter und nennt dieses Werk so ausgezeichnet, dass es «sich wohl um eine Art Quintessenz aus Thomas von Aquin handeln» müsse, da «allein dieser Geist, von unendlicher Gelehrsamkeit und bewundernswerter Verstandesschärfe […] in Wahrheit zu solchen Gedankengängen fähig [sei]»[12]. Nun hat Montaigne – als traute er der Lucidität seines zu verteidigenden Autors doch nicht ganz – mit Thomas von Aquin auch die Autorität des sicherlich bedeutendsten Repräsentanten des christlichen Aristotelismus[13] herangezogen, der in komplizierten und teilweise widersprüchlichen Übersetzungs-, Rezeptions- und Integrationsbemühungen seit dem 12. Jahrhundert durch Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin im 13. Jahrhundert letztendlich so weit konsolidiert worden war[14], dass er für Skepsis eigentlich nur wenig Raum ließ.

[10] Diesen Anspruch macht schon der Prolog der *Theologia naturalis* deutlich: Die in ihr enthaltene Wissenschaft lehre jeden Menschen tatsächlich, unfehlbar und ohne Schwierigkeiten und Mühe jede notwendige Wahrheit sowohl über den Menschen als auch über Gott und über alles, was dem Menschen zur Erlangung des Heils und des ewigen Lebens sowie zur Vervollkommnung nötig sei, zu erkennen. Raimundus Sabundus, *Theologia naturalis*, cit., S. 27: «Ista scientia docet omnem hominem cognoscere realiter, infallibiliter, sine difficultate et labore omnem veritatem necessariam, homini cognoscere tam de homine, quam de Deo, et omnia, quae sunt necessaria homini ad salutem et ad suam perfectionem, et ut perveniat ad vitam aeternam».

[11] Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 167.

[12] *Ibid.,* S. 168.

[13] Dass Montaigne Aristoteles – oder vielmehr seiner intellektuellen Verabsolutierung als «König der Dogmatiker» (II, 12, S. 270) – gegenüber kritisch eingestellt war, wird an einigen Passagen in den Essais deutlich. So schreibt er in seinem Essay Über die Knabenerziehung, Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., I, 26, S. 235: «Ich habe zu Pisa privat einen durchaus ehrenwerten Mann kennengelernt, der jedoch ein so eingefleischter Aristoteliker ist, daß sein allumfassendes Dogma lautet, Prüfstein und Grundregel jedes vernünftigen Denkens und jeder Wahrheit könne allein die Übereinstimmung mit der Lehrmeinung seines Meisters sein, außerhalb deren es nur Hirngespinste und Belanglosigkeiten gebe – kurz: Aristoteles habe alles erschaut und alles gesagt». – Und weiter heißt es dort, Montaigne, *ibid.,* S. 226: «Natürlich weiß ich, daß es eine Medizin, eine Jurisprudenz, eine vierteilige Mathematik gibt und worauf sie im großen und ganzen hinauswollen; allenfalls weiß ich auch noch, welchen Anspruch die Wissenschaften haben, unserem Leben zu dienen. Aber tiefer in sie einzudringen und mir über Aristoteles, den Monarchen der modernen Lehre, die Nägel abzukaun oder mich in ein bestimmtes Wissensgebiet zu verbeißen ist meine Sache nie gewesen.»

[14] Dies ist in Bezug auf die *Theologia naturalis* eine Vereinfachung, da dieses Buch selbst bereits ein Ausdruck einer gewissen Unsicherheit ist. Das Anliegen von Raimundus Sabundus ist es schließlich, ohne den Rückgriff auch brüchig gewordene Autoritäten und gesetzte Dogmen den christlichen Glauben nur auf Grundlage unserer natürlichen Vernunft beweisen zu wollen. Ich folge in der Darstellung der Ansicht Montaignes, möchte aber darauf hinweisen, dass diese Ansicht selbst den Sachverhalt stark vereinfacht. Ein differenzierteres Bild der *Theologia naturalis* gibt M. Gessmann, *Montaigne und die Moderne. Zu den philosophischen Grundlagen einer Epochenwende*, Hamburg 1997, S. 21–46.

Es drängt sich daher unmittelbar die Frage auf, weshalb Charles B. Schmitt einem Text von Montaigne wie der *Apologie*, deren Anliegen es offensichtlich zu sein scheint, einen Autor wie Raimundus Sabundus (und damit, das macht Montaigne durch seinen Rekurs auf Thomas von Aquin klar, auch ein fest umgrenztes christliches Weltbild und ein philosophisches System mit einem unbedingten Wahrheitsanspruch) zu verteidigen, eine skeptische Grundhaltung zuschreiben kann.

Die Antwort scheint Montaigne selbst auf eine für ihn eigene äußerst dissimulative Weise geben zu wollen, indem er schreibt:

> Da viele Leute es [die *Theologia naturalis*] mit Interesse lesen[15], namentlich die Damen, denen wir ja vornehmlich unsre Dienste schulden, bot sich mir schon öfters die Gelegenheit, ihnen bei der Entkräftung der zwei wichtigsten Einwände zu helfen, die man gegen das Buch vorbringt[16].

Hier sehen wir Montaigne auf einem verschlungenen Weg, sich und uns zu amüsieren: Wenn wir ihm folgen würden, wäre die *Theologia naturalis* des Raimundus Sabundus eine Damenzirkel-Lektüre gewesen, in deren Mitte Montaigne, der uns sonst eher als misogyn überliefert ist, ihnen das Buch in seinen Vorzügen erläutert hätte. Spätestens hier werden seine Zeitgenossen und Leser seiner *Essais* – auch wenn sie die Damen ihrer Zeit hinsichtlich ihres Bildungsstandes als Gleichberechtigte geschätzt haben sollten – sich eines Lächelns sicher nicht haben erwehren können und wie wir zu ahnen begonnen haben, dass sie sich mit diesem Essai auf eine verzwickte Lektüre und eventuell einen Skeptiker und zugleich Ironiker hohen Grades eingelassen haben, dessen Text sie wirklich «zwischen den Zeilen» weiter lesen sollten.

Aber zurück zu Montaigne und seinem Versuch bei der «Entkräftung der zwei wichtigsten Einwände zu helfen, die man gegen das Buch vorbringt»: Der *erste Einwand* lautet, dass die Schwachheit der menschlichen Vernunft keinerlei Möglichkeit habe, die Glaubenswahrheiten zu erkennen, sondern dass es dafür allein der übernatürlichen Erleuchtung durch die Gnade Gottes bedarf. Diesem fideistischen Einwand begegnet Montaigne nicht besonders engagiert und sehr kurz, da ihm der Mensch so offensichtlich mehr von kurzfristigen Einzelinteressen und seinen schwankenden Meinungen als von der hellen Illumination durch den Glauben geleitet zu werden scheint, dass einen solchen Einwand ernstzunehmen doch nur von mangelnder Aufrichtigkeit sich selbst und den Mitmenschen gegenüber zeugen könne[17]. Man müsse nur auf die Situation

[15] Die *Theologia naturalis* ist kein so unbekanntes Buch gewesen, wie es uns heute zu sein scheint. Dafür spricht, dass es zwischen 1485 und 1852 vierzehnmal aufgelegt worden ist. Hieran mag Montaigne keinen kleinen Anteil gehabt haben, da er in der Apologie auf äußerst hintergründige Art Werbung für diesen Text macht, den er selber übersetzt hatte. – Vgl. H. Meier, *Über das Glück des philosophischen Lebens. Reflexionen zu Rousseaus Reveries*, München 2011, S. 335.

[16] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., II, 12, S. 167.

[17] Insofern sind auch Interpretationsansätze, die in der Apologie eine Verteidigung einer fideistischen Position sehen wollen m. E. nur schwer haltbar. Montaigne selber hat jede Art von religiösem Dogmatismus aufgrund der ihm klar vor Augen liegenden gewaltsamen praktischen

während der damaligen Religionskriege und der fragwürdigen Motivation ihrer Kombattanten schauen, unter denen ganz Frankreich zu leiden hatte, um dies zu erkennen:

> Laßt uns die Wahrheit eingestehen: Wer aus unseren Truppen, selbst aus der regulären, königstreuen Armee, alle heraussieben wollte, die darin aus reinem Glaubenseifer marschiern, und hierzu noch jene, denen es zumindest um den Schutz der Gesetze ihres Landes oder den Dienst für ihren Fürsten geht, der brächte nicht einmal eine vollzählige Kompanie zusammen[18].

Wesentlich wichtiger scheint Montaigne daher der zweite Einwand zu sein, dessen Widerlegung er bei weiten den größten Raum der Apologie widmet. Dieser Einwand, der «da atheistisch, etwas härter angepackt werden [muss]»[19] lautet, dass die Vernunftgründe, die Raimundus Sabundus für eine sichere Gotteserkenntnis anführt, so schwach seien, dass sie mit Leichtigkeit umgeworfen werden könnten. Ja mehr noch «überdies meinen sie [jene Atheisten], ein leichtes Spiel zu haben, wenn man ihnen freie Hand läßt, unsre Religion mit den Waffen des rein menschlichen Verstandes zu bekämpfen […]». Nun richtet sich Montaigne also argumentativ – und hier sind wir beim Thema dieses Artikels angekommen – gegen jene anmaßende Position, die eine Überlegenheit der menschlichen Vernunft postuliert.

2. Die Anmaßung des Menschen

Montaignes Heilmittel gegen diese menschliche Anmaßung besteht im ganzen folgenden Teil der *Apologie* «darin, Hochmut und Stolz des Menschen zuschanden zu machen und zu zertreten. Prüfen wir also, […] ob es überhaupt in seiner Macht stehe, durch Denkbarkeit und logische Schlüsse auch nur ein Körnchen Gewißheit zu erlangen»[20]. Denn laut Montaigne sei es die Anmaßung des Menschen, sein Hochmut und seine Überheblichkeit, welche zugleich auch sein größtes Elend ist:

> Die Anmaßung ist unsere naturgegebene Erbkrankheit. Das unglückseligste und gebrechlichste aller Geschöpfe ist der Mensch, gleichzeitig jedoch das hochmütigste. Er sieht und fühlt sich hienieden im Schmutz und Kot der Erde angesiedelt, dem übelsten, totesten und stinkigsten Winkel des Weltalls untrennbar verhaftet, hausend

Konsequenzen während der Religionskriege vehement abgelehnt. Sein Eintritt für den Katholizismus hatte keine religiöse, sondern eine politisch-praktische Motivation. Wie man jemanden, dessen berühmtes Diktum lautet, Montagine, *Essais*, cit., II, 12. S. 167: «Christen sind wir im gleichen Sinne, wie wir Périgorden oder Deutsche sind» zu einem Fideisten stilisieren kann, scheint mir nur schwer einsehbar. Am ehesten mag hier, wenn man Montaigne denn als Fideisten sehen möchte, noch H. Friedrichs, *Montaigne*, Tübingen 1993, S. 102 Einschätzung den Punkt zu treffen: «Man hat den Eindruck, als entlaste sich Montaigne mit seinem Fideismus von den christlich bestimmten Glaubensinhalten, um Ruhe vor ihnen zu haben.»

[18] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., II, 12, S. 173.

[19] *Ibid.,* S. 180.

[20] *Ibid.,* S. 186 f.

im untersten und vom Himmelsgewölbe entferntesten Geschoß des Bauwerks, nur den Tieren des Landes zugesellt, die von allen drei Gattungen doch am schlechtesten weggekommen sind; und da geht er hin, setzt sich in seiner Einbildung über den Mondkreis und macht den Himmel zum Schemel seiner Füße![21]

Hier sind wir bei dem paradoxen Knackpunkt dieses Essais angekommen, welcher die Interpreten seit Jahrhunderten immer wieder vor unauflösliche Fragen gestellt hat. Denn Montaigne gibt zwar dissimulativ vor, einen Text wie die *Theologia naturalis* und damit auch die ganze Tradition, die dahinter steht, verteidigen zu wollen, greift aber auf den folgenden Seiten eben jenen Anspruch, den die *Theologia* selbst verfolgt – nämlich den Beweis Gottes durch unsere Vernunfterkenntnis – mit aller Schärfe und Grundsätzlichkeit an, sodass der Leser am Ende ganz verzweifelt zurückbleibt, weil dieser Position jeder Boden entzogen worden ist. An dieser Stelle gewinnt die *Apologie* ein eigenständiges Profil und wird ganz unabhängig von der *Theologia naturalis* zu jenem antidogmatischen und skeptischen Text, als den Charles B. Schmitt sie beschrieben hat. Denn es geht nun nicht mehr um Raimundus Sabundus oder um die Möglichkeit der Erkennbarkeit Gottes, sondern es wird im folgenden die generelle Möglichkeit von Wissensansprüchen jeder Art fundamental infrage gestellt.

Und diesen skeptischen Diskurs leitet Montaigne mit jener radikalen Frage über unser Verhältnis zu den Tieren ein, die den Leser auch auf den nächsten vierzig Seiten nicht loslassen wird: «Wenn ich mit meiner Katze spiele – wer weiß, ob ich nicht mehr ihr zum Zeitvertreib diene als sie mir?»[22] Und Montaigne erweitert diese Frage im folgenden hin zu einer grundsätzlichen Überlegung

> Aus ebendieser hohlen Einbildung stellt er [der Mensch] sich gar mit Gott gleich, maßt sich göttliche Eigenschaften an, sondert sich als vermeintlich Auserwählter von all den anderen Geschöpfen ab, schneidert den Tieren, seinen Gefährten und Mitbrüdern, ihr Teil zurecht und weist ihnen soviel Fähigkeiten und Kräfte zu, wie er für angemessen hält. Wie aber will er durch die Bemühung seines Verstandes die inneren und geheimen Regungen der Tiere erkennen können? Durch welchen Vergleich zwischen ihnen und uns schließt er denn auf den Unverstand, den er ihnen unterstellt?[23]

Um die Radikalität dieser Frage besser zu verstehen, lohnt es sich, jene metaphysischen Vorstellungen zu umreißen, die ein gebildeter Leser in der Renaissance mit ihnen verbunden haben muss.

Rekurrieren wir daher kurz nochmals auf Raimundus Sabundus. Bei ihm findet sich eine Beschreibung der Seinsstufen, die vom bloß seienden Unbelebten über die lebende Pflanze und das empfindende Tier bis zum verstehenden Menschen reicht[24]. Daraus ergibt sich, dass das Tier für den Menschen da sei und ihm zu Diensten sein müsse, was Sabundus ausdrücklich unterstreicht[25]. Dies ist

[21] *Ibid.*. – Hiermit ist zugleich das Weltbild des Thomas von Aquin wie des Raimundus Sabundus gleichsam nebenbei erledigt.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.,* S. 187.
[24] Vgl. Raimundus Sabundus, *Theologia naturalis*, cit., S. 4–6; Titulus I, S. 50* ff.
[25] Vgl. *ibid.*, Titulus XCVII, S. 122 ff.

allerdings keinesfalls eine Ansicht, die Sabundus allein vertritt, sondern bildet das Fundament nicht nur der christlichen, sondern auch der vorchristlichen westlichen Vorstellung von der Sonderstellung des Menschen gegenüber den Tieren und allen anderen Lebewesen. So heißt es bereits bei Aristoteles:

> In gleicher Weise ist augenscheinlich anzunehmen (was auch gilt, wenn sie erwachsen sind), daß die Pflanzen der Tiere wegen da sind und die Tiere der Menschen wegen, die zahmen zur Verwendung und zur Nahrung, von den wilden, wenn nicht alle, so doch zur Nahrung und sonstigem Nutzen, sofern Kleider und andere Ausrüstungsgegenstände aus ihnen verfertigt werden. Wenn nun die Natur nichts unvollkommen und nichts zwecklos macht, so muß die Natur all dies um der Menschen willen gemacht haben. Darum ist auch die Kriegskunst von Natur eine Art von Erwerbskunst (die Jagdkunst ist ein Teil von ihr), die man anwenden muß gegen die Tiere und gegen jene Menschen, die von Natur zum Dienen bestimmt sind und dies doch nicht wollen. Denn ein solcher Krieg ist von Natur gerecht[26].

Damit artikuliert Aristoteles eine ontologisch vorrangige Stellung des Menschen gegenüber allen anderen Lebewesen, die auch im Christentum ein selbstverständlicher Ausgangspunkt für die Beschreibung des Menschen und seiner besonderen Fähigkeiten werden sollte[27].

Das, was den Menschen von allen anderen Geschöpfen unterscheidet, ist sein rationaler Seelenteil, seine Vernunft. Die Vernunft also, die sich besonders in unserer Befähigung zur Sprache ausdrückt, ist die entscheidende Demarkationslinie zwischen dem Menschen und allen anderen Lebewesen, die ihn zu jenem Geschöpf macht, das durch seine Erkenntnisfähigkeit dazu bestimmt ist, über die anderen Lebewesen zu herrschen und Gott auf der scala naturae am nächsten zu sein[28]. Dass der Mensch im Gegensatz zu den Tieren

[26] Aristoteles, *Politik* 1256 b14–27, übers. u. hg. v. Olof Gigon, München 1973.

[27] So heißt es etwa bei Augustinus, *Vom Gottesstaat*, hg. u. übers. v. W. Thimme, eingel. u. komm. v. C, Andresen, München 2007, XI, 16, S. 27: «Denn unter den Wesen, die irgendwie sind, aber nicht sind, was Gott ist, der sie erschaffen hat, sind die lebenden den leblosen vorzuziehen, also die, welche Zeugungs- oder doch Wachstumskraft haben, denen, welchen dieser Trieb fehlt. Unter den lebenden sind sodann die empfindenden den nicht empfindenden vorzuziehen, also die Tiere den Bäumen. Unter den empfindenden aber die vernünftigen den vernunftlosen, also die Menschen dem Vieh. Unter den vernünftigen endlich die unsterblichen den sterblichen, also die Engel den Menschen. Doch dies ist lediglich die Rangordnung der Natur.»

