ARTICOLI / 5 / Paolo Di Leo /
This article deals with the concept of freedom in Bergson and in Plotinus. This concept is a central one in Bergson’s work, as he himself remarks many times: it is on this concept that he builds his own thought and starting from it he interrogates the thought that precedes his. In investigating the presence of this concept in Plotinus, Bergson sees it as linked (and confined to) the concept of the individuality of the soul. This article seeks to question Bergson’s reading, showing that Plotinus’ concept of freedom is much more pervasive and closer to that of Bergson than Bergson himself thought. As a result, I suggest that both philosophers understand freedom as will. Instead of closing the problem, this conclusion opens up new questions both – historical and philosophical: Can the concept of will be seen as a foundational one in the history of philosophy starting from its Greek inception? Is the will the more radical concept under which to elaborate on freedom?