CONTRIBUTI / Till Ermisch
The following article seeks to explain Schelling’s distinction between negative and positive philosophy by discussing some of the core concepts of Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, namely, the concepts of Identity, finite-identity and positive-necessity of free will. Obviously, the distinction between negative and positive philosophy is not explicitly present in Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift. Consequently, the article will demonstrate (and reconstruct) this concept as an implicit consequence of the Freiheitsschrift’s investigation on identity, free will and necessity. Additionally, there will be minor references to other works to indicate the place of these notions within Schelling’s oeuvre. The article intends to elucidate some of the key notions, that are needed to understand the Freiheitsschrift. In turn, other topics are only touched upon, if not left out. This, however, is not meant to be an indication about their significance. The article introduces the concept of negative necessity by elaborating the notions of identity and finite-concepts (see 1.), examining the case of Aristotle and defining negative philosophy (see 2.). The result attained will then be further illustrated by revisiting the topic of free will as it is discussed by the examples of Spinoza (see 3.) and Kant (see 4.). The final paragraph (see 5.) will introduce Schelling’s notion of positive philosophy by discussing the nature of free will as the paradigm case of positive necessity.