[28] Eine Ansicht, die sich – freilich mit einer etwas anderen Akzentuierung – auch in der Renaissanceanthropologie findet. Man denke hier nur an Giovanni Pico della Mirandolas Schrift *De dignitate hominis, Über die Würde des Menschen*, lat.-dt., übers. v. N. Baumgarten, hg. u. eingel. v. A. Buck, Hamburg 1990, S. 5 f: «Endlich beschloß der höchste Künstler, daß der, dem er nichts Eigenes geben konnte, Anteil habe an allem, was die einzelnen jeweils für sich gehabt hatten. Also war er zufrieden mit dem Menschen als einem Geschöpf von unbestimmter Gestalt, stellte ihn in die Mitte der Welt und sprach ihn so an: ‚Wir haben die keinen festen Wohnsitz gegeben, Adam, kein eigenes Aussehen noch irgendeine besondere Gabe, damit du den Wohnsitz, das Aussehen und die Gaben, die du selbst dir ausersiehst, entsprechend deinem Wunsch und Entschluß habest und besitzest. Die Natur der übrigen Geschöpfe ist fest bestimmt und wird innerhalb von uns vorgeschriebener Gesetze begrenzt. Du sollst dir deine ohne jede Einschränkung und Enge, nach deinem Ermessen, dem ich dich anvertraut habe, selber bestimmen. Ich habe dich in die Mitte der Welt gestellt, damit du dich von dort aus bequemer umsehen kannst, was es auf der Welt gibt. […] Du kannst zum Niedrigeren, zum Tierischen

vorrangig aus dem Denken heraus begriffen werden müsse, ist eine Ansicht des Mittelalters, die in der Moderne noch verschärft wird. Die Verabsolutierung der Vernunft wird beispielsweise durch René Descartes' Überlegungen der strikten Unterscheidung zwischen *res extensa* und *res cogitans* – wobei die Tiere für Descartes eine reine res extensa sind – noch deutlich weiter akzentuiert[29]. Und noch Hegel äußert sich über die Differenz zwischen Mensch und Tier:

> Die Philosophie kann zunächst im allgemeinen als denkende Betrachtung der Gegenstände bestimmt werden. Wenn es aber richtig ist (und es wird wohl richtig sein), daß der Mensch durchs Denken sich vom Tiere unterscheidet, so ist alles Menschliche dadurch und allein dadurch menschlich, dass es durch das Denken bewirkt wird[30].

Gegen diese Ansicht, die dem Menschen eine metaphysische und epistemologische Sonderstellung einräumt, wendet sich Montaigne in der Apologie, um den Menschen mit den Mitteln der Skepsis von seinem Hochmut und der Tyrannei der Vernunft zu heilen bzw. ihm deren Grenzen aufzuzeigen. Schauen wir im weiteren, welche Rolle den Tieren bei dieser Therapie von Montaigne zugesprochen wird.

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entarten; du kannst aber auch zum Höheren, zum Göttlichen wiedergeboren werden, wenn deine Seele es beschließt.»

[29] In R. Descartes, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, vol. V, *Discours de la méthode*, Leipzig 1980, S. 49 f. findet sich diese Ansicht ganz deutlich: «Durch diese beiden Mittel kann man nun auch den Unterschied zwischen Menschen und Tieren erkennen. […] Und zwar bezeugt dies nicht nur, daß die Tiere weniger Vernunft als die Menschen, sondern daß sie gar keine haben; denn, wie man sieht, braucht man nur ganz wenig, um sprechen zu können. Da man außerdem unter den Tieren einer und derselben Art, ebenso wie unter den Menschen, Ungleichheit bemerkt und sieht, daß die einen leichter abzurichten sind als die anderen, so ist es nicht glaublich, daß ein Affe oder ein Papagei, der zu den vollkommensten seiner Art gehörte, darin nicht einem der stumpfsinnigsten Kinder oder zum wenigsten einem blödsinnigen gleichkäme, wenn ihre Seele nicht von einer von der unserigen ganz verschiedenen Natur wäre.» – Mit dieser Haltung, die durch seine Anti-aristotelische strikte Dichotomie zwischen Leib und Seele (denn im Gegensatz zum Aristotelismus fällt nun der vegetative Seelenteil, der auch Pflanzen und Tiere beseelt hatte, weg) verschärft Descartes die Diskurse über die Unterlegenheit der Tiere gegenüber den Menschen sogar noch weiter. Denn dadurch werden die Tiere auf reine Maschinen reduziert, denen jeder Anteil an der Vernunft und jede Empfindung abgesprochen werden. Es ist nur zu verständlich, dass Descartes sich über Montaigne – der ja gerade das entgegengesetzte Argumentationsziel verfolgt – in einem Brief vom 23. November 1646 sehr abschätzig äußert: Vgl. Brief von Réné Descartes' an den Marquis von Newcastle (23. Nov. 1646), in: *Descartes, Correspondance*, hg. v. Ch. Adam u. G. Milhaud, Bd. 7, Paris 1960, S. 222–227. – Vgl. zum Verhältnis zwischen Montaigne und Descartes in Bezug auf eine Tierethik, H. Melehy, Silencing the Animals: Montaigne, *Descartes, and the Hyperbole of Reason*, in «Symplokē», XIII, 2005, S. 263–282.

[30] G.W.F. Hegel, E*nzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse. Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik. Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen*, in *Id.*, *Werke*, Bd. 8, neu ediert v. E. Moldenhauer u. K. M. Michel, Frankfurt a.M. 1970, S. 41 f.

3. Montaignes Bestiarium

Mit welchem Recht stellen wir uns über die Tiere? Doch wohl deshalb – so Montaigne –, weil wir sie nicht verstehen[31]. Dabei ist es «eine offne Frage, wessen Fehler es ist, daß wir uns nicht verstehen, denn wir verstehen sie keineswegs besser als sie uns!» Mit diesen Worten beginnt das «Bestiarium» Montaignes, in dem er auf den folgenden vierzig Seiten der *Apologie* zahlreiche Tierbeispiele anführt, die uns klar machen sollen, wer hier eigentlich wen nicht versteht. So führt er den Leser im Verlauf der Argumentation dahin, dass er jene anthropolgische Differenz zu bezweifeln beginnt, weil es Montaignes Ansicht nach schließlich «keinen vernünftigen Grund gibt zu meinen, die Tiere täten aus zwanghaftem Naturtrieb, was wir aufgrund eigener Wahl und erworbner Kunstfertigkeit tun»[32].

Auf den ersten Blick erscheint dem Leser das Bestiarium Montaignes freilich verwirrend. Wir lesen hier von den unterschiedlichsten Fähigkeiten der verschiedensten Tiere, die Montaigne nahezu sämtlich aus der ihm bekannten Literatur gewonnen hat[33]: Von dem thrakischen Fuchs, der mithilfe seiner Verstandesfähigkeit die Dichte des Eises prüfen konnte[34], von Chrysipps Hund, der durch einen Vernunftschluss von drei Wegen den richtigen zu wählen wusste[35], von Androclus' Löwen[36], von sprechenden Drosseln, Raben und Papageien[37], von intelligenten Hunden[38] und gelehrigen Elstern[39], von mit einem religiösen Gefühl ausgestatten Elefanten[40], von deutlich vorausschauenden Kranichen und

[31] Auch hier macht Montaigne bereits deutlich, dass es ihm bei seinen Bemerkungen nicht allein um die Tiere geht, sondern um unbegründete und nur aus der Gewohnheit entstandene Unterschiede zwischen allen Lebewesen generell. Montaigne anthropo-logisiert die Tiere, um anhand dieses Diskurses Kritik an gesellschaftlich-politischen Unterschieden innerhalb der menschlichen Gemeinschaft zu üben, die Montaigne als nur künstliche Unterschiede betrachtet. Ich möchte hier darauf hinweisen, dass Montaigne dafür einsteht, dass wir uns die Artifizialität von Normen und gesellschaftlichen Differenzen bewusst machen und soweit wie möglich für uns selbst davon emanzipieren sollten. Darauf deuten verschiedene Bemerkungen in der *Apologie* hin. Montaigne, *Essais, cit.*, S. 200: «Die Menschen, die uns bedienen, werden geringer entlohnt und mit weniger Aufmerksamkeit und Freundlichkeit behandelt als unsre Vögel, Pferde und Hunde.»; *Ibid.,* S. 222: «Die Seelen der Kaiser und der Flickschuster sind über einen Leisten geschlagen. […] Derselbe Beweggrund, der uns mit einem Nachbarn in Streit geraten läßt, führt zwischen ihnen zum Krieg; derselbe Beweggrund, der uns einen Lakaien zu prügeln verleitet, treibt einen König dazu, eine ganze Provinz in Schutt und Asche zu legen. Das Wollen der Fürsten ist so leichtfertig wie das unsre – sie können nur mehr anrichten. Ansonsten besteht zwischen den Begierden von Mücke und Elefant kein Unterschied.».
[32] Vgl. *Ibid.,* S. 197.
[33] Vgl. insbesondere zu seiner Verwendung von Plutarch, N. Panichi, *Montaigne and Animal Ethics*, cit., S. 91–110.
[34] Vgl. Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 198.
[35] *Ibid.,* S. 202.
[36] *Ibid.,* S. 223 ff.
[37] *Ibid.,* S. 203.
[38] *Ibid.,* S. 204.
[39] *Ibid.,* S. 206.
[40] *Ibid.,* S. 210.

Schwalben[41], von mathematisch begabten Thunfischen[42] und haushälterischen Ameisen[43], von hilfbsbereiten Rindern und Schweinen[44] und von gutherzigen Tigern[45], von einem in ein Mädchen verliebten Drachen und einer brünstigen Gans[46] usw.

Wenn man genauer hinschaut, gewinnen die zuerst als lose und bemüht aus der Lektüre des Literaten zusammengesucht wirkenden Tieranekdoten jedoch an Ordnung und System: Montaigne durchläuft die verschieden Fähigkeiten, die wir als typisch menschlich betrachten und entwirft einen Gegendiskurs, der all diese Fähigkeiten auch den Tieren zuschreibt: Zuerst widmet er sich der Sprachfähigkeit (II, 12, S. 195–197), dann dem Denken (II, 12, S. 198–222), daraufhin geht er über zu den Tugenden, dem Abstraktionsvermögen (II, 12, S. 222–229), dem Imaginationsvermögen (II, 12, S. 230–232) und schließt mit der Schönheit des Körpers und den auffälligen körperlichen Ähnlichkeiten zwischen uns und den Tieren (S. 232–234). Das Ziel, das Montaigne mit den herangezogenen Beispielen verfolgt, besteht darin, jene anthropologische Differenz, von welcher der Mensch glaubt, sie zeichne ihn aus, zu relativieren und in Zweifel zu ziehen. Montaigne äußert sich zu seiner Argumentationsstrategie deutlich, denn von uns und den Tieren muss doch gelten:

> Von gleichen Ergebnissen müssen wir vielmehr auf gleiche Kräfte schließen und folglich zugeben, daß ebender Verstand und ebender Weg, die unser Werken und Wirken bestimmen, im selben Maße auch für sie bestimmend sind, wenn nicht in höherem[47].

Es könne doch nicht angehen – so Montaigne – dass wir die Ähnlichkeit zwischen uns und den Tieren *sehen*, dass sie uns in der Literatur *bezeugt* wird, und dass wir dennoch an einem Unterschied zwischen uns und ihnen festhalten, der nicht der Wirklichkeit, sondern nur unserer Einbildung entspringt. Montaigne vermenschlicht in der *Apologie* die Tiere, um nur konstruierte Unterschiede zu nivellieren.

Noch einmal: Es geht hierbei weniger um die Tiere, als um die Menschen, die aus Unaufrichtigkeit und Anmaßung heraus Unterschiede schaffen, wo keine sind oder doch keine sein *müssten*. Das ist für Montaigne jedoch weniger ein erkenntnistheoretisches Problem, sondern eher ein ethisches und praktisches: Aus ebendieser Anmaßung und dem Unbedingten bestimmter dogmatischer Überzeugungen folgt ebendas Leid, das Montaigne im Frankreich seiner Zeit erleben musste: Denn die Religionskriege zeigten in ihren wechselhaften Konstellationen ja gerade sowohl die Relativität tradierten Glaubens, wie zugleich die Abgründe menschlicher Niedertracht und Anmaßung, die sich

[41] *Ibid.,* S. 213.
[42] *Ibid.,* S. 227.
[43] *Ibid.,* S. 218.
[44] *Ibid.,* S. 226.
[45] *Ibid.,* S. 228.
[46] *Ibid.,* S. 217.
[47] *Ibid.,* S. 197.

an den jeweiligen dogmatischen Vorgaben festmachen oder diese zumindest vorgeben, um desto ungescheuter niederträchtig und grausam sein zu können[48]. Die Lebenswelt Montaignes war so diffus geworden, die Wirklichkeit so schwankend, die Meinungen so zahlreich und dabei (in ihren jeweiligen Ausprägungen) so vernichtend, dass das Leben fast nicht mehr auszuhalten war. Vor diesem Hintergrund schreibt Montaigne seine Essais als einen Versuch, sein *soi-même* in Aufrichtigkeit und persönlicher Freiheit zu bewahren[49] .

Vor diesem Hintergrund müssen auch – denke ich – seine Überlegungen über die Tiere gelesen werden: Die Tiere sind wie wir, wir sind wie die Tiere: Endlich und jederzeit bedroht. Unsere Anmaßung hindert uns ebenso daran, sie zu verstehen, wie sie uns auch daran hindert, uns selbst zu verstehen, denn alles «was uns fremd erscheint, verurteilen wir, und was wir nicht verstehn; genau das widerfährt uns daher auch bei unsrer Bewertung der Tiere»[50].

4. Montaignes skeptischer Gegendiskurs

Viele Montaignekenner schütteln über das *Bestiaire* Montaignes den Kopf. Man schäme sich fast der Anekdoten, die einem dort aufgetischt werden[51], sie können nicht ernst gemeint sein[52], es könne sich dabei nur um satirische Literatur handeln[53], und Donald Frame geht sogar soweit zu äußern, dass «Montaigne gives his critical judgement the day off and revels in the joy of argument»[54].

Diese Interpretationen scheinen jedoch zu verkennen, dass es in der *Apologie* überhaupt nicht darum geht, eine wissenschaftlich sachgerechte Darstellung des *Tier*verhaltens und der kognitiven Fähigkeiten der *Tiere* aufzustellen, sondern darum, dem Leser den Hochmut menschlicher Wissensansprüche und Urteilens vor Augen zu führen. Montaigne stellt nicht *die Tiere* dar, sondern inszeniert mit literarischen Beispielen gegenüber dem Dogmatiker einen *skeptischen Gegendiskurs*, der den Leser dazu bringen soll, bisher als *sicher* Angenommenes in Frage zu stellen: und dies weit über die als Beispiel genommenen Tiere hinaus.

[48] Eigenschaften, die Montaigne aufgrund seines eigenen Erlebens zutiefst verabscheut ha, Montaigne, *Essais*, cit, S. 159: «Ich lebe zu einer Zeit, in der es durch die Zügellosigkeit unserer Bürgerkriege von unglaublichen Beispielen dieses Lasters der Grausamkeit nur so wimmelt, und man findet in der alten Geschichte keine ungeheuer-licheren, als wir sie Tag für Tag vor Augen sehen.»

[49] Ähnlich äußert sich auch Stefan Zweig kurz vor seinem Selbstmord in der zutiefst inhumanen Zeit des Zweiten Weltkriegs in seinem immer noch äußert lesenswerten Artikel über Montaigne. St. Zweig, *Mein Beruf, meine Kunst ist zu leben*, in id., *Über Montaigne*, Zürich 1992, S. 9: Nur «wer in der eigenen, erschütterten Seele eine Zeit durchleben muß, die mit Krieg, Gewalt und tyrannischen Ideologien dem Einzelnen das Leben und innerhalb seines Lebens wieder die kostbarste Substanz, die individuelle Freiheit, bedroht, nur der weiß, wieviel Mut, wieviel Ehrlichkeit und Entschlossenheit vonnöten sind, in solchen Zeiten der Herdentollheit seinem innersten Ich treu zu bleiben.»

[50] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 209.

[51] Vgl. F. Strowski, *Montaigne*, Paris ^{2}1931, S. 166 ff.

[52] Vgl. F. Brahami, *Le travail du scepticisme. Montaigne, Bayle, Hume*, Paris 2001, S. 38.

[53] Vgl. G. Boas, *The Happy Beast in French Thought of the Seventeenth Century*, Baltimore 1933, S. 64.

[54] D. Frame, *Montaigne*: *A Biography,* New York 1964, S. 164.

Je abgelegener und unglaubwürdiger ein Beispiel ist, desto besser paßt es in Montaignes Konzept. Montaigne wendet hier eine Methode an, die er selber bei den pyrrhonischen Skeptikern bewundert:

> Gewinnen sie [die Pyrrhoniker], so hinkt offensichtlich euer Argument, gewinnt ihr, halt das ihre. Irren sie sich, bestätigen sie damit die menschliche Unwissenheit, irrt ihr euch, bestätigt ihr sie. Gelingt es ihnen, zu beweisen, daß nichts wißbar ist – in Ordnung; gelingt es ihnen nicht – auch in Ordnung![55]

Je verrückter daher ein Beispiel ist, desto aussagekräftiger ist es in dem Kontext, den Montaigne aufbaut. Beispiele wie Chrysipps Hund, Androclus' Löwe oder der thrakische Fuchs sind Allgemeinplätze der Literatur und damit Diskurse, die Montaigne begegnen und die er nun für einen skeptischen Gegendiskurs benutzt: Montaigne zitiert die Tierbeispiele aus der ihm als französischem *gentilhomme* geläufigen Literatur, er denkt sie sich nicht selbst aus. Das scheint mir insofern wichtig zu sein, da Montaigne damit implizit zu zeigen vermag – und genau darum geht es ihm –, dass selbst die größten Autoritäten vielleicht den gröbsten Unfug geschrieben haben[56]. Entweder der Leser glaubt die Beispiele, die Montaigne ihm auftischt, oder er muss die Autorität derer bezweifeln, welche diese Beispiele überliefert haben. So oder so – Montaigne hat gewonnen!

Donald Frame hat insofern zweifellos Recht mit seiner Bemerkung, dass Montaigne in seinem Bestiarium «seinem kritischen Urteil einen Tag Pause gönnt», verkennt jedoch m. E., dass dies genau die Intention Montaignes ist: Indem Montaigne aufhört, kritisch zu urteilen, hofft er bei dem Leser auf dieselbe Wirkung. Schließlich ist es gerade die menschliche *Anmaßung*, die uns von den Tieren und von der Natur trennt und die Montaigne mit Hilfe seiner Bemerkungen über die Vernunft der Tiere heilen möchte[57]. Hier zeigt sich bei Montaigne ganz deutlich das therapeutische Anliegen der Skepsis: Der Skeptiker möchte – wie Sextus Empirikus, der Hauptgewährsmann der skeptischen Schule schreibt – «auf alle mögliche Weise erscheinende und gedachte Dinge einander engegensetzen», um dadurch «zuerst zur Zurückhaltung, danach zur Seelenruhe [zu] gelangen.»[58] Es geht hier um eine Form der *persönlichen Befreiung* (und die *Essais* sind, wie Montaigne immer wieder schreibt, ein ganz persönliches und subjektives Buch) von Wissensansprüchen, die wir selber als endliche und bedingte

[55] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 265.
[56] Das ist eine Methode, die für sämtliche Essays strukturbildend ist. Montaigne äußert sich selbst in seinem Essay *Über Bücher* (II, 10) dazu recht klar, Ibid., S. 122: «Ich möchte, daß diese Kritiker dem Plutarch einen Nasenstüber auf meine Nase verpassen; ich möchte, daß sie, indem sie in mir den Seneca verunglimpfen, sich die Zunge verbrennen. Hierzu aber muß ich diese großen Namen ohne Nennung vorschicken und meine Unzulänglichkeiten dahinter verstecken.»
[57] Hier sind wir also im Bereich der Enchiridion- und Fabelliteratur. Niemand würde doch von Äsop verlangen, dass seine Fabeln wirkliche Beschreibungen der Tiere beinhalten, da es darum ja gerade nicht geht. Ähnlich sollte auch der Tierdiskurs Montaignes gelesen werden.
[58] Sextus Empiricus, *Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsi*s, eingel. u. übers. v. M. Hossenfelder, Frankfurt/Main 1985, S. 94.

Wesen gar nicht einholen können. Alle Essais Montaignes zeugen davon, dass es auch die unbedingte Forderung und die große Hoffnung Montaignes war, sich selbst zu einem unabhängigen und freien Menschen heranzubilden. Dies ist eine Hoffnung, die Montaigne mit den Skeptikern teilt und aus der heraus er urteilen kann, dass «Sterbliche [noch nie] etwas so offensichtlich Wahrheitsgemäßes und Heilsames [ersonnen] haben, wie die Lehre des Pyrrhon»[59]. Der Grund liegt für Montaigne darin, dass die Pyrrhonisten nichts behaupten, außer «daß sie noch auf der Suche nach der Wahrheit seien»[60].

Denn unter der «überheblichen Voreiligkeit»[61] leidet man selbst zuerst nur intellektuell, dann jedoch – bedingt durch die Konsequenzen, welche dogmatische Festlegungen nur zu häufig haben können – auch ganz lebensweltlich und praktisch. Die Religionskriege, die Montaignes Haltung mitgeprägt haben, können einem von den fatalen Auswirkungen fest und wiederholt auftretender Behauptungen und deren scheußlichen Konsequenzen eine sehr direkte Vorstellung geben. Doch nicht nur sich selbst möchte der Skeptiker heilen, sondern seine Therapie gilt auch den anderen. Im letzten Kapitel, mit dem Sextus Empiricus seinen Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis schließt, formuliert er dieses skeptische Programm noch einmal ganz deutlich:

> Der Skeptiker will aus Menschenfreundlichkeit nach Kräften die Einbildung und Voreiligkeit der Dogmatiker durch Argumentation heilen. Wie nun die Ärzte für die körperlichen Leiden verschiedene kräftige Heilmittel besitzen und den Schwererkrankten die starken unter ihnen verabreichen, den Leichterkrankten dagegen die leichteren, so stellt auch der Skeptiker verschieden starke Argumente auf und benutzt die schwerwiegenden, die das Leiden der Dogmatiker, die Einbildung, nachhaltig beheben können, bei den stark vom Übel der Voreiligkeit Befallenen, die leichteren dagegen bei denen, deren Leiden der Einbildung nur oberflächlich und leicht heilbar ist und von leichteren Überzeugungsmitteln behoben werden kann[62].

5. Schluss

Montaigne inszeniert in seiner *Apologie für Reymond Sebond* einen skeptischen Gegendiskurs gegenüber den Dogmatikern, der den Leser anhand des Vergleichs mit den Tieren zum Nachdenken darüber bringen möchte, inwiefern unsere eigenen Wissensansprüche und unsere Vorstellung einer anthropologischen Differenz zwischen Menschen und Tieren gerechtfertigt ist. Indem er in der Apologie die Tiere anthropologisiert, hebt er die Differenz zwischen uns und ihnen auf und erinnert uns so daran, dass die «Natur alle Geschöpfe liebevoll umfangen [hat]» und dass es «kein einziges [Lebwesen] gibt, das sie nicht voll und ganz mit den für seine Lebenserhaltung nötigen Mitteln ausgestattet hätte»[63].

[59] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 260.
[60] *Ibid.*, S. 261.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] Sextus Empiricus, *Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis*, cit., S. 299.
[63] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 192.

Doch Montaignes Interesse ist in der *Apologie* tiefer und bleibt nicht bei einem Plädoyer für die Tiere stehen. Denn letzten Endes geht es Montaigne weniger um die Tiere, als vielmehr um den Menschen. Indem er die *Vernunft der Tiere* hervorhebt und argumentativ plausibilisiert, zeigt er damit die *menschliche Unvernunft* auf, die voreilig und anmaßend nur allzu häufig von ungerechtfertigten Annahmen ausgeht. Dass dies nicht nur eine theoretische Diskussion ist, sondern dass die Konsequenzen einer solch überheblichen Haltung ganz praktisch schädlich sind, zeigt Montaigne in seinen *Essais* immer wieder. Als Heilmittel schlägt Montaigne die Skepsis vor, die er anhand seines Bestiariums in der *Apologie* auf äußerst hintergründige Weise vorführt. Denn nach Montaigne vermag nur der Skeptiker eine undogmatische, offene und tolerante Einstellung zu gewinnen, die am Ende auch den Tieren zugute kommen kann:

> Jene geistige Einstellung der Pyrrhonisten nun, gradlinig und unbeirrbar, mit der sie alle Dinge zur Kenntnis nehmen, ohne ein Urteil darüber abzugeben oder sie gar für wahr zu halten, ebnet ihnen den Weg zur Ataraxie, einer friedsamen und gleichmütigen Lebensweise, frei von den Erregungen, die unser Meinen und das Wissen, das wir von den Dingen zu haben wähnen, in uns auslösen und aus denen Furcht und Habsucht entstehn, Neid und maßlose Begierden, Ehrgeiz und Stolz, Aberglaube und Neuerungssucht, Ungehorsam und Aufruhr, Halsstarrigkeit und die meisten körperlichen Leiden[64].

Diese Einsicht könnten uns auch die Tiere beibringen, da ihr Beispiel uns erlauben könnte, einen Sinn für die Relativität unserer eigenen Perspektive zu gewinnen[65]. Wenn wir auf sie achten würden, könnten wir – dies Montaignes Überlegung – viel über uns selbst lernen. Zum Beispiel, dass wir selbst uns von den Tieren nicht unterscheiden, sondern dass wir selber vielmehr ebenso wie sie körperliche und endliche Wesen sind, deren kognitive Fähigkeiten denen der anderen Tiere sehr ähnlich sind. Was den Menschen jedoch von den Tieren unterscheidet, ist sein «Meinen und Wissen, daß wir von den Dingen zu haben wähnen», woraus jene spezifisch menschlichen Eigenschaften resultieren, die uns negativ von den Tieren Absetzen: «Furcht und Habsucht, Neid und maßlose Begierden, Ehrgeiz und Stolz». Von diesen Eigenschaften möchte Montaigne ebenso wie die antiken Skeptiker den Menschen mithilfe der Urteilsenthaltung heilen. Hier sehen wir, dass die Skepsis keine negative oder passive Art zu denken ist, sondern produktiv und tolerant. Auch tolerant den Tieren gegenüber, die uns vielleicht über uns selbst viel vermitteln könnten: «Doch was hilft's – sie tragen ja nicht einmal Kniehosen!»[66] Schließen wir mit Montaigne:

[64] *Ibid.* S. 262 f.

[65] Nicht umsonst besteht der erste Tropus der Zurückhaltung bei Sextus Empiricus auch in dem Vergleich mit den Tieren. – Vgl. Sextus Empiricus, *Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skespsis*, cit., S. 103–111.

[66] Montaigne, *Essais*, cit., S. 331. – 200 Jahre Später werden die «Sans-culottes» die Gesellschaft umstürzen, um zumindest die Gesellschaft der Menschen auf eine neue Basis zu stellen zu versuchen. Das Verständnis für die Tiere – wie für Toleranz überhaupt – scheint neuerdings gewachsen, ohne jedoch sehr viel stabiliserter zu sein, als zu Montaignes Zeit. Skepsis bleibt weiter angebracht.

All dies sage ich, um die Ähnlichkeit der menschlichen Dinge mit denen der anderen Lebewesen zu betonen und uns in deren große Gemeinschaft zurückzuführen. Wir stehen weder höher noch tiefer als die übrigen Geschöpfe: Alles, was unter dem Himmel ist, sagt der Weise, folgt einerlei Gesetz und Los[67].

[67] *Ibid.*, S. 196.

Interviste/1

Animals in and around poetry

Interview with John Burnside

a cura di Myrtha de Meo-Ehlert

The scottish poet and novelist John Burnside, winner of the T.S. Eliot Prize (2011) and the Forward Poetry Prize (2011), author of 14 books of poetry and 12 novels, has explored in his first novel *The Dumb House* the origin of language picking up the thread of the persian myth of Akbar the Great and his expirement with children growing in an enviroment without any contact to human language. The research on how and what human language can express and reflect of human perception of the world and, even more, of its role in the world, is one of the main questions Burnside poses in his writings. In this interview the role of perception, language and imagination as main elements of any poetic production, but also usually identified as main distinction between humans and animals will be discussed, reflecting on Burnside's poems, the Aristotelian definitions of soul and imagination, Montaigne and Stifter.

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In your poems animals play an important part as for example in the poem Cat where you *describe a cat, playing with and offering a mouse to the speaker. In other poems we meet snakes, wild animals, humans treating cruelly diverse animals, or you write about the animals as reflection of human projections in both superiority and determinism. It seems to me, that you do not give in your poems a bucolic or romantic view on animals, would you call it a realistic one or rather an attempt to put yourself in their position? Could you describe how you first chose to write about animals and what it means for you?*

When I began writing about animals, I think it was mostly driven by epistemological concerns. When I worked as a gardener, I remember, the standard way to drive away moles was to bury a bottle in the soil, with just the neck protruding, the logic being that the wind blowing across the opening would annoy the moles so much that they would move away from the patch of land you were trying to protect. I remember thinking, what does that sound feel like to a mole? Which reminded me of all the times I had asked, as a child, what does a dog think? How long does a horse remember some event that happened to it? Those questions children ask. Of course, one of the interesting things, for a poet, is that these questions cannot be answered – we cannot know what animals

are thinking or feeling. It is a short step from this sense of curious interest in animal experience to a feeling that all subjectivity (if we can use that term here) is precious and, in one sense at least, equal. Finally, I became convinced that all lives should be regarded as 'equal' – that is, every creature living has as much right to take up its portion of space as any other – for philosophical purposes. And political purpose, too. We have to respect all life equally, not just human life, but all.

I do think – or maybe I hope – that social justice begins with this respect for all life. We have to renew our definition of 'The Other' to include all living things, and in fact, the land, sea, air – everything. If we do this, I think certain socio-economic and socio-political shifts will follow. Edward Abbey says: «The ugliest thing in America is greed, the lust for power and domination, the lunatic ideology of perpetual Growth…. 'Progress' in our nation has for too long been confused with 'Growth'; I see the two as different, almost incompatible, since progress means, or should mean, change for the better – toward social justice, a liveable and open world, equal opportunity and affirmative action for all forms of life. And I mean all forms, not merely the human. The grizzly, the wolf, the rattlesnake, the condor, the coyote, the crocodile, whatever, each and every species has as much right to be here as we do.» I believe this is true and I think all our activities, from planning to building to thinking would become more fruitful and less damaging to our environment if we made this respect for 'all forms' a matter of policy.

Imagination and poetry

> Sensitive imagination, as we have said, is found in all animals, deliberative imagination only in those that are calculative: for whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring calculation; and there must be a single standard to measure by, for that is pursued which is greater. It follows that what acts in this way must be able to make a unity out of several images. (Aristotle, *De anima*, 434a.)

Aristotle's distinction of different forms of imagination grants animals a «sensitive imagination» and provokes a whole debate about the essential difference between animals and humans. As imagination is closely liked to the intellective faculties and, in the tripartition of the soul, to the intellective soul, the Aristotelian distinction led to very opposite interpretations such as a gradual difference between animals and humans or even the negation of any ontological difference. In several of your poems you point out one human quality, I mean the quality of naming, speaking and interpreting, relating it to our determination and regulation on animals.

> In time, we came to think that house contained
> a presence: we could see it from the yard
>
> shifting from room to room in the autumn rain
> and we thought it was watching us: a kindred shape
> more animal than ghost.

They say, if you dream an animal, it means

"the self" - that mess of memory and fear
that wants, remembers, understands, denies

John Burnside, *Animals*

Could we understand the animal as a nightmare and fear of human being, a reflection of the self as a daimon, like the Landscape is a «reflection of this image of myself», rather than a model for civilized and pacific life as we find it in many medieval bestiaries?

I can honestly say that I have not thought about this question before. So, of course, I want to think for a year or two before answering … But – I feel that I stand halfway between my 'natural' self (what I am, as it were) and the 'self' that results from the socialisation process. I will never 'become' my natural self, but it would be loathsome to me to simply accept the person I have been socialised to be. The difference here, in terms of experience, is the difference between education (the 'leading out' of an inherent self, though of course all of these terms are inadequate) and the formation process that socialisation is – a process, in short, intended to create more or less obedient social subjects, who may be able to exercise certain natural faculties, and will, of course, have appetites, wishes and longings that must be assuaged, appeased or diverted, but who, nevertheless, not rock the boat so much that they become a problem for the social system – or worse, exemplars of a different mode of thinking and dwelling in the world, (true, isolated individuals may live quite separate and self-governed lives, but they must always be seen – and quite often will collude with their portrayal – as eccentrics, or mavericks).

The animal, then, stands in some lights for a 'natural self' that probably cannot be attained, but still exists as an imaginative touchstone. We see how, at certain times, children understand this in much the same way as the shaman or shape-shifter does: they become animals according to their needs at certain times. As a child, I spent a good deal of my time being one bird or another, sometimes a Crow. Sometimes an Eagle.

In your famous poem Septuagesima *you allude to a comprehension «beyond the gloss of things» not limited by the qualities of human intellect.*

I dream of the silence
the day before Adam came
to name the animals,
The gold skins newly dropped
from God's bright fingers, still
implicit with the light.
A day like this, perhaps:
a winter whiteness

haunting the creation,
as we are sometimes
haunted by the space
we fill, or by the forms
we might have known
before the names,
beyond the gloss of things.
Septuagesima

The iustinian «nomina sunt consequentia rerum» which has influenced several poetologies, for instance Dantes Vita Nuova *but also Inger Christensen's* Alphabet*, what does it mean for your poetics?*

As a child, it often occurred to me that I was not to be allowed to name the things in my world – that the names had already been given. I rather resented this. A friend told me how, on a trip to Amazonia, he found a frog as yet 'unknown to science' (though I imagine the local people had a name for it) and he was allowed to name it – and I felt quite jealous of him for that… Seriously, though, this is an interesting thought when it first occurs to one – as a young child, if my memory is anything to go by, (though I have no real sense of time). Then, not long after that, there comes the recognition that the name one is given in one's native language for a 'bird' or a 'tree' is something else in another language. A 'Vogel', a 'Baum'. For example. That, for me, was gratifying. I liked it, that naming was arbitrary and I never really bought the idea of – say – a pre-Babel *Ur*-language, or some divine system of naming that our names merely approximated.

What is more gratifying, though, is when you learn how much grammar forms the way we see the world – which means the world could be seen in other ways from the convention you are accustomed to. For example, we know that the subject – predicate type of sentence structure is not universal – it is just one way of seeing how events unfold. I don't know enough about this – and I am ashamed to say that – but I do know from people more informed than me that Chinese, say, works differently. This is excellent news – it had always seemed rather a limited view of the world that a subject acts upon an object in the way our grammar seems to suggest is universal.

That our naming an sometimes get in the way of our experiencing of things – that was the point of *Septuagesima*, or one of the points there. If we are not careful, naming becomes a gloss. We think we know, because we have named. Or somebody who came before us has named.

In the anthology Animals and Angels *you put a quotation by Lucretius at the beginning of a collection of 12 poems, dealing with nature, creation and human place in it, could you describe this work, your intention and the place of animals in it and the confrontation of these two categories which classically are seen as two distinct genera or, allegorically read, as two opposing models of life?*

Ah. *Angels*. That was a while ago. I guess I was playing with what I had grown up with, just as I played then – and sometimes still play – with Christian/Catholic iconography and concepts. I guess there are two kinds of writing, in broad (very broad) terms: writing that interrogates what is there already, existing/received ideas and images for example, and writing that proposes another way of looking at things, an individual *Weltanschauung*, to go back to that old term. It's hard to get away with either of these unless there is a certain amount of play in the process. For me, thinking about angels in particular gave rise to a certain kind of play that, at the time, interested me.

Recently, I surprised myself on that subject, however. The artist Jürgen Partenheimer asked me to write a poem in response to some work of his, and – perhaps because I started work on this project while I was staying in Switzerland, not far from where Rilke lived in his final years – I found myself thinking about the figures of angels in his work, and in work influenced by him. Then I found myself writing – with no conscious intention, as it were, of doing so – an opening to the new poem with the following lines:

> It's not that I'm tired, it's just that I'm almost
> finished with the angels:
>
> the palaces of breath, the pale
> machinery of misbegotten wings,
>
> noon as Annunciation in the perfect
> garden,
> (fluted columns;
> fleur-de-lys).
>
> What claims me, now, is the swell
> of the literal: sky pouring down
>
> through the branches of willow and alder; small
> dark butterflies charting the meadows above the town
>
> when the mowing is done;

This is how it happens for/to me quite often, in fact: I do not decide, in some logical or systematic way, that I have to make a change. The change happens and then I begin to understand it. To stand under it, and so, see its implications. In recent poems, I find myself more concerned with the swell of the literal, with what I think is there, in the world, the thing I am guessing at as I look, and as I speak. I see each poem now as a kind of *Ansatz*, just as, more and more, I see each perception, each experience, as an Ansatz. for me, now a poem is a starting point, an educated guess, in the process of finding the world that is there, as opposed to the world I cam expecting – that is, socialized – to find.

Human and animal cognition

There are times when I think
of the knowledge we had as children:

the patterns we saw in number, or the spells
and recipes we had
for love and fear;

the knowledge we kept in the bones
for wet afternoons
the slink of tides, the absolute of fog.

John Burnside, *Being and Time, The Light Trap*

This describtion reminded me of Stifters description of his memory of his first perception, offered in his essay Granit. *The question of memory and imagination is also relevant for question about our relation of animals, usually described as a hierarchy in which all the other beings are subordinated to humans (Aristotle,* Politics, *1256b14). In the peripatetic theory of perception and cognition the cognition of a child is often used as an image to illustrate a primitive and initial state of knowledge, a comparison which has been recently used by the modern philosopher Peter Singer relating this state of knowing and selfcomprehension to those of certain animals. What do you think about this traslation?*

I don't want to romanticise the child, in the style of Wordsworth. I do think, though, that as we get older, the world can withdraw from us, as we get busy with the less immediate sense data and the questions inherent in the very fact of being. No romanticising – but don't children seem more capable of wonder – or rather, shall we say, that each one of us was more consistently capable of wonder as a child than s/he is now, as the grown-up that child became?

I would try to clarify this by quoting Paul Shepard, who seems to me as right as it is humanly possible to be about our 'place in nature', which is certainly not, in his view, as part of a hierarchy of any kind. He says, «If nature is not a prison and earth a shoddy way-station, we must find the faith and force to affirm its metabolism as our own... To do so means nothing less than a shift in our whole frame of reference and our attitude toward life itself, a wider perception of the landscape as a creative, harmonious being where relationships of things are as real as the things. Without losing our sense of a great human destiny and without intellectual surrender, we must affirm that the world is a being, a part of our own body».

This is a big task: what he is suggesting is that, while continuing to think and act as adult humans, we must at the same time attempt to regain a sense of the

continuum – or rather, not a sense, but a direct experience – in which we live and move and have our being.

In Strong words you write: «Our respomse to the world is essentially one of wonder, of confronting the mysterious with a sense, not a being small, or insignificant, but of being part of a rich and complex narrative». Stifter in his preface *to the* Bunte Steine *presents a very simalar argument for the «collection of this marvels» of «sweet law of the small things» which mirror the complexe structure of the universe but and at the same time the most inner motions of humankind. How do you see your approach and writing, sometimes called nature poetry or ecopoetry, and which authors and figures have been important for you?*

I will take this opportunity, if I may, to argue with the term 'nature poetry', and to qualify 'ecopoetry' – I write as often about human relationships, or memories of childhood, as I do about what is usually recognised as 'nature' (i.e. greenery etc.) but I class all this work as part of an ecopoetic world-view. that is because I think, at this juncture, an ecopoetic view is what the age demands. I am not talking about climate change here, I am talking about repairing our relationship with the world that we, humans, inhabit. All too often, this world is fractured, poisoned, polluted with unnecessary light and noise and swamped with celebrity gossip and media buzz, which is to say, from the big picture down to the most trivial detail our experience of the world has been cheapened, mostly fro the sake of commerce, either directly or indirectly. I do think the way out of this trap is by way of the sweet law of small things – that is, by way of recognising the fine detail of the quality of our surroundings, as in the old arts of wabi-sabi, say, or the Still Life – and to begin to see these 'small things' we have to discard, to refuse, a good deal of what we have been told is big, so much of what is important (question: is it important to me, or to the masters of my society?).

On that latter note – re 'masters' – we can make one small but important point about how we use 'nature' to justify certain kinds of human behaviour and social institutions e.g. we find hierarchies in nature where they actually do not exist, (e.g. the bee colony, with its supposed 'queen') and we see animals as representative of certain 'virtues' (The Ant and the Grasshopper, the wise old owl, bees again) teaching us important moral lessons. This is all nonsense, of course – it's not just history that is written by the winners, nature is also rewritten again and again according to the dictates and needs of those in power. The job of the poet – any poet who talks about this world we inhabit – is not dissimilar to the work of the naturalist: we have to look at what is there, in that world, and not what we expect or hope to find there, and then we have to tell it as honestly and precisely as we can.

Finally I would like to ask you to comment on a passage of Montaigne's Apology for Raymond Sebond in view of your own considerations on animals and you way to present and rappresent them in your writings: «It is through the vanitie of the same

imagination that he dare equall himself to God, that he ascribeth divine conditions unto himself, that he selecteth and separateth himselfe from out the ranke of other creatures».

A similar notion is found in *Ecclesiastes*, which I used as the epigraph for my last poetry collection: «For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all is vanity.» However, I left out that last «for all is vanity» because, while the Bible text seems to lament the fact that we are «all one breath», I wanted to celebrate it. Every living thing depends on the whole body of living things for the quality of its existence and we would profit by recognising that. Sure, we can survive, for a while at least, with fewer flamingos and mangrove swamps and peatlands, but with each act of destruction, we diminish, not only the creaturely realm as a whole, but the quality of our lives too. The real tragedy is that the abuse of other lives – plant, animal, the poor in places we don't have to see, etc., is so ingrained into our system of values – that, in spite of all the lip service paid to biodiversity, say, in spite of all the greenwashing everyone from banks to so-called renewable energy companies produce every day, it is still the case that anything is permissible if it brings in profit for the one percent. We only have to look at what is going on now with the Shell drilling project in Alaska to see that this is so.

Thank you, mister Burnside, for your contribution and interesting answers .*

* Selected Bibliography: *Black Cat Bone*, Jonathan Cape, 2011; *Glister*, Jonathan Cape, 2008; *The Dump House*, Vintage, 1998; *Sense Data: New Science Poems*, Waning Moon Press, 1998; *Feast Days*, Secker & Warburg, 1992. Italian translations *Una bugia su mio padre*, tr. da M. Ortelio, Neri Pozza 2012; *Glister*, tr. da E. Terrinoni, Fazi, 2010 *La casa del silenzio*, tr. F. Francis, Padova 2007.

Recensioni, discussioni e note

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Recensione

Pia F. Cuneo (ed.), *Animals and Early Modern Identity*

Ashgate 2014

Stella Carella

Il libro di Pia F. Cuneo, *Animals and Early Modern Identity*, intende dichiaratamente inserirsi nel filone dei *nonhuman animal studies*, individuando nel mondo animale e nel rapporto fra questo e il mondo umano la cifra fondamentale per ridisegnare l'identità dell'uomo moderno. La stessa tripartizione del volume si gioca sul filo dei confini identitari, ora da proteggere (*Defending the Boundaries of Identity*), ora da strutturare (*Constituting the Boundaries of Identity*), ora da superare (*Transcending the Boundaries of Identity*).

L'*identità* è dunque posta come grande bacino tematico entro cui Cuneo raccoglie – forse in modo eccessivamente dispersivo e acquoso – sedici saggi interdisciplinari in cui la *intrahistoria* di cani, cavalli, pesci e maiali si fa *historia*, storia umana.

La stessa curatrice ammette la difficoltà di un ambito speculativo che, per complessità ed esuberanza, «makes a concise summary of the field within the circumscribed parameters of an introductiory chapter impossible» (p. 2). Lo stesso concetto di identità è assunto in senso lacaniano, come costruzione fluttuante, instabile, precaria, mai sufficientemente costituita né chiarificata. Il desiderio della fissità è esaudito solo nella reificazione dell'identità stessa, possibile attraverso la definizione dei suoi fenomeni costitutivi, come il linguaggio, la ritualità, la tradizione, i legami sociali. Ebbene, nella prima modernità, come oggi, uno dei fenomeni performanti più potenti in questo senso è proprio la *realtà animale non umana*.

In effetti, il regno animale non è riconducibile ad un sistema simbolico fra tanti: un animale non è solo *qualcosa*, né *sta* semplicemente *per* qualcosa, ma *fa* qualcosa. E questa sua peculiarità fra le cose del mondo fa sì che gli si accordi un'attenzione particolare.

L'uomo della prima modernità sviluppa una sensibilità più consapevole in questa direzione, trovando nel rapporto con alcuni animali la mediazione ontologica e socio-culturale di sé.

La prima sezione del libro, *Defending the Boundaries of Identity*, mostra appunto come spesso l'identità dell'uomo moderno sia tracciata e affermata dalla rappresentazione o dalle pratiche che coinvolgono gli animali. Il saggio di Peter Edwards, ad esempio, mostra come la cultura ippica dell'Inghilterra di fine Seicento fosse particolarmente importante per l'identificazione delle

classi più elevate. In un paese senza organi di polizia e forze dell'ordine, i cavalli, simboli di forza e potenza, possedevano qualità etologiche rassicuranti, assegnate transitivamente anche ai loro padroni.

Alison Stewart analizza come in Germania, in particolare a Norimberga, durante la prima metà del Cinquecento, le autorità secolari e religiose usassero immagini di cani e maiali come caricatura escatologica di un'umanità ferina e dissoluta, per persuadere i cittadini o i credenti ad abbracciare uno stile di vita più "civile".

La storica dell'arte Susan Maxwell esamina l'*Orfeo tra gli animali* di Johann König e la curiosa vicenda del suo acquisto da parte del Duca Massimiliano I di Baviera. Tra il 1613 e il 1614 si trascinarono farraginose negoziazioni fra il duca e il pittore, costretto a rimettere mano molte volte alla sua opera correggendola secondo le minuziose indicazioni del committente. È senz'altro curioso, rileva Maxwell, che il duca si ostinasse a voler comprare un quadro così pieno di errori: evidentemente il dipinto, poi sistemato nella Kammergallerie accanto a opere eccelse come la *Madonna col bambino* di Raffaello, doveva significare molto per lui. Il soggetto di Orfeo circondato dagli animali era da tempo stato assunto nell'iconografia cristiana come prototipo di Noè o del re David o di Cristo stesso, e metafora della Risurrezione; i Gesuiti in particolare amavano usare *topoi* della mitologia classica e della favolistica sugli animali per conferire *delectatio* e *utilitas* alla loro omiletica. La semantica orfica, dunque, doveva esprimere lo spessore socio-culturale del duca come collezionista erudito, signore terriero e devoto difensore della fede cattolica. Ma l'opera di König attesta anche lo sviluppo rinascimentale della filosofia della natura e, in seno a questa, della questione sulla natura senziente degli animali. Nel dipinto, in effetti, i soli uditori del poeta sono proprio gli animali, evidentemente connotati da una sensibilità tutta umana per la musica. Significativamente molti di loro volgono lo sguardo allo spettatore del quadro, creando così una connessione, una mediazione, fra colui che guarda e il mistero della musica orfica.

La seconda sezione del libro, *Contesting the boundery of identity*, vuole mostrare come certe interazioni uomo-animale possano indebolire, contestare o riformulare la fondatezza di certe identità sociali, morali o politico-economiche. Il contributo della stessa Cuneo analizza una xilografia del 1544 di Hans Baldung Grien raffigurante un cavallo, un palafreniere che giace supino, forse morto, e una strega. Discostandosi dall'interpretazione classica che attribuisce al destriero un significato simbolico-sessuale, l'autrice guarda all'animale dipinto semplicemente come animale, rintracciando nell'opera di Grien nient'altro che un avvertimento circa gli effetti deleteri di un eccessivo amore per i cavalli tipico dell'élite.

Il saggio di Karen Reber si rivolge invece alla letteratura, prendendo in esame il *Riccardo III*, l'ultima di quattro opere nella tetralogia minore di Shakespeare sulla storia inglese. Reber esamina le corrispondenze fra la fisionomia del personaggio di Riccardo, gobbo e dentuto, e le fattezze di un "grufolante cinghiale", mostrando come l'analogia ferina esprima plasticamente l'intento

shakespeariano di contestare e in definitiva sovvertire l'identità monarchica inglese.

Il contributo di Corine Schleif, probabilmente uno dei più pregevoli dell'intera raccolta, ci offre una lettura ad ampio raggio del cosiddetto *Geese Book*, un libro liturgico di inizio Cinquecento, in cui gli animali sono coinvolti secondo gradi diversi. Innanzitutto al livello ontologico: sono gli animali a rendere possibile la fattura del manoscritto (la pelle di vitello per le pagine, un pennello di peli di scoiattolo per decorarle, una piuma d'oca per scriverci su). Potremmo dire che essi non semplicemente *costituiscono* il libro, ma *sono* il libro. Ed è dunque sulla loro propria carne che essi stessi sono anche rappresentati: minute di oche, volpi, cani, gatti, polli, cervi, orsi, campeggiano in calce ad ogni pagina. Inoltre, spesso caricaturizzati e antropomorfizzati, essi sono anche specchi dell'umano e allegorie del potere. Sono dunque anche *altro*, anche *altri*; pur sempre continuando a rappresentare se stessi, gli animali "veri", quelli di carne. In un lungo paragrafo meravigliosamente illustrato, Shleif apre così anche uno scorcio sulla loro "vita quotidiana" all'epoca. Particolarmente cruenta è la descrizione dei maltrattamenti cui erano sottoposti: per la soppressione dei cani randagi, ad esempio, a Norimberga era stato istituito l'ufficio civico del *dog-slayer*, preposto alla cattura e al massacro dei branchi vagabondi. Più felice era la vita dei gatti, spesso membri effettivi delle famiglie urbane: nel registro contabile di tale Anton Kress troviamo annotato, insieme alle spese per il pesce e la legna, anche «milk for the cats» (p. 217).

A tutti questi livelli, conclude l'autrice, «the animals - sebbene legati a una costante e scivolosa bipolarità come soggetti-oggetti - were somebody» (p. 234), *qualcuno* da cui l'identità umana era, ed è, più o meno consapevolmente penetrata.

La terza ed ultima sezione del libro, *Transcending the Boundaries of Identity*, vuole far emergere la possibilità di un superamento dei confini delle identità conosciute creandone di nuove.

Il contributo di Louisa Mackenzie si focalizza sulla letteratura ittiologico-fantastica della metà del Seicento, dove l'ibridazione fra l'uomo e il pesce corrisponde all'ibridità della conoscenza scientifica stessa. L'autrice esamina e sfrutta in particolare i trattati di Pierre Belon e Guilaume Rondelet per criticare l'esaltazione di certa scienza moderna tronfia di una presunta oggettività. Esaudendo quello che il sociologo Bruno Latour riconosce come scambio dinamico fra "conoscenza pura" e "conoscenza ibrida", i trattati secenteschi sono esempio di una vera «latourian identity», ovvero di quell'identità costituita dalla fertile tensione fra scienza propriamente detta e altre forme di conoscenza (folclore, convenzioni letterarie, curiosi aneddoti).

Il saggio di Elspeth Graham pone di nuovo a tema il mondo marino e marinaio, rintracciando nelle rappresentazioni letterarie e pittoriche dei pesci (come *Il pescatore perfetto* di Izaak Walton e il *Fischmarkt* di Snyders e Van Dyck) la sottesa presenza di temi economici, politici, confessionali ed epistemologici. I

pesci, come animali svincolati e mobili per antonomasia, diventano metafora di un'identità fluida, cangiante, scivolosa.

È su questa *scivolosità* che si impastano del resto – pur forzatamente talvolta – le disomogeneità dei singoli contributi dell'intero volume. È nel continuo scivolare dell'identità animale su quella umana e dell'identità umana su quella animale il senso dinamico, e tutto post-moderno, della profonda interconnessione interna al mondo della natura. Solo nel fondamentale riconoscimento della nostra identità complessa e intrecciata con il mondo animale è possibile, secondo la curatrice, superare la miopia umano-centrica che ci vuole unici protagonisti di questo pianeta, sordi monoliti nel fragore vitale dell'universo.

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Recensione

Andrew Benjamin, *Of Jews and Animals*

Edinburgh University Press 2010

Giuseppe Fulvio Accardi

Nel suo recente libro *Of Jews and Animals*, Andrew Benjamin conduce un'analisi delle rappresentazioni degli Ebrei e degli animali nella storia dell'arte, nella letteratura e nella filosofia.

Il libro si apre con un preambolo a carattere logico-filosofico, dove l'autore afferma che il suo studio si è concentrato specificamente sulla distinzione tra 'figura', come rappresentazione storico-filosofica, e 'realtà', della vita animale o dell'identità ebraica definita nell'Ebraismo stesso. Era infatti doverosa una spiegazione dell'accostamento inconsueto dei due termini, davanti al quale resta almeno perplessi. Il pensiero di Benjamin si presenta dunque come una riflessione sul rapporto tra universalità e particolarità della situazione umana tout court. Non è quindi suggerita alcuna connessione tra i due termini 'Ebreo' e 'animale', se non per sottolineare il loro tradizionale stato di inclusione/esclusione rispetto all'idea di umanità definita da alcuni importanti maestri dell'Occidente, come Pascal, Hegel, Heidegger, Agamben, Derrida, Blanchot. Per l'Autore, entrambi i soggetti hanno storicamente veicolato a figura di una separazione radicale derivata dall'assenza di relazione: egli la definisce come «without relation», una cateogoria di non-relazione o di puro irrelatum. Se la cultura occidentale ha, così, erroneamente rappresentato la differenza rispetto all'universalità, lo scopo dello studio di Benjamin è quello di una 'metafisica della particolarità' attraverso l'esame della mancanza di relazioni (Come già sottolineava in A. Benjamin, *Perception, Judgment and Individuation: Towards a Metaphysics of Particularity*, in «International Journal of Philosophical Studies», XV,4, 2007, pp. 481-500)

Ben inteso, quindi, non è insinuato alcun dubbio sul fatto gli Ebrei faccian parte dell'umanità; né che gli animali non partecipino a un'intelligenza, un'esistenza, o un'anima' condivisa con gli esseri umani nel mondo come casa comune. All'Autore interessa il processo di creazione della nozione di 'altro' e, infine, di 'nemico', che avviene in ragione di una sua rappresentazione o 'figura' (filosofica o artistica) sulla quale si costruisce l'identità opposta, come il risultato di un'operazione della struttura del pensiero (e non necessariamente a partire dal pdnc): «the figure is what which essentialises» (p. 6). L'indagine di Benjamin è insieme logica e antropologica: a suo avviso, interrogarsi sull'animale «would pose a challenge to philosophy» proprio perché la sua presenza appartiene alla

costituzione stessa di un'idea filosofica di 'uomo' « as that which exists without relation to the animal» (p. 185).

L'indagine muove le prime mosse accostando il pensiero di Descartes e di Heidegger. Una separazione dei domini è fondamentale nel filosofo francese, quando prende in considerazione lo spirito dell'animale per pensare una psicologia umana, sia nei Principia che nelle *Passions de l'âme*, a partire dalla celebre espressione pregiudiziale: «bruta animantia cogitare». Per Descartes, l'animale rappresenta la soluzione di un problema centrale del suo sistema filosofico, cioè il problema di una disconnessione tra l'estensione finita di un 'corpo continuo' e quella infinita di un'anima, o più precisamente dell'opposizione tra pensiero e vita. «The distinction between 'live' and 'thought' can in fact be retained» – scrive Benjamin – «beyond the hold of an incipient porosity (…) an already present form of relationality» (p. 29). Parimenti, nei Concetti fondamentali della metafisica, Heidegger ammette una distinzione tra l'ambito dell'esistenza e quello della vita, in quanto l'animale domestico non 'esiste', non ha un pensiero della morte né dell'esistenza, ma vive solamente, esso non può far parte del 'con' dell'esperienza del *Dasein*, né del *Gefühl* che caratterizza l'esistenza, come il filosofo tedesco spiega a partire dal suo studio su Nietzsche. Citando la celebre massima aristotelica dell'uomo come animale razionale, Heidegger sottolinea che l'animale non può avere un pensiero di sé, né può articolarlo, perché la sua esistenza manca del linguaggio, perciò esso coincide con la sua vita stessa: «the animal is no more than its life» (p. 35). Il filosofo tedesco afferma così che l'essere umano esiste senza relazione con l'animale e in questo si apparenta con il pensiero di Descartes, perché in entrambi il without relation è in gioco come negazione paradossale di relazioni logiche fondamentali: la loro concezione dell'uomo è cioè costituita nella separazione dalla condizione animale, seppure in entrambi, conclude l'autore, essa resti essenzialmente legata e fondante il concetto di umanità.

L'Autore si concentra quindi sulle modalità mediante le quali Blanchot definisce la comunità umana a partire dall'esclusione dell'animale. Se la letteratura è la pratica essenziale dell'uomo, essa nasce con la morte dell'animale, al momento della nominazione adamitica da parte dell'uomo del resto degli esseri viventi, cioè quando egli nomina e annichila (anéantit) la loro (e sua propria) esistenza dentro questo processo di definizione (p. 55). Di più: se per Blanchot la comunità si definisce con la morte dell'animale, per Benjamin l'animale è sacrificato per costituire la separazione tra natura e le forme linguistiche e di coesione della vita di comunità, che si fonda su relazioni umane. La separazione tra l'uomo e l'animale è allora espressa in immagini di violenza e di sacrificio, in quanto la morte rappresenta un'istanza della non-relazione, o almeno la sua eliminazione effettiva. La trasposizione dello stato dell'animale in termini di fiera, mostro, totem, animale sacrificale, ecc., ne sarebbe la dimostrazione ed è proprio tale fondamentale elemento di violenza che veicola, secondo l'Autore, la nozione di morte in Blanchot.

Ugualmente, la logica del sacrificio e della non-relazione sono presenti nell'esame del pensiero di Derrida. La decostruzione dell'antropo-centrismo generatore della metafisica del soggetto apre il 'gioco' tra l'uomo e l'animale (p. 76) come definizione di ciò che è proprio dell'essere umano. Nel *play/jeu* decostruzionista, il senza-relazione è inteso come il tentativo di formalizzare e sostantivare un insieme di relazioni non formali. «'Play' is one of a number of possible names for this plurality» (p. 88). Esso si pone come una relazione primodiale, perché costituisce il modello stesso per la nozione di differenza: in tal senso, si avverte in Benjamin un passaggio dal pensare una differenza antropologica al concepirne una logico-teoretica, che caratterizza nell'insieme tutto il libro.

Riprendendo, poi, le riflessioni hegeliane espresse nella Filosofia della natura, Benjamin introduce la figura dell'Ebreo. Nella sua lettura, gli Ebrei non partecipano dell'universale umano in quanto persistono in una identità non dialettica rispetto alla categoria dell''Uomo'. Secondo l'autore, Hegel «marks the movement in which particularity dominates a conception of possible universality» (p. 99). Benjamin rimanda all' estraneità degli Ebrei nel pensiero hegeliano, «fremde Volk» il cui stato di esclusione si traduce in stato di conservazione della propria specificità, a causa della non partecipazione al processo e allo sviluppo dell'universalità. Come già in un suo contributo passato (A. Benjamin, *What if the Other were an Animal? Hegel on Jews, Animals and Disease*, in «Critical Horizons», VIII.1, 2007, pp. 61-77), Benjamin considera le ragioni dell'accostamento dell'Ebreo con la nozione di 'malattia', che per Hegel è l'elemento d'opposizione alla fluidità della 'totalità' dello Spirito. L'Autore conclude che l'universalità dell'Uomo hegeliano confligge con la particolarità dell'Ebreo: in tal modo, però, essa si definisce negativamente attraverso l'esclusione del without relation, incarnato dall'Ebreo, e ne dipende, almeno dialetticamente, formando un unicum di separazione. Benjamin prende inoltre in esame la nozione di 'vita nuda' in Agamben. Secondo l'autore, il pensiero del filosofo italiano sfocia in un concetto astratto in cui la 'vita nuda' corrisponde a un'indeterminata forma di vita prima dell'identità. Tale astrazione rischia di non saper distinguere fra vittime di violenza attuali e potenziali. La violenza che i nazisti tedeschi infliggono alla 'vita nuda' non è indiscriminata, ma orientata verso chi essi ritengono nemico essenziale, a causa della non assimilabilità al corpo politico della vita totalitaria; ciò in contrasto con una situazione che fonda questa vita stessa e più in generale ogni pensiero della differenza e della esclusione: «the already present relation of self/other and animal/human (…) All lines that divide involve a form of separation that can only ever be made absolute after the event [of presence]» (p. 127). Così, la distinzione tra homo ferus e homo sacer si annulla, secondo l'Autore, nella 'vita nuda', perché cancella la particolarità di chi è ridotto alla vita nei campi e sminuisce il senso politico del «founding mark» della differenza e del 'nemico' (pp. 122-124). Proprio sulla logica del nemico, Benjamin fonda la sua lettura di alcune celebri *pensées* di Pascal, in relazione alla dicotomia di giustizia e forza: la loro interazione delimita «a clear and already present necessity» (p. 139), cioè di chi le si oppone,

che l'Autore collega direttamente alla presenza dell'Ebreo nel pensiero di Pascal (p. 186). Si tratta di tematiche ben note alla letteratura critica pascaliana. È inoltre necessario sottolineare lo slittamento di senso che l'uso della parola méchant assume nell'interpretazione di Benjamin: la necessità che i cristiani o gli ebrei siano méchants va intesa, in Pascal, in senso logico e non storico o morale. Il filosofo francese usa la figura dell'Ebreo secondo la tradizionale 'logica della sinagoga', per cui l'Ebraismo rappresenta la testimonianza della autenticità della religione cristiana, proprio a causa del suo rifiuto, in conformità a un complesso sistema di esegesi biblica. Quel che stupisce, è semmai la connotazione morale (méchant/ wicked) del 'nemico'. Un tratto frequentissimo dell'antropologia pascaliana considera gli Ebrei (e pure il resto dell'umanità) come 'carnali' o 'spirituali', secondo il loro attaccamento alla lettera o allo spirito delle Scritture (da cui la riflessione sul per-fidus). Nei frammenti considerati da Benjamin (L102-L103), il termine méchant è impiegato in maniera traslata, per distinguere chi trae le ragioni delle istituzioni politiche dalla realtà dei fatti e chi ne pensa le cause più profonde e intime. La questione è infatti il «fondamento mistico» dell'autorità o del potere, che traduce invece, secondo l'Autore, un processo di universalizzazione, escludendo ogni specificità. Un passaggio dedicato alla pittura permette quindi di approfondire ulteriormente il rapporto tra universale e particolare, nei termini di identità e alterità nel ritratto. I coniugi Arnolfini e l'Infanta Margherita diventano il simbolo della compresenza dell'autore nell'opera e del suo sé come auto-rappresentazione e firma in un oggetto votato all'universale dell'arte (ovvero della rappresentazione): «Mirrors figure as an inseparable part of the attempt to present a concern with self» (p. 156). Benjamin approfondisce lo statuto del ritratto, cioè la rappresentazione di un'alterità come 'viso' dell'altro, come diretto rinvio alla definizione del Viso universale: un modello astratto, sia artistico-figurativo, sia filosofico. Le analisi de La fontana delle grazie (1430) di Van Eyck o dell'intreccio di mani che si sfiorano nel Gesù fra i dottori (1506) di Dürer si ricollegano alle argomentazioni su Pascal. Nella prima, dove i sacerdoti ebrei sono bendati, è ripreso il tema della cecità degli Ebrei, frequentissimo nella letteratura apologetica, come pure l'immagine della Sinagoga, posta come fondamento alla Chiesa, ma insieme esclusa e dominata, sottoforma di trionfo visuale (eponimo dell'opera, conosciuta anche come Trionfo della Chiesa sulla Sinagoga). Nel secondo quadro, gli stessi visi grotteschi e la disconnessione della giuntura delle mani sono la figura di ciò che non è assimilabile per sua propria essenza: le mani acquisiscono un'«operative quality» (p. 168) che le distacca dall'insieme stesso della rappresentazione, dando loro un aspetto di estraneità e non-integrazione che traduce essenzialmente il without relation: Benjamin vede infatti nell'opera d'arte la possibilità di oltrepassare il processo di violenta eliminazione dell'alterità, che mina la compatta omogeneità dell'universale identico con la sua compresenza. Il merito del libro di Benjamin è forse nell'attenzione accordata alle riflessioni etiche a partire dal pensiero su esseri umani e non-umani attorno alla categoria di relazione, ponendo quindi un interrogativo più ampio rispetto ai modi

d'utilizzo di tale concetto. La domanda di Benjamin: «What does it mean to be just to particularity?» (p. 145) trova una risposta nella concezione di un sistema di rappresentazione filosofica, politica e sociale che riesce a mantenere le particolarità come luoghi di conflitto e non-omologazione (p. 146). «The point of departure» – ad esempio – «is that in regard to animals the affirmation of relationality needs to be understood in terms of particularity» (p. 190) e in tal senso, di irrelatum o pensiero differenziale. «The difference cannot be accounted in terms of world or language: to do so would necessitate the reintroduction of the without relation» (p. 191). Con lo stesso ragionamento (pp. 140-146), la logica della sinagoga, identificata alla figura 'astratta' dell'ebreo, così come la separazione dell'animalità dall'uomo o l'irruzione del sé dell'autore nel ritratto e nell'autoritratto sono associate da Benjamin in quanto medesimi procedimenti operativi di una categoria di «twofold presence» basata su una commistione di fondazione-esclusione, relazione-irrelazione, presenza-assenza che fa implodere i sistemi identitari e formalmente 'forti', o almeno li decostruisce dall'interno, mettendone in risalto le nervature: una dinamica che l'Autore definisce «repositioning» (p. 185) – il che richiama il nucleo semantico di rappresentazione del processo di concettualizzazione, come ulteriore presenza di ciò che è già presente, in termini logici, ontologici, teologici e visivi (p. 191). In finale, una nota di lettura: le argomentazioni di Benjamin non acquisiscono, né andrebbero intese, con un valore di indagine di storia filosofica o delle idee, bensì come un'inchiesta sulle modalità e le procedure del pensiero. Un'analisi teoretica, in fondo.

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Recensione

Lee MacLean, *The Free Animal. Rousseau on Free Will and Human Nature*

University of Toronto Press 2013

Giada Margiotto

In her latest work *The Free Animal. Rousseau on Free Will and Human Nature*, Lee MacLean intends to reassess the role of man's capacity for free will in the context of Rousseau's political philosophy. In the *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau metaphysically distinguishes man from other animals by means of two concepts, both of which expressing man's partial independence of nature: free will and perfectibility. According to Rousseau, man is free because "he feels the call of instinct 'but realizes is free to acquiesce or resist'" (p. 4). This "power of willing and the consciousness" of this power (p. 19) cannot be explained by mere mechanical laws, and reveals the spirituality of man. Perfectibility, on the contrary, as already noticed by Leo Strauss, is "metaphysically neutral". This means it could also be acceptable in the framework of a comprehensive materialism, of the kind which was rife in Rousseau's days. This is also why Rousseau, willing to preserve his theory from the materialists' attacks, grounds the rest of his "genealogy" of society – in the *Second Discourse* – on the very faculty of perfectibility. Many interpreters were thus led to imagine that the use of the notion of free will *chez* Rousseau is merely rhetorical. Rousseau employs this notion, they say, in order to avoid hassles with religious authorities, and pretends to trust it for he thinks that the stability of political life relies on such a belief. At any rate, being Rousseau well aware of "the difficulties surrounding all these questions" (*Second Discourse*, in *The First and Second Discourses*, ed. R. M. Masters, St. Martin's, New York 1964, p. 114), when he introduces the quality of perfectibility, "about which there can be no argument" (*Second Discourse*, p. 114), he actually dismisses the notion of free will. Strauss also claimed that Rousseau's characterization of perfectibility challenges the free will argument, because the development of human faculties comes about contingently, through a "chance combination of external circumstances which need never have happened" (*Second Discourse*, p. 144). In the footsteps of Strauss, Marc F. Plattner argues that Rousseau deliberately writes in an esoteric way to debar an open conflict with Christian orthodoxy.

Against such kind of reading, MacLean holds that Rousseau really believes in free will as a distinctive quality of man. First, Rousseau's argument

for free will is "too intriguing […] to have been merely rhetorical" (p. 18). According to Rousseau, human spirituality emerges not only from the capacity to discern between good and evil, but also – that which he himself particularly emphasizes – from the *consciousness* of free will. In order to avoid contrasts with religious authorities, indeed, it would have been enough to resort to the more conventional notion of free will as the power of choosing between good and evil. Secondly, the free will premise plays a crucial role with regard to politics. Rousseau's critique of the legitimacy of voluntary slavery (to be found in the *Second Discourse*, and in the *Social Contract* as well), grounding his attacks on despotism and arbitrary government, "relies on the premise that humans have free will" (p. 18). Thirdly, as MacLean points out, Rousseau's emphasis on the contingency of the faculties' development is only to stress the natural goodness of mankind, rather than to plead for the idea of a man merely shaped by history and blind chance. In fact, Rousseau himself underscores the active role played by man intended as a free agent in his own corruption. Yet the most effective defence of MacLean's argument can be found in chapter 2 of *The Free Animal*, where she demonstrates that perfectibility alone is not at all sufficient to explain the genealogy of vice, and particularly the emergence of the *amour propre*; free will is all the same necessary. Of particular interest, in this regard, are MacLean's scrupulous analyses of passages from the *Second Discourse* and from the *Emile*, and of some texts from Rousseau's private correspondence.

As a further step, chapter 3 of the book discusses the core philosophical tenets of the *Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar*, which, as MacLean says, "really does contain much of Rousseau's own position about metaphysics and religion" (p. 123). In the *Profession*, Rousseau presents a thorough critique of comprehensive materialism, advocating the idea that free will really exists. This he does, as MacLean suggests, in order to give rational plausibility to his hopes about the existence of God and free will. Rousseau, talking through the Savoyard Vicar, tries to "establish […] a new civil religion" (p. 96) that is grounded in a natural religion of which free will is a *sine qua non* condition. In chapter 4, then, MacLean takes into account some textual evidence that could possibly undermine her argument. In the *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, Rousseau seems indeed to raise doubts on the plausibility of the metaphysical views formerly expressed in the *Profession of faith.* However, "after analysing the principles that he [Rousseau] says have guided him in telling truth and lies", MacLean concludes that "his principles would never have permitted him to lie about the issue of the freedom of the will" (p. 132).

In conclusion, interpretations *à la* Strauss neglecting the relevance of Rousseau's anti-materialism fail to give a satisfactory account of his views on human nature. In opposition to the canonical definition of Rousseau's position as "metaphysical neutrality", MacLean thus proposes that of "metaphysical ambivalence". She suggests that Rousseau employs a strategy which consists in using different registers on different occasions: when developing his theory, he tries to keep metaphysical neutrality to protect himself from the materialists'

attacks; but when he wants to unfold his real beliefs on human nature, "he also uses dualism to protect against the assimilation of human to animal nature" (p. 151). Ultimately, the picture of Rousseau coming out of *The Rational Animal* is that of a radical critic of Enlightenment, more than what it has been thought until now. Rousseau, MacLean writes in the end, "sets himself against the very foundation of modernity with its material view of the universe" (p. 155).

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Recensione

Ryan Patrick McLaughlin, *Christian Theology and the Status of Animals*

Palgrave MacMillan 2014

Adriana Farenga

Il volume di Ryan Patrick McLaughlin vuole sviluppare un progetto ambizioso, ovvero analizzare la posizione della teologia cristiana nei riguardi degli animali, e individuare possibili alternative in considerazione del crescente peso della corrente vegetariana e vegana.

Il volume, edito da Palgrave Macmillan, è parte di nuova collana, chiamata *Animal Ethic*, che la casa editrice ha stabilito di dedicare al tema della costruzione di un'etica che tenga conto dei diritti degli animali, e si compone di otto capitoli. Di questi, quattro – il primo, il terzo, il quarto e l'ottavo – precedentemente pubblicati come articoli, qui opportunamente rielaborati, diventano parte di un discorso organico e lineare.

Il punto di partenza di McLaughlin è l'analisi del pensiero di Tommaso, dal quale risulta un profilo dell'Aquinate forse troppo marcatamente conservatore e antropocentrico, sebbene McLaughlin ammetta di non riscontrare che sporadiche tracce di tale tema nelle opere tommasiane. Quello di Tommaso è un pensiero basato sulla tripartizione aristotelica dell'anima e sulla creazione dell'uomo a immagine di Dio. Pertanto, ciò che non è umano è subordinato alla conservazione e al nutrimento dell'uomo, immagine di Dio per via della parte razionale della sua anima. Questa è la prospettiva che guida la stesura dei documenti ufficiali della Chiesa, esaminati dall'autore nel secondo capitolo.

McLaughlin evidenzia quanto (a partire dal Concilio Vaticano II, fino alle encicliche e ai discorsi di Giovanni Paolo II e Benedetto XVI, nonché nell'analisi dell'attuale catechismo) emerga ancora, nei documenti della Chiesa Cattolica, una visione tomista che per la mentalità odierna può risultare conservatrice. Tale visione si basa sulla consapevolezza del carattere di immagine di Dio che l'uomo porta in sé dal momento della sua creazione, e fondamentalmente è carente di un'analisi dedicata al rapporto tra l'uomo e i non-umani, e delle responsabilità nei confronti di questi ultimi.

L'autore dichiara con fermezza la necessità di giungere a un pensiero alternativo, che non condanni la tradizione dominante, ma che apporti al suo interno una considerazione se non paritaria, rispettosa delle altre creature.

Nel corso della sua analisi, McLaughlin sottolinea più volte come ogni affermazione sia frutto dell'interpretazione del tutto personale, che tiene conto

delle sue caratteristiche specifiche di individuo americano, maschio, bianco, appartenente alla Chiesa del Nazareno, vegano. Tale premessa metodologica è, a partire dall'introduzione, ripetuta più volte nel corso del libro e in particolare nel secondo capitolo.

Più interessante e meglio articolata risulta invece l'analisi condotta nel terzo capitolo, in cui McLaughlin, traendo spunto da opere di filosofi e teologi contemporanei – punto di riferimento particolare qui è Andrew Linzey – cerca di elaborare una via alternativa alla tradizione dominante. Tale via alternativa parte dal riconoscimento e dall'accettazione della differenza tra umani e non-umani, e a partire da questo riconoscimento prendersi cura dei non-umani. L'accettazione di tale differenza sulla base del carattere di immagine di cui l'uomo è portatore, base dell'antropocentrismo caratteristico della tradizione dominante, porta infatti con sé anche un senso di responsabilità nei confronti di chi è escluso da questo carattere: in breve dunque, come scrive l'autore, bisogna trattare gli animali nel modo in cui noi vorremmo essere trattati da Dio, senza rinchiuderli in una prospettiva puramente strumentale.

Ireneo di Lione e Ephrem Siriano sono invece i riferimenti chiave del quarto capitolo, il cui intento è certamente ambizioso: si tratta infatti di trovare, nei testi dei Padri della Chiesa, una base storico-teologica all'idea di un ritorno escatologico che includa anche gli animali. Osserviamo però a questo punto, con più forza, che, se l'intento dell'analisi è notevole dal punto di vista etico, il rischio è quello di forzare l'interpretazione dei testi, con il risultato di rendere debole, se non strumentale, l'argomentazione. Si prenda per esempio l'inizio del capitolo: McLaughlin evidenzia l'armonia dello stato precedente al peccato descritto da Ireneo, in cui non si conoscevano atti violenti e predatori, e in cui tutte le creature non si nutrivano che di vegetali, e conclude affermando che «there is no reason to assume that this harmonious coexistence excluded humans. Irenaeus makes no explicit claim that humans partecipated in predation prior to the Fall» (p. 60). Certo, è vero che Ireneo non afferma che l'uomo fosse dedito alla caccia già prima del peccato, ma è anche vero che siamo qui nell'ordine di un'ottica difficilmente ascrivibile nelle categorie di pensiero dei primi pensatori cristiani. McLaughlin ricorda che anche Teofilo di Antiochia, fonte di Ireneo, nega la partecipazione degli esseri umani in atti violenti; va tuttavia evidenziato allo stesso tempo che attività quali caccia, macellazione, allevamento e consumo di carne non erano considerate violente (in generale, inoltre, atti quali la riproduzione e la nutrizione riguardano, negli scritti dei Padri, unicamente l'uomo post-lapsario e non quello pre-lapsario). Si tratta quindi di un errore di deformazione prospettica: la lettura di McLaughlin rischia di dare poco rilievo al dato storico-sociale dell'importanza della carne per l'epoca, e del problema della nutrizione.

Il quinto e il sesto capitolo propongono un'esegesi diretta di due passi biblici, in continuità, almeno nelle intenzioni, con quanto sostenuto in precedenza. Nel quinto capitolo il passo preso in esame è Gen, 1, 29-30, il celebre passo in cui, dopo aver creato l'uomo a immagine, Dio lo rende custode della creazione; il

confronto con l'atteggiamento quasi opposto nelle parole di Dio nell'incipit del nono capitolo del Genesi (dove, nei primi tre versetti, Dio riconosce a Noè e ai suoi figli un ruolo superiore rispetto alle altre creature) è immediato. McLaughlin vuole promuovere atteggiamento gentile e non violento nei confronti del mondo di cui è custode, proprio per il fatto che il mondo è stato creato da Dio, di cui l'uomo è immagine.

Il passo preso in esame nel sesto capitolo è Isaia, 11, 1-9 (la descrizione escatologica dell'avvento del messia, quando il lupo dimorerà con l'agnello e il leone si ciberà di paglia), affrontato prima nel contesto generale dell'intero libro e poi nel suo significato intrinseco. Tale analisi porta l'autore a una lettura escatologica *animal-friendly*, che si pone in aperto contrasto con l'atteggiamento conservatore rintracciato nella visione tomista e ripreso dai documenti della Chiesa Cattolica.

Il penultimo capitolo esamina il concetto di sacralità del cosmo: è proprio in questo contesto che McLaughlin vede potersi realizzare l'ipotesi che gli uomini possono collaborare, finalmente, alla realizzazione di una comunione escatologica composta dalla totalità delle creature, umane e non. Si giunge così all'ultimo capitolo del libro, che spazia oltre i confini della tradizione cattolica: si cede la parola a Gandhi (il cui principio di non-violenza risulta fondamentale per ampliare le preoccupazioni morali includendo anche gli animali) e ad Albert Schweitzer, la cui concezione etica riesce opporsi fermamente all'antropocentrismo tomista. Si insiste ancora sul ruolo di responsabilità che l'uomo gioca nel proteggere l'ambito del non-umano, e sulla necessità del dialogo inter-religioso riconosciuto come requisito nella costruzione di un diverso rapporto uomo/animale.

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Recensione

Horst Bredekamp, *Immagini che ci guardano. Teoria dell'atto iconico*

Raffaello Cortina Editore 2015

Libera Pisano

Immagini che ci guardano è il titolo accattivante della versione italiana di *Theorie des Bildakts*, monumentale opera di Bredekamp tradotta in modo esemplare da Simone Buttazzi per Raffaello Cortina, a distanza di cinque anni dall'uscita in Germania, e impreziosita tanto da una prefazione di Federico Vercellone, quanto da una bellissima dedica che l'autore ha scelto di fare alle «forme casuali delle nuvole» (p. 3). Eminente studioso, Horst Bredekamp è una delle voci più originali nel dibattito culturale tedesco nonché un autorevole rappresentante della *Bildwissenschaft*, la scienza delle immagini che con un approccio nuovo ripensa lo statuto dell'arte e del visuale al di là dell'estetica tradizionale.

Lungi dall'essere manualistico e meramente enciclopedico, il volume si nutre di un vasto apparato iconografico, di una folta schiera di esempi e rimandi, seguendo un preciso taglio critico che fende secoli di storia del visuale, dalle primissime iscrizioni preistoriche fino alle più recenti performance artistiche, in modo diacronico e trasversale. Anche se sono molte le opere di Bredekamp tradotte già in italiano, questo libro riveste un ruolo decisivo perché è una *summa* di una ricerca decennale, una rielaborazione di un ciclo di lezioni (*Adorno Vorlesungen* del 2007), conferenze e articoli in cui l'autore definisce i punti cardine della sua teoria a partire da un'urgenza del presente, a tal punto che – sostiene Bredekamp – «senza l'elemento iconico, pare impossibile arrivare a un illuminismo contemporaneo» (p. 7). Sono molteplici, infatti, le ragioni dell'attualissimo interesse verso il problema delle immagini: non solo il bombardamento mediatico a cui siamo sottoposti, ma anche il rinnovato uso politico, militare, scientifico e giuridico di esse. Come scrive Vercellone nell'introduzione, l'intento del volume è quello di pensare l'immagine come «un ecosistema e una forma di vita nuovi (e insieme antichi) che andrebbero sempre più approfonditamente indagati *iuxta propria principia*» (pp. XVIII-XIX).

All'interno di un quadro che esula dai rigidi confini dell'estetica, il gesto di Bredekamp è quello di svelare l'*energeia* e la potenza storica delle immagini, prendendo definitivamente le distanze dall'interdetto razionalistico della mera

rappresentazione per «superare il gigantesco smarrimento» (p. 266) dell'epoca moderna. Il passaggio teorico che si compie in queste pagine è quello dal soggetto custode e creatore del mondo alle immagini-soggetto, che non hanno bisogno di una costruzione razionale per giustificare la loro esistenza. Nella lunga storia del visuale l'Illuminismo rappresenterebbe un vero e proprio spartiacque perché ha congedato, in nome della ragione, la *dynamis* e la *virtus* che caratterizzavano la teoria iconica. Tuttavia, bisognerebbe ammettere, che il rapporto tra la filosofia e le immagini non è mai stato pacifico, basti pensare alla condanna platonica e alla critica sottesa al mito della caverna, anche se Bredekamp – facendo i conti con la contraddittorietà del concetto platonico di arte – la reinterpreta come la conferma più energica dell'efficacia delle immagini. Dal pensatore greco l'autore salta direttamente nel Novecento, guardando ai tentativi fallimentari di riscattare filosoficamente lo statuto dell'immagine operati da Heidegger e Lacan. Se il primo, in fondo, preferirebbe «salvare la filosofia invece dei fenomeni» (p. 31), il secondo – pur sviluppando la reciprocità del concetto di *regarde* – ridurrebbe l'arte «alle tradizionali varianti della sua degradazione filosofica» (p. 33).

L'atto iconico rimanda inevitabilmente sia all'atto del discorso di Schleiermacher, sia all'atto linguistico di Austin. Il concetto che Bredekamp prende in prestito da quest'ultimo è quello di performatività, che è la chiave per comprendere la sua argomentazione e che avrebbe, senz'altro, meritato un capitolo a parte all'interno del volume. Che cosa si intende, dunque, per performatività? È l'effetto che un enunciato veicola nel momento in cui viene pronunciato e tale capacità «di balzare, mediante una fruizione visiva o tattile, da uno stato di latenza all'efficacia esteriore» (p. 36) Bredekamp la estende anche al visuale. Questa forza fattiva dell'immagine è l'atto iconico in sé e si può distinguere in tre categorie: schematico, sostitutivo e intrinseco, a cui corrispondono rispettivamente la vita, lo scambio e la forma.

Dipinti, affreschi, sculture e l'intera gamma di immagini «capaci di vitalità» (p. 78) appartengono all'atto iconico schematico, dove per "schema" si intende un criterio formale che, trasmettendo un preciso contenuto secondo dei parametri dati, sortisce «un effetto esemplare agli occhi dell'osservatore» (p. 77). Un caso paradigmatico sono i *tableaux vivants* che, elevando gli uomini a «recipiente iconico» (p. 92), esibiscono la performatività alla base dell'atto iconico stesso. Dalle pitture murarie di Pompei, passando alla riproduzione manieristica della *Deposizione* di Rosso Fiorentino ne la *Ricotta* di Pasolini e al video di Bill Viola che mette in scena la *Visitazione* del Pontormo, fino alle performance di Vanessa Beecroft, le repliche vive eliminano i confini tra artefatto e corpo, liberano la forza delle immagini e le avvicinano alla dimensione umana.

Appartengono anche al primo tipo di atto iconico gli automi ludici, liturgici e teatrali, la cui storia va dagli antichi Egizi fino agli avatar degli ultimi film di fantascienza; la schiera di sculture dalla forte carica erotica a partire dalla Venere di Prassitele fino alle bambole surrealiste ispirate al mito di Pigmalione innamorato di Galatea; la recente "arte transgenica" che incorpora materiale organico nell'artefatto dotato, quindi, di vita propria – basti pensare a Edgar

Lissel, al brasiliano Eduardo Kac o al collettivo Tissue, Culture and Art che ha realizzato bambole guatemalteche dalle cellule di topo. Tuttavia, la sintesi perfetta delle tante forme dell'atto iconico schematico viene offerta dalla performance "transumana" di Micheal Jackson a Bucarest nel 1992, quando «oltrepassò il confine che separa un'opera d'arte figurativa da un essere vivente» (p. 107), unendo il *tableau vivant* all'androide.

La seconda forma di atto iconico è quella sostitutiva e non scaturisce «dall'assimilazione di immagine e corpo, bensì dalla loro fondamentale scambiabilità» (p. 137). Il *Leitmotiv* di questa sezione è la *vera icon*, che ha origine nella reliquia autentica del Cristo morto per ispirare tecnologie iconiche successive volte a riprodurre "immagini vere" e l'aspettativa di tale verità si basa sulla reciproca interscambiabilità di corpo e immagine. Da questo assunto ne deriva una vasta gamma di processi religiosi, giuridici e politici a cui Bredekamp fa riferimento. Uno tra tutti riguarda i simboli sovrani e collettivi, che attraverso il loro carattere plastico perseguono obiettivi politici. Rientrano a pieno titolo nell'atto iconico sostitutivo le punizioni iconiche – dagli *Schandbilder* medievali alla fotografia del dissidente russo Litvinenko morente pubblicata su tutti i media quale simbolo di resistenza – e le iconoclastie classiche e contemporanee, intese come aggressione e annichilimento del nemico attraverso l'immagine. Se l'assunto di base della *vera icon* è che i corpi possono essere effettivamente immagini, se ne deduce che essi in quanto tali possono anche essere distrutti. La versione tristemente più attuale dell'atto iconico sostitutivo è quella terroristica, ovvero il brutale abbattimento e l'insensata distruzione di opere d'arte, patrimoni dell'umanità, perpetrata ad opera dell'Isis, la cui guerra segue strategie iconiche precise come si evince anche dalla diffusione di testimonianze video delle uccisioni di civili e soldati, interpretate come un modo per cancellare la distanza tra azione, persona e immagine.

L'atto iconico puro è quello intrinseco, immanente tanto nella natura quanto nell'arte, e trae la sua efficacia dalla complessità della forma e dalla paura della potenza visiva dell'immagine, affascinante e crudele quanto lo sguardo di Medusa. Da Cusano a Merlau-Ponty viene messa a fuoco una certa reciprocità chiasmica tra il vedente e il visto, che l'autore ritrova anche in un verso al cuore del componimento di Rilke – così amato dai filosofi – sul *Torso arcaico d'Apollo*: «non c'è punto che non veda te». Bredekamp parla, dunque, di «opere occhieggianti» che vedono senza scritte o dotazioni meccaniche e sono «custodi dell'atto iconico intrinseco» (p. 199). L'occhio è il varco per poter parlare della *potentia* formale delle immagini, *potentia* connessa – proprio come il potere mortifero dello sguardo di Medusa – alla paura e al suo superamento. È qui che la teoria dell'atto iconico di Bredekamp si lega alle *Pathosformen* di Warburg, «baluardi energetici attivi» (p. 243) che riattualizzano sempre e di nuovo il conflitto tra il *pathos* e l'*ethos*. L'atlante iconico *Mnemosyne* esibisce l'*energeia* tanto di una pagina di giornale, quanto di un affresco di Raffaello ed è senz'altro il modello che segna profondamente l'analisi di Bredekamp, il quale tuttavia azzarda – nelle conclusioni del libro – un salto evoluzionistico non molto convincente.

Riprendendo le osservazioni sulla *sexual selection* di Darwin, che concepirebbe lo sviluppo della specie come «una sinfonia incessante di atti iconici» (p. 255), l'autore tenta di dare una base scientifica solida alla sua teoria gettando un ponte tra uomo e animale. Questa operazione teorica mette insieme Lucrezio, Darwin, Peirce e Warburg come «indicatori della validità generale dell'atto iconico» (p. 261), poiché ripensano la vita come un'inspiegabile entità «dotata di volontà propria, mutevole, riproducibile e moritura» (p. 265). Al di là dei confini dell'umano, l'atto iconico acquista una validità universale e le immagini diventano entità autonome in grado di collegare l'inorganico alla cultura. Ma era davvero necessaria questa base scientifica come garanzia di universalità? O sarebbe bastata anche una teoria più "aperta" proprio perché connessa alla vita delle immagini?

Un altro punto centrale dell'intero volume è la tensione tra *Sprache* e *Bild*, percepibile soprattutto nelle prime pagine dove l'autore riporta molti esempi di opere d'arte che, parlando in prima persona, reclamano un ruolo attivo e si impongono come «un evento senza tempo» (p. 49). Tra le opere parlanti non si annoverano solo le fibule greche, le statue, i quadri – uno degli esempi celebri è la forma riflessiva usata da Jan van Eyck nel *Ritratto di uomo con turbante rosso* –, ma anche altri tipi di artefatti come le campane e le armi. Le immagini che parlano in prima persona hanno una semantica propria, quasi un desiderio e un'urgenza di riconoscimento che sta alla base della teoria dell'atto iconico.

Se la lingua appartiene all'uomo, l'immagine ha una «corporeità aliena» (pp. 9-10) e in questa crepa tra la dimensione umana che l'ha prodotta e l'autonomia del proprio statuto risiede il fascino iconico. D'altro canto, però, il concetto stesso di *energeia*, che Bredekamp utilizza rispetto alle immagini, rimanda alla forza retorica del linguaggio, già messa in luce da Aristotele. Nonostante l'inevitabile parallelismo tra parole e immagini, Bredekamp si svincola da ogni tipo di gerarchia e, pur riconoscendo che la capacità di produrre immagini è di gran lunga più antica rispetto all'evoluzione linguistica, ribadisce che «la teoria dell'atto iconico non va intesa – né dal punto di vista storico né da quello concettuale – come un voto "pro immagine" nell'eterna lotta tra immagini e parole, bensì come un contributo per il rafforzamento della lingua nell'era della sfida visuale» (p. 38). E non è un caso, dunque, che chiami a custodia dell'autonomia dell'atto iconico un motto e un'icona, una frase e un'immagine. Il primo è un verso di Leonardo che si riferisce alla consuetudine di velare le opere per poi scoprirle in occasione delle feste: «Non iscoprire se libertà/ t'è cara ché 'l volto mio/ è charciere d'amore»; la seconda è l'occhio alato che si trova su una placca realizzata da Leon Battista Alberti, un emblema «capace, in un sol colpo, di vedere e toccare» (p. 269). Il pericolo paventato nel verso leonardesco di perdere la libertà alla vista dell'opera d'arte e la sinestesia albertiana dell'occhio strappato dal resto del corpo fanno appello alla forza viva e al fascino rischioso liberato dalle immagini, immagini che questo libro ci invita a guardare non come strumenti di cui si può disporre o oggetti da contemplare, bensì come potenza storica e «condizione necessaria» (p. 266) della realtà.

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Recensione

Vincenzo Sorrentino, Cupio dissolvi. *Senso della vita e abbandono (impressioni)*

Armando 2015

Giacomo Dini

Potrà forse sembrare un paradosso, ma fra tutte le domande filosofiche quella sul senso della vita è una delle meno frequentate o, quantomeno, una di quelle che il più delle volte non senza impaccio viene posta in modo esplicito e schietto. Ciò probabilmente è dovuto al fatto che essa richiede di ricondurre i vari aspetti di cui la disciplina filosofica si occupa a unità, necessitando di una risposta che guardi alla vita in quanto tale, più in là dei suoi singoli ambiti e segmenti. In questo senso, per l'appunto, il testo che qui mi propongo di raccontare arriva come una ventata d'aria fresca, dritto verso questioni e problemi che da sempre e ogni giorno serpeggiano sottotraccia nella nostra quotidianità, quasi sempre senza venir portati davanti allo spietato, talvolta cinico, tribunale della riflessione critica.

Partendo da ciò mi pare di poter cogliere il maggior contributo donatoci da Vincenzo Sorrentino attraverso *Cupio dissolvi. Senso della vita e abbandono (impressioni)*: un insieme, per l'appunto, di "impressioni" volto a tentare di percorrere sino in fondo una strada che a tutta prima sembra porsi come difficilmente praticabile: vale la pena vivere? E, se sì, perché? Come si direbbe, sono questioni da un milione di dollari, ma verso le quali, tuttavia, Sorrentino si pone in maniera paziente, senza sottovalutarle e al contempo senza etichettarle subito come astruse o eccessivamente audaci. Ne nasce un *pamphlet* leggibilissimo, dove il professore dell'Università di Perugia sembra quasi assumere nei confronti del lettore un atteggiamento colloquiale e intimo, spiegando con estrema chiarezza espositiva e senza un eccessivo utilizzo – perché in questo caso forse non del tutto pertinente – del linguaggio tecnico-scientifico della filosofia le sue posizioni e i rimandi a quegli autori che ne hanno promosso la formulazione.

Le "impressioni" raccolte da Sorrentino sono undici, come undici sono i capitoli che le contengono. Ognuno di essi, pur affrontando la questione da uno specifico punto di vista, ha al proprio centro l'intreccio concettuale che permea di sé l'intero testo: il nesso, per l'autore imprescindibile, fra senso della vita e abbandono di sé. Per spiegare questa relazione Sorrentino pone fin dalle prime pagine la necessità di distinguere fra *senso* e *significato*. Spesso, infatti, si crea, nel

sentire comune degli uomini, il fraintendimento per cui la vita assume il proprio senso solo quando l'individuo sia stato in grado di conferirle un determinato significato. Quest'ultimo, al contrario, rimanda, per dirla con Sloterdjik, in primo luogo alla condizione "climatica", ambientale dell'essere umano, non a quella ontologica: il mondo che abitiamo ci pone all'interno di una complessa rete di relazioni (spaziali, temporali, interpersonali, sociali ecc.) che esula dalla volontà e dalle intenzioni del singolo soggetto. Questo orizzonte sovraindividuale pone la sua vita in un gioco comunitario di scopi, regole e convenzioni che rende *significative* le sue scelte e le sue azioni. «Il significato non è mai riducibile a qualcosa di scelto o creato direttamente e intenzionalmente dagli individui. Esso si dà sempre anche alle spalle di questi ultimi [...]. Ogni persona ha bisogno di sentire che il proprio contesto di appartenenza non dipende esclusivamente da una propria decisione, che è relativamente stabile» (p. 43). Questa stabilità ci deriva dal fatto che in ogni istante sappiamo che c'è un mondo oltre la nostra singolarità che va avanti indipendentemente da noi e che assegna una precisa posizione, una direzione alle nostre azioni, rassicurandoci. Ci troviamo dunque all'interno di un'area dai confini ben delineati, che non trascende i limiti temporali e spaziali del mondo in cui abitiamo.

L'intero edificio dei significati e dei simboli che faticosamente ci siamo costruiti viene però a crollare quando la consapevolezza della morte irrompe nei traffici tutti intramondani degli uomini; l'architettura relazionale e simbolica che fonda la possibilità di agire nel mondo si sfalda. Inevitabilmente, «la prospettiva della morte dell'umanità, almeno per l'ateo, distrugge ogni significato ultimo, dal momento che porta alla luce l'isolamento cosmico della vita umana. L'esistenza, infatti, ha significato quando è sostenuta dalla rete delle relazioni personali e simboliche che costituiscono il mondo; ma la morte (della specie) recide i contorni esterni della rete, facendo così precipitare la vita umana nell'abisso» (p. 44).

Da ciò ne deriva un annichilimento pure del senso della vita? Nient'affatto. Dolore, sofferenza e morte non impediscono il suo manifestarsi. La domanda fondamentale, infatti, non è «Quale significato, quale scopo ha la vita?», bensì «Merita di essere vissuta? Ne vale la pena?». Entrano qui in gioco alcune categorie che per Sorrentino sono le sole in grado di rischiarare i termini della questione, ossia quelle di *bellezza* e di *estasi*. Anche se una vita non ha scopo o significato, può essere meritevole di essere vissuta in quanto bella. Il senso, letteralmente, è cosa che ha a che fare con la sensibilità, con l'*aísthesis*: «Credo che l'esperienza del senso non dipenda dalla visione che si ha della vita, ma dal modo in cui si sente la vita: il senso ha un carattere essenzialmente estetico, ha cioè a che fare con la percezione [...] della bellezza» (p. 63). Qui mi pare di intravedere un aspetto kantiano nell'argomentazione di Sorrentino. La bellezza mostra una necessità, un ordito colmo di sensatezza della vita nonostante il suo lato a-finalistico: essa possiede una finalità senza fine. Nonostante l'esistenza possa non avere uno scopo determinato, la bellezza ne mette in luce i tratti che in qualche modo la giustificano e la garantiscono, facendone trapelare l'intrinseca bontà. Anzi, di

più. Sarei tentato di dire che il senso della vita, la sua aura finalistica, discenda proprio dal fatto che essa non ha alcuno scopo. Il fatto che quest'ultimo manchi e che ciononostante il mondo, la natura, l'uomo, le società, l'arte ecc. si diano, dona al tutto una luce di grazia (Wittgenstein avrebbe parlato del Mistico per indicare la meraviglia di fronte al fatto che l'essere, la realtà si dà): la bellezza di questa gratuità ci suggerisce che un senso vi è, che un'armonia trionfa, nonostante il dolore osceno dei bambini.

A livello individuale, infine, ciò ha a che fare con l'esperienza estatica. Attraverso la percezione estetica della vita, il soggetto, seppur temporaneamente, abbandona il proprio sé; il *principium individuationis* viene meno. Da questo punto di vista, come la morte catapulta la vita verso orizzonti non riducibili, fuori da un contesto religioso, ad alcun significato o scopo, così l'esperienza mistico-estetica proietta ogni uomo fuori dal proprio perimetro singolare-individuale, permettendogli di cogliersi come parte del Tutto, di una totalità che sempre gli ricorda quanto la sua volontà di creare senso sia vana. Cogliendosi come preso in un meccanismo cosmico, universale ed eterno più grande di lui, ovvero abbandonandosi, all'individuo viene così offerta la possibilità di sperimentare la gratuità e la leggerezza di quella vita che gli è stato concesso di attraversare. In un certo senso, l'esistenza cessa di essere un possesso e inizia a configurarsi come dono. In ciò Sorrentino, da filosofo politico qual è, rileva anche il meccanismo più potente contro i totalitarismi, che della vita parlano proprio in termini di possesso e di dominio.

Insomma, se di senso della vita si vuole parlare, dobbiamo esercitarci ad abbandonarci, a cogliere l'esistenza non come un oggetto da indirizzare mediante la nostra volontà e da forgiare tramite scopi e significati particolari, bensì come quella soglia-limite dove la vita finita del singolo seca quella cosmica e senza tempo dell'Essere. Come avrebbe colto splendidamente Ungaretti, il segreto sta nel cogliersi «immagine passeggera / Presa in un giro immortale» (G. Ungaretti, *Vita d'un uomo. 196 poesie (1914-1960)*, Mondadori 1980, p. 71).

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Recensione

Massimiliano Nicoli, *Le risorse umane*

Ediesse 2015

Ambrogio Garofano

Con la sua opera prima, *Le risorse umane* (Ediesse 2015), Massimiliano Nicoli, studioso formatosi tra Trieste e Parigi, si propone di analizzare, servendosi della «scatola di attrezzi» di Foucault, il variegato universo delle pratiche e dei saperi compresi sotto l'etichetta dello *human resource management*. Nonostante la parola, risorse umane, sia abbastanza recente – è stata introdotta nell'ambito dei saperi manageriali nel 1965 da Raymond Miles con un articolo comparso sulla prestigiosa «Harvard Business Review», *Human Relations or Human Resources?* – e lo stesso sviluppo della disciplina a cui si riferisce sia da collocare negli anni Ottanta del ventesimo secolo, per permettere all'oggetto teorico posto al centro della trattazione di sprigionare il proprio potenziale critico, l'autore sceglie di tracciarne lo sviluppo diacronico – genealogico, più che storico e sociologico. Sulla base della fondamentale intuizione di Marx – la funzione di direzione è «*funzione di sfruttamento di un processo lavorativo sociale*, […] volta a conseguire il massimo grado di sfruttamento della forza-lavoro, di estrazione di plusvalore e di autovalorizzazione del capitale» (p. 59) –, declinata foucaultianamente e sottratta alla teoria del primato dell'economico, vengono analizzate le pratiche e i discorsi entro i quali si è inteso organizzare la forza-lavoro, a partire dal capitalismo primo ottocentesco per arrivare al toyotismo, passando per Taylor e Ford. L'analisi diacronica fa emergere che, nell'ambito di quella che un tempo si chiamava «gestione del personale», si è passati da un dispositivo di controllo e disciplinamento del lavoratore (in alcuni casi – specie nelle fasi aurorali del capitalismo – coercitivo e violento, e, insieme, dispendioso e poco efficace) a un dispositivo entro il quale l'individualità del lavoratore è considerata una *risorsa* da *valorizzare* e implementare. Insomma, dalla *expertise* di un sapere manageriale ormai datato – o, volendo risalire ancor più indietro nel tempo, dal controllo coatto e violento della forza-lavoro – alla «umanizzazione del lavoro» (p. 51). La quale, però, garantisce – ed è questo l'aspetto (solo apparentemente) paradossale – un più efficace e meno dispendioso controllo. «Controllare meno per controllare meglio: ecco la semplice invenzione dei pionieri delle risorse umane» (pp. 171-172).

Ma, come risulterà chiaro sin da queste prime battute, l'intento di Nicoli non è tanto quello di tracciare una storia – o sia pure una genealogia – dello *human resource management*, quanto piuttosto quello di svelare il funzionamento

del dispositivo di potere che informa le società postfordiste; dispositivo, il cui meccanismo, come insegnano i metodi di analisi foucaultiani come sanno bene i foucaultiani, si lascia scorgere meglio tra le maglie dei discorsi che vertono su «oggetti bassi», piuttosto che su quelli che riguardano Stato, sovranità e diritto. In questo modo, venendo a far luce sul legame tra soggettivazione e potere nelle società contemporanee, il libro si fa ambizioso: la lente foucaultiana permette di leggere, nell'articolarsi dei discorsi e delle pratiche relative alle risorse umane, la cifra della nostra epoca.

Il primo capitolo si apre con un «carotaggio» nell'ambito del discorso manageriale. Termini desueti come 'gestione', 'dipendente', 'forza-lavoro' e così via vengono abbandonati e sostituiti dai più attraenti 'cooperazione', 'persona', 'risorsa'. Sul piano delle pratiche specifiche messe in gioco dal *management* delle risorse umane sono da rilevare il *mentoring*, il *counseling*, il *coaching*, la *performance appraisal*, il *feedback* a 360 gradi, tecniche attraverso le quali si riesce ad imbastire «un complesso sistema di specchi in grado di rimandare all'individuo [il lavoratore] un'immagine di sé strutturata, solidificata e verificata da un contesto oggettivo» (p. 36). Insomma, una «tecnologia del sé» che fa leva sull'oggettività di pratiche e di saperi, sì condivisi dai membri dell'azienda, ma che si concentrano nella figura del *manager* (capo o consulente valutatore), quale «detentore di un sapere/potere» (p. 37), il cui ruolo di direzione, anziché essere esercitato attraverso l'intimidazione, passa per l'ampliamento della sfera di autonomia del lavoratore (*empowerment*). Se queste specifiche pratiche richiedono la diretta «cura» della soggettività, ve ne sono di altre che passano per l'elaborazione di una cultura d'impresa – elaborazione di *missions* e *visions*, carte etiche e documenti di *corporate social responsibility* –, le quali mirano a generare nel lavoratore un fenomeno affettivo d'identificazione con l'impresa (*commitment*). Sul piano dei saperi che sottendono tali teorie e pratiche, prevalgono orientamenti cognitivisti e comportamentisti, i quali presuppongono una struttura psichica monistica, compatta e aconflittuale, un sé sempre accessibile, che non conosce gli abissi e le vertigini della psicologia del profondo, e la cui performatività è sempre migliorabile.

Dopo averci condotto attraverso i discorsi dello *human resource managemet*, l'autore ci invita a cogliere sotto l'incessante ritmo che batte su sviluppo della persona e cultura d'impresa il basso continuo delle tecniche di controllo. Nei capitoli che seguono, la nascita e lo sviluppo delle risorse umane vengono spiegati alla luce di più ampi rivolgimenti economici, i quali, a loro volta, richiedono nuovi dispositivi di addomesticamento della ribelle mano del lavoro. Dalle rozze e poco funzionali tecniche ottocentesche (minaccia, gerarchia di tipo militare, rigidi regolamenti di fabbrica, uso della tecnologia in chiave repressiva), si è passati a tecniche che, se perdevano in violenza e coercizione, guadagnavano in «sapere», e dunque, foucaultianamente, in produzione di «potere» e «verità». È (anche) così che si spiega il successo su scala planetaria del modello taylorfordista prima (capitoli secondo e terzo) e di quello postfordista dopo (capitolo quarto). Ma se il primo, definito dall'autore «dispositivo di stabilità» (p. 103), permette ancora

l'insorgere al suo interno dell'antagonismo di classe, il secondo, «dispositivo di flessibilità», tende a saturare del tutto lo spazio – e il tempo – di formazione di resistenza e libera soggettivazione, esibendo, rispetto al primo, una maggiore capacità di catturare «bios» (p. 137).

Negli ultimi tre capitoli del libro (che in totale ne conta quattro), la presenza foucaultiana si fa sempre più determinante. Dello strumentario di Foucault, Nicoli invita ad accogliere, oltre a «dispositivo» e «società disciplinare» – l'utilizzo dei quali era stato indirettamente annunciato nell'*exergum* con cui si apre il capitolo secondo – concetti quali «biopotere» e «biopolitica». Non solo, dunque, il Foucault di *Sorvegliare e punire*, ma quello della *Volontà di sapere* e dei corsi tenuti al Collège de France nella seconda metà degli anni Settanta. Si tratta di testi nei quali, a partire dall'idea di uno scambio osmotico tra piano microfisico e piano macropolitico del potere, tra discipline e biopolitica, l'amministrazione dell'impresa e il governo dello stato vengono a stringersi entro le maglie di un unico dispositivo. Si tratta di un intreccio, così sostiene Nicoli, che nel caso del postfordismo viene a stringersi intorno al nodo delle pratiche e dei discorsi relativi alle risorse umane, le quali, proprio per questo, rappresentano un punto d'accesso privilegiato ai meccanismi di potere strutturanti le società contemporanee. Eppure, proprio rispetto a questo punto capitale, nel quale la teoria foucaultiana dovrebbe rendere conto di se stessa, l'autore – in parte, comprensibilmente – fa un'importante ammissione metodologica: senz'altro le affermazioni secondo le quali il taylorfordimo (lo stesso, ovviamente, vale per il postfordimo) possa essere assunto come un determinato dispositivo di potere dovrebbero essere provate attraverso l'indagine archeologica e genealogica, ma, dal momento che una ricostruzione di questo tipo esorbita limiti e possibilità del testo in questione, l'autore si limiterà a «descrivere il dispositivo e le sue metamorfosi a partire dai suoi effetti» (p. 109). È su questo punto, ripeto, che la teoria di Foucault dovrebbe affrontare la prova dei fatti; è su questo punto che il confronto tra il Marx del primato dell'economico e il Foucault della connessione tra capitalismo, disciplina e biopolitica dovrebbe aprirsi. Ma i libri non sempre si giudicano per quello che non dicono o sulla base dei problemi che eludono, specie se, nonostante i silenzi, l'analisi che contengono è efficace e in grado di gettar luce sul presente.

Recensione

Hubertus Tellenbach, *Melancolia. Storia del problema, endogenicità, tipologia, patogenesi, clinica*

Il Pensiero Scientifico 2015

Alessandro Siciliano

"Sa di cenere", dice Justine mentre mangia il polpettone cucinato da Claire. Per sanare il malessere della sorella, Claire le ha preparato "una sorpresa" per cena, qualcosa che punta al risveglio dei sensi. Ma questo, per Justine, caduta in un severo stato di tristezza vitale, semplicemente non funziona. Il buon polpettone sa di cenere, è bruciato. La sua bocca sente il sapore della morte, non è più zona erogena. Il suo corpo è diventato recettore attento della caducità delle cose del mondo.

La scena è tratta dal film *Melancholia,* di Lars Von Trier. Si vede bene qui la centralità del corpo, della profonda sovversione di quel corpo vissuto, mondanizzato, che è il *Leib* nell'esperienza melancolica. Com'è possibile che un cibo realizzato non certo per nutrire, ma *in primis* per essere goduto, una tale esperienza dei sensi studiata appositamente per il godimento orale di un'intera civiltà, com'è possibile che sappia, che rievochi l'idea della cenere? È solo un problema di papille gustative e/o di percezione neuro-chimica dei gusti? Oppure un profondo sentimento di tristezza e di disperazione che filtra le percezioni?

In un secolo di psicopatologia fenomenologica, autori come Karl Jaspers, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugène Minkowski, Wolfgang Blankenburg hanno provato a oltrepassare la sottile linea rossa che separa normalità e follia per descrivere e comprendere, attraverso lo strumento dell'indagine fenomenologica, qualità e caratteristiche dell'esperienza vissuta negli stati di sofferenza psichica. In questo solco si colloca Hubertus Tellenbach, che con il suo *Melancolia* realizza nel 1961 il più importante studio in ambito fenomenologico del male della *bile nera*. Già tradotto e pubblicato in Italia nel 1975, questo testo è ora riedito dalla casa editrice *Il pensiero scientifico* – tra le cui ultime pubblicazioni troviamo proprio *Psicopatologia generale* di Jaspers, in occasione del centenario del testo – atto fondativo della psicopatologia fenomenologica.

Perché *Melancolia* oggi? Che senso ha leggere oggi questo testo denso, problematico, che si pone nel ruolo difficile di crocevia tra biologia, filosofia, clinica, antropologia? È Tellenbanch stesso a rispondere, in prefazione (1983), quando afferma che «[…] delle singole scienze che si occupano della conoscenza dell'essere umano […] la psichiatria oggi, per ampi tratti, non fa più parte»,

rivolgendo essa le sue domande a un empirismo «orientato ai metodi delle scienze naturali applicate, le cui verifiche e falsificazioni computazionali rispondono soltanto al predicato della "scientificità"» (p. XV). La situazione attuale non è diversa. La psichiatria è ancora una pratica orientata al mito dell'empirismo, dell'evidenza cosiddetta scientifica, che aliena e riduce il proprio oggetto a corpo disorganizzato, *troppo vivo,* da rigovernare tramite il farmaco e mente vittima di errori di valutazione e debolezza cognitiva. Da sempre, quello tra psichiatria e follia è il rapporto tra la definizione di una norma comportamentale, psicologica – l'indicazione del giusto modo in cui l'individuo deve rapportarsi alla propria cultura – e le possibili deviazioni da questa, con l'importante derivato politico del destino di tali eccedenze (segregazione, internamento, istituzionalizzazione, medicalizzazione). In tal senso, la posizione di Tellenbach è chiara fin da subito: «Una psichiatria che sappia porsi al di là delle barbarie delle attualità non può rinunciare alla spiegazione dei suoi presupposti metafisici» (p. XXIII).

Dopo una nutrita premessa storica – in cui viene subito messa a punto l'interessante distinzione tra *avvilimento*, sentimento proprio del tipo umano geniale confrontato con la potenza della vita e del cosmo, e "malattia melancolia" – Tellenbach va al cuore del problema, indagando meticolosamente il concetto cardine di *endogeno.* Smarcandosi dall'antico dualismo somatogenesi-psicogenesi in cui è stato preso il problema psichiatrico, Tellenbach si rivolge all'endogeno come terzo e più importante campo causale in psicopatologia. L'endogeno «sembra appartenere alla regione del soma, ma piuttosto come un *come* che non come un *cosa* della corporeità» (p. 19). È essenziale stabilire una tale *interfaccia* tra somatico e psichico, non fosse altro che per render conto della continua significazione dell'esperienza *reale* del proprio organismo da parte del soggetto psichico, così come del costante dialogo tra corpo, ambiente e mondo, tale per cui il discorso intorno all'*endon* diventa subito il discorso sulla *endo-cosmo-genicità*.

Il campo dell'endon «è determinato dall'interconnessione con il cosmico» (p. 60), in cui l'individuo è preso da sempre, e da «contenuti di significato specifici prossimi al vitale» (p. 57). L'inclusione dell'uomo in una natura che ha le sue proprie leggi e che pure lo riguardano si manifesta in modo particolare nella dimensione del *ritmico*. Campo d'indagine privilegiato in questo senso sono i ritmi biologici, la sincronizzazione dell'uomo col cosmo, con i cicli dell'ambiente (giorno-notte, stagioni), dunque le trasformazioni di questi nella situazione melancolica. Alla base delle psicosi endogene vi sarebbero, a questo livello, profonde *trasformazioni qualitative del ritmo dell'accadere della vita*. Nella melancolia, in particolare, sarebbe in primo piano ciò che Gebsattel ha definito «inibizione del movimento basale della vita». «Nell'affastellamento del *succedersi* del tempo e della molteplicità di modi di *esperire* il tempo, che insieme concorrono a costituire il corso temporale della vita, c'è il "tempo del divenire interiore", che nel melancolico endogenamente inibito non fluisce più» (p. 27).

Non il biologico, tanto meno l'esistenziale, l'endon è il risultato dell'impronta della natura e dell'ambiente umano sull'individuo. L'organismo è *istruito dal cosmo* e il soggetto si fa istruire ed istruisce l'organismo.

Ogni *typus* umano ha il suo proprio endon, ciò che di per sé, anche nelle trasformazioni più distanti dalla norma, non costituisce mai patologia per Tellenbach. Il *typus melancholicus* non è la *psicosi melanconica*. È questa una delle grandi intuizioni di questo studio. «[…] L'endon specifico, cioè la caratteristica fondamentale del typus melancolico che ha ricevuto l'impronta di possibilità specifiche, nei suoi sviluppi può essere *ostacolato* da situazioni specifiche (patogene) a tal punto che ne risulta una trasformazione endogena nella psicosi "melancolia". Una tale minaccia dell'endon è presente quando a questa forma dell'essere umano, che contrassegna il typus melancolico, vengono imposte necessità dello sviluppo che non le può far esistere e che neppure le può *trascendere*» (p. 47). Perché si dia melancolia conclamata, un typus melancolico deve incontrare una situazione ambientale disposta in modo tale da proporre al soggetto una certa vicinanza a un precipizio.

Il terzo capitolo di *Melancolia* è dunque dedicato alla descrizione del *typus melancholicus*, «modo di essere, che s'incontra empiricamente, costituito da una certa struttura che, per le sue *possibilità*, inclina verso il campo gravitazionale della melancolia» (p. 64). Dall'analisi dei casi clinici di molti soggetti ricoverati nel 1959 nella clinica di Heidelberg per melancolia, Tellenbach estrae una serie di tratti tipici che vanno a costituire la struttura del typus melancolico. Primo fra tutti, *l'ordinatezza*, l'essere *ancorato* all'ordine. Il typus melancolico imposta intorno a sé e ricerca una stabilità, una fissità dell'ambiente in cui potersi posizionare una volta per tutte, prendendo le distanze dalla possibilità della novità, del cambiamento. Tanto nel lavoro quanto nelle relazioni umane, l'ordinatezza è elevata al ruolo di garanzia esistenziale; in una fondamentale identificazione del soggetto ai propri oggetti (tratto caratteristico individuato anche da Freud nel suo *Lutto e melanconia)*, il typus melancolico è ancorato a questi ultimi nell'impossibile compito di sottrarre sé e l'oggetto al fluire dell'esistenza.

Nel momento in cui una tale situazione subisce una perturbazione proveniente dal mondo esterno, può manifestarsi il secondo tratto fondamentale descritto da Tellenbach: la coscienziosità e la colpa. Il mantenimento dell'ordine dipende e riguarda *esclusivamente* il soggetto. Qualunque spostamento (trasloco, cambio di lavoro, promozione professionale, licenziamento, parto, separazioni, lutto, malattia) dell'ordine in cui il soggetto *situa* la propria esistenza sarà un'occasione per poter riferire a sé stessi il rimprovero di non aver fatto abbastanza, non esser stati sufficientemente coscienziosi da prevenire anche i più piccoli danni o cambiamenti. Tellenbach nota come la maggior parte delle congiunture di scatenamento di una psicosi melancolica consistano in momenti di normale scuotimento di un ordine esistenziale. Sono riportati casi in cui è la gravidanza ad essere il punto di caduta nella melancolia, per via dell'interruzione del ciclo mestruale, ordine biologico. «Il tema della colpa "si procaccia" per così dire la melancolia» (p. 108).

In una parola, a essere forclusa dalla vita del melancolico è la dimensione del caso e dell'imprevedibile, vero scandalo della vita. È chiaro come l'unica

possibilità esistentiva per il typus melancolico sia quella di una totale alienazione dell'essere nei propri oggetti, nel proprio ordine ambientale. «Egli s'incatena a questa identità dell'essere, per non dover passare attraverso quel nulla che ci separa dal futuro e nel quale noi non sappiamo cosa saremo» (p. 133). Questo essere completamente rinchiusi nella propria situazione è ciò che in Tellenbach prende il nome di *includenza*; il limite intrinseco nell'ordine in cui ci si rinchiude diventa insormontabile, tale da non poter più permettere al soggetto alcuna possibilità di trascendere la situazione stessa. «Manca l'elasticità della libertà. Il fatto che le esigenze rimangano mentre la loro completa osservanza rende impossibile l'adempimento: *questa situazione è includenza*. Includenza è essere rinchiusi in un'autocontraddizione» (p. 164).

Nell'ambito della coscienziosità e delle pressanti pretese rispetto al proprio operare, il soggetto si sofferma in un'accuratezza che lo pone in ritardo rispetto alle sue stesse ingiunzioni. «Se rimangono da fare cose che si era previsto di fare, queste non possono essere *lasciate* in sospeso. Nulla può essere *rinviato*. Piuttosto questa natura melancolica rimane indietro, direi quasi, *con* le cose, e insieme ad esse rimane indietro rispetto alla propria esigenza, al provvedere che si pretende da se stesso». Il rischio è dunque, di nuovo, di cadere in una contraddizione, per cui «la distanza tra essere e dovere diventa un abisso» (p. 166). La *rimanenza* è la condizione per cui il melancolico si trova costantemente in debito rispetto all'esistenza – ciò che di per sé è la regola, piuttosto che l'eccezione, dal momento che l'esistenza è debitrice di qualcosa alle sue possibilità d'essere, rispetto alle quali si trova sempre indietro (Binswanger, 1957). «Rimanere debitori di nulla nei confronti dell'esistenza è l'impossibile. Il melancolico, che intende sempre e solo il possibile, vuole porre l'impossibile come possibile» (p. 172).

Includenza e rimanenza sono le costellazioni patogenetiche tipiche della condizione premelancolica. Incastrato paradossalmente tra includenza e rimanenza, il melancolico soccombe sotto il peso della colpa che ora ha fonti preziose a cui attingere. Una colpa che ha sempre le sue radici nel passato più lontano e che si procaccia ora la propria melanconia.

Tra la *disposizione premelancolica* finora descritta e la *psicosi melancolica* sta il ponte della *disperazione,* intesa qui non come la perdita di ogni speranza ma, *stricto sensu*, come il «*rimanere* avviluppato nel dubbio. […] Disperazione è niente di definitivo, non è un essere arrivato alla fine, bensì un andare e venire, un alternarsi, cosicché non è raggiungibile una decisione definitiva. […] *Ciò che è specifico della disperazione melancolica è il divenire ancorato a quest'alternarsi*» (pp. 187-188). La condizione premelancolica del typus in tal senso orientato sembra attualizzarsi a cascata nel *momento dell'incontro* che fa vacillare l'individuo, «incontro che viene assunto dall'esistenza in toto». Nel momento dell'incontro si annida l'origine e tutta l'incomprensibilità della psicosi melancolica. «Nell'incontro si costella una situazione e questa può avere una tale forza *endotropa*, riferita alla natura nel suo insieme, che nella trasformazione dell'endon (endocinesi), un individuo si può modificare fondamentalmente» (p. 192). "Quello che non posso capire è l'istante" dice Tellenbach, l'istante in

cui la struttura della personalità subisce una tale trasformazione endogena che si condensa e manifesta nel fenomeno della disperazione; soggetto circondato, immobilizzato, disarmato dal tema della colpa.

Seguono interessanti discussioni cliniche sul concetto di *depressività*, sui motivi scatenanti della patologia, le cosiddette *petit fautes*, sul bilanciamento del ruolo causale tra *disposizione tipologica* e *situativo* nel loro addentellamento all'endogeno e, infine, sulla grande categoria di psicosi maniaco-depressiva.

Il testo mostra in prima pagina la celebre incisione di Albrecht Dürer, *Melencolia I*, in cui vediamo un angelo in primo piano, pensieroso, forse stanco, circondato da oggetti appartenenti al campo dell'alchimia, della scienza e dell'intelletto. L'alchimista è colui o colei che lavora per trasformare il piombo in oro. Sullo sfondo brilla una cometa in un cielo incorniciato da un arcobaleno. La *Melencolia* di Dürer riguarda il mito, gli astri, il cosmo e il lavoro che l'essere umano continuamente compie per partecipare al Tutto, alla completezza del reale, essendone allo stesso tempo sempre separato, costituito in quanto umano come differenza dal Tutto. Il genio si affanna per riavere indietro qualcosa, un segno della grande pienezza mitica dell'Origine.

Ne *Il disagio della civiltà*, Freud afferma che la società domanda troppo all'individuo e che la vita sarebbe impossibile da sopportare se l'uomo non riuscisse a ritagliarsi uno spazio vuoto, fuori dalla domanda alienante della civiltà. Oggi, sempre più di ieri, la società tardo-capitalistica fondata sulla prestazione non può concepire l'inoperosità e la depressività. Il discorso clinico sulla melanconia potrebbe allora proseguire - e già prosegue - aprendosi a una chiave di lettura politica, in cui le tematiche della colpa, del debito e della melanconia stessa siano indagate a partire dalla considerazione del trattamento che una società riserva alla propria depressività (tristezza?), rovescio oscuro del progresso.